The face of Africa : essays in honour of Ton Dietz by Beek W.E.A. van et al.
513779-L-os-ASC Processed on: 13-9-2017
The Face of Africa
Essays in Honour of Ton Dietz
Wouter van Beek, Jos Damen, Dick Foeken (eds.)
Occasional Publication  28

513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 1
The Face of Africa
Dietz Essays.indd   1 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 2
Dietz Essays.indd   2 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 3
The Face of Africa
Essays in Honour of Ton Dietz
Wouter van Beek, Jos Damen & Dick Foeken (eds.)
Dietz Essays.indd   3 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 4
Authors have made all reasonable efforts to trace the rightsholders to copyrighted 
material used in this work. In cases where these efforts have not been successful, 
the publisher welcomes communication from copyright holders, so that the ap-
propriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other 
permission matters.
ASCL Occasional Publication 28
Published by:
African Studies Centre Leiden
Postbus 9555
2300 RB Leiden
asc@ascleiden.nl
www.ascleiden.nl
Cover photo: Stamps from Zanzibar, Mauretania and the Netherlands
Design by Jos Damen and Harro Westra
Maps: Nel de Vink (DeVink Mapdesign)
Layout: Sjoukje Rienks, Amsterdam
Printed by Ipskamp Printing, Enschede
ISBN: 978-90-5448-163-8
© Wouter van Beek, Jos Damen and Dick Foeken, 2017
Dietz Essays.indd   4 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 5
Table of Contents
 Introduction  9
 Wouter van Beek, Jos Damen & Dick Foeken 
 PART I 
 Coping with Africa
1 Seasonality of water consumption by the urban poor: 
 The case of Homa Bay, Kenya 25
 Dick Foeken & Sam O. Owuor
2 Food and nutrition studies at the African Studies Centre 37
 Wijnand Klaver
3 From macro to micro: How smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe 
 are coping with dollarization 63
 Marleen Dekker
4 Waithood in Africa’s Silverlining 75
 Akinyinka Akinyoade & Rantimi Jays Julius-Adeoye
5 Revisiting survival strategies from a frugal innovation 
 perspective: A research idea 91
 André Leliveld
6 From ‘Livelihood & Environment’ to assessing livelihoods 
 and development aid 101
 Leo de Haan
7 Climate change, drylands and conflict in Africa 115
 Han van Dijk
Dietz Essays.indd   5 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 6
 PART II
 Maps, stamps and the environment
8 The critical fence: A Dietzian reflection on divergent 
 fieldwork experiences in Southern Africa 133
 Rijk van Dijk, Marja Spierenburg & Harry Wels
9 Gods of the East, gods of the West: A Dogon cartography 149
 Wouter van Beek
10 Stamps surrender to mobile phones: Reading the 
 communication ecology of erstwhile West Cameroon  165 
Mirjam de Bruijn & Walter Gam Nkwi
11 Stemming the tide? The promise of environmental 
 rehabilitation scenarios in Ethiopia 185
 Jan Abbink
12 Connecting rare birds and people in Burkina Faso: 
 Observations from the field 199
 Michiel van den Bergh
 PART III 
 African arenas
13 Beyond ‘two Africas’ in African and Berber literary studies 215
 Daniela Merolla
14 Imagining Africa: An uphill struggle 235
 Harrie Leyten
15 From roads for form to roads for war: 
 Toward a history of roads in colonial Zambia, 1890-1920 247
 Jan-Bart Gewald
16 Colonial memoirs 265
 Jan Hoorweg
Dietz Essays.indd   6 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 7
7
17 ‘His name will inseparably be connected to the African 
 Studies Centre’: The legacy & archives of Hans Holleman, 
 second director of the ASC Leiden 277
 Jos Damen
18 History, politics and the public perception of Africa 285
 Chibuike Uche
19 Some reflections on Africa’s changing educational landscape
 in the current age of global restructuring 301
 Mayke Kaag
Dietz Essays.indd   7 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 8
Dietz Essays.indd   8 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 9
9
Introduction
Wouter van Beek, Jos Damen & Dick Foeken
Ton Dietz and the African Studies Centre
By no means can this book do homage to all aspects of the academic life of 
Ton Dietz—far from it. In order to do so, we would have had to include the 
many PhD students he supervised, the host of his geographical colleagues in 
Amsterdam and all of the Netherlands, and especially the multitude of his 
international contacts, from the United States to China, and from Japan to 
Scandinavia—plus, of course, colleagues, pupils, and friends from all over 
Africa, indeed throughout the African continent. This volume is just the 
voice of the African Studies Centre (ASC), with contributions from those 
who happen to be ‘here’ at this juncture in time: this is Leiden speaking. So 
this is a homage by colleagues who have witnessed Ton as their co-research-
er, as their stimulus, and especially as their director. The fact that we mention 
these three functions—collegiality, inspiration, and leadership—is highly rel-
evant, as Ton’s tenure at the ASC has shown how one can indeed combine 
these seemingly contradictory functions of what is so easily called academic 
leadership. We are bidding a fond farewell to an academic leader, our aca-
demic leader.
 Ton Dietz came to the ASC in 2010, following in the footsteps of his friend 
Leo de Haan, who had moved to become rector of the ISS in the Hague. Until 
2012 Ton combined this with a part-time professorship in Amsterdam, the 
chair he had been occupying since 1995 at the UvA, and from 2017 his direc-
torship of the ASC was integrated with the Leiden Chair of ‘African Devel-
opment’. In the past decade, he led the ASC through a tumultuous time and 
over raging waters, navigating the rapids of consecutive budget cuts while 
scouting for a more secure channel inside Leiden University. The voyage is 
far from over, but his successor inherits a solid vessel on a clear course. There 
are no anchors in science, no safe havens, just a continuous trimming of the 
sails, watching the changing winds, and setting new courses toward unchart-
ed horizons. 
 Internally, Ton restructured the ASC in order to stimulate cross fertiliza-
tion of the various fields and topics; now called collaborative groups, these 
working groups aim at just one thing: to get researchers to speak to each 
other. Social sciences being quite individual, each researcher tends to focus 
on his or her own topic, digging ever deeper into their specialization, so a 
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continuous tug-of-war between specialization and externalization is part and 
parcel of the scientific project. Ton, for one, always has been an expert on the 
externalization part, on finding inspiration and stimulus from research work 
elsewhere, be it in one’s own discipline or far afield, and easily leads his col-
leagues and PhD students into academic networking all over the world. Few 
academic leaders can boast the extent of the networks that he has, and we 
have all benefited from them. 
 That does not mean that he has no proper discipline, no field to call his 
own, for above all he is a human geographer. Trained in Nijmegen, he moved 
to the University of Amsterdam, where in 1987 he defended his PhD thesis, 
Pastoralists in dire straits: Survival strategies and external interventions in 
a semi-arid region at the Kenya/Uganda border: Western Pokot, 1900-1986, 
under the tutelage of Willem Heinemeyer and Herman van der Wusten. And 
however far Ton was to roam later in his life, the main themes of his thesis 
were to remain with him; though ‘survival’ as a concept would morph into 
‘coping’, and the intervention-relationship with the exterior would be trans-
lated as ‘development’, the themes as such are still relevant. For a considerable 
part they have informed the articles written in his honour. Of course, as a 
geographer, ‘das Raum’, the spatial component of human life on earth, is for 
Ton the first and foremost angle, but geography for Ton means much more 
than direction, dimension, and distance. Several times we have heard him 
explain that when a geographer has to show what kind of cake his discipline 
bakes, he will cut a slice from a series of cakes of adjoining disciplines, put 
these together and present this layered amalgam as the cake of geography. 
For him his discipline hovers between the multi-disciplinary and the applied, 
since before anything else he is a human geographer: man is central—in his 
case, the African: struggling, wrestling, inventing, adapting, migrating, and 
trying to find out who he or she is. Africa has a face.
 Figures are important for geographers and Ton likes statistics, but for 
him figures in themselves do not tell the whole story; statistics have to ac-
quire a human countenance. For instance, demographics have to relate to 
babies born to individual women, to people dying, and to all the bittersweet 
life in between. One contribution in this volume starts out with his gentle 
reminder to a fully quantitative scholar: do not let figures hide faces. The 
same holds for other analytical abstractions in science. For instance, with the 
term ‘resources’, we run the same risk: we speak about ‘resource conflicts’, ‘re-
source scarcity’ or ‘monopolization’, and these abstractions tend to obscure 
the people on the ground. Evidently, the Pokot pastoralists struggling with 
pasture and water-holes have taught Ton once and forever that resources are 
about access, about people finding a pathway for living in a harsh environ-
ment. Markets, development indexes, urbanization—all the many constructs 
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scholars dream up to reduce a bewilderingly complex reality to manageable 
proportions need the constant reminder that Ton always extends: that they 
should retain their human face. That is the Dietzian approach, a human ge-
ographer indeed.
   Probably the clearest example of this human approach is climate change. 
Few dynamics are of a larger scale than the shift in our global climatic sys-
tem—the one candidate would be the expansion of the universe, but we 
would expect that Ton would succeed in giving that a human face as well; 
just wait! The gist of climate research is indeed global and at this juncture in 
time is intensely preoccupied with the polar zones, which in fact means with 
our own European situation: sea level rise and the large ocean currents, that 
is what threatens us. It was Ton who as the director of CERES had the idea 
to break into that meteorological stronghold with a project on Africa and 
climate change: not just the prerogatives of the rich countries were under 
threat, but climate change eroded the sheer survival of the poor. One contri-
bution in this volume is a direct result of this disciplinary breaking-and-en-
tering and shows why Ton was right. Climate models show considerable var-
iation; but in very few of these models, the plight of the hot and dry zones 
in Africa is not under threat, and with that, indeed, human beings. Climate 
change is about fellow Africans. 
 Development is another buzz word, the core of his present Leiden chair: 
African Development. Ton is not one to bend over backwards to formulate 
the ultimate definition, and development is one of those terms which is sur-
prisingly hard to define—that means, if one does not stick to a simple increase 
in GNP, or any other crude economic measure. One issue is that nobody can 
be opposed to development; it is a value in itself, and this ethical high ground 
reduces its purely academic usefulness: it is a political buzz word more than 
an analytical term. Yet, the Dietzian approach on the one hand fully acknowl-
edges the problems and pitfalls of development—like in the notion ‘victims 
of development’—but on the other hand is definitely upbeat: development is 
not only sorely needed but also just over the horizon. Ton is an incurable op-
timist: Africa has a silver lining—at least still when he took the Leiden chair 
in 2010—and development is a thing to be wished for that Africa can indeed 
attain. 
 This has not been an easy position in African studies for the last decade, 
but it does have the advantage that it keeps doors open and keeps people 
interested in Africa who otherwise would not have bothered with the conti-
nent; as such, Ton’s optimism checked the all-too-easy Afro-pessimism that 
tended to engulf much of African studies. It was and is a healthy antidote, 
one that will be much needed in the foreseeable future as well. Such a posi-
tive outlook on Africa’s future will remain crucial, especially when studying 
Dietz Essays.indd   11 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 12
12
African leaders themselves, whose political performances all too often, let us 
say, have ‘room for improvement’. One article argues that their tendency to 
blame the old colonial powers for all of their ills, and fend off any criticism as 
racism, in the end is a lose-lose option.
 Of course, the old colonial situation is never far away in Africa, especial-
ly not in those countries with a white minority, such as Kenya and most of 
Southern Africa. History in Africa is just around the corner, a constant re-
minder that we are our own lived past. In the Dietzian approach that means 
that Africa not only received its political shape in the colonial presence, but 
that the continent has been, is, and will be in constant interaction with the 
larger world. Africans are, for Ton, not the ‘ultimate other’, and Africa not ‘the 
continent over the horizon’; their present history is in continuous interplay 
with the rest of the world. Africa is our next-door neighbour; Africa has a 
face like ours. One major thrust of his ASC administration was to Africanize 
the Centre, to have a constant presence of Africans in Leiden, a stream of 
African researchers going through the fellowships, and a roster of African 
scholars in various types of relationship with the Centre. African studies has 
to be ‘about Africa, in Africa and definitely with Africa’. African studies has 
to mean that Africans study themselves, together with Northerners.
 Never was that clearer than when he, still as director of CERES, engaged 
in the SANPAD (South Africa Netherlands Programme for Alternative De-
velopments) project, an endeavour in which one of the present editors has 
cooperated with him closely. If Africans have to shape their own destiny 
more than they have been able to do in the past, is the reasoning, they have to 
move up in research and academic culture as well. That too is development. 
For field research, the relationship with CODESRIA (Council for the Devel-
opment of Social Science Research in Africa) and OSSREA (Organization for 
Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa) has been crucial, 
and a lot of time was invested in the link between African studies ‘there’ and 
‘here’. But it was SANPAD that embodied his tutorial dreams. This major 
educational project envisaged joint research by Dutch and South African re-
searchers in order to boost the academic prowess of South Africa. Ton was 
especially important in the Research Capacity Initiative—yes, we are here 
in development-speak, but this was real education, for this was the training 
that PhD candidates needed for their research. Since the academic culture of 
South Africa was still shot through with the problematic divisions of the past, 
Ton designed a course for supervisors, which for many of these experienced 
academics proved to be an absolute eye-opener. With his South African col-
leagues he wrote a manual for PhD supervision, a booklet that later was used 
in follow-up projects on PhD supervision in South Africa. 
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When Ton became director of the ASC he brought in the very same notion 
that research and education have to stimulate each other. For a staff not used 
to teaching, this was a major change; but to leave such a concentration of 
knowledge on Africa underused for teaching was a waste of intellectual cap-
ital on the one hand, while on the other hand it deprived researchers of a 
student feedback that many of us feel is highly stimulating. So the RESMAA, 
the Research Masters Africa, was further developed, a legacy from his prede-
cessor Leo de Haan. Now the course is accredited and institutionalized, and 
it forms a major feature in the educational landscape of Leiden University. 
Whatever his many obligations and commitments, Ton always took ample 
time to teach these Masters’ students. Also PhD students entered the hal-
lowed halls of the ASC, from various sources and with diverse financial ar-
rangements, and now they are an integrated feature of ASC functioning and 
especially publishing. 
 This shift toward research-cum-teaching in the ASC is now boosted by 
the further integration with Leiden University, the focus of the last years of 
Ton’s administration. For various reasons a closer collaboration with and in-
tegration in Leiden University became necessary, not in the least because of 
the dwindling finances from development aid, which in turn were based on 
major shifts in the political landscape of recent years. Development aid has 
no longer the political or public appeal it had in the last decades of the 20th 
century; that wind has changed quite dramatically. Consequently, the splen-
did isolation of the ASC as an independent research institute with a spectac-
ular library, financed for a large part by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did 
not look so splendid any longer—a problem not confined to the ASC, as it is 
shared with many institutions geared toward international education. So Ton 
moved the ASC in the direction of Leiden University. Inevitably, this coura-
geous move evoked discussion and disagreement and still poses a challenge 
for the staff, but the academic integration as such has become a crucial fea-
ture for the future of the ASC. 
 One item was professorial chairs. Though in the past ASC researchers 
had moved into such teaching positions—Bonno Thoden van Velzen, the 
‘promoter’ of one of the present editors is an early example—this leap into 
academia was the exception rather than the rule. Often it concerned part-
time chairs, like those of Jan Abbink (VU), Jan Hoorweg (Wageningen), and 
Wim van Binsbergen (VU). But with the new academic approach, having 
chairs occupied by ASC researchers in other university departments became 
policy, either as part-time appointments between the ASC and the other in-
stitution—the chair of the late Stephen Ellis at the VU is an example—or as 
ASC-endowed chairs, such as the chair ‘Religion and Sexuality in Africa’ at 
the UvA, occupied by Rijk van Dijk. With the integration of the ASC into 
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Leiden University, joint appointments at ASCL—that is what ‘we’ are called 
now—and the participating faculties became standard: Mirjam de Bruijn and 
Jan-Bart Gewald are examples. 
 Maybe the most personal contribution of Ton to the ASCL is the least ex-
pected: stamps. Ton is an avid stamp collector, African stamps in particular. 
Now philately is a typical collector’s craze, at least in the eyes of the ‘normal’ 
outsider: hunting for the rare stamp, the ‘two-penny black’ that everyone 
craves for, the average collector is seen as the ‘odd and nicely deranged’ kind 
of passionate hobbyist—in Dutch, ‘prettig gestoord’. Having a complete col-
lection is the ultimate aim, and in this strange realm collectors of small pieces 
of paper create their own virtual world, with their own journals and confer-
ences, their own myths and legends, totally shut off from everyday reality. In 
the hands of Ton, however, though the collection as such is important, these 
stamps suddenly acquired an additional dimension, not as collectors’ items 
but as messengers and cultural witnesses: they told something to the discern-
ing outsider. Ton showed and shows how nations portray themselves in their 
stamps, define their core interest, how they construct their history in and 
through their stamps. In short, stamps are a means to constructing a national 
identity. Stamps not only often bear faces; they are the face of a nation. In his 
hands, stamp collections became cultural geography, and his many examples 
are highly convincing. Thus cultural studies arrived in Africa, as one follows 
the historical dynamics within one country through the substance and style 
of its changing stamps. One article in this volume  takes this as its starting 
point. 
Nineteen contributions in a Dietzian vein
The essays in this volume address three broad themes, which the editors have 
suggested to the contributors: coping, the relation between people and envi-
ronment, and development. The fourth theme we suggested was Kenya, and 
that came out anyway. So the articles are grouped into these three parts.
 Coping first. The first contribution, by Dick Foeken—a fellow human ge-
ographer and lifelong friend of Ton—and Samuel Owuor—a Kenyan PhD 
student of Ton and Dick—addresses the crucial issue of access to resources, 
water in this case, and focuses on the new majority of Africans, the urban 
population. Water is one commodity governments should routinely provide, 
but that provision often is quite patchy. On the other hand, water is not any 
commodity; water is life in Africa. The essay gives a human face to water 
access, sketching what unreliability in water delivery and consequently con-
sumption means in the lives of people of Homa Bay, Kenya. In doing so, it 
also discusses the perennial problem of measuring in Africa, the relation be-
tween the measurement at one place and time, and the diachronic processes 
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that really inform life. Seasonality is the operative word here, in access and 
consumption, and thus in the experience of poverty.
 Wijnand Klaver follows the rise of nutrition studies at the ASC, with its 
long and respectable track record and its close collaboration with Wagenin-
gen University. Jan Hoorweg, whom we will meet in another essay, started it; 
Dick Foeken and Wijnand Klaver pursued it. The topic of urban agriculture 
emerged from this research tradition, and in the treatment of Klaver this also 
gets a human face, actually an animal one, as the main picture in the article is 
of two cows! But it clearly shows that urbanization, as an academic concept, 
hides the human face of Africa.
 If any people have to cope right now, the Zimbabweans do, and Marleen 
Dekker gives us their story. The former grain basket of Africa is now among 
the poorest countries, with a record hyperinflation of their currency. The 
article describes how a former monetized economy has to fall back on earli-
er forms of transactions: how do people cope with the absence of cash? An 
earlier form could be barter, but interestingly enough, the even more funda-
mental human transaction of gift-giving seems to win out: here the economy 
is redefined as relations between humans, so both hyperinflation and dollar-
ization regain their human face.
 André Leliveld encountered a younger Ton Dietz when presenting him 
with the PhD thesis he (André) was engaged in producing. Leliveld was fo-
cusing on informal social security in Africa from economic and judicial an-
gles, and when he discussed this, Ton made it very clear that a more human, 
Africa-oriented, and especially more empathic approach would be more rel-
evant for the African conditions—meaning simply the way Africans lived. 
André did not cave in and went his economic way. But in this contribution 
he describes how the general approach in development economics slowly 
but surely has reoriented itself to what one could call a Dietzian perspective. 
Especially the notion of frugal innovation, a combination of adaptive tech-
nology with on-the-spot innovation, in Leliveld’s eyes offers ample space for 
a productive blending with the concept of survival strategies, which Ton has 
been advocating for so long. Frugal innovation is the happy result of the cre-
ative adoptions, designs, and redesigns by the people in question, and as such 
renders full homage to the inventive acumen of Africans: technology with an 
African face.
 Akinyinka Akinyoade & Rantimi Jays Julius-Adeoye focus in on the very 
relation between figures and faces, between numbers and names. Tracking 
Ton’s involvement in development studies in the last decade, the piece moves 
into a gentle debate with Ton’s silver lineament around the African picture 
in his 2011 inaugural address. Though the present statistics go into differ-
ent directions, both optimistic and pessimistic, the article ends with a ma-
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jor concern of Ton: demographics, in this case African youth. The notion of 
‘waithood’—an intermediate state between youth and adulthood—which the 
article cites, is as insightful as it is disturbing. 
 Leo de Haan, fellow human geographer, delves into the history of the ge-
ography of development at the various Dutch universities, focusing on the 
programme Livelihood and Environment. In his interesting short history 
of the discipline, the geography of development is presented as a field-in-
search-of-a-theory. From the original ‘Utrecht School’, the geography of de-
velopment put down its roots in Amsterdam, at both the VU and the UvA, 
and in Nijmegen, and in doing so developed the notion of livelihood(s) and 
environment. De Haan traces the contributions Ton Dietz made to this quest 
for academic analysis and planning, especially his responses to the contin-
uous challenge of the under-theorized nature of the field. His conclusion is 
something of a surprise. 
 The next chapter takes the geographical scale up a notch, from regional 
geography to sub-continental ecology, as it addresses climate change in the 
West African Sahel. Han van Dijk, Ton’s successor at CERES, recounts the 
history of the Africanist incursion into Dutch climate change programmes 
we mentioned above. The leading notion was the way people adapted to cli-
mate change, and one of the outcomes of the project was that this projected 
one-way adaptation is too simple. So van Dijk traces an important switch 
in approach to climate, toward the notion of climate variability. The models 
of climatic change diverge in many specifics, but converge on the notion of 
increase in variability: if anything, our climate will become more capricious, 
fickle, and unpredictable, and prone to extremes. For the African Sahel, one 
of the major zones where people live ‘on the edge’, this means above all an in-
crease in mobility, an age-old strategy anyway. The present political instabil-
ity and unbalanced development again tend to heighten that mobility, which 
is a challenge for governance, especially for the weak states of the Sahel. 
The second theme is the way people address their physical environment and 
give shape to their own identity through their surroundings. The trio Rijk 
van Dijk, Marja Spierenburg & Harry Wels, each with their own particular 
connection to the ASCL, focus in on man-made divisions inside a continu-
ous landscape. The spotlight is on fences, the physical lines we draw between 
‘us’  and ‘them’, our way of making the world tiny enough to fit our needs. 
Rijk van Dijk starts small scale, with an invisible but oh-so-real fence: the 
spiritual border between those inside and outside a healing church commu-
nity in Botswana. Moving south-east, Marja Spierenburg, one of Ton’s suc-
cessors at the CERES directorate, sketches the impact of the physical fence 
of private game farming areas; they keep wild animals in and non-paying 
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guests out, but do much more, since they exclude the former farm personnel 
and safeguard class privileges for the ‘happy few’; the latter tend to be white. 
The third fence aims to protect what is arguably the most famous inhabitant 
of Africa, the lion. And here not just any lion, but a white lion at that. Harry 
Wels takes us on tour alongside this fence, showing how our conception of 
this ‘icon of the wild’ is out of touch with reality: the wily beast responds quite 
differently to a fence than conservators would have it do. So, the authors ask 
in the end, what does this mean for fences? How would a Dietzian openness 
to alternative interpretation inform our vision on fence dynamics? The article 
ends with some fascinating observations about fences.
 The Dogon, Wouter van Beek’s topic, live in a spectacular environment, 
also familiar to Ton Dietz, one that is characterized by a huge and long sand-
stone cliff, the escarpment of Bandiagara. As all people do, they live with the 
rising and setting sun, so with East and West, and consequently with the oth-
er two points of the directional axis, which we call North and South. Trying 
to map Dogon rituals on the compass points, van Beek found something odd: 
the Dogon cardinal directions do not follow the standard East-West direc-
tion but are skewed: their axis has turned 45%, pointing NE-SW and SE-NW. 
Why? And do all Dogon languages do so? So the article focuses in on the ver-
nacular terms for the cardinal directions in all Dogon languages—there are 
22—and shows that it is the direction of the Bandiagara cliff, not the sun, that 
is the main determinant. People define themselves in relation to what is rele-
vant in their environment. However, not all Dogon live at the escarpment, so 
these skewed cardinals give an interesting view of the settlement history of 
the Dogon: geography always is history as well. The face of Africa is lined by 
its past.
 Perhaps the most Dietzian article is the one by Mirjam de Bruijn & Walter 
Nkwi on stamps, mobile phones, and the nation of Cameroon. A nation-state 
like Cameroon has amply used the opportunities that stamps offered to mo-
nopolize national symbolism, and the stamps of the period, the heyday of the 
postal office, show us how. But nationalism tends to suppress regional vari-
ation and especially minorities, in this case Anglophone West Cameroon, a 
province definitely left out of national symbolism. The core question of the 
article is whether the technology that replaced the stamp can serve similar 
functions, like state symbolism and control. It seems that the dwindling post 
office has not been replaced by a similar state monopoly, since the dynamics 
of the mobile telephone work in both ways, against and for state domination. 
In any case, the direct, rather straightforward state symbolism of the stamp-
cum-post office has evaporated. New symbols link the citizen more with the 
international scene than with the national one, and attempts at nation build-
ing have to find new modes. 
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A perennial discussion within development circles, but above all a heated de-
bate between fieldworkers in Africa and those that regard Africa from the ac-
ademic heights, is the contribution of local solutions to large-scale ecological 
and developmental problems. Ton’s inaugural lecture addressed this issue, 
and it is Jan Abbink who pursues it in this volume. Africa does face huge chal-
lenges—demography, climate change, rising expectations of wealth—and the 
knee-jerk reaction of planners to these problems is to devise large-scale pro-
jects, centrally planned mega-schemes and one-size-fits-all solutions. Ab-
bink discusses this quandary for Ethiopia, where if anywhere in Africa cul-
tural and ecological diversity reigns supreme, so the standoff between the 
local and the national is highly germane to any kind of development initiative 
in this country. The article provides convincing examples of the embedded 
sustainability of local systems and especially of local initiatives for ecological 
improvement, which are set against the hybrid development strategies of the 
Ethiopian government. On the whole, Ton’s silver lining of Africa appears to 
resonate even in the African Horn, which is not the most conducive environ-
ment for optimism. 
 The last piece of this part focuses in on the ecology of ‘the other Africa’: 
animals. As we saw already in the chapter on fences, for tourists and conser-
vationists Africa is a continent of animals, and local people are considered 
intrusions between wildlife and the ever-present camera. Michiel van den 
Bergh takes us bird-watching in Burkina Faso, a surprising journey as the 
first association with Africa neither focuses on wings nor on Burkina. But, as 
his research shows, it is productive to include the local population and local 
ecological initiatives into our European view on wildlife. Birds are about the 
only wildlife without fences, and more than any other wildlife they connect 
the continents, which brings this part full circle. ‘Our’ birds migrate to or hi-
bernate in Africa, and in Burkina Faso, so this piece on birds, illustrated with 
a range of magnificent photographs, gives us pause about the way our species 
claims to ‘own’ the planet. 
 
Part Three discusses specific arenas in Africa, debates and discussions over 
what ‘is’ Africa and what ‘are’ African cultures, questions that are highly in-
formed by the spotted history of Europe with humanity’s continent of origin. 
So the following contributions are on history, perception, and the relations of 
Africa with the global world. 
 Daniela Merolla calls into question the northern border of African 
studies, since in the traditional definition Africa starts south of the Sahara. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has long been the unchallenged definition of ‘the conti-
nent’, with the ‘North’ of Africa either belonging to the Mediterranean world 
or to the world of Islam. That divide into ‘two Africas’  has become increas-
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ingly untenable, if only because it has emerged that the Sahara never was a 
dividing wall, but was more of a cultural highway. Without going into flights 
of pan-African fancy, ‘black Africa’ has been thoroughly criticized as a colo-
nial construct, just as the ‘Orient’ has been shown to be. Merolla takes studies 
in Berber literature as her main case, illustrating how this tendency to divide 
along colour lines operates in various European scholarly traditions, from 
the French ‘myth of the Tuareg’ to the Italian forms of Orientalism. So the 
socio-historical processes to essentialize African identities in terms of colour 
constitute a way of ‘othering’ by the North, which urges us to rethink how we 
constructed Africa’s face. 
 Africa and its cultures always have presented a challenge for Europeans, 
and our changing views of Africa are nowhere clearer than in the history of 
ethnographic museums and the ways we have looked at the strange, weird, 
and wonderful objects called African art. Harrie Leyten provides a historical 
overview of the changing views during 150 years of those who were directly 
confronted with African art, such as missionaries, museum curators, and an-
thropologists. The three disciplines had their own distinct views on the very 
same African objects, views that are shown to be quite diverging, without 
overly informing each other. Thus, the history of the ethnographic muse-
ums, and especially their approach to the African collections, offers us some 
glimpses of how Africa depicted its own face, while our gazing at Africa tells 
us in fact more about ourselves. 
 Not only personal views on Africa have changed; so has Africa itself. As 
we said, the colony is never far away, and colonialism has thoroughly changed 
the face of the continent. From a continent without wheels, the colonizer 
transformed Africa into one where wheel transportation is crucial, be it rail 
or road. Jan-Bart Gewald analyses the social and historical circumstances 
informing that transformation in Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia. The start 
of the 20th century saw a frenzy of road building, for diverse reasons, and the 
most curious and explicit one was war, World War I. Far from the trenches of 
France and Belgium, the European powers fought ‘their’ war on African turf, 
and for that they needed transportation. War logistics thus dictated many of 
the road-building projects of East and Southern Africa, calling for thousands 
of workers and multitudes of porters. These roads met a variegated use or 
disuse after the war, but on the whole were seen as a major achievement. 
However, they were mainly hailed as an effort of the colonizer, disregarding 
the indispensable labour of the Africans themselves. 
 With Jan Hoorweg we are still in colonial times, as he reminisces about his 
early days in the field as a researcher and his encounters in Malindi, Kenya, 
with that other breed of expatriates, the ex-colonial officers. At a time when 
Africanists themselves are starting to write their memoirs, the musings of 
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former colonial officers have become something of a cottage industry and 
have indeed led to quite a few great insights into that crucial period for Af-
rica. Hoorweg selects three memoirs of those retired symbols of authority 
in consecutive periods, before 1920, and before and after World War II. The 
article illustrates that there is still a lot to be learned on this vital historical 
period, despite the bad press the colonizing project has been receiving since 
independence. Hoorweg ends with an invitation for present researchers not 
to leave their memoirs to those after them, but to write them with their own 
hands. 
 In the same vein, the history of the ASC has been touched upon already 
in Max de Bok’s Leer mij Afrika Kennen: Vijftig jaar Afrika-Studiecentrum 
(2000), but especially in the present decennia this history may well prove to 
be a fascinating reflection on how the Netherlands approach, study, and deal 
with Africa. For the Centre, two dynamics seem to have been important. On 
the one hand, the relations of Dutch politics and Dutch development with 
Africa to a large extent have coloured the set-up and institutionalization of 
the present ASCL and its library. On the other hand, the Centre is an aca-
demic institution and, as such, part of academic culture in general; so the 
shifts in paradigms inside the disciplines and the relations between them did 
not leave the Centre untouched. We saw already some of the debates within 
regional geography in the first part of this book, but other disciplines were 
involved as well. Jos Damen, our librarian, presents a portrait of the first di-
rector of the ASC, Hans Holleman. From 1963 until 1969 he led the Centre, 
leaving a heated debate on the merits of his administrative reign in his wake. 
As a South African white academic, Holleman epitomized the quandary for 
Africa research, between political correctness and academic excellence, and 
between a top-down approach and a liberal free-for-all. Time may well have 
come to reassess those years; and in our present days of tightening funds and 
central planning in science, this debate on how to lead professionals is as rel-
evant as it is timely. 
 We continue with a contribution by one of ‘our Africans’, the Centre’s 
very own Chibuike Uche. His topic is the one we started out with, our gen-
eral theme of the face of Africa, and in particular how Africans themselves 
feed that perception and use it for their own benefit. Starting out with the 
general 19th century depreciation of ‘the African’, which found its roots in a 
widespread and even pseudo-scientific racism, Uche shows how that nega-
tive attitude was at the basis of the 1984/5 Berlin Conference on the colonial 
division of the continent. World War II saw a turning point to re-apprecia-
tion of Africa’s inhabitants, which made sure that each of the new nations 
had its own fresh start—more or less fresh, one should say—in the years of 
independence, the 1960s. What has happened since in African politics has 
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not really done much to repeal the negative image of Africa in the world, 
given the spate of dictators, presidents for life, revolutions, and civil wars 
we are witnessing now. Uche argues that the African leaders have succeed-
ed in keeping the international community somehow captive through a dis-
course of political correctness. Whoever criticizes African leaders is almost 
routinely accused of ‘racism’, evoking a ‘guilt-by-association’ in the North, 
and this amounts to a kind of ‘white blackmail’ that is difficult to counter. His 
argument is that in the end Africans are ill-served by invoking this discourse 
on racism, as it tends to exonerate all the faults and failures of African pol-
iticians, stifles internal debate, and leads to acceptance of excesses that are 
harmful for the nations themselves. In the end, Africans who invoke ‘racism’ 
hold themselves captive. 
 We end this part and the whole book with a contribution by Mayke Kaag 
in which we flow gently back to the present, in Senegal, and to the field of 
education. As we have argued above, education is a major commitment of 
Ton Dietz. Changing the face of Africa, internally as well as in the world, will 
require major investments in and restructuring of education in the various 
countries in the continent. The colonizer had his own agenda with educa-
tion, but after decolonization the education scene remained a favourite arena 
for powers from abroad. During the Cold War, the major powers fought out 
their educational battles in Africa, and nowadays other players in the field 
want to wield influence on the continent through the schools. Kaag focuses 
on Turkish schools in Senegal linked to the Gülen movement, private secular 
schools inspired by Islam. The Senegalese are well used to schools coming 
from overseas, and of course to Islam, but the Turkish schools present some 
uncomfortable challenges. Whatever the outcome of this incipient research, 
schools in Africa will be one pivot for further development, while remaining 
an arena for ideology and political hegemony. 
Ton Dietz is saying farewell to the ASC, but not to Africa. How could he ever? 
Many of us researchers at the ‘troisième vie’ of our academic existence turn 
back to our point of origin as an academic, and in Ton’s case as an African-
ist. That starting point would be the Pokot of Kenya, the region and culture 
that inducted him into his African life. Our first research tends to mark us 
for life, since it is in fact an initiation, a coming of age as a researcher, and 
thus remains a solid definition of who we are: research is identity. The face 
of Africa has become Ton’s face, and as Africanists we are all well aware that 
the continent is much more than just a field of research: it is an addiction. 
Ton himself is starting to formulate ways to pursue his work and, indeed, to 
return to Kenya, back to the Pokot: not as the same young PhD candidate he 
once was—that person does not exist any longer—but as a seasoned scholar 
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that will be able to look at these people from various standpoints at the same 
time. Undoubtedly he will find ways to link the Pokot to the wider world, the 
one of development and politics, but also to the world of research and schol-
arship, and just as undoubtedly he will give them their own voice, let them 
depict their own face, the face of this part of Africa. Meanwhile, he leaves an 
institution in good health, a vessel fully ship-shape—to take up our initial 
metaphor—and in good hands, a new captain at the helm. Where African 
studies and its Centre will go from here nobody knows, but we have seen our 
captain of the last decade steer a resolute course, setting an example of both 
open and inspiring academic leadership. The coming times will not be easy, 
neither for Africa nor for African studies nor for the Centre, but with such a 
past we are well prepared for the future. 
Wouter van Beek
Jos Damen
Dick Foeken
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PART I
Coping with Africa 
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1
Seasonality of water consumption 
by the urban poor: The case of Homa 
Bay, Kenya1
Dick Foeken & Samuel O. Owuor2
Introduction
Among the pioneers in studying ‘seasonality’ was the human geographer 
Robert Chambers, who, referring to the rural areas in developing countries, 
observed that there is ‘a widespread tendency for adverse factors to operate 
concurrently during the wet seasons [and] these factors tend to hit the poor 
people harder’ (Chambers et al. 1981: 3). It was during the 1980s that sea-
sonality was being studied as a more complex issue than the existence of a 
hungry season alone, playing an important part in rural poverty. One such 
research project, entitled ‘Seasonality in the Coastal Lowlands of Kenya’, was 
carried out by the African Studies Centre.3 It focused on the impact of climat-
ic seasonality on household food consumption and on the nutritional status 
of women and children. As such, this study was also the reason to organize a 
study day at Wageningen University on ‘Seasons, Food Supply and Nutrition 
in Africa’.4 Although the day’s main focus was on climatic seasonality and on 
food and nutrition, there was one speaker (yes, that was you, Ton) who added 
1 This paper is derived from the earlier published ASC Working Paper 107 (Owuor & Foeken 
2012).
2 African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands and Department of Geography & Environ-
mental Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya, respectively.
3 It was one of the studies in the context of the Food and Nutrition Studies Programme (FNSP), 
a joint effort between the Kenyan Government and the African Studies Centre to analyse cur-
rent developments concerning food and nutrition in Kenya by means of a number of research 
projects. It resulted in four FNSP Research Reports and a monograph (Hoorweg et al. 1995).
4 These one-day study days were organized annually by the Department of Human Nutrition of 
Wageningen University and the African Studies Centre. In total, ten of these days were organ-
ized, each time focusing on a different theme.
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a completely new perspective on the concept of seasonality: ‘the rhythm of 
external interference’ (Dietz 1990). Like seasonality, external interventions—
such as the fluctuations in government spending and the school calendar—
have their own rhythms, rhythms that may coincide or collide with the sea-
sonal patterns. Ton, looking back now, it was one of those typical examples of 
your often innovative and creative way of doing research. 
 Seasonal aspects (like gender) became a ‘not-to-miss’ part of the study of 
rural poverty and rural development. But seasonality in an urban context is 
a largely overlooked subject, with the exception perhaps of the widespread 
phenomenon of urban farming. This paper deals with the seasonality of wa-
ter consumption by the urban poor. The data presented below are derived 
from a survey that was carried out in 2010 in two low-income settlements—
Sofia and Shauri Yako—in the town of Homa Bay in Kenya (see Map 1). A 
total of 231 households were interviewed using a standardized questionnaire, 
97 in Sofia and 134 in Shauri Yako. 
Homa Bay
Homa Bay is located in the western part of Kenya on the shores of Lake Vic-
toria, some 100 km south of Kisumu and about 400 km west of Nairobi. The 
municipality covers an area of 23 sq km, of which 3 sq km consists of the 
central business district (CBD). With a population of about 60,000 people in 
2009, Homa Bay is primarily an administrative centre with small-scale trad-
ing as the dominant economic activity. The three low-income settlements in 
the municipality are Makongeni on the northern side of the town and Shauri 
Yako and Sofia on the southern side. Water and sanitation services in the mu-
nicipality are provided by the South Nyanza Water and Sanitation Company 
(SNWASCO). However, as in other towns of Kenya, water supply in Homa 
Bay is still characterized by low coverage, unreliable service, poor financial 
management, and neglected operation and maintenance. This has translated 
into generally inadequate services, which are particularly lacking for the ur-
ban poor.
 In 2006, UN-Habitat carried out a general survey in Homa Bay on access 
to, among other things, water sources.5 The results of this survey revealed 
that one-quarter of the households had water piped into their habitations (i.e. 
either to the house or the yard), but this percentage was much higher for the 
non-slum households (47%) than for the slum inhabitants (21%). Hence, the 
majority of the Homa Bay households relied on water sources outside their 
5 The data presented in this section is based on Excel summaries of the survey results, sourced 
from UN-Habitat (Nairobi Office). For a more elaborate overview, see Owuor & Foeken (2012).
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compounds, especially public standpipes (40%) and surface water (15%). The 
latter was primarily water directly from the lake, which was drawn only by 
slum inhabitants. For the majority of the slum households (58%), it took at 
least half an hour to fetch water, and for one-third of them even at least one 
hour. Disruptions in the supply of water were common: almost 60% of the 
households reported a disruption during the two weeks preceding the inter-
view. 
 Besides SNWASCO’s interventions through Kenya’s water sector reforms, 
Homa Bay is one of the towns that was selected by UN-Habitat in the most 
far-reaching intervention project in urban Kenya, called LVWATSAN,6 to ad-
dress the water and sanitation needs of the people—particularly the poor—in 
a number of secondary towns around Lake Victoria (see Owuor & Foeken 
2009). During the years 2006-10, the programme involved a mix of invest-
ments in the rehabilitation and/or expansion of existing infrastructure as 
well as capacity building at local level and was designed to assist the people in 
the Lake Victoria towns to meet the water- and sanitation-related MDGs (see 
e.g. UN-Habitat 2008). The major interventions of LVWATSAN in Homa Bay 
included, among others, the rehabilitation of the existing water intake points 
(from Lake Victoria) and the installation of new water pumps to increase 
the volume of water supply in the municipality, extension of the piped water 
distribution network into lower-income areas, and the construction of 12 
water kiosks, most of them in low-income areas. However, by May 2012, the 
water production was still only one-sixth of what was required. Furthermore, 
only three water kiosks—two in Shauri Yako and one in Makongeni—were 
connected and operational, the others remaining unconnected or not (fully) 
operational, including those in Sofia (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2).7
6 Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation Initiative (see e.g. UN-Habitat 2008).
7 For the problems around the construction of the pipelines and the water kiosks, including the 
role of ‘politics’, see Owuor & Foeken (2012: 12-19).
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Figure 1.1
Homa Bay and the location of the study areas
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Figure 1.2
Water vendor with water from a private kiosk further away passes near a non-opera-
tional LVWATSAN water kiosk in Sofia (Dick Foeken, 2011)
Seasonality of water consumption
Most parts of Homa Bay town—except for the CBD, hospital, and prisons—
suffer from water rationing based on a schedule determined by SNWASCO. 
Sometimes, water rationing, coupled with low pressure, is so acute that taps 
in Sofia and Shauri Yako run for only two or three days a week and not even 
during the whole day. Water rationing is a problem not only for the water 
kiosks, but certainly also for the households whose main water source is any 
type of piped water. As such, other water sources, such as roof catchment 
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and the lake, are at least as important for the water supply as the piped water 
source.
 However, because of the irregularity of the SNWASCO water provision 
and the lack of water connections in the two low-income areas, water con-
sumption in Homa Bay has strong seasonal components. During the rainy 
season, most households are able to easily and cheaply cope with the irreg-
ularity in the piped water system by means of roof catchment. Outside the 
rainy season, there is a serious shortage of easily accessible (and relatively 
clean) water. This has consequences for, among others, the time required to 
fetch water, the cost of water, and the amounts of water used in the house-
hold. Table 1.1 provides an overview of these factors.8
 Fetching of water is primarily a female task (Figure 1.3). In the large majority 
of the households, it was the female head or the female spouse or a female child 
who was normally responsible for fetching water. The respondents were asked 
how much time was spent on fetching water from their main water source9 in 
the wet and in the dry season. On average, slightly more than one-quarter of an 
hour per day was spent fetching water in the wet season; a figure that was about 
8 Details are presented in Owuor & Foeken (2012: Annex 1, Tables A.4, A.5 and A.7).
9 Hence, the households with their main water source ‘on-plot’ are excluded here. ‘Time to 
fetch water’ includes walking to and fro as well as waiting/queuing at the source (‘full cycle’).
Figure 1.3
Women fetching water from a private kiosk in Shauri Yako (Dick Foeken, 2011)
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the same in the two areas. This is not a lot of time, which can be explained by 
the fact that for most households who had no on-plot water source, their main 
water source was the on-plot water source of a neighbour. Things are different, 
however, in the dry season, when people have no rainwater to harvest and have 
to rely on alternative sources instead, often located further away. This can be 
seen in the more than doubling of the time needed to fetch water. This was 
most striking in Sofia, where 70% of the households spent at least half an hour 
per day fetching water. Due to the distance from the lake, it requires no expla-
nation that the households in Sofia using water from Lake Victoria (20%) spent 
(much) more than an hour doing so. 
Table 1.1
Characteristics of water consumption by area and by season1
TOTAL 
(N=231)
Sofia 
(N=97)
Shauri Yako 
(N=134)
Wet season 
Time taken to fetch water (average, minutes/day)2 16.9 17.1 16.8
Cost of water (average, Ksh/day) 23.7 30.8 17.9
Water used (average, litres/day):
■ for drinking 6.2 6.6 5.9
■ for cooking 14.4 14.3 14.5
■ for washing/cleaning 67.7 60.7 72.7
 Total 102.4 94.8 107.9
 Idem, per household member3 22.3 20.0 24.0
Dry season 
Time taken to fetch water (average, minutes/day)2 37.0 40.2 34.5
Cost of water (average, Ksh/day) 49.9 66.1 37.2
Water used (average, litres/day):
■ for drinking 7.9 8.5 7.4
■ for cooking 14.2 13.8 14.5
■ for washing/cleaning 57.7 51.2 62.4
 Total 92.4 83.2 99.1
 Idem, per household member3 20.1 17.3 22.0
1 Averages are calculated using class middles.
2 Concerns the main water source, hence households with ‘main water source on-plot’ are excluded; 
Ns are 166, 73, and 93, respectively.
3 Total divided by average household size (4.6, 4.8, and 4.5, respectively).
Source: Owuor & Foeken (2012: Annex 1, Tables A.4, A.5, and A.7).
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As for the cost of water, it is the same story as for fetching water: on the 
whole, costs were more than twice as high during the dry season in compari-
son with the wet season. Again, this is (much) more striking in Sofia. During 
the wet season, people already paid more than 70% more on water than in 
Shauri Yako, a difference that was even higher in the dry season. The cost 
difference between the dry and the wet season can be explained by at least 
two factors. First, people with their own on-plot water source who sell water 
to neighbours not only sell more water in the dry season, they also charge 
more.10 Second, private water vendors do more business in the dry season 
and can (and do) make more profit from the scarcity of water. In general, 
people who bought water from private vendors paid three times as much as 
people who bought from neighbours or from public standpipes and kiosks.11
The use of water is divided into water for drinking, water for cooking, and 
water for washing and cleaning. The figures in Table 1.1 show some inter-
esting patterns. First, on the whole, total water consumption in the dry sea-
son was about 10% lower than in the wet season (92.4 and 102.4 litres per 
day per household, respectively). Second, while overall water consumption 
was lower in the dry season, this did not apply to water for cooking, while 
water consumption for drinking was actually higher in the dry season (for 
obvious reasons). Third, the reduction in water consumption was greater in 
Sofia (-12%) than in Shauri Yako (-8%). Fourth, in the wet season, total wa-
ter consumption per household per day in Sofia was about 12% (or 13 litres) 
lower than in Shauri Yako. Per household member, it was 17% less. In the dry 
season, these differences were even larger (16% and 21%, respectively). These 
differences were solely due to substantially saving on the use of water for 
washing/cleaning in Sofia.
 According to UNDP (2006: 3), ‘all citizens should have access to resourc-
es sufficient to meet their basic needs and live a dignified life. Clean water is 
part of the social minimum, with 20 litres per person each day as the min-
imum threshold requirement.’ Hence, on average, water consumption per 
person in the two areas and seasons was ‘just’ enough to meet their daily 
basic requirements for drinking, cooking, and cleaning—except for Sofia in 
the dry season. However, since these figures are averages and since this min-
10 Based on 14 cases of people selling water to neighbours, we could estimate that they sold 
about twice as much water to their neighbours in the dry season compared with the wet season 
(on average 164 and 80 jerry cans per day, respectively) and charged them about 40% more (on 
average 4.1 and 2.9 shilling per jerry can, respectively).
11 According to the respondents, these prices were Ksh 13.1 (N=79), Ksh 4.4 (N=81), and Ksh 
4.0 (N=60), respectively.
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imum may vary depending on a number of factors,12 it is not surprising that 
for only about half of the households the total daily water consumption was 
always enough for their daily needs during the wet season and that this ap-
plied to only 1 out of 10 households during the dry season. Furthermore, the 
daily consumption of drinking water was much less than the recommended 
2-4 litres per person: 1.3 litres and 1.7 litres during the wet and dry season, 
respectively (ibid.).
 Respondents were asked whether they faced any problems with water dur-
ing the wet season and during the dry season. Eight types of problems were 
distinguished: unreliable, interrupted, insufficient, poor quality, source too 
far, price (too) high, irregular billing, and corruption. In general, the percent-
age of households facing problems was much higher in the dry season than in 
the wet season. Nevertheless, even in the wet season, when water is supposed 
to be relatively abundant, quite a number of respondents with access to piped 
water13 complained about unreliability, interruptions, and therefore insuffi-
cient supply and poor quality of the water. The same complaints, though to 
a slightly lesser extent, were heard regarding rain water collected by means 
of roof catchment. Compared with the wet season, the percentages of house-
holds facing problems in the dry season multiplied in all respects.
 In the questionnaire, a distinction was made between problems and seri-
ous problems. Table 1.2 presents the percentages of households facing serious 
problems with the various types of water sources.14 It is immediately clear 
that in the wet season, most of the respondents felt that although problems 
existed, they were mostly not classified as ‘serious’. The situation regarding 
the dry season was completely different, however: not only were the percent-
ages of households facing problems with their water situation much high-
er than in the wet season, these problems were also perceived as ‘serious’ 
by most respondents. The only exception in this regard was the problem of 
‘source too far’, which was not seen as a serious problem by about half of those 
mentioning this factor. Table 1.2 also shows that the seriousness of problems 
with the households’ water situation was more strongly felt in Sofia than in 
Shauri Yako, and this applied to all eight categories of problems.15
12 The UN suggests that each person needs 20-50 litres of water a day to ensure their basic dai-
ly requirements for drinking, cooking, and cleaning and that daily drinking water requirement 
per person is 2-4 litres (see www.unwater.org/statistics_san.html).
13 This percentage includes many households getting water from private water vendors be-
cause the latter usually obtain their water from water kiosks.
14 Both ‘problems’ and ‘serious problems’ are shown in Owuor & Foeken (2012: Annex 1, 
Table A.9).
15 The very high percentage of respondents (69%) in Sofia for whom ‘corruption’ was a serious 
problem in the dry season is conspicuous, but may be caused by the small number of cases (13).
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Table 1.2
‘Serious problems’ with household water situation by area and by season (% yes)
TOTAL 
(N=6251)
Sofia 
(N=2871)
Shauri Yako 
(N=3381)
wet 
season
dry 
season
wet 
season
dry 
season
wet 
season
dry 
season
unreliable 4.8 55.5 7.0 65.2 3.0 47.3
interrupted 4.0 43.0 6.6 48.8 1.8 38.2
insufficient 2.7 53.3 4.5 60.6 1.2 47.0
poor quality 11.4 44.6 9.1 47.7 13.3 42.0
source too far2 7.2 19.1 7.7 24.2 6.7 15.1
price (too) high3 7.0 57.9 9.1 68.3 4.8 47.6
irregular billing4 18.6 48.8 30.8 53.8 13.3 46.7
corruption4 11.6 37.2 15.4 69.2 10.0 23.3
1 Ns concern water sources.
2 Excluding households with on-plot water source and private water vendors (N=446/194/252).
3 Excluding roof catchment and surface (lake, river) water (N=330/164/166).
4 Only households with individual (on-plot) connection (N=43/13/30).
Source: Owuor & Foeken (2012: Annex 1, Table A.9).
Conclusion
The data show that water consumption in the two low-income areas in Homa 
Bay has strong seasonal components. While the situation is relatively better 
during the wet season due to reliance on rain water, there is a serious short-
age of easily accessible and clean water during the dry season: the piped wa-
ter is more unreliable, insufficient, and interrupted; households spend more 
time and longer distances looking for water; they rely more on unsafe water; 
they are forced to survive with the little water available; and they pay more 
for purchasing and treating water. Furthermore, as women and girl-children 
shoulder the burden of fetching water, inadequate access to water has a major 
gender dimension in Homa Bay.
 Although the LVWATSAN programme interventions in Homa Bay are in-
deed very timely, the implementation history of the programme showed that 
the obstacles to realizing the programme’s objectives are immense. Hence, as 
long as the capacity of the Homa Bay water supply network does not meet 
the municipality’s water demand and all the LVWATSAN water kiosks in the 
low-income settlements are not (yet) fully functional and do not have a regu-
lar supply of water, the programme’s main objective—to provide all residents 
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in Homa Bay with clean and affordable water—will not be realized. This also 
means that the seasonal problems people in the low-income areas face re-
garding their water consumption will not be solved.
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2
Food and nutrition studies at the 
African Studies Centre
Wijnand Klaver16
A history of 45 years’ involvement in food and nutrition research in 
Africa17
A whole generation of social scientific nutrition studies by the African Stud-
ies Centre (ASC) in Leiden had its origins in the meeting of young social psy-
chologist Jan Hoorweg with the English paediatrician J. Paget Stanfield, then 
at the Child Nutrition Unit, Medical Research Council in Kampala, Uganda. 
Against the background of the strong interest in the relationship between 
malnutrition and mental development in the 1960s, Hoorweg undertook a 
retrospective study of this relationship in adolescents who had been severely 
malnourished as toddlers, and a comparable control group (Hoorweg 1976). 
Thereafter, the ASC group (in varying composition) focused on monitoring 
and evaluating interventions from a social science perspective. This began 
in 1971-72 with the evaluation of various nutrition programmes in Ugan-
da (Hoorweg & McDowell 1979). In 1976-79 the Nutrition Intervention 
Research Project (NIRP) was conducted in Kenya in cooperation with the 
University of Nairobi. In different ecological zones in Kenya’s Central Prov-
ince the effect of three interventions was examined, viz. the rehabilitation of 
malnourished children, supplementary feeding linked to growth monitoring, 
and nutrition education (Hoorweg & Niemeijer 1989).
 The NIRP was followed by a comprehensive research programme for pol-
icy support in Kenya, the Food and Nutrition Studies Programme (FNSP), 
in collaboration with the Kenyan Ministry of Planning and National Devel-
opment. In the first phase of the FNSP (1983-89), research was carried out 
on (a) the effect of specific rural development programmes on nutrition, (b) 
food policy, and (c) factors related to household food security. At that time 
16 African Studies Centre (ASC), Leiden. 
17 Based on the ASC’s own contributions to the review article of Kusin & Luyken (1999).
Dietz Essays.indd   37 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 38
38
the first theme was high on the agenda in international circles, including with 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), which called attention to the 
possible negative effects on nutrition of agricultural development and, in 
particular, of the growing emphasis on the cultivation of cash crops (Hoor-
weg et al. 1996). The second theme of food policy was in line with the initi-
atives of others elsewhere, such as the design of national food strategies in a 
number of African countries by the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam. 
The FNSP research on food security at the household level focused on the in-
teraction between the economic and geographical aspects (agro-ecology and 
seasonality) of food consumption and nutritional status.
 Of policy relevance was the observation that in a poor area in economic 
transition, thanks to the availability of cheap staple food in the shops and on 
the market (food policy—see below), households could largely meet their in-
creased nutritional needs during the period of hard work on the land prior to 
harvest (Hoorweg, Foeken & Klaver 1995; Klaver & Mwadime 2000). Howev-
er, child malnutrition was widespread. Seasonal fluctuations were observed 
in the growth of young children (peak weight gain in the rainy season after a 
peak in length growth in the preceding dry season before the long rains) and 
in the incidence of diseases such as malaria and diarrhoea (Niemeijer & Kla-
ver 1990).
 In the second phase of the FNSP programme (1992-96), research was 
conducted in Trans Nzoia District on the living conditions of labourers on 
large farms (Foeken & Tellegen 1994). A pilot project was launched in Kilifi 
District for intersectoral nutrition planning, in conjunction with a nutrition-
al surveillance system at district level (Owuor & Okello 1995). The strength 
and nature of the relationships in the popular UNICEF conceptual frame-
work for nutrition planning was tested empirically (Mwadime 1996). In this 
phase, there was intensive cooperation with local universities, including the 
Applied Nutrition Programme (ANP) of the University of Nairobi. 
The Nakuru Urban Agriculture Project
In the late 1990s the ASC took up a new hot topic, namely urban agriculture, 
and continued to combine it with its interest in food and nutrition security. 
This research programme, coordinated by Dick Foeken, selected the mid-
dle-sized town of Nakuru in Kenya as the site for its research: the Nakuru 
Urban Agriculture Project (NUAP). The ANP and the Department of Human 
Nutrition in Wageningen continued to be involved in this research. Later in 
the new decade the urban agriculture theme was applied to school farming 
and school feeding (Foeken et al. 2010).
Dietz Essays.indd   38 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 39
39
Africa Seminars in Wageningen
In the meantime, in the mid-1980s (the time of the first phase of the FNSP) 
the ASC had established a cooperative partnership with the Department of 
Human Nutrition of Wageningen University. This collaboration focused on 
the socio-economic scientific aspects of food and nutrition security. One re-
sult of this collaboration was the organization, annually in mid-December, 
of an ‘African Studies Seminar’ for social scientists, nutritionists, health ex-
perts, policy makers, students, and others who were involved in food and 
nutrition issues. During the 11 years that this series of seminars was held, 
the late Adel den Hartog (1937-2012), social geographer at the Department 
of Human Nutrition, was the motor, organizer, secretary, and often mod-
erator. One of the highlights was the African Studies Seminar of 1988 on 
seasonality in food and nutrition security (see below). An overview of the 
11 themes (see Table 2.1) offers a good cross-section of the area of interest 
of food and nutrition security in the tropics, starting and ending with social 
sciences and nutrition improvement programmes, and then focussing on a 
number of capita selecta: the role of women, seasonality, town and country-
side (in their reciprocal relation), livestock, labour, ecology, training, policy, 
emergency, and small-scale food processing. Those who think in terms of the 
nexus of food and energy may miss the subject of fuel scarcity—a forgotten 
energy crisis—but this is only an apparent omission: the topic was covered in 
the seminar on ecology.
Table 2.1
Themes of the African Studies Seminars in Wageningen (1986-1996)
1986 Social sciences and nutrition programmes in Africa
1987 Women in food production and nutrition in Africa
1988 Seasonality, food supply and nutrition in Africa
1989 Food and nutrition problems in town and countryside in Africa
1990 Livestock production, food and nutrition in Africa
1991 Labour and nutrition in Africa
1992 Food and nutrition in ecologically fragile areas
1993 Food and nutrition training in tropical Africa 
1994 Food and nutrition policy in Africa: Research between theory and 
practice
1995 Nutrition in emergencies in Africa: Between disaster and 
rehabilitation
1996 Nutrition in relation to small-scale food processing in Africa
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In 1988 Ton Dietz participated as one of the speakers in the African Studies 
Seminar on Seasonality (Dietz 1990). The hot topic in those days was season-
ality, and the discussion generally concentrated on rainfall-related forms of 
seasonality in rural areas (Figure 2.1). Ton widened the discussions by argu-
ing that the study of other—so-called ‘non-local’—rhythms, and especially 
the rhythm of labour migration and government calendars, should be added 
to arrive at a better understanding of seasonal aspects of life in tropical and 
sub-tropical rural areas. From 1989 until 1994, Ton served as a member of 
the Board of the ASC. From that time on, he has been following the develop-
ment of the ASC’s research programmes on food and nutrition.
Figure 2.1
Example of rainfall distribution within a year
NUAP and the Wageningen seminars integrated18
As a humble offering at the farewell of Ton, this chapter presents an integrat-
ing description that echoes the themes of Table 2.1. It is based on empirical 
data derived from field work by the ASC as part of the NUAP around the Mil-
lennium (Foeken & Owuor 2000; Foeken 2006). Nakuru is a medium-sized 
town in the Rift Valley with, at that time, a quarter of a million people. Most 
18 With thanks to Dick Foeken and Samuel Owuor for providing the case material.
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of the research on urban agriculture in Africa reported in the literature had 
been conducted in the metropoles of the continent, but not in medium-sized 
towns such as Nakuru. For a social geographer, this is an exquisite topic to 
chart, not only figuratively but also literally. The investigators had access to 
readily available detailed maps of Nakuru. In 1999 Dick Foeken and Samuel 
Owuor made a general survey among 594 households. In October 2000, ad-
ditional interviews were held with 30 farming households selected from the 
study population; an ad-hoc selection follows below. 
Women
In Africa south of the Sahara, women are generally responsible for food pro-
duction. This is no different in Nakuru. 
Pauline is 37 years old and arrived with her husband in Nakuru when she was 
17. From that moment she has grown food crops near the house. She also 
has a few cows, and some sheep, ducks and chickens. The animals are partly 
intended for their own consumption (milk, eggs) and partly as a source of 
additional income by selling them (sheep, ducks). Pauline is solely respon-
sible for the household’s urban agricultural activities. During the weeding 
and harvesting season (April–July), it takes her a good eight hours of work 
per day.
Seasonality
With an annual average rainfall of 950 mm (this is higher than the 750-odd 
mm in the Netherlands, but it is less equally distributed) Nakuru has a dry 
sub-humid equatorial climate. There are two rainy seasons: the long rains in 
March–April–May and the short rains in October–November–December.
Charles and his wife Mary grow food crops on a small piece of land of a quar-
ter of an acre (0.1 ha, about 25 m by 40 m) along the railway, at a 30-45 min-
utes’ walk from their house. Just as most other urban farmers in Nakuru do, 
they seed and plant only once a year because the short rains are unreliable. 
This means that the harvested produce lasts no more than a few months (at 
least in good years!). Charles and Mary also have ducks, partly for their own 
consumption (eggs) and partly for some extra income (a preventive measure 
against seasonal fluctuations).
Town and countryside
More than six in ten households in Nakuru grow food and/or keep animals 
in the countryside. 
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In addition to their piece of land in Nakuru, Charles and Mary also have a 
piece of land of 0.75 acres (0.3 ha) in Nyandarua district, a plot that Charles 
inherited from his father. There they grow maize and millet for their own use. 
They also keep chickens for consumption (eggs) and for sale. During nine 
months a year, Mary lives there to take care of the crops and the animals. 
The plot outside the town not only has a value for them as a source of food 
and income, but also they regard it as a place where, if necessary, they can 
resort to and go back to by the time that Charles will retire. Moreover, for 
them it has a ‘sentimental value’: ‘it runs in the family.’
Livestock keeping
One fifth of the households in Nakuru keep livestock in town. It is estimat-
ed that within the built-up (urban) area of the town there are approximately 
12,000 cows; 7,000 sheep; 7,000 goats; 350,000 chickens; 14,000 ducks; 3,000 
rabbits; 1,400 pigeons; and 600 turkeys. 
Clement and Rose have two cows for milk production (Figure 2.2) and a heif-
er for breeding. The animals are kept in the yard inside a fence. Rose is re-
sponsible for keeping the animals. The feed is purchased. The two cows pro-
duce 10-14 litres of milk per day, most of which is sold to neighbours. They 
use the proceeds to buy food for the family.
Figure 2.2
The cows of Clement and Rose
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Labour
In general, agriculture in Nakuru town depends on family labour. The pieces 
of land on which crops are grown are usually too small to pay for extra labour. 
Hiring labour to herd cattle and/or to collect feed for the permanently sta-
bled animals occurs somewhat more often. 
Abraham and Ellen hire a labourer for seven days a week to take care of their 
cattle. This man collects grass, milks the cows and cleans the stable. He lives 
on the property and earns the amount of 50 Kenyan shillings [Dfl. 1.75 = 
€0.80 in 2002], payable per day.
Ecology
Urban agriculture is often considered harmful to the environment. For in-
stance, crops can be contaminated by exhaust fumes, polluted soils, or 
the use of untreated sewage water. Chemical pesticides can affect soil and 
groundwater. Animals can cause nuisance in the form of manure and bad 
smell. In Nakuru the problems seem to be modest. For example, to the extent 
that manure is dumped on the streets, in general it is not derived from large 
livestock.
Joseph keeps the manure in a pit in the yard and takes it at regular times to 
his ‘farm’ in the countryside. Like many others, Geoffrey uses the manure 
to fertilize his plot in Nakuru. There is also an inverse relationship when it 
comes to animals roaming freely about: on the one hand, they ensure ef-
ficient recycling of part of the garbage that lies everywhere in the streets; 
but on the other hand, this also takes its toll in the form of mortality among 
the cattle as a result of swallowing the plastic bags that are scattered every-
where and that give the streets of Nakuru their characteristic white-gray col-
our. In that respect, there is still a long way to go before Nakuru will be grant-
ed the (proposed) label of ‘Green City’.
Training
The farmers in Nakuru hardly get any technical assistance; and if they get it, 
it is usually at their own request. Only 6% of the crop producers had received 
some form of assistance; for those who kept animals, this was 30% (mainly 
for large livestock). They rarely see any ‘Extension Officers’ of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, although there are exceptions. Esther told the interviewer that 
she was regularly visited by such an officer, while Jedidah on the other hand 
reported never to have had such a visit.
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Policies
According to local regulations, which date back to the colonial era, agricul-
ture in town is an illegal activity. But for the keen observer, it is omnipres-
ent. With support from Western donors, the local government is working to 
create a planning unit (Localising Agenda 21). Decision makers realize that 
urban agriculture should be an integral part of urban planning, but they lack 
any systematic knowledge about this. Such knowledge is provided by the 
NUAP research project.
Disaster
The year 2000 was very dry in Nakuru. As a result, there was no harvest, and 
it was difficult and/or expensive to get feed for the animals. Some households 
could partly cope with these problems by receiving food from their home 
plot in the rural area outside the town. But not everyone could rely on such 
resources. 
Esther saw her crops wither and the milk production decline, which reduced 
her income, while buying feed for the animals cost a lot more money than 
usual. Reuben and Bett had fewer problems: the dried maize plants were fed 
to the cows, and by selling food grown in the countryside they could finance 
the purchase of food in town.
Small-scale food processing/marketing
Margaret is a good example of someone who combines urban agriculture 
with doing business. In late 1999 she owned four cows and 60 chickens. The 
cows are permanently in the stable behind the house and the hens ‘live’ 
on top of it. The cows produce 50-60 litres of milk a day and the chickens 
produce about 60 eggs a day, all for sale. After deducting the cost of fodder 
(which they buy) and labour (for milking, among other tasks), she earns a 
nice profit from it. Since there is sufficient demand for fresh milk and eggs, 
she sells them unprocessed.
The importance of urban agriculture for food and nutrition
While the above case descriptions focus on food availability, a follow-up 
study conducted in October 2000, one year after the first survey, provided 
insight into food procurement and food consumption. From the larger sam-
ple of 594 households, two groups were sub-sampled: 74 engaged in urban 
farming (UF) and 61 not so (NF). A dietary recall interview was held covering 
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the 48 hours immediately preceding the start of the interview, thus captur-
ing two days’ worth of consumption. The main purpose of the October 2000 
survey was to assess to what extent urban farmers were better off in terms of 
food consumption and nutritional status, compared with non-urban farmers. 
Within each of the two study groups (UF and NF), the contribution of any 
food item to the mean consumption of the group is the resultant of the num-
ber of households that consume that food item and the amounts consumed. 
Food can come from different sources: buying and household’s own produc-
tion (either in the urban area and/or in a surrounding or remote rural area). 
Bartering of food was virtually negligible, and no food was reported to be 
received or borrowed.
 Annex 1 shows for all food items—arranged by food groups—the per-
centage of households that consumed that food during the two-day period 
preceding the interview. Among UF households, 30% consumed vegetables 
from their own urban production, 23% products of animal origin (milk, eggs, 
and poultry), 5% cereal products (i.e. fresh and dry maize), 3% dry beans, 
3% fruits (papaya and avocado), 3% sugar, and 1.5% potatoes (Annex 1). 
Although the data represent a snap-shot for each individual household, at 
group level they can be considered to represent their usual intake, at least in 
that period of the year. It has to be noted that the percentages mentioned do 
not represent the percentage of households that produced that food, but just 
the consumption that was ‘captured’within the two-day study period. Less 
than 2% of the households consume some vegetables, products of animal or-
igin, and/or grain legumes from their own rural production. A mere 3% of 
NF households consumed vegetables (i.c. sukuma wiki) derived from urban 
home production; this may seem a contradiction but can be explained by 
the criteria used to distinguish the two study groups: households farming on 
plots of less than 1 sq m were included in the NF group.19
 More than 90% of the households in both groups consumed purchased 
vegetables, cereal products, products of animal origin, oils/fats/margarine, 
and miscellaneous products. For the latter two food categories, buying is al-
most the only option, as most of these are processed foods that people do 
not produce themselves. For roots/tubers/starchy foods, the percentage was 
lower (around 70%), and for grain legumes around 40%. Less than 10% of the 
households consumed fruits, and still fewer consumed seeds and nuts. As 
expected, food buying was the predominant source of procurement for these 
urban households—and the more so because rainfall in 2000 was even lower 
19 One sq m may seem very small, but studies have shown that it is enough to realize a produce 
that ‘matters’.
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than in 199920—so there was very little harvest from urban crop cultivation. 
This applied not only to those who relied on rain-fed farming but to some ex-
tent also to those who normally practised irrigation because during droughts 
there is an overall water shortage in Nakuru town. 
 Against this backdrop, food procurement from UF played a modest—yet 
not insignificant—role. Its exact contribution will become clear once the 
quantities consumed are considered. As different types of food differ in nu-
trient content per unit weight—notably due to differences in water, fat, and 
fibre content—a first analysis preferably uses dietary energy (kilocalories) as 
the common denominator representing the quantitative aspect of food con-
sumption (see Annex 2). Next, in order to do justice to the quality aspect of 
the diet, household food consumption is also expressed in terms of the dif-
ferent macro- and micronutrients (see the graphs in Annex 3). Both energy 
and nutrients are expressed per consumer unit per day. To arrive at these 
figures, the consumption during the recall period was divided by the number 
of household members partaking in household food consumption (expressed 
in terms of adult equivalents: ‘consumer units’) and by the equivalent of valid 
food consumption period reported (i.e. 2.0 days in most cases).
 Annex 2 shows that UF households consumed on average 77 kcal/CU 
more than NF households. This is the result of the former sourcing 102 kcal/
CU/day more from their own production (96 from UF and 6 from rural farm-
ing) and 26 kcal/CU/day fewer from buying. UF households obtained on av-
erage 99 kcal/CU/day from urban farming. NF households obtained a mere 3 
kcal/CU/day from urban vegetable farming (sukuma wiki); this seeming con-
tradiction was explained above. Rural farming contributes only a very small 
amount of energy (around 10 kcal/CU/day): less than 2% of the households 
consume some vegetables, products of animal origin, and/or grain legumes 
from their own rural production. 
 For further analysis, the focus is on the main sources of food: personal ur-
ban production and buying. Looking at the breakdown of the overall result by 
food groups, the following appears. Cereal products and vegetables are food 
groups where UF more or less replaces part of the buying; thus it serves as 
‘fungal income’: on average 23 kcal out of 1,588 (1.5%) in the case of cereals, 
and 23 kcal out of 120 (20%) in the case of vegetables. As vegetables have a 
high water content, their energy content is low; so 23 kcal from vegetables 
represents more food weight than 23 kcal from cereals. Their contribution in 
terms of nutrients is more considerable (see below). UF households consume 
home-produced products of animal origin (39 kcal/CU/day, of which 33 kcal 
20 Total rainfall was 601 mm (compared with a long-term average of 940 mm), and the ‘long 
rains’ failed completely.
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from milk), but they also buy more of those food groups compared with ur-
ban NF households (279 vs 263 kcal/CU/day). Home production represents 
14% of total energy consumed. UF households consume home-produced 
grain legumes and fruits (8 and 2 kcal/CU/day, respectively) but buy even 
more of those food groups compared with urban NF households (140 vs 108 
and 7 vs 1 kcal/CU/day, respectively). Home production represents 23% and 
6%, respectively, of total daily energy consumed. Like vegetables, fruits have 
a high water content and modest energy content per weight of food. Urban 
households do not produce seeds and nuts, but almost 3% of the urban farm-
ers buy them for consumption (on average 5 kcal/CU/day). Home production 
of the food groups roots/tubers/starchy staples, oils/fats, and miscellaneous 
is negligible (only 3 kcal/CU/day). What is more striking is that UF house-
holds buy less of these food groups compared with urban NF households: 
(125 vs 138, 267 vs 293 and 190 vs 198, respectively). 
 Thus, the 77 kcal/CU/day more consumed by UF households is the re-
sult of 9 kcal/CU/day more from vegetables and cereals (substituting for pur-
chases), 111 kcal more from products of animal origin, fruits, grain legumes, 
seeds, and nuts (more than substituting for purchases), and 44 kcal fewer 
bought from roots/tubers/starchy staples, oils/fats, and miscellaneous. Their 
lower consumption of the latter food groups is more than compensated for 
by their higher consumption of the former food groups.
 Focussing on the individual cereal products (providing some fungal in-
come to urban farmers), the following are bought only: 1,004 kcal/CU/day 
from maize flour, millet, and wheat flour; rice; spaghetti; bread; biscuits; 
cakes; Cornflakes; Weetabix; and doughnut/mandazi. The UF households 
consume 7 kcal/CU/day more energy from cereal products than urban NF 
households. They compensate their 94 kcal/CU/day less buying of maize 
flour largely by home producing 19 kcal dry maize and 5 g fresh maize; by 
buying more of the following: 52 kcal rice, 19 kcal wheat flour, 10 kcal dry 
maize, 7 kcal fresh maize, 4 kcal bread; and by buying less of the following: 
12 kcal mandazi and 4 kcal other cereal-based convenience foods (spaghetti, 
biscuits, cakes, Cornflakes, Weetabix). Thus, the urban farmers have a more 
diversified cereal products’ base that partly replaces maize flour and conven-
ience foods.
 The UF households consume 2 kcal/CU/day more energy from vegetables 
than urban NF households. This is roughly the result of buying 4 kcal more 
spider flower (saget) and 2 kcal more cabbage, offset by buying 4 kcal/CU/day 
less fresh shelled peas (all bought). Both groups consume 70 kcal/CU/day of 
kale (sukuma wiki), but the urban farmers derive 30% of it from urban pro-
duction (vs 4% in the case of urban non-farmers). The UF households con-
sume 59 kcal/CU/day more energy from products of animal origin than the 
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urban NF households. This is roughly the result of 56 kcal more from meat 
(beef, chicken, goat, duck), 8 kcal more from sausage, 11 kcal more from eggs, 
7 kcal more from milk and milk products, offset by 19 kcal less from fish 
and 4 kcal less from cow’s liver. Among UF households, 25% of the milk and 
11% of the eggs are home produced, while another 11% of the eggs originate 
from their own rural production. The UF households consume 8 kcal/CU/
day more energy from fruits than urban NF households. While 3% of the lat-
ter consume fruits (bananas and lemon), 11% of the former consume fruits 
(also purchased pineapple, partly purchased and partly home-produced pa-
paya, and rural home-produced avocado).
 The predominance of buying as a source of food procurement is quite 
graphic, as Annex 3 shows. The exceptional consumption of home grown 
sukuma wiki among some urban NF households disappears in the group av-
erage and is not visible in the graphs. Among the UF households, the con-
tribution of their own home production to food consumption is visible and 
mostly so among the vegetables, fruits, and products of animal origin. The 
first two have—expectedly—a peak contribution to total vitamin C intake, 
and the latter to total calcium intake (due to the large part of milk in the ani-
mal foods group). The cereal products contribute most of the carbohydrates, 
protein, and much iron and B vitamins. This is due to the large amounts con-
sumed and their nutritional composition (as found in food composition ta-
bles). Compared with their energy contribution, the grain legumes are richer 
in protein, iron, and B vitamins than the cereals. The products of animal ori-
gin (milk excepted) are low in carbohydrates and very rich in most nutrients. 
In fact, comparison of the different stacked graphs in Annex 3 shows in an 
indirect way the difference in nutritional value of foods in the different food 
groups. On the whole, the contribution of UF to household consumption in 
Nakuru in 2002 shines most in graphs showing the foods particularly rich 
in nutrients: animal products, fruits and—last but not least—vegetables (see 
Grubben et al. 2014). 
Conclusion
Human nutrition can be seen as the outcome of the marriage of agriculture 
and health. Historically, the discovery of malnutrition and nutritional defi-
ciencies owes much to pioneers in the health sector. Then started a process 
of ‘digging deeper’ for the causes of these problems. This is where research 
of a socio-economic nature came in. Food security is embedded in livelihood 
security, and peoples’ own production is an important source of food. This 
has always been the focal point of the ASC’s involvement in food and nutri-
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tion research. Thus it started from a health concern in mainly rural areas and 
eventually ramified into the role of urban agriculture. 
 After Ton Dietz joined the ASC in 2012 in his new capacity of director, 
he found a fertile ground to apply his fondness for statistics in combination 
with his interest in food matters in the Food Balance Sheets of the FAO. Food 
production comes about by combining area (hectares cultivated) with yield 
(tonnes per hectare) in a multiplicative relationship. The fruits of this en-
deavour (Akinyoade et al. 2014) are too many to include in this chapter, but 
inter alia we found a way to estimate a reference trend line for crop area and 
yield to keep up with population increase in a balanced fashion (Akinyoade 
et al. 2013; Dietz et al. 2013; Leliveld et al. 2013a, 2013b).
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From macro to micro 
How smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe are 
coping with dollarization
 
Marleen Dekker
As Africanists, geographers, and development specialists, we are often puz-
zled by connections and disconnections between different levels of scale. At 
times, there is, for example, a disconnect between macro-economic growth 
performance indicators and micro-level poverty figures—that is, the puzzle 
of jobless growth. In other situations, we simply do not know what a mac-
ro-level figure actually means for people on the ground and how it affects 
their lives and livelihoods. Oftentimes the way people are affected by these 
macro-economic circumstances also depends on where they live and what 
opportunities their geographical context provides. In short: geography mat-
ters! In this contribution, Ton, I would like to take you back to Zimbabwe, the 
country that connected you and me as a teacher and student, through your 
involvement with Carla van Wiechen’s research on livelihoods in Mbereng-
wa district in 1992. Although there is much to say about that study and the 
circumstances (the worst drought in living memory) in Zimbabwe at that 
time and how it formed me as an academic, I will take you to the resettle-
ment communities in which I worked for my PhD project. To a time in the 
mid-2000s during which Zimbabwe was in dire straits. Simply because it is 
important to document how ordinary farmers were affected by and coped 
with the hyperinflation and subsequent dollarization in 2009; how mac-
ro-economic crises play out at micro-scale. Not only to ‘document history’ 
but also to emphasize the relevance of this work for today. Regular contacts 
with my research assistants confirm that despite reports of economic dyna-
mism in some parts of the country (e.g. as documented by Scoones 2016), 
other parts of the country still witness a scarcity of cash in 2016/17. Mon-
ey, and especially cash money, is scarce at a national level (Moyo & Onisho 
2016). The government is often unable to pay salaries to civil servants and 
has now introduced a new currency, ‘bond notes’, to meet the liquidity con-
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straints (Marawanyika 2017). In rural farming areas, the availability of cash is 
much determined by the intensity of agricultural production and marketing 
and related local economic structures (see Scoones 2016). The contribution 
is based on fieldwork performed by Michael Shambare and Nyaradzo Nzobo 
and analyses by Merel Langeveld and myself. 
Introduction
Once the grain basket of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe has scored poorly on 
economic development indicators since the early 2000s. The country has the 
doubtful honour of having had the second-highest inflation ever recorded 
globally, and its national currency, the Zimbabwe dollar, has jokingly been 
used in Western television shows to signal bad luck. Behind this façade, and 
the fortunes made by those who have successfully taken advantage of the 
opportunities provided by the parallel currency markets (Pilossof 2009), lies 
a day-to-day reality that has not been extensively documented but that has 
affected many in Zimbabwe.
 To curb hyperinflation, in 2009 the Government of Zimbabwe replaced 
the Zimbabwean dollar with the US dollar. The dollarization of the economy 
brought some stability: macro-economic indicators improved, and prospects 
for economic recovery were heralded. Little is known, however, about the ef-
fects of this dollarization on livelihoods and economic life in the rural areas. 
Combining a snapshot of 20 farmers in two rural areas in December 2010 
with insights from longitudinal studies in the same areas, this paper sheds 
some light on the micro-implications of the crisis, hyperinflation, and the 
subsequent ‘dollarization’ in Zimbabwe.
 Most existing work on risk-coping strategies documents strategies in 
‘normal’ economic contexts, where cash is readily available and it is viable 
for savings or assets to be sold to generate a cash income (Dercon 2002).21 
Hyperinflation and the subsequent dollarization in Zimbabwe made savings 
worthless and resulted in a shortage of cash, especially in rural communities. 
This provided a challenging situation for small-scale farmers who were fully 
integrated in the cash economy before the economic downturn began in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. Jones (2010) describes how hyperinflation led to 
the rise of the Kukiya-kiya economy, in which people do whatever they can 
to put a deal together, in line with the informalization documented by, for ex-
ample, Hammar et al. (2010). Jones’s research, however, was carried out in an 
urban context where seasonality and cash constraints are less prevalent, and 
it deals with the period of hyperinflation before dollarization occurred. This 
21 With the possible exception of remote areas where cash is always scarce.
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paper considers how farmers obtain cash in a period when ‘normal’ solutions 
are not possible, selling possessions is difficult because nobody has cash to 
buy assets, and relatives in town or abroad—who normally might have been 
expected to send remittances—are themselves also strapped for cash. Stand-
ard economic thinking suggests that people revert to barter when cash is 
scarce/unavailable, but such practices have not been well documented.22
 The data presented in this paper show that many households indeed did 
not have any cash at their disposal. In addition, remittances from family 
members in the city or overseas were not as important a source of income 
as had been expected. In cases where the availability of money is limited, it 
is often assumed that barter would be the most important financial tool to 
sustain livelihoods. Surprisingly, ‘on-the-spot’ barter was insignificant here. 
Instead, a pre-existing gift-giving economy, based on the principle of delayed 
reciprocity, intensified. 
  
The context: Zimbabwe
The agrarian structure in Zimbabwe changed significantly in the early 2000s 
(Hammar et al. 2010; Cliffe et al. 2011). The dualistic landscape in which 
large-scale commercial farms co-existed with smallholder farmers changed 
when the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) led to the breaking up 
of many large-scale farms. This change in landscape also affected the agro-in-
put industries that supplied the large-scale farms, as well as affecting the 
agro-processing industries that purchased and processed their products. As 
a result, there was a steep, albeit uneven, decline in output, exports, and the 
inflow of foreign currency. Agricultural productivity and food production 
declined (Moyo 2011: 952). In addition, more than 400,000 people who used 
to work on commercial farms lost their jobs when they were broken up. Con-
traction, however, has not been even across the country, and some groups of 
smallholders have proven to be remarkably resilient; in addition, redistribu-
tion of land to smallholders has created pockets of economic dynamism in 
various localities (Scoones et al. 2010; Scoones, 2016).
 The transition from large-scale farms to a multitude of smallholder 
farms has not been easy and has been extensively discussed in the literature 
(Scoones et al. 2010; Cliffe et al. 2011; Moyo 2011; Hanlon et al. 2012; Ma-
tondi 2012). Several interrelated developments resulted in severe constraints 
for small-scale farmers. First, farmers experienced resource constraints that 
prevented them from financing inputs and tools, which was exacerbated by 
the fact that many private institutions involved in input supply withdrew af-
22 For an exception, see the report by Solidarity Peace Trust (2009).
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ter the FTLRP. Even though the state still provided some financing schemes, 
which were limited to newly resettled farmers, most farmers had no choice 
other than to finance production through their own savings (Moyo et al. 
2009). Second, even when farmers were able to afford inputs, there was a 
shortage of inputs due to the slowdown of the agricultural markets (Moyo, 
2011). As a result, farmers reduced the acreage they had under maize and 
started planting other crops that required fewer or no inputs. Farmers also 
started to barter seed with their neighbours instead of buying it at the mar-
ket. The number of farmers using modern inputs (hybrid seeds, fertilizers, 
and pesticides) has decreased over the last decade (Dekker & Kinsey 2011a). 
Third, farmers who had crops to sell derived almost no income from them 
owing to hyperinflation combined with delayed payments and a shortage of 
cash money (Dekker & Kinsey 2011b: 8). When money did become available, 
the required goods were in short supply, which affected the farmers’ ability to 
provide for other household needs.
 In search of greener pastures and in an attempt to protect themselves from 
various forms of violence, an estimated 1-3 million Zimbabweans (more than 
20% of the population) left the country after the start of the crisis in the early 
2000s. This has created transnational family networks (Hammar et al. 2010). 
Hyperinflation and dollarization
During this tumultuous decade, the Zimbabwean dollar experienced contin-
uous inflation. From a 56.09% inflation rate in 1999, inflation rose to 585.84% 
in 2005 and then to a staggering 231,150,888.87% in July 2008. It took until 
mid-November 2008, when inflation had reached approximately 89,700,000
,000,000,000,000,000%, before the government permitted the use of foreign 
currency and the hyperinflation was halted. Noko (2011) reports that non-
cash transactions became the predominant form of transaction in the Zim-
babwean economy during this period. 
 To curb inflation and restore stability, Zimbabwe adopted a multi-cur-
rency financial system in April 2009, using the US dollar (US$), the South 
African rand, and the Botswana pula. The Zimbabwe dollar (Z$), which had 
been pegged to the US$ since 1999, was abandoned (ibid.). Various sources 
reported on the consequences of the dollarization and the macro-economic 
changes that resulted from this. First, cash was in short supply,23 especially 
small-denomination US$ banknotes and coins (Kramarenko et al. 2010; Mu-
nanga 2013). In rural communities, the situation was even more acute due 
to a lack of formal employment, the absence of financial institutions, and the 
seasonality of cash incomes from agriculture (Solidarity Peace Trust 2009). 
23 A situation that exists even today.
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Farmers reported going ‘for several months without setting … sight on a mere 
coin’ (IRIN 2013). Instead, the return of a ‘cashless society’ and the practice of 
using barter to meet household needs were frequently reported in the pop-
ular press (ibid.), and retailers started using small items such as sweets, bis-
cuits, and matches or credit slips to provide ‘change’ for customers (Noko 
2011). Secondly, with the collapse of agricultural markets, cash constraints, 
vanishing savings, and the non-availability of inputs, farming activities came 
under pressure and earnings became marginal. Given that incomes from 
crops and livestock normally constitute about 80% of farmers’ total incomes 
in the study sites (Deininger & Hoogeveen 2004: 1,702), it was expected that 
they would be forced to develop different economic activities to sustain their 
livelihoods. However, Dekker and Kinsey (2011b) documented how farmers 
were undertaking fewer non-agricultural activities in 2009/2010 compared 
with a decade before.
 It has been argued that the cautious improvement in the economy from 
2010 onwards may have resulted in an increase in remittances (IRIN 2013) 
and that more job opportunities in the city or abroad have allowed migrants 
to save money to send to family in the rural areas. These remittances have 
been of critical importance for many rural households and have been made 
easier by the emergence of telephonic cash transfer initiatives. Econet Wire-
less, for example, has been described as ‘a bless’ and ‘a lifeline’, particularly for 
rural people (ibid.).
 As Hammar et al. (2010) and Nhodo et al. (2013) demonstrated, the cash 
scarcity has required the agency and resilience of people. A great deal of time, 
energy, discussion, flexibility, and sometimes despair went into answering 
the daily questions about what people could get where and for how much,24 
as is illustrated by the account of one farmer in the study area who received a 
good income for his 2008 crop. 
After I got paid for my harvest, I went to the shops in Bindura. Goods were 
now scarce in the shops. All I could do was buy exercise books with the mon-
ey. I bought them and brought the exercise books home. People came to 
exchange almost anything—chickens, mealie meal, etc.—for exercise books.
With this 2008 experience and a wider availability of goods after dollarization, 
this farmer sold his tobacco and bought six head of cattle and groceries to last 
24 Despair could result, for example, from sudden changes in terms of trade, such as when 
a bed of tobacco seedlings was exchanged for two bags of fertilizer rather than just one bag. 
Solidarity Peace Trust (2009) reports how these terms of trade became exploitative in Mata-
beleland, especially in more isolated rural communities and when bartering with people from 
outside who had arrived with truckloads of goods from town. 
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his family for a year after the 2009 harvest. He gave the groceries to a shop 
owner at Madziva Mine, and his wives withdrew them as they needed them.
Transactions
The data presented in this paper derive from transaction diaries compiled 
by 20 farmers over a period of three weeks in 2010. Transaction diaries were 
kept as part of an ongoing project on social networks and risk-coping strat-
egies in rural Zimbabwe. Data were collected in two different resettlement 
areas in Zimbabwe that had been established in the early 1980s: Mupfurudzi 
in Mashonaland Central and Sengezi in Mashonaland East, both part of the 
Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamics Survey (ZRHDS) managed by B.H. 
Kinsey. These are ‘old resettlement schemes’, as opposed to the more recent 
schemes that were set up under the FTLRP in the early 2000s. In both these 
areas, ten men and ten women were asked to keep a transaction diary for 21 
days in November and December 2010.
Figure 3.1
A Shop in Sengezi Resettlement Area
The data collected cover almost 800 transactions (for a review of the method-
ology and descriptive analysis of the transactions, see Van ‘t Wout & Dekker 
2014) and are summarized along two important dimensions in Table 3.1. The 
first horizontal panel shows the type of transaction, distinguishing gifts, mar-
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ket transactions, and other; the second panel describes the time setting of 
the transactions; and the third panel documents the type of goods transacted 
(food and non-food). These data provide three important insights into the 
local economies in the two areas at the time just after dollarization. First, 
the data shows that transactions were primarily exchanges of gifts or mar-
ket transactions, with exchanges of gifts more frequently reported compared 
with purchasing and selling products and services. These latter ‘market’ 
transactions are more often higher in value; almost 7 US$ value per transac-
tion compared with 2.83 US$ value for gifts. There is a smaller ‘other’ catego-
ry of loans, paid labour, etc.
 Second, transactions involving a direct exchange of money or products 
(purchases, ‘on-the-spot’ sales, barter, and paid labour) account for 41% of 
the total number of transactions, while transactions based on an expected 
future reciprocation (the exchange of gifts in kind, money, labour, and social 
assistance) constitute more than half (55%) of the total number of transac-
tions. Despite the lower frequency of ‘on-the-spot’ transactions, they have a 
higher monetary value, again almost 7 US$.
 Thirdly, more than half of all the transactions involved food and groceries, 
mainly as part of gift-giving relationships and often small in size. The value of 
most of the transactions here (89.2%) did not exceed US$ 5.
Combining these general observations with a more detailed look at the data 
highlights three main points concerning household exchanges in a cash-con-
strained economy, which will be discussed in more detail below: the (in)flow 
of cash in the villages is limited; the frequency of remittances and barter is 
low; and gift-giving has intensified. 
Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics on selected characteristics of the transactions
Type of transaction Frequency Value US$ per transaction
Gifts 41% 2.83
Market 37% 6.91
Other 22%
On-the-spot 41% 6.99
Future reciprocity 55% 3.83
Other 4%
Food 54%
Non-food 46%
N=798
Source: Van ’t Wout and Dekker (2014)
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Limited amount of cash circulating in local economies
Given the severe cash constraints after the dollarization of the economy, it 
is noteworthy that about half of all transactions still involve cash. Yet, on 
the other hand, this also means that half of the respondents were not able 
to have access to cash over three weeks. Of the incoming cash transactions, 
the majority (67%) took place in the village or in nearby villages (21%), which 
suggests that instead of a steady inflow of cash from abroad or the cities, 
transactions are being made with cash that is circulating around the villages 
and in the immediate surroundings. Cash availability in the local economy is 
thus strongly determined by local agricultural and economic opportunities.
Remittances are not frequent
As a result of the decline in production, inadequate farm incomes, and ris-
ing food shortages in rural areas, it was assumed that an increasing num-
ber of rural households would be relying on remittances and emergency aid 
(Rural Poverty Portal Zimbabwe n.d.). For other rural areas in Zimbabwe, it 
has been argued that remittances are ‘mostly crucial for the sustenance of 
the households involved, even before the onset of the economic crisis of the 
2000s’ (Harts-Broekhuis & Huisman 2001: 290). Reporting on urban house-
holds, Bracking & Sachikonye (2006) claim that ‘it is difficult to see how some 
of these households could even survive without these informal remittance 
transfers’. A similar argument is made by Nhodo et al. (2013) concerning the 
importance of remittances for pensioners in Masvingo.
 With regards to incoming transfers of money, the transaction diaries 
showed that two participants received money from different sources on multi-
ple occasions in the month under review, while two participants received mon-
ey twice, and five participants received money once. The majority of the sums 
were relatively small and came from family members, neighbours, and friends 
in the same village, and they therefore do not qualify as a remittance. In only 
one instance was an amount of rand 500 (approx. US$ 70) received by one of 
the households from a family member living in South Africa, and 14 transac-
tions (gifts) were received from a local or regional town, Harare, a new farm, 
or abroad. Although low in frequency, given the scarcity of cash in the areas as 
well as the small size of the transactions generally reported, the observed re-
mittances can make a substantial contribution to local circulation of cash.
 The low level of remittances raises the question whether households have 
family members elsewhere on whom they can rely. Historically, labour mi-
gration to cities and abroad was a common household strategy, and many 
of the diary households had migrants in their networks. These migrant net-
works have become ever more dispersed as a result of the FTLRP, which at-
tracted the younger generation particularly in the old resettlement areas to 
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seek greener pastures (Dekker & Kinsey 2011b). Previous research based on 
the ZRHDS indicated that in the early 2000s before the economic downturn, 
farmers in old resettlement areas derived 3.7% of their income from remit-
tances, and the figure was 18.5% among farmers in communal areas (Dei-
ninger & Hoogeveen 2004: 1,702).
 An alternative explanation for the low level of remittances might be that 
remittances are sent irregularly and were therefore not picked up during this 
study, or that family members are not able or willing to send money home. 
The latter would be in line with the observations made by the Solidarity Peace 
Trust—namely, that remittances from relatives living abroad are never guar-
anteed. Worby (2010) also illustrates how migrants may (deliberately) dis-
connect from their relatives back home, especially at times of material dis-
tress and ongoing uncertainty. 
The role of barter and the intensification of gift-giving
The third finding is that ‘instantaneous’ barter is rare. Fafchamps (2004) dis-
tinguished three kinds of trust-based exchange mechanisms as alternatives 
to cash transactions: first, ‘instantaneous barter’, where no contractual ob-
ligations of exchange are carried forward in time; second, ‘delayed barter’, 
when one part of the exchange is conducted instantaneously and the other 
is delayed; and thirdly, gift exchange, where there is no explicit link to a cor-
responding payment. In his view, ‘instantaneous’ barter and gift-giving are 
two points on a continuum, differing only in the degree of the counter obli-
gation (Thomas & Worrall 2002). In other words, gift-giving can be regard-
ed as a gesture in which a future reciprocal counter gift is expected (Mauss 
1967). However, this exchange can be carried forward in time, and no specific 
agreement is made as to the content and value of the counter gift.
 The transaction data show that the first category of barter, ‘instantane-
ous’ barter like that reported in the exercise book example above, is rare.25 
The assumption that if there is no cash available, either from crop sales or 
from remittances, people revert to ‘instantaneous barter’ to sustain their live-
lihoods is thus not supported. In the households under review, fewer than 
1% of transactions can be categorized as ‘instantaneous barter’ trade. Two of 
these were food transactions—in one, a plough share was exchanged, and in 
the other, a cow was exchanged for six bags of maize and nine bags of fertiliz-
er—while the remaining two transactions involved agricultural seeds.26
25 The exploitative barter trade reported by the Solidarity Peace Trust (2009), where external 
agents go to rural areas with food and barter this food for productive assets, was not reported 
in this study area.
26 From the transaction diaries, it was unclear what kinds of products were being bartered in 
exchange. 
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In contrast with the relative absence of ‘instantaneous barter’, gift-giving was 
a prominent feature in the data. Small gifts were exchanged between family 
members, neighbours, and other close relations. Examples of such gifts were 
a plate of mealie meal, a cup of sugar, four tomatoes, or three cups of beans. 
In the food and groceries category, 60% of the transactions were exchanges 
of gifts in kind, suggesting that exchanging small gifts is an important way of 
meeting daily food needs. This was much more important than barter trade, 
which accounted for less than 1% of the food and grocery transactions.
 This raises the question whether gift-giving as a form of transaction has 
intensified in comparison with the period prior to hyperinflation and dol-
larization. To shed light on this, ZRHDS data from 2000 was reviewed, in 
which households were asked to list assistance in cash and kind that they had 
received and given over the previous year. This resulted in a dataset with 783 
transactions, including medical expenses, education costs, farming expens-
es, food and grocery expenditures, farm and agricultural investments, non-
farm business investments, and other assistance. The data suggest that 40% 
of these transactions were in cash and 60% were in kind. When these figures 
are compared with transactions in kind and money in the current dataset, it 
is clear that gifts in kind have become much more important. Gifts in kind 
and labour constitute 92.4% of the total gifts, while gifts in money consti-
tute 7.6% of the total. This suggests that there has been an intensification of 
gift-giving in kind in response to the shortage of cash. 
From macro to micro
Using a micro-lens to understand the implications of macro-economic fig-
ures yielded three important observations. First, in these ‘traditional’ farm-
ing areas (i.e. not the dynamic new communities featured in Scoones et al. 
(2010)), the inflow of cash from surrounding areas, cities, Harare, and abroad 
was severely limited. Half of the households did not report having received 
any cash transfers in the weeks under review. Since transactions in cash (pur-
chases and sales) constituted 37.3% of the total number of transactions, the 
data suggest that a limited amount of cash was circulating in the villages and 
was being exchanged in small transactions. The availability of cash in such 
‘island economies’ is determined by the local economic structure and dyna-
mism: geography matters!
 The second finding was that there was no indication that remittances 
were a steady component of the incomes of farmers, which contradicts the 
view that a substantial number of rural households in Zimbabwe rely on re-
mittances to sustain their livelihoods.
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Thirdly, and in contrast with conventional wisdom about transactions in 
cash-scarce societies, ‘instantaneous’ barter was rare. Fewer than 1% of the 
transactions can be categorized as ‘on-the-spot’ barter. This can be consid-
ered positive, as it means that participants were not being forced to deplete 
their assets to meet their daily household needs through unfavourable barter 
transactions (e.g. exchanging an animal for food at unfavourable terms of 
trade). Instead, the shortage of cash resulted in an intensification of gift-giv-
ing in kind; and small gifts, mostly of food and groceries, were being ex-
changed between family members, neighbours, and other close relations.
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4
Waithood in Africa’s Silverlining 
Akinyinka Akinyoade & Rantimi Jays Julius-Adeoye
There is a pattern to the ebb and flow in Africa’s development experience 
and story. The continent’s economic history can be broadly divided into four 
sub-periods: the post-1960 period, corresponding closely to the era of po-
litical sovereignty (1960-80), when the growth of many African economies 
equalled that in many other areas of the world; 1980-2000, when economic 
growth collapsed as a result of external shock; 2000-07, when many African 
economies recorded reasonable economic growth; and 2008 until the pres-
ent, when economic uncertainty returned in some areas (see Roemer 1982; 
Olamosu & Wynne 2016). Particularly for the year 2015, a dip in GDP values 
became a marker for Antonius Dietz to express reservations about his hith-
erto optimistic stance of ‘Silverlining Africa’. Dietz is not the first to express 
such a change in optimism regarding Africa’s economic development. Fab-
ricius (2015) reported on ‘Africa rising or Africa uprising’, while Gettleman 
(2016) challenged that ‘Africa rising? Africa reeling’ may be more fitting. In 
the longue durée, Africa’s development seems to be in a constant state of 
flux—or transition, tenure, turning points, and outcomes which may be dif-
ficult to predict.
 In this chapter, we will examine individual and societal transitioning in 
academic and life spaces. Our encounters converge on the theme ‘Silverlining 
Africa’ (Dietz 2011) and diverge on the current (2016) assessment of gloomy 
statistics that appear to overshadow the aforementioned promise. Some so-
cio-economic data are thereby used to realign divergent thoughts to show 
that the latest dip in Africa’s development trajectory may in the long run be a 
blip on Africa’s radar.
 As Julius-Adeoye recounts: I registered for my doctoral degree in Febru-
ary 2009 at the Leiden University Institute for Cultural Discipline (now Lei-
den University Centre for the Arts in Society) but did not arrive in the Neth-
erlands until six months later in August. One of my promoters, Dr Daniela 
Merolla, took me to the African Studies Centre library for registration, and 
she invited me to sit in on some of their Research Master (ResMA) lectures. 
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It was in one of these lectures that I had the opportunity of meeting Akinyin-
ka Akinyoade, who in turn invited me to other events organized by the ASC 
and introduced me to a distinguished looking gentleman, Ton, ASC’s new 
director. I attended Ton’s inaugural lecture ‘Silverlining Africa’ in 2011, when 
he presented the glimmers of hope radiating from the African continent. I 
returned to ASCL as a Visiting Fellow in March 2017, amazed that Ton rec-
ognized me. But he appeared cautious and perhaps less optimistic about Af-
rica’s development trajectory on the basis of recent disturbing signs. This is 
what prompted us to write this chapter. 
 Akinyoade now speaking: On my part, it was not my wish to arrive late in 
Holland for my doctoral programme. In actual fact, it was stated quite clearly 
on the ISS website that a PhD programme is individual; invariably, the candi-
date could commence his/her programme on any chosen day. So I arrived in 
the Netherlands in April 2002, only to be told that I was late for the CERES 
course for PhD students that began a month before my arrival. I joined the 
CERES course mid-stream and had to present my draft research proposal 
to the group almost immediately. At the end of my presentation, one of the 
people in attendance told me that while he enjoyed my presentation, it was 
filled with intentions to calculate rates and figures to depict the slowing down 
of birth rates among Ghanaian women. He also said that my proposed thesis 
would be much better if it followed the style of a book he would like to give 
me. I accepted the book with thanks—quantitative technique is my joy and 
skill—but from a quick scan the book given to me had a qualitative leaning 
to it. My forte was technical demography, honed at the Regional Institute for 
Population Studies (University of Ghana), where I had obtained two Masters 
degrees with distinction in the late 1990s. 
 The majority of students of demography were primarily concerned about 
figures, rates, graphical illustrations, and continuous refinement of statistical 
procedures to get the most reliable rates. Economists such as Gary Becker 
(New Household Economics) were also part of the picture, as was Shryock 
and Siegel’s (1973) The methods and materials of demography bible, while In-
troduction to the mathematics of population by Keyfitz (1968) had an abstract 
that encapsulated the statistical grandiosity of contemporary demography, 
not only showing advances in mathematical demography but also exploring 
problems in the mathematics of population. Some attention was also given 
to substantive demography. Professor Anquandah at Legon studied demo-
graphic dynamics of long-forgotten populations by deploying archaeology 
to derive levels of childbearing among bushmen of the Kalahari. The quanti-
tative approach to population studies had the edge, but a few other scholars 
(Ebigbola and Olusanya) argued about the need to see human populations as 
more than just rates and figures.
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It was with this background that I contributed to the growth of the Demog-
raphy Unit at the University of Cape Coast, and later I arrived in Holland for 
my doctoral programme in development studies with a focus on population 
and rural development. After I arrived in ISS, my supervisor (Christine Syl-
vester), having read my proposal, wanted it to have a more substantive feel 
than the rates I promised to calculate. She advised that I add gender perspec-
tives on childbearing, to which I curtly replied ‘we study women’. And later 
in CERES the man who gave me a book decided not to argue but said that 
my PhD thesis would be fantastic if I could combine my yet-to-be calculated 
rates with some nice life stories on the childbearing aspirations and careers 
of women. The idea was not only to show rates indicating declining fertility 
of Ghanaian women, but to explain better the processes of this decline. One 
large question was whether lower fertility would be the end of demographic 
transition in Africa in general and Ghana in particular. 
Demographic transition theory
Demography is a science short on theory but rich in quantification. In spite 
of this, it has produced one of the best-documented generalizations in the so-
cial sciences: the demographic transition (Kirk 1996). According to Caldwell 
(1976), ‘our interpretation of past population movements and our expecta-
tions about future trends rest primarily on a body of observations and ex-
planations known as demographic transition theory’. Stripped to essentials it 
states that societies experience modernization progress from a pre-modern 
regime of high fertility and high mortality to a post-modern one in which 
both are low. Basically, fertility is high in poor, traditional societies because of 
high mortality, the lack of opportunities for individual advancement, and the 
economic value of children. All these things change to lower fertility levels 
with modernization or urban industrialization, when individuals, once their 
viewpoints become oriented to the changes that have taken place, can make 
use of the new opportunities. In the transition process, a decline in mortality 
occurs first, and a decline in fertility much later, implying a period with high 
population growth as a transition period. The African demographic context 
finds itself in this stage of transition of high fertility and declining mortality. 
The resulting population figures do not bode well for per capita economic in-
dices, which in comparison with other world regions look bleak. And with in-
creasing numbers of migrants braving the unforgiving Sahara, perilous times 
in dinghies across the Mediterranean,27 and lengthy times camping in Calais 
27 BBC Online, Europe migrant crisis: EU blamed for ‘soaring’ death toll. www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-40515054 6 July 2017. Europe.
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for opportunities to cross into the UK, the question of further increases in 
Africa’s population goes beyond the discourse on food and water security in 
the continent.
 The Danish government was more direct on 12 July 2017, when the coun-
try pledged more funds for family planning in developing nations so as to 
‘limit the migration pressure on Europe’.28 This argument may appear clear 
and convincing, but fertility behaviour has elements and implications that 
are more complex or debatable, which impact on ways of looking at demo-
graphic change within and across countries. Cursory evidence from Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, and in some parts of Nigeria and Ghana indicated that child-
bearing levels may rise as people’s income increased. Demographic transition 
in some countries outside Africa has been aided by enforced contraception. 
Take for instance India: during the 1975 Emergency, a ‘gruesome campaign’ 
to sterilize 6.2 million men in just under a year was carried out under the di-
rection of Sanjay Gandhi and a government encouraged by loans in millions 
of dollars from international sources (Biswas 2014; McCoy 2014).
 
Back to the man who gave me a book. I was to meet him on two other oc-
casions: one short, and the other long. The former was in ISS when I met 
him with Mathew Kurian, who gleefully introduced him as ‘my supervisor’. 
Mathew, of Indian parentage but Nigerian by birth, bonded well with me 
in ISS—especially when I told him his supervisor had given me a book at a 
previous meeting. Years later, on the other occasion, theatre stage Leiden, I 
met the man in the corridors of the ASC, near the secretariat bordering the 
director’s office. The man who gave me a book, with his usual charismatic 
smile, informed me upon my questioning about what he came to do in the 
ASC that he was the new director. Everything appeared to fall in place. Still 
standing, we had our first discussions on research plans. Tracking Develop-
ment (TD) was not in the desired trajectory at this time; I had not been given 
space to conduct the kinds of research I promised as a demographer during 
my interview. Despite the hiatus, I had already published elsewhere what TD 
authorities deemed unimportant. One of the papers (credit to the advice of 
Jan Kees van Donge) was based on a list that I had made of all ministers in 
Nigeria and Indonesia from 1970 up to 1999, which enabled me to statisti-
cally relate tenure of office of government ministers to policy performance. 
Outside TD, I had worked with Francesco Carchedi on the subject of forced 
labour in Nigeria. It turned out that Francesco had been Ton’s colleague 30-
odd years back. Ton rescued TD, and I eventually published a comparison 
28 BBC Online, Denmark’s contraception aid to Africa ‘to limit migration’. www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-40588246 12 July 2017. Europe.
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of population policies of Nigeria and Indonesia. Other discussions with Ton 
led to an examination of food and water security in Africa, on which I had 
a bit of side knowledge (Hilderink et al. 2012; Oyeniyi & Akinyoade 2012). 
This culminated in a book publication titled Digging deeper: Inside Africa’s 
agricultural, food and nutritional dynamics, under the responsibility of the 
AFCA collaborative research group (Akinyoade et al. 2014). 
 It was in between the collaborative research and teaching activities that 
Ton gave a rousing and inspired inaugural address (Julius-Adeoye in attend-
ance), where as an incurable optimist Ton informed the world that Africa 
has a rosy future. Using evidence from the deployment of PADev in Ghana, 
it was discovered that development initiatives are mainly improving the lives 
of people who are regarded locally as being in the rich and middle-income 
groups. Development agencies working in our research areas are most suc-
cessful at directly improving the level of well-being of the upper part of the 
bottom of the pyramid (those who have slightly better education, are more 
entrepreneurial, have easier access to land, water, and public services, and are 
better connected to the rich and powerful both economically and politically). 
These are the ones who are not addicted to alcohol or drugs (do not engage 
in substance abuse), do not have excessive debts, and do not have a history of 
failure or ‘bad luck’ in life (Dietz 2011).
 Ton turned the optimism up a notch by stating how FAOSTAT indicated 
that
over the last fifty years, African farmers have succeeded in achieving a higher 
yield per hectare for all crops, with the exception of vegetables. The yield in-
creases were most pronounced for fruit and cereals, with almost a doubling 
of average yields. Roots and tubers showed a 61% improvement in yield ... 
[Where] yield and acreage data are combined, the aggregated results for all 
major food crops show that Africa is better able to feed its population to-
day than it was in 1961, despite its huge population increase over these fifty 
years. Both now and then, Africa produced, on average, a little more than 
the minimum food requirements for a healthy life, as outlined by the World 
Health Organization, although many Africans still do not get enough food 
every day. (ibid.)
In the area of physical infrastructure, ‘various sources suggest an overall 
growth in air transport facilities and far better connectivity for major parts 
of the continent with outside destinations’ (though internal connectivity re-
quires substantial improvements). Road networks had vastly improved, num-
bers of vehicles had increased. Electricity provision had been slow, but new 
investments were being made, as Northern and Southern Africa had reached 
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electricity coverage of more than 80% (in these two regions, households us-
ing modern fuel were approximately 50%). Investments in communication 
infrastructure were booming, instigating rapid change in people’s connectiv-
ity (cf. de Bruijn 2009)
 Furthermore, urbanization had been on the increase since 1960. It had in-
creased from 20% living in cities to 50% at the turn of the century. In the do-
main of human capabilities, health and education also improved a great deal 
over a similar time scale, even though Africa trailed behind in achievement 
of the MDGs. Health-wise, Africans have much better access to safe drinking 
water than 50 years ago. Life expectancy has improved tremendously, such 
that by 2008, no African country had life expectancy figures in the thirties an-
ymore; 14 countries made the 50-60 years range; people living in five others 
have survival chances of over age 70 years, despite the decline in Zambia and 
Botswana due to the HIV/AIDS problem. Many countries have achieved near 
universal literacy, which is the result of investments particularly in primary 
education. It was recalled that in the 1960s and 1970s, economic growth was 
bleak in many parts of Africa; by 2009 economic growth had varied, with 
many countries experiencing remarkably high economic growth, such that 
signs of an ‘emerging Africa’ were evident. On the socio-political scene, Ton 
averred that compared with 1990, many African governments and presidents 
came to power as a result of multi-party elections; and there is clearly a per-
ception of increasing decency, based on improved African performance in 
indexes such as the Democracy Index, Corruption Perception Index, Legal 
Rights Index, Freedom Index, and the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Govern-
ance. While there is still a lot of room for improvement, regular elections, 
legal protection for business interests, and improved press freedom are pos-
itive developments.
 On the economic front, ‘[t]he target of reducing extreme poverty rates 
by half was met five years ahead of the 2015 deadline.’ Food production had 
more than caught up with the extreme growth of population: in the 1960-
2010 time frame, as population growth experienced a 3-fold increase, ag-
ricultural land had shown a 2-fold increase, yields nearly 2-fold increase, 
chickens over 5-fold increase, and food value per capita more than 1-fold 
increase. In stark figures, Africa’s population increased from 275 million in-
habitants in 1961 to 994 million in 2012 (an impressive or threatening 3.62-
fold increase in 51 years). The situation in the 1980s and 1990s did indeed 
look rather gloomy, as Africa experienced a number of dramatic food crises 
and famines; however, looking at the last 50 years as a whole, most of Afri-
ca’s food production has increased more than population growth. Although 
its traditional export crops increased by less impressive percentages, Africa’s 
agricultural production volume became more oriented toward Africa itself, 
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particularly at the turn of the century. Interestingly, increases were observed 
for all the major basic food categories: cereals, pulses, and particularly roots 
and tubers.
 Nutritionally, Africa’s total (potential) food availability can be expressed 
in terms of the food energy and proteins available for human consumption in 
Africa. In Figure 4.1 below, we can see how total food availability increased 
since 1961: energy per capita increased by 31% and protein per capita by 30%. 
Instructively, hunger and undernutrition in Africa were actually not a matter 
of limited total quantities available for human consumption but of inade-
quate distribution. Therefore, in terms of dietary composition, consumption 
per capita, and average wealth levels, these figures represented impressive 
improvements for Africa, a continent that has also experienced a tremendous 
population explosion. It was cautioned that behind the averages there is con-
siderable diversity, and that despite all the improvements in food availability, 
nutrition for the ‘bottom half ’ of the population remains problematic. All 
the evidence provided by Ton Dietz in his inaugural address as well as sub-
sequent joint publications did indicate ‘Africa rising’. The President of United 
States could not have done better in an annual address, which always has a 
statement that the state of the union is strong (Carter 2016).
Figure 4.1
Growth in Africa’s food available per capita at retail level, 2011 (index compared with 
1961=100). Source: Adapted from Akinyoade et al. 2014
In 2008, a near-similar pattern led Barack Obama to stress the audacity of 
hope; but leaving the presidency eight years later after two tenures, his wife 
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Michele Obama stated: ‘We are feeling what not having hope looks like’, as 
the Democrats lost national elections to Republican Donald Trump (Scott 
2016). It was sheer coincidence that in the same time frame Ton also started 
having doubts about the maintenance of Africa’s economic growth and de-
velopment toward the end of 2016, despite evidence supporting his earlier 
optimism. But permit us to digress a little before we present statistics that 
appeared to dent Ton’s optimism.
 Africa experienced mainly stagnation and crisis in the 1970s and 1980s; 
the 1990s marked the beginnings of recovery; high economic growth became 
the norm in the 2000s, as six African countries were counted among the 
world’s ten Fastest Growing Economies (FGE); for 2010-15, further take-off 
was predicted for seven African countries among the ten FGE. But in 2014, 
a slowing down of growth coupled with major trade deficits was observed 
(Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2
Exports and imports in Africa, 2005-16. Source: Adapted from www.trademap.org
Stephen Ellis had earlier cautioned in his book Seasons of rain: Africa in the 
world (2012)—though not in direct response to our book on Africa’s agricul-
tural productivity—that the notion of ‘Africa rising’ should be approached 
with caution. Some portions of this book and other questions led Ton to 
examine the 2010-15 data, which prompted his worries in late 2016. Ju-
lius-Adeoye and I observed Ton’s worry; the statistics appear to indicate Af-
rica in trouble once again. It is true that the improved commodity prices that 
fuelled the growth observed in many African countries are now experiencing 
falling prices. And regarding its population, Professor Alcinda Honwana (a 
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former holder of the Prins Claus Chair) had also presented millions of Afri-
can youths as being in ‘waithood’, as population projections signify upcom-
ing billions that will need to be fed and clothed, draining the continent’s lean 
purse.
Waithood constitutes a twilight zone, or an interstitial space, where the 
boundaries between legal and illegal, proper and improper, and right and 
wrong are often blurred. It is precisely at this juncture that young people 
are forced to make choices. Their decisions help to define their relationships 
towards work, family, and intimacy, as well as the type of citizens they will 
become. Rather than being a short interruption in their transition to adult-
hood, waithood is gradually replacing conventional adulthood itself. (see 
Honwana 2014: 2438)
Ton lamented in a lecture to MA students in Leiden (December 2016) that 
although Africa’s private sector grew, it was more a case of female traders 
participating in the informal sector coupled with slow growth of secure jobs 
and not a growth in industry. He went on to describe a continent with little 
involvement of government in facilitating employment (where many young 
people with good education are not working in paid jobs), increasing outmi-
gration, strong growth of remittances, and growth of microcredit (but mainly 
thanks to secular NGOs). He concluded that though change agents are still 
mainly NGOs and government, the involvement of the private sector in gen-
erating jobs is still not strong enough. And while foreign aid has played an 
important role as a driver of change, it will become rooted only if embedded 
in local agencies. Such agencies are generally much appreciated, but people 
not only judge ‘initiatives’ by the outcome (practical success) but also by the 
process (respect, decent relationships, trust, dependability). In general, all 
areas are experiencing both population pressure on local resources and ex-
panding expectations for a ‘better living’. 
 But, ‘we ought to be cautious about the data we use … We have gotten 
Africa wrong so many times’ (Fabricius, 2015). The Tracking Development 
project encourages us to consider that before a pattern can be deemed to be 
sustained, it needs to follow at least five years of similar trajectory. To us, Ton 
had observed only one year of dip, and we make bold to say it is not déjà vu 
1980s Africa. And we also make bold to say there is a new resilience in Afri-
ca’s economic activities and productive potential, which will not allow these 
warnings to be manifested in reality. Developments in the informal sector 
led to a new rebasing of Nigeria’s economy that propelled it into becoming 
the foremost African economic giant; mobile connectivity is engendering 
new forms of social and financial transactions and inclusion: entrepreneur-
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ship, health care delivery, frugal innovations (Heilbron et al. 2017; Rouse & 
Verhoef 2017). In terms of health services, mobile phone-based technolog-
ical innovations are changing the service delivery landscape in Africa, es-
pecially among poor populations and those living in fragile states (Brinkel 
2014; Kimenyi 2015); and in some areas, mid-level cadres are being used as 
substitutes for internationally mobile health professionals, saving lives and 
hard currency (Dovlo 2004). On the demographic side, waithood is leading 
to new modes of childbearing that will not result in the envisaged popula-
tion explosion scenario. Longer birth intervals and reductions in fertility rate 
among women are emerging in West Africa. Population pyramids of North-
ern and Southern Africa have started taking on the Western shape of low-
er dependency burden; intra-African migrations are yielding more positive 
effects—new entrepreneurs, the use of frugal innovations to better African 
society—all conspiring toward positive results which will be more rooted by 
2030, two decades earlier than the worst-case scenario projected in the world 
population data sheet (Gewald et al. 2012; Akinyoade & Gewald 2015). The 
level of current birth rates and Africa’s youthful population imply that, for 
the foreseeable future, labour will be available to drive economic productivity 
in the continent. 
 Honwana (2014) examined the lives of young people struggling with un-
employment and sustainable livelihoods in the context of widespread social 
and economic crisis in four African countries: Mozambique, Senegal, South 
Africa, and Tunisia. Failed neo-liberal economic policies, bad governance, 
and the political instability of the 1980s had caused stable jobs to disappear—
and without jobs, young people cannot support themselves and their fami-
lies. By the turn of the century, many young Africans in the aforementioned 
countries were discovered to be living in ‘waithood’—a period of suspension 
between childhood and adulthood, a state of limbo that appeared to be re-
placing conventional adulthood. For Honwana, the emergence of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ in Tunisia was an outcome of the crisis of joblessness and restricted 
futures, occasioned by the high unemployment experienced by the youth. 
Thus we need to caution that predicting changes in social systems is tricky. 
The Failed States Index (a composite of a dozen demographic, economic, 
political, and military indicators, covering 177 countries, and supposed to 
reveal which states around the globe are weak and failing) is supposed to 
give an ‘early warning of conflict … to policymakers and the public at large’ 
(Goodwin 2011). The assumption is that political conflict is more likely to oc-
cur where one finds weak and failing states. But the Failed States Index data 
for 2010 failed to suggest that conflict was about to erupt in the Arab world. 
Paradoxically, the index predicted an ‘African Spring’, as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Cameroon featured in the top 25 most weak 
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and failing states; only one Arab country, Yemen (ranked thirteenth), fell into 
the group. Arab Spring occurred elsewhere, and as Kurzman (2004) conclud-
ed, these estimations cannot be known in advance; nor can the willingness 
to participate. Even the most thorough survey could not have predicted very 
far into the future; for this reason, revolutions will remain unpredictable. The 
events of the Arab Spring remind us that demographic, economic, religious, 
and political processes within each country are not entirely independent. 
This reality violates many of the assumptions built into our analyses, so we 
need to be more careful when we construct our models (Saideman 2012).
 Youth in waithood is not limited to Africa alone; a similar phenomenon 
is conceptualized as parasaito shinguru in Japan. This youth crisis is global. 
And despite the fact that marriage and motherhood are still the most impor-
tant markers of adulthood for young African women, the crisis has resulted 
in a much longer wait to start childbearing, or an increase in birth intervals 
for those who already have a child (Akinyoade 2011)—which ironically is re-
sponsible for the observed slowing rate of population growth. This is quite 
different from the factors responsible according to the first accounts of de-
mographic transition theory, thereby questioning the global applicability of 
the theory. Populations in transition need to be understood in terms of costs 
of transition, social contexts of transition, and the future of transition. Par-
ticularly for Ghana, it is emerging that as women with higher education ac-
quire better job and employment conditions, fertility aspirations change, and 
lower fertility rates are likely not to be the end of the current transition, as 
demographic transition theory would have led us to assume. Fertility decline 
will occur in Ghana, but not to the level that will threaten replacement fer-
tility. Currently, societies in the four African countries that Honwana stud-
ied seem not to endow young men and women with the social, economic, 
cultural, and moral resources they need to follow robust pathways to adult-
hood. Some of the youth risk all to travel across the Sahara to reach Europe 
in search of a better life. Many of those that survive the brutal Sahara and 
the Mediterranean graveyard confront another form of waithood in Calais,29 
where they camp for years in the hope of getting a better life in the UK, just 
across the Channel. 
 But the ‘waithood generation’ also possesses a tremendous transforma-
tive potential, as young people understand that the struggle to attain free-
dom from want requires radical social and political change. From riots and 
protests in the streets of Maputo, Dakar, Madrid, London, New York, and 
Santiago, to revolutions that overthrow dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya, the waithood generation appears to be conquering freedom from fear 
29 Calais Migrant Crisis, www.mirror.co.uk/all-about/calais-migrant-crisis
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and fighting for their rights. Waithood is creative; waithood is transform-
ative. For the ‘African youthman, it will get worse before it gets better’, as 
espoused in the lyrics of a popular song in Sierra Leone (Honwana 2012). 
Newer engagement is needed for taming the wild, ungoverned digital and 
political spaces in bourgeoning super-urban environments spreading from 
Lagos through Cotonou, to Lome, and to Accra. For now, the youth and soci-
ety at large will continue to adapt to new forms of waithood. Young people in 
waithood are dynamic, and they use their agency and creativity to invent new 
forms of being and interacting with society. Thousands of youths formerly 
labelled as illegal refinery operators are now being attracted to work with 
modular refineries in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Their new-found jobs as legally 
recognized artisanal refinery operators has positive implications for employ-
ment, income generation, and financial inclusion, bringing less reliance on 
imported refined oil products and bringing much-desired peace in the Niger 
Delta, which had been rife with militancy, military operations, and general 
instability in the past decade (Obasi 2017). Such ingenious engagement of the 
youth must start in all other areas of Africa; the benefits are unquantifiable.
 The dent in Ton’s optimism on Africa’s Silverlining is an early warning 
sign. Africa is at a critical waithood juncture where it needs to make hard 
choices for socio-economic development. These decisions will help to main-
tain or re-define processes of investment, entrepreneurial development, fi-
nancial inclusion, democracy, public service delivery, work, family, and the 
type of accountable citizens youths will become in the foreseeable future. 
Apart from leveraging human capital, the financial clout of the continent’s 
billionaires is increasingly becoming more important than FDI from outside 
Africa. African countries will gain much from measures aimed at improving 
the domestic investment climate (Ndikumana & Verick 2007). As indicated 
in The Economist (2011), population trends could enhance these promising 
developments. A bulge of better-educated young people of working age is en-
tering the job market, and birth rates are beginning to decline. Though roads 
are generally dreadful, some fundamental numbers are moving in the right 
direction. Africa is still capitalizing on advances in communications, with 
mobile banking and telephonic agro-info enjoying a huge boom. Autocracy, 
corruption, and strife will not disappear overnight. But at a dark time for the 
world economy, Africa’s progress is a reminder of the transformative promise 
of growth. Tourism now accounts for approximately 10% of the continent’s 
economy, with about 40% of tourists coming from within Africa.30 Analysts 
say liberalizing air transport and further relaxing visa rules could boost tour-
ism further. In addition, over 90% of African billionaires on the Forbes List 
30 BBC Online, Big jump in African tourists, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 40519226 
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actually earned and invested their money in Africa. Dangote, for instance, 
has inspired and expanded cement manufacturing in African countries far 
more than foreign investors from outside Africa have ever done. Thus the 
continent is fast approaching self-sufficiency in the construction sector. Food 
security remains a challenge only in distribution, not in production. Other 
Nigerian tycoons are urging youth across the continent to embrace entre-
preneurship. Impact Hub in Accra has been established toward engendering 
an enabling environment for the next wave of successful (West) African en-
trepreneurs. Across Africa, it was estimated in 2016 that there are over 314 
active ‘tech hubs’, of which nearly three-fifths are incubators or accelerators 
(Sleurink 2017). These developments signpost that waithood is not for all 
African youth. And, in the Netherlands, Gerd Junne of the Network Univer-
sity (TNU) announced a free online course titled ‘From Brain Drain to Brain 
Gain’, spanning six weeks from 28 February to 11 April 2017. This course was 
designed to show the measures that countries of origin of highly educated 
migrants have taken to harness the potential of their diaspora for the devel-
opment of the country. The aim is to assist policy makers to devise strategies 
to increase the interaction with this group and to facilitate their contribution 
to development—turning a ‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain gain’. The man who gave 
me a book and the distinguished gentleman Ton must remain optimistic.
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Revisiting survival strategies from a 
frugal innovation perspective
A research idea
André Leliveld
Introduction
It must have been in 1988, when I had just started my PhD project on ‘infor-
mal social security mechanisms in rural Swaziland’, that my first promoter 
Hans Linnemann advised me to contact Ton Dietz, a human geographer at 
the University of Amsterdam, who had just finished his thesis on survival 
strategies among the Pokot in western Kenya (Dietz 1987). It was already in 
those days not easy to arrange a meeting with him. A note on his office door 
announced strict contact hours for students, among whom I still reckoned 
myself despite being Doctorandus for more than about a year. I managed to 
get an appointment though. His reaction to my PhD project was enthusiastic 
but also critical. Informal social security? What do you mean? Why apply 
such a Western idea and concept to an African rural society? I really needed 
to get a better understanding of how people in African rural societies live 
and work, what their motivations are, and how these relate to their loca-
tion and environment. In other words, I should adopt a human geography 
perspective to understand these kinds of issues, and I would soon become 
aware then that the concept of survival strategies would be much more apt 
for analysing the phenomena I wanted to study. This would have caused a 
radical analytical change in my project, which was much more informed by 
an emerging line of economic literature on risk and insurance in low-income 
countries (Platteau & Abraham 1987; Rosenzweig 1988) and studies in legal 
and economic anthropology on solidarity, reciprocity, and reproduction (Po-
lanyi 1957; Scott 1976; Meillassoux 1981; von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988). 
I decided to stick to my course, perhaps also because of an ‘angry young man’ 
syndrome, and disciplinary boundaries might also have prevented a further 
cross-fertilization and collaboration. After more than 10 years, our roads 
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crossed again on the topic in the WOTRO research project ‘Social Security 
in the Third World’ (1999-2004), of which Ton Dietz was one of the founding 
fathers. He contributed with his vast knowledge and expertise on sustainable 
livelihoods, with which much of his earlier work on survival strategies reso-
nated. In fact, his work in the 1980s on survival strategies among the Pokot 
can be considered a livelihood study avant la lettre. Today, the question can 
be asked what relevance these discussions still have within an increasingly 
dominant discourse on Africa which focuses on the continent’s economic 
growth potential; the role of trade, investment, and business; its rising middle 
class; and its changing and new engagements in the world. The remainder of 
this essay is devoted to launching a research idea which, in line with Dietzian 
thinking, links at first glance unusual suspects—namely, survival strategies 
and frugal innovation. The remainder of this essay takes frugal innovation as 
a point of entry to launch a first explorative idea on how studies on survival 
and livelihood strategies can benefit frugal innovation studies. 
The rise of frugal innovation
The Economist (2010) placed frugal innovation in the spotlight, and since 
then it has become an emerging field of scientific interest. Frugal innovation 
aims ‘to do more and better with less’ and has its roots in the Indian practice 
of jugaad innovation, a colloquial Hindi and Punjabi word used to signify 
creativity and a ‘make do’ attitude (Radjou & Prabhu 2015) to respond to 
limitations in resources, whether financial, material, or institutional. Gener-
ic definitions refer to frugal innovations as new, smart (re)combinations of 
available technologies, new business models and marketing models which 
lead to products, services, or systems that are considerably cheaper but 
maintain functionality, are affordable to low-income customers, and appli-
cable in resource-constrained environments (Bhatti 2012; Knorringa et al. 
2016). These products, services, and systems designed and produced by cor-
porate business are not second-grade but characterized by good value for 
money; and the technology within frugal products, services, or systems can 
still be highly sophisticated. Examples include mobile money services (such 
as M-Pesa), portable ultrasound devices, single-use washing sachets suitable 
for cold water, the Q drum (rollable water container), WakaWaka lights, and 
cheap but reliable smartphones (Figure 5.1).
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Portable ultrasound Single-use washing sachets
Rollable water container (Q drum) WakaWaka lamp
Figure 5.1
Examples of frugal innovation
Frugal innovation as a topic of academic interest evolved initially from the 
‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ (BoP) discourse that arose in the business manage-
ment and organization literature in the early 2000s. The BoP discourse sug-
gests that businesses can find fortune by serving ‘the billions of aspiring poor 
who are joining the market economy for the first time’ (Prahalad & Hall 2002, 
cited in Knorringa et al. 2016). Those living on less than US $2 a day, an esti-
mated 4 billion people worldwide, including Africa, would constitute a mega 
and still unsaturated market of ‘micro consumers’, who are underserved by 
existing products and services. Frugal innovations could lead to products, 
services, and systems that are affordable for low-income consumers and offer 
solutions to problems that arise from living in resource-constrained envi-
ronments. International businesses have picked up this message since then. 
Among advocates, the ability of international businesses to serve the needs 
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of the BoP through frugal innovations has been celebrated as a ‘win-win’ 
proposition that would generate profits and simultaneously alleviate poverty 
(Prahalad 2006). Academic research on ‘inclusive business for the poor’ (al-
ternatively ‘social business’, ‘pro-poor business’, or ‘inclusive capitalism’) has 
started to address questions such as how to marry profits with social aims, 
assuming that ‘business activities can contribute to the long-term goal of 
poverty alleviation by embedding the neglected poor parts of the world pop-
ulation into efficient value chains and market structures’ (Hahn 2012: 51).
 Soon thereafter, a critical strand of literature—rooted in development 
studies—started to question the premises behind the BoP and frugal innova-
tion discourses. Critical approaches to the BoP literature suggest that a better 
understanding is required on how corporate profits and the needs of the poor 
might be combined, whereas others simply dismiss outright such possible 
win-win scenarios
 For example, BoP rhetoric might aggravate poverty and inequality by re-
constituting poor people as ‘modern’ and value-conscious consumers, with 
unmet needs and wants that can only be satisfied through capitalist enter-
prise and market involvement (Dolan 2012). And multinationals might well 
crowd out local resources, transfer inappropriate technologies or practices, 
and enhance dependency (Meagher & Lindell 2013). BoP approaches also 
perceive people living in a resource-constrained environment only as the re-
ceivers of innovations, as consumers. But that is not the case. They are ca-
pable of innovating for themselves, of adapting innovations to fit with their 
requirements and environments, and they know what they want (bottom-up 
processes), but at times they do not have the means to achieve their objective 
(Bhaduri 2016). It is perhaps at the BoP itself where we may find the ‘true’ 
frugal innovations. This latter observation will be explored in more detail 
below. 
Frugal innovations at the BoP
The idea that poor people are not only receivers of (frugal) innovations but 
can be also innovators themselves relates to a point that development schol-
ars have been making for a long time—that innovations for the global North 
do not always satisfy the requirements of the global South. In the current 
frugal innovation literature, some scholars therefore emphasize the need 
to alter the process and organizational structure of frugal innovative activ-
ities (Prahalad 2012; Radjou & Prabhu 2015) to be able to reach out to the 
BoP. This view shares the spirit of the discourses on ‘appropriate technolo-
gy’ (Stewart 1978) and ‘technological capability’ (Lall 1987). The appropriate 
technology discourse relies heavily on Schumacher’s legacy of ‘small is beau-
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tiful’ (Schumacher 1973) and took a radical approach to reconfigure techno-
logical activities in the global South by breaking away from the large-scale 
technological projects of the North. The technological capability school ar-
gue that developing economies cannot remain inactive recipients of technol-
ogies transferred from the global North. Rather, these economies must un-
dertake well-articulated searches toward the adaptation and assimilation of 
the transferred technologies (Lall 1987; Bhaduri 2016). Both the appropriate 
technology and technological capability schools of thought worked out dif-
ferently though in practice, and they did not succeed into creating a radical 
breakthrough in the dominant position of Northern actors in innovations for 
and in the global South. 
 According to Prince Claus Chair holder Professor Saradindu Bhaduri, 
the frugal innovation discourse opens up a new possibility in this discussion, 
however, by explicitly referring to the behavioural characteristics of agents 
and economic activities in informal economies in the discourse on innova-
tion (Bhaduri 2016).31 He refers to Radjou et al. (2012), who highlight the cre-
ative improvisations of individual economic actors who come up with small 
but creative solutions and innovative fixes for resource-constrained environ-
ments. These types of innovations are referred to as jugaad (in India), zizhu 
chuanxin (in China), and gambiarra (in Brazil) and are in many cases devel-
oped in large urban informal industrial clusters, of which jua kali in Kenya 
and Suame Magazine in Ghana are good examples (Figure 5.2). 
By focusing on the creative improvisations or ‘make-do-attitude’ of infor-
mal sector agents who are part of the BoP themselves, Bhaduri (2016) and 
others (Bhatti 2012; Radjou & Prabhu 2015) show that the terms ‘frugal’ and 
‘frugality’ are not as new as we may think, but have been part of people’s 
daily practices for centuries. In this respect Bhatti (2012: 13) maintains that 
‘frugal innovation has always occurred since the invention of Neanderthal 
hand tools from stones and bones to make do with what is on hand’. Bha-
duri (2016) refers to Adam Smith, who as early as 1776 observed frugality ‘in 
demonstrating the value of “experience” in offering innovative solutions to 
frequently encountered problems in daily lives’ (Smith 1776, quoted in Bha-
duri 2016). But since the early industrial revolution, there has been a move 
toward mass consumption and therewith a need for mass production and 
high-end innovations, as a consequence of which the old concept of frugality 
slipped out of sight.
31 Ton Dietz is member of the Curatorium of the Prince Claus Chair, which carries out the 
procedure of the appointment of a candidate to the Prince Claus Chair. Professor Saradindu 
Bhaduri held the Chair between 2015 and 2017. Website: www.princeclauschair.nl
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Jua kali lamp Jua kali water tap locks 
Jugaad waterpump Jua kali charcoal stove
Figure 5.2
Examples of jua kali and jugaad innovations
The term ‘innovation’ also needs reconsideration here. Innovation is only in 
some cases disruptive, creating completely new development trajectories in 
societies (steam engine, electricity, computer). More often than not, inno-
vation comes from the cumulative effect of implementing small-scale ideas 
over prolonged periods of time. It is a process that encompasses the acts of 
numerous individuals, not only the original inventors but also the produc-
ers, consumers, and middlemen that transmit and operationalize the innova-
tions, making them acceptable to society (Gewald et al. 2012). Innovation in 
this sense thus refers to processes of invention, adoption, adaptation, appro-
priation, and transformation—not only of products but also of systems, and 
not only scientific and technological products and systems, but including all 
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institutional, organizational, social, and political dimensions (see also Bhat-
ti 2012). These notions of ‘minor innovation’ and ‘incremental innovations’ 
are nowadays much more accepted among scholars, practitioners, and policy 
makers in the field of development and have brought the creative solutions by 
entrepreneurs operating in the informal economy and by members in local 
communities much more above the radar. 
Linking frugal innovation and survival and livelihood studies
In short, for understanding phenomena of frugal innovation and frugality 
better, the creative improvisations at the BoP in the forms of jugaad, zizhu 
chuanxin, gambiarra, or jua kali are an important source of knowledge 
about frugal behaviour and activities. Therefore, we have witnessed a sig-
nificant rise in interest among academic scholars in recognizing informal 
economic spheres as reservoirs of knowledge, skills, and creativity (Daniels 
2010; Obeng-Odoom & Ameyawb 2014), besides the traditional focus on the 
exploitative work conditions of this sphere. White (2014: 22) notes that the 
informal economy is not just a ‘dwelling for the poor people and home to 
indecent work, a lot of wealth is generated, stored and circulated informally 
within the informal sector’.
 In his inaugural address, Bhaduri (2016) concludes that little energy has 
been spent, however, on contributing to a meaningful understanding of the 
way this reservoir of knowledge in the informal economy persists or evolves. 
He notes that such an understanding requires an intense engagement with 
the motivations behind the knowledge-generating activities, the underlying 
mechanisms used to approach uncertainty, and the affinity for solving the 
problems of daily life by the people at the BoP (ibid.). As Badhuri notes:
the long neglect of the informal sector by the scholars of innovation and 
technology has indeed created a vacuum of theoretical scholarship through 
which one would have liked to analyse the knowledge-generating activ-
ities in this sector. It is, therefore, a challenge of the current generations 
of researchers (all of us) to ground our discussion in a suitable theoretical 
framework to meaningfully contribute to the emerging frugal innovation 
discourse. (ibid. 17) 
I think that Bhaduri’s challenge is valid but his observations on the long ne-
glect may be too pessimistic. It is precisely in the numerous studies on sur-
vival and livelihood strategies that have been conducted since the 1980s that 
we can find many examples of frugal innovations at the BoP. The ways in 
which the Pokot in Kenya deal in their water and herd management with-
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in their resource-constrained environment are expressions of frugality, cre-
ative solutions which try to ensure survival, rooted in generational transfer 
of predominantly tacit, non-codified knowledge. Frugal innovations which 
can provide affordable solutions for water management, for example, should 
build on this vast reservoir of knowledge to be effective and accepted. One 
of Dietz’s key messages in his academic work is exactly this: uninformed ex-
ternal interventions may disturb a delicate balance between man and his en-
vironment with catastrophic consequences. This message is as relevant to 
development agencies as it is to business propositions that aim to produce 
and market frugal innovations for the BoP. 
 So, a first step in addressing the challenge by Bhaduri is to revisit the 
numerous studies on survival and livelihood strategies that have been done 
in the past, either in Africa, Latin America, or Asia, and look through a fru-
gal innovation lens at their theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings. 
These studies will generate a vast amount of information on people’s capa-
bilities to create innovative solutions to be able to survive within and deal 
with the resource constraints they meet in daily life, and the knowledge that 
underlies these capabilities. We may also gain more insight into the factors 
which determine the success or failure of these solutions. And we could learn 
more about the methodologies that can be used to provide us with a broader 
and deeper understanding of frugality and frugal innovations. For instance, 
it would be interesting to take PADev methodology, developed by Dietz and 
others (see Dietz et al. 2013 and www.padev.nl), and explore how it could 
help us to gain more and better insights into histories of innovation and in-
novation trajectories in communities and regions in Africa and elsewhere 
in the global South. Intuitively, scholars seek for new, paradigm-changing 
insights. But sometimes adopting a frugal approach and lens in research by 
revisiting older concepts, paradigms, and methodologies and re-using and 
redesigning them accordingly might yield equally interesting results and in-
sights. The proverbial ‘not to re-invent the wheel again’ might be applicable 
here. 
Concluding note
The research on frugal innovation in Africa and elsewhere across the globe 
has gained momentum now, and various research institutes and centres 
across the world have started research projects on frugal innovation, with 
the aim to understand better the phenomenon of frugal innovation and its 
underlying idea of frugality: What exactly is frugal innovation? How does it 
manifest itself and what makes it different from other sorts of innovation? 
Does a better understanding of frugal innovations lead to a new paradigm 
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in innovation and development studies? How is frugal innovation related to 
discourses on the 4th industrial revolution? And what are its implications 
for (understanding) local and global developmental challenges and policies 
(Sustainable Development Goals)? 
 To address and investigate these questions, Leiden University, Delft Uni-
versity of Technology, and Erasmus University Rotterdam established the 
Centre for Frugal Innovation in Africa (CFIA) in 2014. On behalf of Leiden 
University, the African Studies Centre is a co-founder and constituting part-
ner of CFIA. Ton Dietz is a member of CFIA’s Steering Committee, while I 
participate in CFIA as Associate Director and researcher. Ton Dietz’ succes-
sor at the ASC will probably succeed him in CFIA’s Steering Committee as 
well, but I hope our roads will continue to cross on how studies on surviv-
al and livelihood strategies can yield further insights into frugal innovation 
phenomena among people who have to deal and cope with daily challenges 
and uncertainties in African rural and urban areas. His contact hours may be 
more numerous and more flexible after retirement. I am not an ‘angry young 
man’ anymore. This sounds like a good recipe for a fruitful and continued 
exchange of ideas on the above issues. 
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From ‘Livelihood & Environment’ 
to assessing livelihoods and 
development aid
Leo de Haan
Introduction
There is no doubt Ton Dietz and I share a long-standing interest in poor 
people’s livelihoods. Therefore, I thought it would be worthwhile to uncover 
where that joint interest came from, how it evolved over time, and where it 
is now. The trajectories of our academic careers have crossed many times 
in the past four decades, but for the purpose of this paper I will limit myself 
to those crossings which were relevant to our interest in the livelihoods of 
the poor. Undoubtedly, this brief quest into the past—that is what it has be-
come—suffers from forgetfulness. Information has slipped my memory, and 
this account might even be the product of a selective memory. Moreover, it 
most certainly suffers from ‘presentism’—that is, we imagine that we give an 
objective interpretation of the past, but in reality contemporary ideas colour 
our interpretation. Was it not Jan Blokker who wrote: ‘Geschiedenis is niet 
wat er gebeurd is, geschiedenis is wat de mensen zich herinneren’? [‘History is 
not what has happened; history is what people remember.’ My translation]. 
Hence, I will offset that bias by embedding that story line in a second, more 
objective story line, that of the scientific evolution of the concept of liveli-
hoods itself. The first section deals therefore with the origins of the liveli-
hoods concept. The second section shows how the concept matured. The 
third section discusses ways to examine livelihoods beyond the household 
level and beyond the case, and the fourth section places the same issue in the 
context of assessing development aid. In the final section, I will demonstrate 
how Ton’s academic work came full circle. 
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Livelihood & Environment
‘Livelihood & Environment’ was the name of a research group, which Ton 
and I were part of in the 1980s, of geographers and urban planners of devel-
oping countries in the Faculty of Environmental Sciences at the University of 
Amsterdam. It was the first time that a Dutch research group labelled itself 
explicitly as working on livelihoods. Nowadays, ‘Livelihood & Environment’ 
would certainly be written in the plural, acknowledging that under contem-
porary post-modernism there are many realities and thus many livelihoods 
and many environments. But in those days, we were all positivist quanti-
tative researchers: straightforward modernists for whom the singular was 
good enough. I am not sure who came up with that label, but credits should 
probably go to Ton and Ad de Bruijne, who led the group as chair in human 
geography of developing countries. I will explain further below why that la-
bel—innovative at first sight—was also solidly grounded in the tradition of 
geography. 
 ‘Livelihood & Environment’ was not the first research programme on de-
velopment in the faculty. That was SALPA (Semi-Arid Lands Project Am-
sterdam) and its informal predecessor, ‘peripheral dry areas’. According to de 
Bruijne et al. (2002: 197), the notion ‘peripheral’ was a relic of the time that 
the Department of Geography at the University of Amsterdam reluctantly 
gave in to the demand of students for development issues in the curriculum, 
without committing itself to ‘real’ developing countries but instead to the 
periphery of Europe. SALPA’s core was a collection of PhD research projects 
of Paolo De Mas, Jan Mansvelt Beck, Ton Dietz, and myself. It was expanded 
in 1985 with Peter Druijven’s PhD project in Mexico after the Department of 
Geography of VU University Amsterdam involuntarily merged with the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam after a countrywide reshuffle of disciplines between 
universities. SALPA focused on 
livelihood strategies in dry areas… all five research projects were concerned 
with problems faced by households living in remote, politically and bureau-
cratically peripheral, and economically backward, rural, semiarid regions…. 
A major objective was to find out whether it might be possible to arrive at 
generalizations which could shed light on processes of change and, more 
specifically, provide insight into the manner in which changes in household 
strategies are conditioned by changes in contextual circumstances, partly in-
duced by governments. (Reitsma et al. 1992: 11)
In fact, a lot of work was done to arrive at meaningful comparisons; but de-
spite the fact that there were many similarities between the field areas in 
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physical conditions, population density, and economic activities, differences 
were also many, making comparison along thematic lines too ambitious (ibid. 
11-12). Indeed, I retain lively memories of numerous attempts to compare 
our research areas on various variables. Often, Ton was the driver, with his 
distinctive style of presenting tables with scores of our fieldwork areas on 
variables such as rainfall, government interventions, seasonality, household 
incomes, and labour migration—to name just a few. 
 Indeed, heterogeneity of fieldwork areas—except for Ton’s north-east-
ern Kenya and my northern Togo having many similarities because of their 
colonial, post-colonial, and geographical background—was one factor that 
hampered comparison. Aridity was supposed to be one converging dimen-
sion, and livelihoods strategies—and especially mechanisms for coping with 
aridity—were thought to be comparable. In my case, aridity always remained 
a delicate issue because, according to climate statistics, northern Togo was 
much too wet to qualify as arid or even semi-arid. But the odd man out was 
still welcome to jump on the bandwagon; SALPA stretched semi-aridity to 
include sub-humid (SA/SH: ‘semi-arid to sub-humid’, as it figured in Ton’s 
comparative tables). Ironically, with hindsight my fieldwork in Togo took 
place in a period, the early 1980s, of particularly low levels of rainfall. 
 The other reason hampering meaningful comparison was the lack of a 
coherent theoretical perspective on the state. From the beginning of the ‘pe-
ripheral dry areas’ project, I remember a number of sessions—usually held 
in Willem Heinemeijer’s office, then chair of human geography—on Tarrow’s 
(1977) Between center and periphery, which should have laid a theoretical 
foundation under our perspective on the state. But I found the discussions, 
dominated by political geographers, largely uninspiring and of little interest 
to developmental state interventions. However, Ton did refer to it in his doc-
toral dissertation.
 In 1989 (according to Reitsma et al. 1992: 11) or 1990 (according to de 
Bruijne et al. 2002: 200) SALPA developed into a new research programme, 
‘Livelihood & Environment’. The new academic policy context of stronger 
top-down research programming, increased accountability for research time 
in terms of efforts and output, increased competition for research funds, a 
focus on young PhD candidates, and more commissioned research required 
more robust planning and coordination—that is, management of research. 
‘Livelihood & Environment’ was a bigger, stronger, and more visible outfit 
than SALPA, not least because it included all geographers and planners of 
developing countries as well as some development economists. Chaired by 
Ad de Bruijne, it aimed to study the practices and possibilities for livelihoods 
of poor groups in developing countries, with particular attention paid to the 
impact of regional contexts and specific local environments (de Bruijne et al. 
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2002: 201). To my perception, the forced merger of Amsterdam geographers 
was the most fortunate event in my early academic career. From a group of 
eager but young, rather inexperienced, rather marginalized, non-Amster-
dam-trained geographers of developing countries, we established with our 
colleagues who came from VU University Amsterdam a lively and strong 
research group. ‘Livelihood & Environment’ became a geuzennaam and a 
vehicle to carve out our territory in geography practice and to distinguish 
ourselves from other geographers in the department, who in our view did 
not look out further into the world than the borders of the city of Amster-
dam. Around the year 2000, the programme merged again into an even larger 
whole, but by that time I had already left for the University of Nijmegen.
 With hindsight, if one compares it with contemporary academic prac-
tice, ‘livelihood’ as a concept was surprisingly under-theorized in the ‘Live-
lihood & Environment’ programme. There was some reference to Norman 
Long’s early work on development practitioners and their interventions—
the so-called development interface. But from the occasional research pro-
gramme meetings I do not remember long and winding theoretical exposés 
and debates. We counted cattle, measured plots, registered harvests, enu-
merated household members, and specified non-agricultural incomes. Then 
we classified them in empirically generated categories and typologies. We did 
become increasingly interested in environmental degradation and manage-
ment of environmental resources, in conflicts, and in the features of the state, 
but again without much theoretical depth. In an overview of Dutch research 
programmes on environment and development for the Werkgemeenschap 
Afrika, Peter Ton and I (de Haan & Ton 1994) classified ‘Livelihood & Envi-
ronment’ under actor-oriented research—to distinguish it from village stud-
ies—and gave an explanation of livelihoods which was clearly inspired by—if 
not even paraphrased (and I do hope not copy-pasted)—introductory texts 
of the ‘Livelihood & Environment’ research programme, which were drawn 
up every few years (and unfortunately have disappeared from my personal 
archives).
 
Livelihood strategies relate to the way people find a place to live, acquire 
goods and services by production and social networks, and obtain an in-
come in order to buy goods and services and to maintain social networks. 
The word ‘strategy’ is used with some reluctance because it suggests a ra-
tional, long-term planning which especially the African poor cannot sustain. 
Livelihood strategies do not exist in a vacuum, but interact with the wider 
(regional, national and international) context and with the local environ-
ment. We emphatically wish to avoid the impression here that livelihood 
strategies are always re-active or defensive. All too often the African rural 
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poor, for example, are seen as victims of inescapable circumstances such 
as drought. In our view, there is in reality a continuous scale, ranging from 
defensive strategies on the one hand to offensive strategies on the other. On 
the extreme defensive end of the scale there are the pure survival strategies 
in periods of environmental disasters such as drought; then come the coping 
mechanisms that serve to deal with regular environmental problems such as 
seasonality. On the offensive end we find activities aimed at improvement, 
for example by means of investment (cf. Reitsma et al. 1992)  … Livelihood 
studies have very often chosen households as their unit of research, since 
households are considered important decision-making units for production 
and consumption. As a consequence, household livelihood strategies also 
take a prominent position in research that attempts to understand the links 
with the environment. (de Haan & Ton 1994: 21-22)
Similarly, Dietz et al. (1992: 42) classified livelihood strategies, after a brief re-
view of the literature, along two dimensions—time and goal—and into four 
categories: recovery, conservation, opportunistic, and improvement. Liveli-
hood strategies in their view have three objectives: meeting daily needs, main-
taining social networks, and preserving or improving productive capacity.
Livelihoods: A serious matter
But then the concept of livelihoods received momentum and became a se-
rious matter. By that time, I had moved to the University of Nijmegen and 
made livelihoods the central concept of my inaugural address and the re-
search plan of the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen I 
was chairing. It received quite some attention in academic and development 
policy and practitioners’ circles, not least because ‘livelihoods’ had broken 
through internationally. DFID had made it its principal approach and had 
asked various reputable academic institutes and think-tanks to develop the 
concept further for development aid purposes. Parallel to this a lively ac-
ademic debate developed in which the livelihoods approach was criticized 
but also furnished with theoretical and methodological bedrocks—a debate 
to which I passionately contributed by positioning ‘livelihoods’ flanked by 
Giddens and Bourdieu, by discussing notions of power, and by surpassing 
the locale through contextualizing livelihoods in globalization. My papers 
with Annelies Zoomers are still being quoted when in geography (de Haan & 
Zoomers 2003) and in development studies (de Haan & Zoomers 2005) the 
principles of livelihoods studies are being reviewed. 
 This need for theory in ‘livelihoods’, I always argued, emerged from my 
new academic context. That is, I not only moved from Amsterdam to Nijme-
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gen but also from disciplinary geography to interdisciplinary development 
studies, be it understood in a social sciences faculty. Perhaps the latter was 
an even more decisive factor. But the soul-searching for this paper also made 
me aware that I have to revise somewhat my statement in the previous sec-
tion on the under-theorization of ‘livelihood’ in ‘Livelihood & Environment’. 
While writing my inaugural lecture (de Haan 2000), the collection of pho-
tocopies, books, papers, and references on my bookshelves was one source 
of inspiration. No doubt, that collection stemmed also from ‘Livelihood & 
Environment’: as in any good research group, we frequently exchanged and 
photocopied ‘interesting stuff’. There were documents by Norman Long and 
Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan—the latter through my French connection—
references to Giddens, livelihood papers from ODI’s Pastoral Development 
Network, and, last but not least, Chambers and Conway’s (1992) founding 
livelihoods paper, defining it as follows:
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and 
social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is 
sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, 
while not undermining the natural resource base. (ibid. 6)
A small innovation grant by CERES, our National Research School, put addi-
tional wind into the sails of ‘livelihoods’. It brought a group of Dutch geogra-
phers, anthropologists, and economists together and it enabled us to deepen 
the concept, to connect it to our various disciplinary traditions in order to 
improve its interdisciplinary potential, and to invite scholars from the UK to 
provide feedback on our paper (Kaag et al. 2004). Ton was CERES director at 
that time and was instrumental in granting the funds.
 Livelihoods studies matured thanks to all these considerations. It carried 
a strong flavour of agency at the start and was a-political (de Haan 2012: 
349), but we realized soon that the poor’s agency is limited by structural con-
straints—by markets, property relations, gender norms, and so on. Liveli-
hoods studies learned to keep an open eye for power struggles and exclu-
sionary mechanisms in livelihoods resulting in marginalization and social 
exclusion of the poor. Moreover, we comprehended the multi-dimensionality 
of poverty and realized that a livelihood was more than an economic activity, 
a material way of making a living: livelihoods also give meaning to the poor’s 
lives. Thus livelihoods became a holistic concept. Livelihoods studies
has after the 1990s come to mean people-centred studies that—through a 
holistic perspective on how they organise themselves a living—illuminate 
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the processes of exclusion they are subject to and think through the inter-
ventions and policies that are intended to counteract that. (de Haan 2016: 6) 
Examining livelihoods beyond the household level and the case
One issue worth discussing further is how livelihoods studies could arrive 
at meaningful generalizations from research that usually takes households, 
families, and nowadays increasingly individuals—think of migrants—as 
point of departure. In my farewell lecture as director of the African Studies 
Centre Leiden, I criticized actor-oriented studies on Africa for their inabili-
ty to arrive at generalizations that would help to reveal long-term trends in 
livelihoods. I partly blamed it, following Chabal (2005), on African studies’ 
‘excessive specialisation’ and ‘tautology of exceptionalism’.
On the one hand, [I found it] logical because an enormous differentiation 
in living conditions is hidden in averages over the long- term, so the picture 
can only be diffuse. However, on the other hand there is also the challenge 
of coming to grips with that same endless variation in living conditions. At-
tempts should be made to deduce conclusions from actor-oriented research 
that surpass the micro level and by doing so enter the debate about macro 
trends in standards of living. This roughly applies to other themes, too, such 
as environmental degradation and climate change, ethnicity and conflict, 
and mobility and migration. Consequently, I call for two supplementary re-
search strategies: meta-analysis and comparative research. (de Haan 2010: 
104-105). 
For livelihoods research, Annelies Zoomers and I pointed already at a specif-
ic method of meta-analysis through the study of livelihoods trajectories and 
pathways. Livelihoods pathways are
patterns of livelihood activities which emerge from a coordination process 
among actors, arising from individual strategic behaviour embedded both 
in a historical repertoire and in social differentiation, including power rela-
tions and institutional processes, both of which play a role in subsequent 
decision-making. (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 45)
Livelihoods trajectories are an important stage in the analysis of pathways 
because these examine individual (household) behaviour. Pathways are the 
collective result of individual trajectories. 
 Needless to say, Ton cannot be identified with that lack of vigour and that 
interest in generalizing. On the contrary, throughout his academic career he 
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wanted to ascend from the case and the specific to the whole and the gen-
eral. Already above, I referred to his drive during SALPA and ‘Livelihood & 
Environment’ to compare the research areas on various indicators, aiming to 
reveal more general processes. He also led a large-scale research project on 
the impact of climate change on drylands in West Africa. Detailed compar-
ative studies on the local level in Burkina Faso and Ghana were combined 
with analyses of previous research. From coping strategies to climate change 
at the individual and household-farm level in a context of rapid population 
growth urbanization, pathways of adaptation to climate change were identi-
fied  (Dietz at al. 2004). 
 Again in the context of CERES, now in collaboration with the Mansholt 
Research School in Wageningen, Ton also embarked upon another line of 
analysis beyond the individual and household level in livelihoods research 
and reflected in collective action.
A broader focus … could shed new light on the dynamic relationship be-
tween the individual and the collective … There is a need for analysis at 
the aggregate level of communities and regions of the effect of individual 
(household) behaviour as well as of the causes and effects of collective ac-
tion based on collective vision. Pathway analysis provides a promising tool 
for such analyses.... Pathway effects encompass the externalities of the be-
haviour of the poor as well as the wealthy. Livelihood behaviour incited by 
poverty conditions may increase external vulnerabily, which may lead to col-
lective awareness and action to redress this. (Brons et al. 2007: 10, 11)
At present, trajectories and pathways have become an accepted methodology 
in livelihoods studies to arrive at generalizations beyond the individual. Two 
prime examples are worth mentioning in this respect. The first is a study by 
do Rego (2012) on the livelihoods of poor farmers from the Portuguese At-
lantic island of Madeira who migrated to the oil industry on the Caribbean 
island of Curaçao. Through a longitudinal analysis of individual livelihood 
trajectories over a period of almost 80 years, the pathway of this group to 
sustainable livelihoods could be examined. From a group of marginalized and 
excluded oil workers—and later ice vendors and street sweepers—the Portu-
guese immigrants started producing food on irrigated plots abandoned by 
the local population. The small outlets from which they sold their produce all 
became grocery shops and, more importantly, became social focal points in 
many dispersed neighbourhoods. For its part, this transitional pathway facil-
itated significantly the integration and social inclusion of the group into local 
society. And it established the stepping stone from which their groceries de-
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veloped into supermarkets when the local middle class started growing. The 
Portuguese grew into a business elite, the final stage of their pathway.
 The second pathway study is longitudinal and comparative analysis of the 
development pathways of 17 rural communities in the Andes valleys of Bo-
livia (le Grand 2014). Though very heterogeneous in terms of agro-ecology, 
livelihoods, and demography, the research communities showed similar tra-
jectories over a period of 20 years. These trajectories could be grouped into 
four distinct pathways, depending on the resource base (irrigation or dry-
land) and demographic change (population growth or population decline). 
In the end, a successful—and sustainable—livelihoods pathway proved to 
be less determined by capitals, assets, and capabilities on the individual and 
household level, but more and more by critical mass, collective action, and 
the ability to establish translocal connections. Both studies are exemplary. 
Both demonstrate that solid analyses of livelihood trajectories and pathways 
require a longitudinal approach. Not by coincidence perhaps, both research-
ers are geographers.
Evaluating development aid beyond the micro
There is a direct line from the intention to arrive at telling generalizations, 
discussed in the previous section, and Ton’s unceasing work to picture the 
effects of development aid on the livelihoods of the poor. Already his PhD 
project was embedded in Dutch development aid to Kenya, followed by nu-
merous similar activities throughout the world. In the past decade, he de-
voted quite some energy and time to PADev (Participatory Assessment of 
Development), which I followed for some time on the sidelines as a member 
of a klankbordgroep [sounding board group]. PADev was a research project 
of several academic institutes, including ASC Leiden and some Dutch devel-
opmental NGOs. It was a daring attempt to significantly improve evaluat-
ing practices of development interventions and to design a new participatory 
and holistic methodology. According to Ton, evaluations of development 
interventions tend to focus on too short a period, are nearly always spon-
sor-driven, are too narrowly focused on input and output, are isolated from 
wider developments in the region, and neglect the opinions of the supposed 
beneficiaries (www.padev.nl).
PADev can be differentiated from conventional assessment methodologies, 
which often focus on a single agency, project/programme or sector with 
quite a ‘technical’ expert-driven approach to evaluation of output, effect 
and sometimes impact. In PADev, participants assess a wide range of chang-
es, projects and agencies based on their perceptions. Further, PADev assess-
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ments typically look back at development and change over the past twenty 
to thirty years. This yields extremely valuable information for development 
agencies in the area: they learn about their own impact vis-à-vis other ac-
tors, and in addition, they find out which types of projects have been regard-
ed as most effective and relevant in that particular geographic and cultural 
setting and more importantly: for whom and why, according to people’s own 
experiences and criteria. This can be an important lesson for future interven-
tions. (Dietz et al. 2013: 9)
In sum, PADev is about the big picture of development change. It is not only 
interested in the views of the poor but also cross-cuts through the society of 
a region.
 PADev is not livelihood research; it bears many features of livelihoods 
research, but it is bigger: it is regional analysis—very good regional analy-
sis. It resembles livelihoods studies in its multidimensional and holistic per-
spective; however, it is not solely focused on poverty but on development 
overall. Livelihood concepts such as ‘capitals’, ‘capabilities’, and ‘livelihood do-
mains’ figure on all sides (Rijneveld et al. 2015). As in livelihoods studies, the 
required methodologies are participatory. Like livelihoods trajectories and 
pathways, it considers a longitudinal perspective indispensable, although in 
this respect the right term is probably ‘historical’ or ‘historicizing’ rather than 
‘longitudinal’. Interestingly, here Ton’s academic practice with respect to ‘live-
lihoods’ comes full circle, as I will show below in the concluding section.
By way of conclusion: Re-assessing and re-valuating the past and the 
origins
Looking back at this stage upon ‘under-theorized Livelihood & Environment’ 
(which turned out less under-theorized at a later stage, as discussed above), 
an important insight flashes. At the onset of our journey through academia, 
Ton and I and our colleagues were equipped with a body of thought which 
informed our academic practice without our always being very conscious of 
it. Implicit theoretical assumptions did not have to be discussed, because 
they were undisputed. That was possible because most of us were geogra-
phers; even most urban planners were trained as geographers. Not only that: 
we were ‘Utrecht School’—even though we worked at the University of Am-
sterdam—for the simple reason that the Amsterdam School had not engaged 
itself in the geography of developing countries. Ton and I and others were 
recruited to fill that gap, to meet the demand of students for teaching and 
supervision in development issues. I was trained in the Utrecht School by 
Jan Hinderink. Ton was definitely Utrecht School too, though trained in Nij-
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megen by Jan Kleinpenning. Jan Kleinpenning had studied geography and 
completed his PhD in Utrecht and worked there as a lecturer, before moving 
to Nijmegen where he chaired the most successful research group in human 
geography of developing countries in the country. Also, Ad de Bruijne, the 
chair of ‘Livelihood & Environment’, had studied at Utrecht. Human geog-
raphy of developing countries at VU University Amsterdam was modelled 
on the Utrecht School, and the team of geographers and urban planners he 
brought with him to the University of Amsterdam, after the involuntarily 
merger, were all Utrecht School. I have always considered that merger as a 
blessing in disguise—though I know that Ad de Bruijne regretted it deeply—
because it reinforced considerably our group at the University of Amster-
dam, as explained in the second section. 
 To the Utrecht School, ‘livelihood’ was basically synonymous with 
bestaansverwerving. That concept was so robustly embedded in geographi-
cal tradition that it went without saying. We were practically imbued with it, 
and so ‘the fish never talks about the water’. In his recent autobiography, Jan 
Kleinpenning (2016) explained what geography, as he learned it in the 1950s, 
stood for. In Utrecht, it was pointed out to students
that human geography examines the way in which larger and smaller human 
groups (societies) try to develop a livelihood on earth and how successful 
they are in doing that. Existence, making a living, livelihood, mode of exist-
ence, struggle for life, genre de vie, and striving for prosperity were concepts 
that soon sounded familiar to students in those days. We learned in addition 
that in human geography, as developed by the French school, not only gen-
res de vie, modes of existence / livelihoods, etc. matter, but also the resulting 
‘men-environment’ relationship—better and more specifically: society-hab-
itat .... From a range of opportunities offered by nature, men make a choice 
that depends to a large degree on civilization, the whole of the material and 
organizational techniques a group or society has as its disposal to realize its 
striving for prosperity. That attention to the relationship of society-habitat 
meant in this particular case that geographers—as we learned—are interest-
ed in how people, in organizing their livelihood, use, arrange, and transform 
their habitat. (Kleinpenning 2016: 39) [my translation]
This is the geography Ton subsequently learned in Nijmegen as I had learned 
it in Utrecht. Note that Jan Kleinpenning’s view on the discipline—as ex-
plained in his Nijmegen valedictory address—inspired me while writing my 
Nijmegen inaugural (de Haan 2000: 346).
 A few points stand out: according to the Utrecht School, ‘livelihoods’ was 
making a living, as modes of existence; at the core was the exploitation of 
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opportunities offered by the local environment—physical in the first place, 
but then also social, economic, and cultural; finally, livelihoods were further 
shaped by regional contexts, be they economic, social, cultural, or political. 
Moreover, a proper understanding of livelihoods not only required a spatial 
perspective; it was to be underpinned by historical analysis. This was pre-
cisely the kind of geography we practised in SALPA and ‘Livelihood & En-
vironment’, though in a modern guise. And the other way around: this was 
the tradition in which our take on livelihoods was embedded: geography and 
livelihoods were strongly intertwined. In the new look, there was more atten-
tion paid to higher levels of scale—that is, to the national and global, and to 
the state and the political. And the historical underpinning was still taken se-
riously: Ton’s PhD thesis covered eight decades, mine not less than a century. 
Interestingly, more than elsewhere in Dutch geography our research concen-
trated—under the impact of the Amsterdam School—on the household level, 
while elsewhere the study of society-habitat relationships also took the form 
of regional analyses. 
 It is fair to confirm that, in an way, ‘Livelihood & Environment’ was 
still under-theorized. Jan Kleinpenning (2016: 42), referring to his kan-
didaatsstudie, explains: ‘there was no reference to theories, because these 
were hardly developed, if not entirely non-existent’. But this was compen-
sated for by a thorough introduction to the object of the discipline through 
lectures and the study of regional monographs. That was in the 1950s. Things 
have changed also in geography, but our original practice in livelihoods re-
search was very much shaped by it. 
 Now, returning to the previous section on PADev, it is clear why Ton’s 
academic practice on ‘livelihoods’ comes full circle here. PADev is about the 
striving for prosperity of a society—nowadays called development—in a par-
ticular area; it is holistic; it takes into account a wide range of features: nat-
ural, economic, social, cultural; and it is historical. In other words: Ton, it is 
regional geography—damned good regional geography!
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7
Climate change, drylands and 
conflict in Africa
Han van Dijk
Introduction
At present, the West African Sahel is one the most marginal and volatile 
agro-ecosystems in the world, inhabited by millions of people, often below 
the poverty line (Raynaut 2001). Over time the region has been plagued by 
devastating droughts (1913-14, 1968-73, 1984-85), leading to large-scale 
famines and massive losses of livestock. Despite these droughts and the eco-
logical instability, deep poverty, and high levels of malnutrition, the region 
has been relatively stable in a political sense. Yet in the more distant past the 
area was also the scene of jihadist movements that formed the basis of a large 
number of Muslim emirates all across the region (see Burnham & Last 1994; 
de Bruijn & van Dijk 2001). These empires were reactively stable in some 
places, but in other places they soon succumbed to internal and external 
pressures (see van Dijk 1999; de Bruijn & van Dijk 2001, 2002). The colonial 
period and during the first decades after independence was an era of relative 
calm, despite revolts by the Saharan Tuareg, first in Mali (1962-64) and later 
in both Niger and Mali (1990-96).
 For an innocent observer, this relative calm changed abruptly in 2012 
when Tuareg rebels took over most of the north of Mali and were subse-
quently overrun by Muslim jihadist movements, which even dared to threat-
en an attack on the Malian capital Bamako. In January 2013 the French army 
stepped in and chased away these Muslim groups in a rapid military inter-
vention (aided by Chadian troops). After this operation a combined mili-
tary-civilian UN-mission was started under the heading MINUSMA (Mis-
sion multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization au 
Mali), to stabilize the country and reach a political solution for the grievances 
of the people in the north. Despite this multi-billion dollar mission, the po-
litical situation did not improve much in the three northern regions (Gao, 
Tombouctou, Kidal) where most effort was concentrated, and the situation in 
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the Mopti region further destabilized, leading to further destabilization not 
only in the south of Mali but also in neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso. In 
other countries the number of incidents of political violence are also on the 
increase despite efforts to stabilize the region.
 Yet the tendencies toward destabilization of the entire region were al-
ready there long before. Political unrest and small groups of rebels (jihadist 
and non-jihadist) have been active in the region for longer periods of time. 
Chad has of course been the scene of a succession of rebellions and civil war 
in the period 1965-90 (see Buijtenhuijs 1978, 1985, 1993); however, extremist 
Islam was never the undercurrent in these conflicts, but rather internal fac-
tional conflicts fuelled by the Libyan dictator Khadafy, who wanted to add 
Chad to Libya in his pan-African dream. Mali was the scene of several Tuareg 
uprisings (1962-64, 1990-96), but these never threatened the integrity of the 
Malian state and were largely based on political and economic grievances.
 Many issues can be raised about the origins and root causes of this grad-
ual descent into instability. The situation in Mali is not an isolated unhappy 
incident. In northern Nigeria and around Lake Chad, a radical Muslim move-
ment, Boko Haram, creates terror, and in other areas such as Darfur and oth-
er parts of Sudan such as Kordofan, political unrest has been the rule rather 
than the exception over the past decades. Chad, though apparently stable at 
this moment in time, has a recent history of successive rebellions against the 
government (see van Dijk 2007). In the 1990s Algeria also was the scene of 
a rebellion against the government by the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé). 
More recently, with the fall of Khadafy, Libya descended into chaos, with 
different governments and different parts of the country ruled by a multitude 
of armed militias which emerged all over the country. As the region is quite 
empty and governance control is weak, the region is perceived as a security 
threat and there are worries that it will produce large numbers of migrants 
and refugees.
 As the climate is very dry and unstable, the current situation raises the 
question whether this political instability is related to climate change and 
what has been labelled progressive desertification of the sub-continent as a 
result of overexploitation and increasing scarcity of natural resources (pas-
tures, land, forest). The Sahel/Sahara is not the only dryland region that is 
unstable. What are the effects of climate change and how are these translated 
into violent conflict? What is the role of political mobilization and Muslim 
extremism in these conflicts? And is this something specific to dryland areas 
of the world, as they are the most vulnerable to climate change and among 
the poorest in the world? Of course this complex set of questions cannot be 
answered in the course of this essay, but some observations will be made on 
the climate factor involved and its consequences for future scenarios.
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From desertification and degradation to non-equilibrium ecology 
Following the Sahelian droughts of 1968-73 and 1983-85, with their images 
of dying children and livestock skeletons scattered over the landscape, alarm 
was raised over the situation in the Sahel. It was argued that a combination 
of population growth, ill-adapted agricultural technology, overgrazing, and 
deforestation were causing a major environmental disaster. This would lead 
to a Malthusian doom scenario with an ever-increasing population destroy-
ing its own environment. In particular, nomadic pastoralists were targeted, 
with their ever-increasing herds of cattle and goats said to be destroying all 
vegetation in the Sahel and Sahara.
 Only a decade later this discourse was severely attacked from different 
corners. Some range-land experts propagating opportunistic range-land 
management (Sandford 1983) argued that pastoralist strategies for livestock 
keeping were perfectly compatible with the non-equilibrium ecology of the 
dryland areas and would do no harm to semi-arid and arid areas of pasture 
land (Ellis & Swift 1988; Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1995). According to 
non-equilibrium ecologists, these pastures areas are largely controlled by ex-
ternal factors such as rainfall and temperature, and they argued that human 
activity would do no harm. Later results of long-term research on the impact 
of grazing on vegetation sites in Mali largely confirmed this picture (Hier-
naux & Gérard 1999; Hiernaux et al. 2009). Only small corridors (100 metres 
wide) where a lot of livestock pass showed some effects of grazing on the 
vegetation (Hiernaux & Gérard 1999). Even large-scale analyses by means of 
satellite images and model studies also confirmed that human impact on the 
vegetation, if it was there at all, was not harmful and that rainfall was a much 
more powerful predictor of desertification (Hélden 1991, 2008). So what in 
general is taken as land degradation at first sight is often the same condition 
that has existed for decades.
 A similar case was made for the expansion of agriculture as a driver for 
degradation. To practise agriculture, the vegetation has to be removed to a 
large extent, leading to a loss of biomass, which may have an effect on soil 
carbon and, when the land is continuously cultivated, cause a decline in nat-
ural fertility of the soil. Here too the evidence is mixed. In an overview study 
by Olsson et al. (2005), the NDVI (a measure of greenness and available bio-
mass) and the millet production per capita increased between 1982 and 1999 
in Burkina Faso and Mali. Where there is degradation, it is not so easy to dis-
entangle anthropogenic from natural causes of land degradation (Sietz & van 
Dijk 2015). In other studies, human influence also had a positive influence in 
the vegetation in Burkina Faso and southern Niger (Reij et al. 2000). In areas 
where people actively engage in soil and water conservation, one can actually 
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observe a ‘greening’ of the Sahel rather than a desertification (Sendzimir et 
al. 2005).
 So for both nomadic pastoralism and rain-fed agriculture, the contribu-
tions to desertification and land degradation is unclear and contested. It is 
also clear that demographic growth does not necessarily lead to problems, 
provided that people invest in soil and water conservation. The two most 
densely populated areas in the Sahel, the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso and 
the south of Niger, are also from a political point of view fairly calm and are 
not known for large-scale violence and political instability.
From climate change to climate variability
So instead of focusing on large-scale neo-Malthusian narratives that predict 
doom, it is better to focus on more differentiated and varied messages about 
the drylands, and about the Sahel in particular. Two landmark studies inspired 
a lot of this research. One of them (Cour 2001) emphasized the potentially 
positive impact of population growth and urbanization. In his paper and the 
original study for the Club du Sahel, the West Africa Log Term Perspective 
Study (WALPTS), Cour argued that vast demographic and economic chang-
es will change the sub-continent. Whereas during the colonial period the 
majority of the sub-continent’s population lived in semi-arid areas, this will 
have changed completely by 2020, when two-thirds of the population will live 
in the costal countries (and zones). West Africa will also have changed from 
a sub-continent without cities into a continent with a number of mega-cities 
and 50% of its population in cities, compared with 10% in 1960 (Cour 2001). 
Urbanization will be a major driver of economic growth and a stimulus for 
agriculture as well, because cities are markets for agricultural products, and 
with this demand the countryside will also experience economic growth. This 
urbanization will not limit itself to the coastal countries. The Sahelian cities 
of Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey, and N’Djaména are also growing enor-
mously and beginning to have an influence on their surroundings. The sec-
ond landmark study was published by Raynaut (2001), based on his book Les 
Sahels, and emphasized the enormous diversity of situations in the Sahel. Far 
from being a uniform area, where population densities are low and agricul-
tural productions systems all look alike, it is an area of high diversity, both in 
population distribution and in what these people do for a living to make the 
best use of all kinds of micro-climatic and hydrological differences.
 These two landmark studies inspired a third important study, which fo-
cused on the diversity of strategies by Sahelian populations and was based on 
the interdisciplinary work of the programme ‘Impact of Climate Change on 
Drylands’ (Dietz et al. 2004). This programme was a kind of afterthought in 
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the Dutch NWO-funded programme on climate change, which was 95% ori-
ented toward the situation in the Netherlands. Despite the limited funding, 
a considerable programme of research was executed thanks to the personal 
contributions of the participating institutions. This programme was started 
when climate change became a real political issue in the 1990s and the Dutch 
government and its research organization NWO started investing in climate 
change research. Almost all attention was oriented toward natural science 
research and the situation in the Netherlands. This is still a major feature of 
global change research. Even if social issues related to global change are the 
object of research, they are the domain of people that try to find connections 
between climate change and social issues on the basis of econometric mod-
els, such as the relation between climate change and conflict (Hsiang et al. 
2013), or basing themselves on crude neo-Malthusian frameworks, such as 
the environmental security studies by Homer-Dixon (1999) and related re-
search.
 In this context the project ‘Impact of Climate Change on Drylands’ made 
an innovative contribution to the debate on climate change adaptation. The 
project, the first collaboration between geographers of the University of Am-
sterdam and the African Studies Centre, and conceptualized by Ton Dietz,32 
Mirjam de Bruijn, and the author,33 positioned adaptation to climate change 
squarely within the context of a number of other issues in the  Sahel. It po-
sitioned adaptation to climate change in the middle of the vast ongoing po-
litical, economic, and demographic changes that had been triggered in the 
colonial and post-colonial period (see Cour 2001; Raynaut 2001) and capital-
ized on thorough and data-based research in drylands conducted by the au-
thors of the proposal (Dietz 1987; de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995). In addition, it 
added a new but important dimension: the mobility of the people inhabiting 
drylands—as theorized in the 1970s by the French geographer Jean Gallais 
(1975), the work of de Bruijn and van Dijk (2003) on the mobility of Fulani 
pastoralists, and work by others such as Breusers (1999) on farmer mobility, 
who collaborated in the project later on.
 The initial focus of climate change research was on climate change as a 
driver for adaptive strategies of farmers and herdsmen in a number of sit-
uations. A number of sites were selected for further investigation, based on 
earlier work of the research groups of the consortium. These sites were the 
Douentza region in central Mali, Koutiala in central Mali, the Central Plateau 
in Burkina Faso, and the north of Ghana. It soon appeared that the sites were 
very different in terms of livelihood strategies of the population, risk pro-
32 Then Professor of Political Geography at the University of Amsterdam
33 Then post-doc fellows at the African Studies Centre
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files, crops, and ethnic composition, which made a systematic comparative 
framework a difficult avenue to follow. In addition, the availability of data per 
site differed greatly, with, for example, detailed quantitative data-sets over a 
number of years obtained from the Compagnie Malienne de Développement 
de Textiles (CMDT) for the south of Mali, compared with the Douentza re-
gion, where detailed qualitative data were available on strategies of the pop-
ulation to cope with drought along with an absence of detailed quantitative 
data on crop and livestock production. In short, the end publication of this 
project testified to this diversity and flexibility of the strategies of Sahelian  
populations to deal with climate variability and risk (Dietz et al. 2004)
 One of the basic differences among the different regions was the variabil-
ity of the climate. With decreasing rainfall, the variability of crop and pasture 
production increased exponentially (de Steenhuijsen-Piters 1995; Gandah 
1999; Hiernaux 2009). These variations were at the basis of crop and pas-
tures failures that contributed to the famines and large-scale loss of livestock 
of Sahelian pastoralists in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, rainfall is variable not 
only in time but also in space. Given these basic conditions in spatial vari-
ability, decreasing rainfall mobility is increasingly at the basis of local live-
lihood strategies, ranging from long-range camel pastoralism as practised 
by Tuareg pastoralists, to medium-range pastoralism of cattle and sheep by 
Fulani herdsmen, to more small-scale mobility of sedentary farmers, such as 
the Dogon in central Mali, who exploited various soil types that fitted with 
different rainfall regimes (see Nijenhuis 2013). In fact, as was argued by the 
French geographer Gallais (1975), mobility was an intrinsic part of livelihood 
strategies in the Sahel, which he labelled ‘la condition sahélienne’. Therefore, 
research focused not only on people fixed in space, but also on how people 
were combining production in different agro-ecological zones and were con-
stantly shifting from one area to another (see Breusers 1999; de Bruijn & van 
Dijk 2003).
 Climate change may have an effect on the current situation in two ways. 
In an early study of the direction of climate change in West Africa (van den 
Born et al. 2001), Global Circulation Models gave largely contradictory out-
comes, from a progressive desiccation of the Central Sahel by 20-25% of 
total rainfall, to a considerably much wetter future with a rainfall increase 
of the same magnitude. Both outcomes would cause fundamental changes. 
The desiccation scenario would have a catastrophic outcome, with an end to 
rain-fed agriculture in much of Mali, Burkina Faso, and southern Niger (30 
million inhabitants), which would lead to massive migration out of the area. 
Current scenarios (see Niang et al. 2014) are much more moderate, though 
significant changes may be on the way. According to this IPCC study, rain-
fall trends are not significant—meaning that they may have a large impact 
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in some places, but that the overall impact will probably be moderate. More 
worrying is that the predicted increase in temperature, which is already very 
high, may have negative effects on the production of the main rain-fed crops, 
millet and sorghum, which are the basis of the staple food in West Africa. 
This impact may be stronger in the savannah region than in the Sahel and 
stronger on the modern varieties (ibid.)
 If we take a more detailed look at the nature of the changes in the distri-
bution of population and the individual decisions underlying these changes, 
we should take several things into account. Mobility is nothing new in the 
region. Nomadic pastoralists in the Sahel and so-called sedentary farmers 
often were itinerant farmers, or were confined to mountain areas such as the 
Bandiagara region in Mali (Gallais 1975), the Guéra region in Chad (Fuchs 
1970), and the Highlands of Northern Cameroon (van Beek 1987). This be-
gan to take different forms under colonialism, when the freedom of move-
ment increased and people started to move toward the coastal areas (Cordell 
et al. 1998; Cour 2001). Cities began to grow, with the coastal areas as the 
main attraction point. Over time also, the middle belt and forest areas began 
to be populated with decreasing pressure of diseases. Following the Sahelian 
droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, a new wave of migration emerged. At the 
moment, many inhabitants from dryland areas are moving back and forth 
between the coastal and Sahelian countries and between the savannah and 
coastal zones within the coastal countries. 
 The question is of course whether these movements are related to climate 
change or are the result of larger economic and demographic changes. This 
would require that we are able to relate migration to vulnerability to climate 
change. A typology of vulnerability to climate change was developed by Kok 
et al. (2010) and further refined by Neumann et al. (2015) to relate vulner-
ability to migration. This method is based on a cluster analysis of different 
indicators related to climate change, and to vulnerability indicated by data 
on malnutrition that were available in a spatially explicit manner. The results, 
however, are severely limited by the availability of data-sets. Up to today we 
do not have a good measure of rainfall variability at the sub-continental level, 
and therefore we have to take water availability and soil quality as the main 
indicators for vulnerability to climate change. This analysis shows that the 
relation between climate and migration is at most indirect, because water 
availability and soil quality do not directly determine the relative magnitude 
of migration. Demographic factors, such as population density, do not ap-
pear to be decisive either. Relative migration is lower from areas with higher 
population density, though of course in absolute numbers these areas pro-
duce the highest number of migrants. 
Dietz Essays.indd   121 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 122
122
What is more relevant for the current context is that the absolute numbers 
of migrants in each of all the different clusters is around 10% over a decade, 
which is lower than population growth; so, despite the fact that many peo-
ple move out, population will continue to grow in the dryland areas of West 
Africa. When we take a further look at the areas with the highest numbers 
of migrants, some other interesting observations can be made. When focus-
ing on areas with high outmigration, we have to take into account historical 
and political factors. An important area of outmigration, the Guéra region in 
central Chad, is clearly distinct from the neighbouring areas because of the 
intensity of conflict there in the 30 years of civil war in Chad (see de Bruijn & 
van Dijk 2007). The area east of Dakar is an area of high outmigration as well, 
called urban polarization by Raynaut (2001), and is oriented toward Dakar 
and Europe. It is also striking that some of the areas that are currently ex-
hibiting high levels of conflict also showed high levels of outmigration in the 
past. Examples of these are the northeast of Nigeria and parts of central Mali.
Political instability 
The increase in political instability is the single most important political de-
velopment since climate change research started in West Africa. During most 
of the post-colonial period, the larger part of the Sahel was relatively peaceful 
compared with some other parts of West Africa (Biafra War, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia). As noted above, there were revolts by the Tuareg in the Sahara (1962 
in Mali, 1990-96 in Mali-Niger), and of course there has been the long peri-
od of civil unrest in Chad. However, the Tuareg revolts never took on a large 
scale, and the latter revolt soon fell apart into different factions. The unrest in 
Chad, though started as an internal conflict within Chad, soon took regional 
dimensions with the involvement of Libya (Khadafy) and the French. Over 
the 1990s and 2000s, the situation was largely conditioned by the interests 
of Algeria in controlling its internal opposition in the form of the GIA and 
Khadafy’s interest in exerting control over the Sahara and returning to nor-
mal relations with Europe and the USA. Therefore, both powers did not have 
an interest in large-scale political unrest in the region. 
 However, even within the 1990s and even more so after 9/11, a gradu-
al destabilization process was already under way in the larger region. This 
destabilization was promoted by a number of larger trends. In the first place, 
there was the emergence of a clandestine economy in the Sahara in the 1990s 
consisting of the smuggling of cigarettes and narcotics, and more recently of 
human trafficking (Molenaar & El-Kanoumi-Janssen 2017).
 In the second place, the Sahara was identified by the administration of 
Bush Jnr as one of the battlegrounds in the global war on terror. This led to 
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a number of counter-insurgency activities by the US army in collaboration 
with the national armies of a number of countries in the region. This was 
started in 2002 under the banner of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), with Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. It was later increased in scope under the head-
ing of Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to include a 
larger number of countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal) to fight Al-Qaida in the 
Sahara. However, there was never a coherent strategy. There were persistent 
rumours that the Algerians were nurturing some of the groups related to 
Al-Qaida; and, for example in Mali, high government officials were involved 
in the clandestine economy (Keenan 2013), which was closely interrelated 
with the jihadists groups in the Sahara.
 Thirdly, these military interventions, which were mainly aimed at fighting 
terrorist splinter groups and in doing so antagonized the local population, 
were not accompanied by a coherent strategy to address the underlying so-
cial, economic, and political problems of the Sahel/Sahara region. Ever since 
the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a lack of investments in 
the Sahel and Sahara regions by governments in these regions. In Mali, for 
example, all attention was oriented toward cotton production in the south 
and rice production in the Inner Delta of the Niger. For the pastoral popu-
lations in the Sahara and the Sahel, there was hardly any attention, leading 
to an unbalanced economic development. After the peace accords in 1996 
that ended the Tuareg rebellion, promises were made with respect to eco-
nomic development, of which part was implemented with the help of for-
eign partners (among them the Dutch government), but these activities were 
soon abandoned because of the lack of interest shown by the governments 
involved.
 Fourthly, there was an important rupture in the balance of power in the 
Sahara when the Libyan dictator Khadafy was toppled after a rebellion, sup-
ported by the Western powers who decided that his era had ended. Khadafy, 
though a fervent Muslim, always fiercely opposed extremist versions of Islam 
and never supported groups related to Al-Qaida in the region. With his fall, 
the enormous stock of weaponry amassed by his regime became available to 
all kinds of splinter groups, among whom the MNLA (Mouvement National 
de Libération de l’Azawad), a Tuareg movement started by Tuareg who were 
part of Khadafy’s Islamic legion and were forced to flee after the collapse of 
the regime. As the Malian army was very weak, the MNLA easily took pow-
er over the north of Mali, but were soon after swept away by fundamentalist 
Islamic groups, such as the MUJAO (Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad 
en Afrique de L’Ouest), AQIM (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb), and An-
sar-Dine (the Helpers of God). When these groups formed a threat to the 
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heartland of Mali, the French army, with the help of Chadian troops, inter-
vened and chased these groups away into the desert again. This involvement 
of both international Muslim extremists and a UN stabilization mission indi-
cates that the instability has acquired international dimensions and is fuelled 
by international actors. However, these interventions did little to stop politi-
cal instability. Conflict and extremists are creeping further south into central 
Mali, where the situation is deteriorating rapidly (ICG 2016). Therefore, it is 
important to take a look at the internal dynamics of the region to fully explain 
the current turmoil.
Unbalanced development
Despite the fact that the West African sub-continent has exhibited enormous 
dynamism, substantial economic growth, increasing urbanization, and the 
expansion of markets, the benefits of these positive developments have been 
quite unevenly distributed. This unequal distribution of infrastructure, eco-
nomic opportunities, and income, together with high demographic growth 
and a volatile climate, forms the basis for major political upheavals. There 
are five major drivers for these political conflicts: (a) north-south imbalances 
within the countries of the region; (b) north-south imbalances in the region 
as a whole; (c) high numbers of people migrating within the region; (d) the 
possibilities of major natural disasters because of climate change; and (e) the 
fundamental conflict between mobile and sedentary forms of production, 
coupled with the saturation of space in a number of places in West Africa.
 The unequal distribution of infrastructure and opportunities within the 
countries is leading to internal political struggles as well. In a number of 
countries, populations in the north do not feel represented at the level of 
national politics, and infrastructures and government services such as edu-
cation and health care are most often concentrated in the south and also in 
the large cities there.
 The region as a whole is also imbalanced along the north-south axis. As 
a result, large numbers of people will continue to migrate from the north of 
the region to the south. However, this migration is directed not only toward 
the urban centres, but also toward the rural areas with higher rainfall and 
better soils in the savannah region. Because of migration from the Central 
Plateau in Burkina Faso, in some areas in south-west Burkina Faso migrants 
already form the majority of the population (Howorth & O’Keefe 1999). In 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, the cocoa-producing zones host numerous mi-
grants from the Sahel countries looking for employment and land. Migration 
was one of the key issues underlying civil conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (Mitchell 
2011).
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Yet, in the Sahelian countries and the semi-arid parts of the coastal coun-
tries the population will continue to grow substantially over the coming dec-
ades. The population of Niger, the country with the highest fertility rate in the 
world, is expected to grow up to 38 million in 2050 (Hilderink et al. 2012). 
Other Sahelian countries will exhibit similar demographic growth. Nigeria’s 
population, now estimated at 170 million people, will reach 340 million by 
2025 (ibid.). This enormous concentration of people in a region which has 
known already such major climatic disasters requires the building of systems 
that are able to deal with drought and large fluctuations in food production. 
At present these systems are not in place. As a result, disasters may produce 
large numbers of migrants and refugees.
 In addition, numerous nomadic pastoralists have been moving south for 
decades (Bassett 1988; Blench 1994; Diallo 2001) and are now in many coast-
al countries a factor of importance as they exploit so-called empty spaces. 
In doing so, there is potentially an enormous increase in conflict with local 
sedentary populations, whose cropping land is endangered by the pressure of 
livestock. This, in combination with large-scale land acquisitions, will lead to 
increasing pressure on land and natural resources. This pressure will have to 
be managed carefully by all parties involved.
Discussion: a research agenda
To sum up, the situation in the Sahel/Sahara region tends toward political 
instability because of a number of tendencies that are related both to the 
management of investments and wealth within the countries and to climate. 
In contrast with accepted notions of climate change and Malthusian scenari-
os, this essay argues that climate variability is a much more important driver 
of social and economic changes than climate change as such. Over centuries 
the populations of the Sahel and Sahara developed all kinds of strategies to 
deal with this climate variability by being mobile and flexible. Adaptation 
is a complicated term to use here, because in an area of high volatility and 
variability it is difficult to know exactly to which conditions to adapt, since 
they vary in space and time. Rather, people look for the conditions that suit 
them best and offer the most secure livelihoods. As a result, people tend to 
become extremely mobile and move to look for labour and land to all corners 
of the sub-continent, accompanied or not by their livestock, or by trying to 
get access to land in multiple locations to offset risks in one area against risks 
in another area.
 The failure of policy makers and governments to provide better condi-
tions for development in high-risk areas will translate itself into even more 
mobility and higher political risks in areas already overburdened in an eco-
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logical sense. In addition, the concentration of a large number of people in 
areas that are at high risk of climate-related disasters increases the risks for 
large-scale upheaval once these disasters actually arrive. The risks for receiv-
ing areas in the coastal areas cannot be neglected either, because the inflow 
of high numbers of people within a short period of time is bound to increase 
political and social tensions.
 Yet, the precise relations between these phenomena still requires a lot of 
fundamental research. The linkages between large-scale demographic, cli-
matic, and economic changes (Cour 2001; Neumann et al. 2015) and the mi-
cro-level strategies of local land users (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995; Breusers 
1999; Dietz et al. 2004) require further focused research. Macro-level studies 
need to take on board different variables such as climate variability and more 
detailed data-sets of soil conditions and regional differentiation of political 
stability. Micro-level studies need to be better contextualized in relation to 
the ecological and political conditions in place.
Underlying trends toward increasing levels of conflict, perceptions of exclu-
sion, and political mobilization require further study. It does not help to take 
individual perceptions of justice, greed, and grievance into account, when no 
answer can be given to questions such as how people are mobilized and de-
cide to become part of large movements and rebellions. For this we have to 
look at the position of these people (youth) in these societies and from which 
groups they are recruited. Unless we can answer these questions, the current 
trend toward political instability in the Sahel cannot be explained. We can 
only say that basic conditions at the level of climate, economy, and politics do 
not favour a smooth transition to development. 
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8
The critical fence
A Dietzian reflection on divergent fieldwork 
experiences in Southern Africa
Rijk van Dijk, Marja Spierenburg & Harry Wels
Introduction
In our contribution to this Festschrift celebrating Ton Dietz’s energetic input 
into the development of a wider socio- and politico-geographic understand-
ing of Africa, we aim to highlight the significance of what at first glance seems 
one of the most important markers of geographical space: the fence. Need-
less to say, fences have great socio-political and geographical significance. We 
believe that Ton Dietz’s work on the significance of geographical territories 
in Africa is inspirational in terms of the manner in which his work aims to 
draw in and expand multi-disciplinary perspectives. His work on the Kenyan 
Pokot (e.g. Dietz 1991) was and is exemplary in this regard: spatial activities 
that take place in bounded domains require, by definition, the involvement 
of multiple disciplines so as to provoke deeper understandings—social and/
or human geography alone cannot do the job. Ton’s work is therefore marked 
by a surprising openness to the validity of incorporating divergent—and not 
necessarily mutually supporting—views and interpretations (see for instance 
van den Bergh et al. 2013; Dietz et al. 2014; Dietz 2015). These can come from 
anthropology, political science, economy, and history, and while their epis-
temologies, methods of research, and conceptual frameworks can be widely 
divergent and conflicting, Ton’s work marks these in our view as being ‘pro-
ductive tensions’ that turn academia into an open field of exchange. Obvious-
ly, much of this multi-disciplinary openness is driven by a problem-oriented 
approach; this openness is, in his mind, not an end-in-itself but must bring 
pragmatic value to the understanding of issues at hand. 
 Hence, what has inspired us to write this contribution to the Festschrift 
is exactly this productive tension that we see between the elusive openness 
of this epistemological position and the ‘closedness’ of the topic that we aim 
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to discuss—namely, the idea of the fence, interpreted from a Latourian per-
spective in which ‘things’ have agency. The challenge is this: can the fence as 
an ‘instrument’ of closing, bounding, and demarcating be profitably studied 
from a ‘Dietzian’ perspective of what the openness of a multi-disciplinary 
approach might bring? After all, we know all too well, for example, how a 
singular politico-historical approach to such a thing as the prison led to Fou-
cauldian understandings of the functioning of the panopticon, the manner in 
which walls and fences lead to monolithic systems of discipline and punish-
ment, for which contradicting views as to the meaning, execution, and signif-
icance of such regimes of power may not add much to their understanding. In 
other words, following the Dietzian challenge, can there be an understanding 
of the significance of the fence from the perspective of a ‘productive tension’ 
between conflicting views and conflicting disciplinary approaches? Or is the 
fence at the same time fencing our views, making such openness impossible?
The three authors of this piece took up this challenge by engaging our views 
on understanding the significance of the fences that we met while conducting 
our research in Africa. Was/is there an interdisciplinary openness among the 
three of us that would do justice to a Dietzian challenge? Impartial observers 
of the disciplinary backgrounds of the three of us might disagree: all three of 
us have been trained in anthropology, have demonstrated great interest in 
ethnographic research in various African localities, and have been publishing 
our research results in anthropologically oriented journals. Yet, our anthro-
pology is broad—actually, extremely broad—so much so that the domains 
in which we have been working only rarely see points of convergence where 
our topics of research or our theoretical and conceptual frameworks are con-
cerned. And, in addition to this, all three of us have been meeting fences 
in widely divergent circumstances, cultural contexts, and political realities. 
Taking ‘the fence’ as a central point of convergence is for us as challenging 
as the Dietzian approach to the life of the Pokot has been in making relevant 
contrasting (disciplinary) views of their lived reality.
 Harry Wels met fences in South Africa while conducting anthropologi-
cal fieldwork on human-animal interactions—the fence here being a high-
ly contested instrument of separation, of conflicting (economic) interests of 
land use, of wildlife protection, and so forth. Marja Spierenburg met fences 
as part of conservation strategies, implying political regimes of control and 
supervision, but also of increasing inequalities, exploitation, and the power 
brokering of investors and stakeholders. Rijk van Dijk met fences as mark-
ers of spiritual domains in the life of religious communities. Here fences are 
religiously charged as means to indicate spiritual geographies where, for in-
stance, the power of churches, healing prophets, or traditional doctors can be 
indicated. 
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In all these cases, however, we are interested in exploring how and why these 
various fences do something to the people and the communities involved. 
The fence is not passive but generates processes of inclusion and exclusion, 
of connection and disconnection, and of protection as well as danger for the 
people that are subjected to the fence (cf. Appadurai 1988; Verbeek 2010). 
This makes the fence an agent of some sort, and in many cases a critical one. 
The fence becomes critical in the way it generates this impact on the social 
life of people and their (everyday) concerns that in a sense also produces a so-
cial life of the fence itself. Things in this sense can easily get out of hand, and 
uncountable are the cases in which the fence became the primary source of 
conflict in many African situations. This calls for a Dietzian approach to the 
fence; that is, the fence needs to be opened up for multi-disciplinary analysis 
in a critical manner. 
 We will do so by offering three different vignettes from our fieldwork ex-
periences that will each demonstrate how a particular fence became agentive 
critically—that is, showing how the fence is not just a passive object but in-
stead sets in motion specific forms of further action and reaction.
Vignette 1: The spiritual fence in Botswana [Rijk van Dijk]
In working among a number of spirit-healing churches in Botswana, I was 
reminded repeatedly of the active mode of the fences that were demarcating 
the places of worship, the localities where certain churches would meet and 
gather their flock, and the way in which these fences would invoke the po-
sitioning of forms of religious authority. In Botswana, spirit-healing church-
es—sometimes also referred to as prophet-healing churches—have a long 
history that is related to the introduction of missionary Christianity into this 
part of Africa. Not very long after the introduction of missionary Christiani-
ty, which involved the spreading of Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, Anglican, 
and Methodist forms of the faith, Africanized forms of Christianity start-
ed to make their appearance. Often called ‘syncretic’ churches, many of the 
Africanized Christianities creatively combined elements of mainline, mis-
sionary traditions with elements of African historical religious traditions in 
which spiritual healing takes a central place. Usually under the leadership of 
a prophetic or charismatic figure, these new-found churches began to grow 
and to spread rapidly throughout the Southern African region in the decades 
preceding World War II, thereby often following the flows of massive labour 
migration that began to emerge in this region at the same time.
 This is why these types of churches also landed in what is now Botswana. 
In this country these churches have emerged in many different forms, making 
for a truly colourful and richly diversified religious domain. Many of these so-
called ‘independent churches’ specialize in spiritual healing, for which they 
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commonly use particular artefacts and substances largely derived from the 
wide field of traditional healing. Among these objects and substances, one 
can find the use of fire and water, of medicinal plants, herbs, and roots, and 
of particular sacrifices or other objects. This can be combined with the use of 
the Bible, the singing of Christian hymns, preaching, praying, and speaking 
in tongues. Much can be said about the symbolic and ritual repertoires of 
these churches, their colourful outfits, and expressions of religious authority; 
my point is to indicate the symbolic value of the ways in which demarcations 
of space play a crucial role.
 At one point I decided to visit one of these churches in the place of my 
fieldwork in Botswana—Molepolole—which happens to also be a place where 
one of the most well-known spirit-healing churches in the country has a con-
gregation: the Eloyi Christian Church. This church has frequently been in the 
news in the country’s media because of its spectacular but at times contro-
versial exorcist rituals, which as such have also been the subject of extensive 
anthropological study (see Werbner 2011). I am not claiming to be an expert 
on this particular church, its practices, ideologies, and symbolic repertoires; 
my visit to the church in Molepolole just served the purpose of acquainting 
myself with this congregation and of getting an impression of its relative size 
and composition. 
 Yet in meeting the congregation at their small place in Molepolole, I was 
first of all confronted with a fence. While plots in Molepolole are commonly 
fenced so as to demarcate the places that households occupy, in this case this 
singular ‘geographical’ purpose of simply demarcating the plot of the church 
was not the only function of the fence. The fence was above all demarcating 
the contours of a spiritual ‘clearing ground’, so I was made to understand in 
quite a ‘physical’ manner. Meeting one of the prophets of the church, very 
colourfully dressed in a bright red-coloured gown and adorned with some 
brightly coloured emblems and symbols, I was made to stand still at the en-
trance of the fence. At this entrance a bucket with water was placed in which 
there was a fly-whisk (commonly made of a cow-tail). While the prophet 
greeted me in a most friendly manner, he nevertheless made clear that before 
I was to be allowed into the fenced yard—in which, toward the back, a small, 
dilapidated building was situated from where singing and the clapping of 
hands emanated—I was to be spiritually cleansed. Dipping the whisk into the 
water, the prophet now splashed the cold water over my head and chest and 
then asked me to turn around so that the whisk could then splash my back 
as well. While some other members of the church came out to have a look 
at what was happening, this splashing of water was conducted in an atmos-
phere of great hilarity, obviously also produced by my shivers when the cold 
water hit my spine. I successfully passed this ‘water-fence’ of controlling my 
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spiritual powers and was now happily invited to come into the dusty church 
yard and proceed into the small building. 
 This kind of cleansing by using water that is ‘doctored’ by inserting tra-
ditional medicines to strengthen its spiritual powers is a method of warding 
off evil and avenging powers and spirits. The water-fence is in that sense a 
critical fence, since any visitor will have to pass through it, so as to shield 
the church community and its location from the potential intrusion of evil 
powers. This cleansing is not just a passive activity of washing off symbolical-
ly that which may harm the spiritual status of the church community, as its 
splashing is much more an active statement of bouncing-back these powers, 
of ensuring that the powers that are contained in the water are more force-
ful than what the stranger may be bringing along. It thus creates the inside 
of the fenced area of the church yard as a spiritually purified and protected 
zone. And the water-fence creates this specific moment of the exercise of 
(religious) authority whereby nobody can just walk in while having an un-pu-
rified status. 
 Spiritual water thus creates a double meaning in becoming a critical 
fence. Firstly, the water-fence actively puts up a barrier to (potential) aveng-
ing spirits and forces that may damage the purified church ground and its 
community; and it produces a particular form of authority to which any vis-
itor, such as the anthropologist, can be subjected. If one is not open to what 
this water-fence wants to establish in terms of one’s personal subjection and 
one’s personal spiritual cleansing, just forget about meeting the Eloyi on their 
own turf—in other words, the fence produces an openness of a very particu-
lar kind. 
Vignette 2: Fencing for conservation [Marja Spierenburg]
As Rijk mentions above, fences are indeed a common sight when walking 
through towns and cities in Southern Africa. The fences mark ownership—
whether supported by title deeds or not—and keep people and animals both 
in and out. Fences can be knee-high and easy to jump over, or they can con-
struct formidable, impenetrable fortresses. And, in combination with other 
tools—such as the religious ones mentioned above—they can produce par-
ticular forms of authority.
 An example can be found in my earlier research on Zimbabwe, in Dande 
in northern Zimbabwe, where many villagers refused to give up their land 
management system. This system allowed different users to use different 
plots of land for different purposes at different times of the year, and the vil-
lagers did not want to move to the pegged plots designed to create ‘modern 
farmers’ with neatly separated homesteads and fields allocated to individual 
households. While this ‘modern’ form of land management was supposed to 
Dietz Essays.indd   137 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 138
138
reduce soil degradation and deforestation, the ironic result was the opposite 
(Derman 1997; Spierenburg 2004). Attempts to fence people in had the con-
tradictory result of causing larger and geographically more extended ecolog-
ical footprints.
 From these contestations about boundaries and conservation, I moved 
into the arena of protected areas, studying changes in the old fines-and-fenc-
es-approach—which in many cases turned out to be mainly discursive. To-
gether with Harry Wels I wrote about how transfrontier conservation areas 
were promoted by the Peace Parks Foundation as undoing the ‘unnatural’ 
and colonial boundaries, opening up the borders to wildlife and neighbour-
ing communities, and including the latter in sharing the benefits of tourism 
(Spierenburg & Wels 2006, 2010). Alas, as we discovered, the boundaries were 
mainly opened for investors, who thus managed to obtain control over land 
hitherto farmed by local communities, while at the same time the borders 
were rendered ever more impassable to local community members, who now 
ran increased risks of confrontations with dangerous animals, game guards, 
and border police. The cutting of part of the fence between the South African 
Kruger Park and the Mozambican Limpopo National Park (LNP) resulted in 
panic among conservation authorities, as the herd of TB-free buffaloes in the 
LNP had to be rescued and translocated to protect them from TB-infected 
buffaloes and lions coming in from South Africa (Caron et al. 2014). 
 From private sector investments in publicly owned and managed protect-
ed areas, I moved to the private protected areas in the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal provinces of South Africa. Together with Shirley Brooks and 
Harry Wels, we were motivated to study this when we saw the endless 2-me-
tre high fences which seemed to have expanded further every time we re-
turned to the areas. It is on these fences I would like to focus in this vignette.
 One sunny morning in March 2009, I was driving with Femke Brandt—
one of the PhD students involved in the research project—toward the gate 
of one of the game farms on the road between Cradock and Graaff Reinet in 
the Eastern Cape. Just outside the gate we came across a man, his wife, and 
their three children, one of whom was ill. Femke opened the car window and 
asked where they were going. They responded that they were on their way 
to the main road, hoping to catch a lift to either Cradock or Graaff Reinet to 
visit a doctor. They came from the farm, where they lived in a small cluster of 
workers’ houses. Their walk across the game farm toward the gate had been 
quite scary, as wildlife roams freely across the farm. While the house of the 
owner as well as the accommodation for the visiting tourists were fenced off 
to protect them at night, the workers’ houses were not. The wife commented 
that the journey on foot had been long, since shortcuts across neighbouring 
farms had been closed off by the 2.1-metre-high electric fences (mandatory 
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for game farms with dangerous animals and those that offer hunting all year 
around). As many of the sheep and goat farms—with their low fences main-
ly designed to keep livestock in—had been sold to game farmers, the latter 
added them to their properties, moving the perimeters and destroying most 
farming infrastructure (including internal fencing of grazing camps) except 
for the water points to manage the movement of the animals. As game farm-
ing, and especially the hunting sector—contrary to claims made by game 
farmers—provides less employment opportunities, the amalgamation of 
farms and reduction of the work force resulted in an exodus from the rural 
areas into the small towns and cities in between the farms. For the remaining 
farm dwellers, this had a severe impact on access to services. Farm schools 
had been closed one-by-one, as there were not enough children, and it be-
came too dangerous for children to walk across the farms; farm clinics and 
churches closed, and mini-bus services stopped operating between the farms 
and the towns and cities. 
 The farms which were converted from (mainly) livestock production to 
wildlife-based production were primarily owned by white farmers. They ar-
gue that the conversions return the landscape to what it was when their an-
cestors arrived in the Eastern Cape and contribute to the restoration and 
conservation of a severely overgrazed area. By erasing most of the farming 
infrastructure, land owners claim to contribute to nature conservation, but 
they are also effectively erasing the traces of the native herdsmen and agri-
culturalists who shaped the landscape before colonial conquest denied them 
access to land. Those who remained on the white-owned farms as farm work-
ers and tenants are now facing renewed threats of eviction. While livestock 
farmers prefer to have farm dwellers scattered across the farm to keep an eye 
on sheep and goats, game farmers transform the landscape to create ‘pristine’ 
nature, devoid of human occupation. Farm dwellers are often moved to the 
edges of the farms—and preferably over the edges (Brooks et al. 2011). This 
displacement prevents farm dwellers from lodging tenant claims under the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act—and even when the displacement takes 
place within the boundaries of the game farm, the move makes it difficult for 
farm dwellers to prove they have stayed in the same place for more than ten 
years (as the Act stipulates). The conversions are hence an effective way of 
safeguarding white ownership from land reform (Brandt 2013; Spierenburg 
& Brooks 2014). In the Eastern Cape the nature conservation argument also 
helps in preventing redistribution of white-owned farm land, as many pro-
vincial and district officials accept the game farmers’ claims (Andrew et al. 
2013), while in some other provinces attempts have been made to restitute 
and/or redistribute game farms to land claimants (Ngubane & Brooks 2013).
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Figure 8.1
Swimmingpool with cattle
On the farm, within the fences, an image is created of wilderness, but also a 
romanticized version of a colonial past—the ‘safari’ experience—with a com-
bination of white hosts and professional hunters to assist the tourist, and 
some dedicated servants. Those who wish to enjoy this experience are eager-
ly awaited at the locked gate and can enter, but only—as Rijk also describes 
above—on the owner’s terms. The fence creates a purified space here as 
much as the fence around the church in Molepolole—a space of ‘untouched, 
pristine’ nature, devoid of the traces of pre-colonial land use but filled with 
colonial longing, and devoid as much as possible of farm dwellers and their 
threatening land claims. 
Vignette 3: Safeguarding non-human animals: More fences [Harry Wels]
Marja and I indeed share many research experiences in (and fond memories 
of ) Southern Africa and joint publications reporting on them. While Mar-
ja moved beyond ‘the fences’ of our department and university to accept a 
professorship in Nijmegen, I continued my research by actually adding more 
focus on fences to my research agenda: trying to understand the rewilding of 
(white) lions, apex predators, in an intellectual context contesting the Carte-
sian divide between human and non-human animals, and strongly influenced 
by an animal rights discourse as translated into a political science argument 
under the concept of ‘Zoopolis’ by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011). 
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The concept of Zoopolis was coined in 1998 by urban geographer Jennifer 
Wolch (there we go).
 More focus on fences means that I now not only try to understand it as 
I used to do from a strictly social sciences perspective, reducing ‘the social’ 
to only the human species, but now also try to understand the fences from a 
non-human, in this case, lion perspective. The vignette I would like to pres-
ent is based on recent fieldwork in South Africa and reveals what only a 24/7 
presence and hanging out in the field can uncover. Before I settled in the 
field I had read about the lion rewilding project extensively and talked to the 
owners of this conservancy on several occasions about what they want to 
establish with these (white) lions. They told me that they basically want two 
things: to rewild white lions in their endemic environment in Timbavati, and 
to take care that more white lions are born in the wild—and not bred in and 
for captivity, nor ‘bred for the bullet’ of the (canned) hunting industry, rife in 
this part of South Africa. This double goal has led to a strategic decision that, 
as an organization, they take care that they never publish a picture of any of 
their lions in the vicinity of a fence or where a fence is visible in the picture. 
This would contradict everything they stand for in terms of ‘rewilding’ and 
‘anti-breeding’, and they made this very clear to me. As they—on top of this 
more earthly consideration—consider the white lions, such as the Shangaan, 
sacred, as ‘messengers from God’ or ‘star lions’, they ask visitors to abstain 
from taking photographs of the lions. As a researcher, I am allowed to take 
pictures for research purposes only, but I am asked not to share them on so-
cial media (which I solemnly promise).
 After the first few weeks in the field, with daily lion checks in the early 
morning and late afternoon (and sometimes in between), ranging from one-
and-a-half to three hours, I soon come to realize that it is almost impossible 
to take photographs of the lions without fences! There are fences everywhere; 
wherever I find the lions, I see fences. On this particular property, as it is 
close to a busy and popular public tar road and therefore prone to poaching, 
they have in addition to the double electrified perimeter fence created anoth-
er electrically fenced-in island, where the lions can in a way live their lives 
without the threat of poaching, in the process basically assigning the rest of 
the property the function of (heavily patrolled) buffer. The island is actually 
not large enough for the lions to fend for themselves, as the Lion Zone is too 
small to sustainably maintain a browser population which they could hunt 
and on which they could feed and live independently. As a result, they need 
to be supplemented with meat every five to six days (ironically, they are fed 
with the cheap left-overs from the hunting industry the owners fight so vehe-
mently, but which is also conveniently close down the road from them). 
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The fences and gates you pass from the main tar road are as follows. Where 
the tar road turns to the dirt road passing by the property, there is a general 
24/7 check point before you can enter the dirt road. You must stop in front of 
closed steel doors, and your car is registered by an officer dressed in military 
attire. From there you continue until there is an off-ramp that leads you to the 
Security Gate, which gives access to the actual property. Once through that 
gate, you drive past Security Camp, where the five field rangers live, and the 
manager’s house, and then you approach a choice between the Lion Zone (to 
the left) and the Lion Free Zone (to the right). If you want to go into the Lion 
Zone, the protocol is that before you open the gate, you check with your telem-
etry that there are no lions close by; otherwise you have to enter the Lion Zone 
via another gate, which you can reach only via the Lion Free Zone (which takes 
you to another three gates). All gates have different padlocks, and it requires 
some experience to find the right key and to avoid being electrocuted by the 
fence, by accidentally touching one of the electrified wires in the process of un-
locking the gate. If you opt for the Lion Zone to check on the lions, assuming 
you can enter the gate based on the signals of your telemetry, you now have to 
find the lions with a combination of telemetry, knowledge of the area and its 
roads, knowledge of where the lions usually like to hang out, where they were 
last spotted and, last but not least, spotting skills, as they know very well how 
to play hide and seek in the thicket (believe me). 
Figure 8.2
Khanyezi, tawny lioness, patrolling the fence (Photograph by Harry Wels)
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And where do the lions usually like to hang out? Exactly near fences and 
gates, with longing and intense stares across the fence where the grass seems 
always greener, or at least the impalas more frequent and fatter (there is usu-
ally a correlation between ‘greener’ and ‘fatter’).
Figure 8.3
Lebata and Regeus, white male lions, resting near almost invisible fence (Photograph 
by Harry Wels)
So by the time you are finally able to take a photograph of the lions (for re-
search purposes), there is hardly any escape from picturing them with a fence 
or gate in the background. Or you have to manipulate the angle of, or even 
‘Photoshop’, your photographs to get rid of the fences. The everyday reality 
is that the lions are usually socializing close to the fences. And, like humans 
and other sentient beings, lions give meaning to the fences: they curse (read: 
growl) when they accidentally touch one of the electrified wires; they test if 
the wires are ‘hot’ and, if not, they try to take the wires down (so every in-
dication that the electricity on the fences is down for one or another reason 
brings the whole maintenance team in a state of red alert); they check the 
fence around the Lion Zone systematically for weak spots; they roar toward 
the male lion that is on a property across the dirt road and who always an-
swers the challenge with a counter roar; on one of their other properties with 
more prey animals, the lions systematically use the fence to corner prey and 
kill it—in other words, they make strategic use of the fence for hunting (espe-
cially the lionesses); if for some or other reason, like a medical check up, they 
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are lured with food in the bomas,34 you can interpret their behaviour and 
body language as that they become sad and as a result pace up and down the 
boma fence (like lions in zoos). In other words, they are sentient beings with 
a mind of their own, giving their own interpretations to the endless fences by 
which they are surrounded. It shows in this case the incredible power differ-
ences between the non-human and the human animal—between the lions 
and the ones who can find the money to pay for the erection of the fences, 
humans who do that in the name of conservation and representing the li-
ons, giving them ‘a voice’, doing it for the lions’ own good and saving them 
from extinction and the ‘bullet next door’. Power differences that also haunt 
the perceptions of fences and feelings of inclusion and exclusion in human 
configurations, as described by Marja; power differences that also make Rijk 
‘bite the bullet’ of a ritual cleansing, which he survives. Can we compare the 
vignettes? Can we compare the powerlessness of lions to marginalized com-
munities and to rituals in religious communities? Can the fence bring the 
human and the non-human together in one social analysis, in one chapter? Is 
the fence, which usually only divides and excludes, perhaps also the symbolic 
and paradoxical marker of a cross-disciplinary openness in a Dietzian way?  
Conclusion
In his inaugural address, which he held upon his appointment as director 
of the ASC and as Professor of the Study of African Development—both in 
Leiden—Ton Dietz spoke of the ‘silver lining’ of Africa (Dietz 2011). Every 
dark cloud—when the sun is shining behind it—will show its brighter side 
by being circumvented and captured by a silver line. The metaphor is one of 
hope and optimism in the sense that while the inner part of the cloud may be 
pitch-dark, the outer part is a lining of silver that may announce the immi-
nent coming of a brighter day. Ton Dietz used the metaphor not only to fight 
Afro-pessimism, but also to set a new research agenda in which the prospects 
of African societies were going to be explored as to their challenges, dyna-
misms, and opportunities; new economic initiatives, a better positioning on 
the world market; clear signs of the reduction in poverty, rising educational 
standards, improved health care; and better functioning political systems. 
Pointing at the African miracles of success, such as Botswana, he claimed 
a new silver lining for Africa. And, strangely, the silver line itself became an 
agent, as it set in motion different perspectives and imaginaries, opened new 
avenues into research and policy making, and managed to connect differ-
34 In eastern and southern Africa, an enclosure, especially for animals.
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ent—academic, policy, business—actors with each other in new ways (the 
conferences on ‘Africa Works’ were a direct outcome of this silver lining). 
 Are fences silver linings? At least by the very look of them, they are: shiny 
metal strands, reflecting the light like any silver object does. But more met-
aphorically, do fences demarcate while allowing for a brighter day to emerge 
on the horizon, demarcating spaces for experiments with new ways of liv-
ing? We may not want to push the metaphor too far, yet it is clear from our 
vignettes that fences are more than only the dark constructs of control and 
discipline; perceiving the fence as an agent capable of setting certain things 
in motion allows for a more challenging view of the fence than that of it being 
just this dark cloud that hangs over the mobility of people, animals, or even 
spirits. 
 While approaching the fences from different perspectives—and differ-
ent anthropological interests, some of which border on other disciplines and 
fields such as development studies, organization studies, philosophy, and 
even a hint of geography—there are a number of commonalities in the vi-
gnettes in relation to open/closedness, in- and exclusion, but also of purity.
 The fences of the church, the game farms, and lion conservancy are all 
meant to create safe havens where believers, game farmers and their guests, 
and the lions can move freely and safely. Within the fences, open interactions 
are possible between different people and other animals (the believer and 
the visiting anthropologist, the game farmers, their guests and again the an-
thropologists, and the lions and the anthropologist), but one party dictates 
the rules… In all these spaces, an idealized and ‘purified’ kind of utopia is 
created, often with references to an idealized past—Eden, the colonial period 
when white farmers and big game hunters could do as they pleased, ‘pristine 
nature’ as it existed ‘long ago’ (but did it ever?), or an idealized future, like 
a Zoopolis. Are these the silver linings, catching the light by either looking 
back in nostalgia or dreaming ahead? As all safe havens do, they are created 
to keep ‘menaces’ out, evil spirits, poachers, and land claimants. Some move 
freely between inside and outside; others cannot. Yet, some try to force their 
way in—human (for instance, poachers and land claimants) or non-human 
‘outsiders’ rebelling against the fences erected to keep them out—and some-
times succeed in that. 
 These spaces take a lot of imagination—especially in the last two vignettes. 
‘Pristine nature’ is not supposed to include fences, so guests and researchers 
refrain from taking pictures of wild animals and fences and pretend the fenc-
es are not there; the agency of the fences is paradoxically articulated by their 
imaginary absence.
 In conclusion, the fence does need to be looked at from various perspec-
tives: those fenced in and those fenced out, while indeed attention is required 
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to focus on what the fence does to the various human and non-human an-
imals in the configurations around the fences. Hence, a Dietzian open out-
look, combining various disciplines, may result in a better understanding of 
the workings and impacts of these markers. There is one last point to make, 
one which we feel can directly be linked to Ton Dietz’s open outlook on mat-
ters, and one which intriguingly may lead to unsuspecting insights: without 
a gate a fence ceases to exist! Indeed, without openings it can no longer per-
form its function of allowing an inner and outer that can be crossed. After all, 
what is a fence without a gate/an opening? What kind of space is it then de-
marcating, if any? If gates remain closed, or selectively closed to some, people 
and animals may force their way in or out; a gate is therefore a moral entity, 
as it may help to judge behaviour in terms of trespassing and poaching when 
the conditions of gate-keeping are not being respected. The fences’ openings 
and closures thus make for yet another intriguing domain of investigation. 
Anticipating an open-minded Dietzian reflection on this intrigue, we look 
forward to reading Ton’s first publication on the topic.
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9
Gods of the East, gods of the West 
A Dogon cartography
Wouter van Beek
The invocation
The imposing cliff already casts its shadow on the small public place when 
the crowd falls silent to listen to Asama Ajuro, one of the village speakers, for 
his tɔrɔ, the ritual invocation, will send the deceased to his final abode. The 
speaker of the dead, Asama, may be old, but his voice easily carries from the 
little square to the caverns up in the cliff, as he calls upon Ama, the sky god, 
Lèwè, the god of the earth, and Nomo, who rules the water. Each of them is 
honoured by his tige, the honorific name that can be lengthy and sometimes 
is quite revealing. The one for Ama is ‘the one who changes everything’, fol-
lowed by a long standard explanation: ‘Who walks in the bush, he will set on 
the path; who walks on the path, he will put in the bush; who has a bowl of 
food, he changes for a bowl of leaves; while whoever just has leaves will find 
his bowl full of food.’ Ama is a fickle and capricious god on whom all depend, 
but who has his own agenda, inscrutable to us humans. This fundamental 
ambivalence characterizes the whole of the ‘other world’, with all the various 
beings that populate it, who represent both the good and the bad side of ex-
istence, both threat and comfort, both harm and healing, both famine and 
fortune. After the three major gods, all spiritual beings are mentioned, called 
upon with their honorifics, and each and every one of them is asked to be nice 
to the newcomer into their realm, to receive him as one of them, to welcome 
him in his new home. Thus, the various spirits that roam the bush and the vil-
lage have to weigh in with their share, as have the first people arriving at the 
spot, those ancestors that made the stairs up the cliff, together with the more 
recent ancestors, plus the one whose death we are mourning here: ‘Your big 
evening has come; thank you, thank you; be well and be well mourned.’ About 
halfway through the list, Asama mentions four gods without tige: ‘Gods of the 
East (manu) receive him; gods of the West (dono) receive him; gods of the 
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North (dudaga) receive him; gods of the South (tεŋunu)35 receive him; bid 
him a welcome.’ The whole discourse is directed to the high cliff, where a few 
days ago the body of the deceased was laid to rest in one of the many caverns 
that dot the cliff face.  
Directions
The Bandiagara cliff, a landmark in West Africa, is highly present in Dogon cul-
ture with its over 200 m height and spanning more than 150 km. In this Fest-
schrift for Ton Dietz, who as a geographer has always been greatly interested 
in the relation between topical setting and culture, I want to focus on one geo-
graphical item that features in all cultures, the cardinal directions. We saw Asa-
ma invoke the gods of East, West, North, and South; that they bore no tige is 
significant, since in Dogon culture every personalized being has one. Thus the 
gods of East and West are more the directions themselves than specific gods. 
They feature in many of the texts and show up in various parts of the rituals. 
 When a woman is buried, the bearers bring the stretcher to the public 
square of their ward and dance with the corpse on their heads: they shuffle 
the corpse toward the four directions, North-East-South-West, before bring-
ing it up to the burial cave. At one particular sacrifice that is part of another 
ritual complex, Mèninyu, the elder in charge, performed an invocation to 
the cardinal directions: he took the iron lance that lay alongside the altar and 
stabbed it in the four directions, making a full circle when doing so. As shown 
in Figure 9.1, luckily I happened to have my camera ready.36
Also, the famous Dogon masquerades are shot through with directional el-
ements. During the long preparations for this second funeral, the saru jogu 
(spear mask) appears and dances, clothed in a death blanket with a black fibre 
hood on its head, a lance in hand. He dances slowly, turning around, swings 
the lance to the North, East, South, and West, sending the evil things away 
and drawing the good stuff in with the movements of his spear. Later in the 
liturgy, the main rituals consist of the arrivals of the masks from the cardinal 
directions, each day from one: the mountainside setting is a natural theatre 
as well as a collection of sacred spaces.
 During a major song cycle called baja ni, the group of singers chants 
about the Dogon prophet Abirè, who roamed the plains and cliff area during 
the last part of the 19th century (van Beek 2012). One of his chants echoes a 
complaint of all times and eras: the world is changing for the worse: ‘Former-
35 ε mid-central, unrounded (cap), ŋ voiced velar halfvocal (long), ɔ, back, rounded (long).
36 Sorry, I missed manu.
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ly, when someone lived in the same village, he could give you his daughter 
in marriage, as his neighbour. No longer so: the world is spoilt’; and then it 
continues: ‘The East is spoilt, we might even have to move South. For this 
funeral, how do we organize it: we start at the East, how do we organize it in 
the South?’  
 Other examples could easily be found, but these will do for the moment 
to highlight the cultural importance of cardinal directions, though the latter 
one is curious: only two directions are mentioned, East and South. Why not 
all four? Why these two? So let us take a look at these cardinal directions 
among the Dogon, for they are by no means the standard directional cross. 
We start with my research village, Tireli, where people speak a version of 
Dogon called Toro So and use the following terms for the cardinal directions:
 
North:  dudaga  
East: manu 
South: tεŋunu   
West: dono  
This sounds pretty straightforward, but here we encounter a major transla-
tion problem, since the identification of the directions is far from simple, as a 
look at Figure 9.2 immediately reveals.
a b c
Figure 9.1
Mèninyu points toward dudaga (a), toward dono (b) and toward tεŋunu (c)
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Figure 9.2
The Dogon region (Source: van Beek & Hollyman, 2001)
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The central part of the Dogon area—that is, the cliff plus part of the plateau 
and the plains (called Gondo)—has been a UNESCO World Cultural Herit-
age site since 1989.37 The map shows the cliff as an almost perfect diagonal, 
South-West to North-East. How do the Dogon lexemes match the geograph-
ical directions? For the emic map, meaning the Dogon definitions of the car-
dinal cross, we have to see what these Dogon terms actually mean. Sketch-
ing the cliff in its geographical directions with the Dogon perceptions of the 
cardinal directions, we arrive at Figure 9.3, which depicts just the direction 
of the cliff. 
 
dono dudaga
tεŋunu manu
Geographic 
north
Figure 9.3
Dogon emic cardinal directions
Clearly our translation was off, by some 45%! The gods of the East in geo-
graphic fact are the gods of the South-East; the gods of the West come from 
the North-West. Actually, there seems to be little reason to insist on translat-
ing, for instance, tεŋunu as South and not as West, and we will come to that 
choice later. Whatever the direction of the cliff, the sun still rises in the geo-
graphical East and sets on the opposite side, the West, and if anything it is the 
movement of the sun (yes, of course, it is the earth rotating) that dominates 
37 The area was listed by Decree No 89-428 P-RM of 28 December 1989 as a natural and cul-
tural sanctuary.
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the cardinal directions, at least with people that do not live at the cliff-side. 
That raises two questions: How do the Dogon tally this with their ‘skewed’ 
(saltire) cross? And secondly, how do Dogon that live out of sight of the cliff 
define their cardinal directions?
Associations
First, the Dogon have a series of symbolic associations that go along with 
their skewed directions: from the ‘North’ come the good things, like the rain, 
the ‘child of heaven’, whereas from the ‘South’ nothing good can be expect-
ed: any wind blowing from there will spoil the rains. ‘Never marry a woman 
from the tεŋunu,’ my main informant Mèninyu repeatedly warned his grand-
son Emanuel. From the ‘East’ come the foodstuffs, millet, peanuts, the ‘good-
ies’. The ‘West’ holds an absolutely surprising association: from that direction 
comes the caiman, the small caiman species to be found in the deep wells 
and pools at the cliff-side. The pond in Amani, just ‘dudaga from Tireli’, was 
particularly famous with tourists since it is packed with caiman, and its pool 
population is admired also by the other Dogon as the grand Amani binu, 
totem. The caiman is a familiar of the water god Nomo, and its presence is 
crucial, as without a well no village is possible. ‘Our ancestors had to find the 
traces of caiman before founding the village,’ elders explained to me. Also Ti-
reli, with its deep main village well, sports its caiman. 
 Viewing these North-South associations, the sun tends, for the Dogon in 
Tireli, to rise in dudaga and set in tεŋunu, so this is one place in the world 
where the sun travels to some extent from North to South. They are, evi-
dently, aware that the actual direction is from between dudaga and manu, 
to between tεŋunu and dono; but whatever the direction the sun takes, it 
is thought to more or less follow the escarpment rim. That North-East to 
South-West direction is also the way the wind travels and the rains come and 
go. The discrepancy between the sun’s trajectory and the orientation of the 
cliff-side for the Dogon is not difficult to live with, as the exact provenance 
of the rain is more important than the path of the sun. Of course, the cliff in 
the afternoon casts its shadow over the village—that was the scene we started 
out with—and all are perfectly aware of this fact, but the perceived geography 
follows the setting of the cliff, so somehow the sun does the same. As do the 
moon and the stars, of course. 
 Second, not all Dogon live at the cliff-side, not by far. The great majority 
of the Dogon live either on the plains, well out of sight of the escarpment, or 
on the plateau, with no view of the plains. They too have their axes of orienta-
tion, which cannot be expected to be skewed, just the normal—rather boring, 
I think—cartographic North-South orientation. The terms we saw the Tire-
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li Dogon use are part of their language called Toro So, the ‘language of the 
mountainside’. Linguistics are highly relevant here as there is not one Dogon 
language, but there are a lot! Fortunately, Dogon languages are under thor-
ough investigation by a team of linguists headed by the University of Michi-
gan. What formerly was considered as one Dogon language with eight dialects 
(Calame-Griaule 1968), on closer inspection turns out to be much more than 
that: 22 languages plus one or more isolates.38 Dogon has moved from a lan-
guage to a language family, on a par with Mande or Gur families but with one 
major difference: the almost two dozen Dogon languages are confined to a very 
restricted area: they all live closely together, on and around the plateau and cliff 
called the ‘falaise de Bandiagara’.39  Since language and territory walk hand in 
hand around here, let us take a look at how speakers from other Dogon lan-
guages, most of whom never see the escarpment, orient themselves. 
  First, the other Toro So speakers living on top of the plateau, as in Sangha, 
share more or less the same terms:40
 
North:  du-na:41 
East: du 
South: tεŋulu or tεŋuru 
West:  dono 
Though the villages of Sangha and Tireli are just 12 km apart, there is a marked 
dialect difference between them; in the Dogon region a small geographical dis-
tance is enough for a significant change in dialect. The main difference is in 
East: in Sangha du, in Tireli manu. The people in Tireli know the word du very 
well, but prefer manu, meaning ‘the plains’, exactly the feature the people from 
Sangha never see, and which in downhill Tireli cannot be missed. If there is 
a minor difference already over 12 km, how do the words for directions fare 
in the whole corpus of Dogon languages, spread out over a much larger area? 
Thanks to the Michigan-based project (see dogonlanguages.org) and the work 
of Roger Blench,42 plus two major dictionaries,43 I could retrieve 19 examples of 
Dogon directionality, as far as known now44 (Table 9.1). 
38 Discussed below are more than 24 languages, but two sub-languages are included, Gourou 
and Yomo So, and some classifications are not fully clear yet. 
39 That does not hold for the isolates, of course, such as Bangime, which has no discernible ‘rel-
atives’ in West Africa, but which is considered culturally a Dogon village (Blench & Dendo 2005).
40 Calame-Griaule (1968, resp. p. 81, 271, 71)
41 Na means ‘large’. 
42 See www.rogerblench.info/Language/Niger-Congo/Dogon/DogOP.htm [Accessed 21 No-
vember 2016].
43 Calame-Griaule (1968) for Toro So, and Kervran (1982) for Donno So.
44 The lexicons are informative but provisional.
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Tabel 9.1
Overview of directional terms
Dogon language North East South West
Northern W → Ea
Bondum Dom / 
Najamba-Kindige
kolal dûn tombal yεndε
Bankan Tey hawsa du:-jiro gurŋga usu taŋga-ya-i
/ gorgal
Ben Tey boson-da dû / du-dâ munyurɔ-dâ tεŋi-dâ / tεŋ-dâ
Toro Tegu haws du dεwri luwo
Central W → Eb
Mombo nyomboli ko:lo a:sugu nyomboli sigok a:tege
Tommo Soc paigai du:daga sada tan-daga
Nanga du:-daga usi-(tum-no) teŋ-daga usi-(yegi-nɔ)
Tebul Ured dubari tumbemgo teŋgule pilεmgo
Ana Tingae dudaga tumɔn tεndaga pilεm
Yanda Dom du-daga tum-oŋ teŋ-daga piloŋ
Perge Teguf ilam dû / dû: gire tεŋ-daga numɔgu
Jamsayg tɔrɔ / tɔrɔdaga dû: / du-daga munyurɔ-daga / oru tεŋ / tεn-daga
Southern W → Eh Ampari
Ampari Dogoni ? du-rigitu mbere ? ku-rugitu mbere
Donno So wazuba du tεŋulu kolu
Toro Soj du-daga du tεŋulu dono
Yomo Sok donô dû: tεŋîl nam [numɔ-ŋ]
Gouroul tɔrɔ-daya du-daya nɔŋɔ-daya tεŋu-daya
Togo Kan tɔrɔ-digi du-daga nɔŋɔ-digi tεŋ-daga
Tomo Kanm jigi du jigi sara
a No information available on Penangwe, Tiranige Diga Dogon, nor, for that matter, on Bangime, which is 
not classified as a Dogon language but appears to be an isolate.
b No information on terms for directionality available in Tomo Kan, Ampari Dogon, Bunoge, Dogul Dom, 
Nyaambeeŋge (also not in the wordlists on the Blench). www.rogerblench.info/Language/Niger-Congo/
Dogon). Walo, mentioned by Blench & Dendo (2005), probably is the same as Ben Tey.
c Here the ‘dogonlanguages’ lexicon gives different lexemes for Tommo So, i.e. kɔlɔlu, tummu-go/du:, 
tumbalu, daa, respectively. The terms given come from a trusted informant in Kassa, by the mediation of 
Oumar Ongoiba, and I have chosen his version of directionality.
d From www.rogerblench.info/Language/Niger-Congo/Dogon/DogOP.htm [Accessed 21 November 2016].
e A language spoken by one village only, Ana (meaning ‘village’), and closely related to Nanga and Tegul. 
Information from www.rogerblench.info/Language/Niger-Congo/Dogon/DogOP.htm [Accessed 21 
November 2016].
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f Perge (Pergue) is a village on the southern edge of a long inselberg that begins East of Douentza and runs 
South-East toward Bamba. Perge has an aberrant Jamsay-like variety with a lot of Nanga lexicon (due to 
intermarriage). With thanks to Jeffrey Heath for this and the following information.
g Both from private information and the lexicon.
h No information available on Tomo Kan,
i From www.rogerblench.info/Language/Niger-Congo/Dogon/DogOP.htm [Accessed 21 November 2016].
j This includes the terms as used in Tireli, a variant of Toro So, mentioned at the start of our article.
k A Toro So version spoken in Yendouma (local name Yorno). Info: Jeffrey Heath.
l A Jamsay version, taken as a separate entry, spoken in several villages east and south of Koro, such as 
Kiri. Info: Jeffrey Heath.
m The lexicon does not give lexemes for the cardinal directions for Tomo Kan; these lexemes stem from a 
Tomo Kan speaker who is a mathematics teacher in Bamako, by mediation of Oumar Ongoiba. The terms 
for North and South depend on the spot the speaker is in: the name of a village in the North or South, 
followed by –jigi, the Togon Kan variant of daga.
Of course, in this comparative linguistic exercise there is no checking of the 
actual directionality, and I assume that most languages do follow an upright 
cardinal cross. 
 The first observation is that the Dogon have two basic directional terms, 
du and tεŋunu. The other terms differ from language to language and often 
refer to people living in that direction, or to geographical features: dono is the 
area of the Donno So speakers,45 tɔrɔ is the direction of Toro So speakers—
the word itself means ‘mountain’, so fits well with the escarpment—while oru, 
the other Jamsay term for South, simply means ‘bush’, comparable to manu 
in Tireli.46 Incidentally, the use of tɔrɔ as North in Jamsay brings to mind the 
skewed directionality we mentioned, since for most Jamsay speakers the es-
carpment is toward the West, at best to the North-West. Mombo and bon-
dum refer to the Kolu people, who live near Ningari.47 For North in Donno 
So, wazuba, Kervran mentions the region North of Gondo people by the Wa-
zuba people.48 For many other incidental terms this may well hold, but these 
cannot be checked in the present state of knowledge. 
 The second observation, and the most germane to my discussion, is that 
both directions, du and tεŋunu (or its variants tεŋ, tεŋi or tan), are not com-
pletely fixed. Du is predominantly East, but with a suffix can mean North, 
the ‘fixed East’,49 or East-side’,  though with the same suffix it is East as well in 
other Dogon languages. Tεŋunu is predominantly Southwards but can move 
to the West.
45 Though a hillock toward the West is also mentioned, Calame-Griaule ibidem p. 71
46 According to Jeffrey Heath, even tεŋunu might refer to an ethnic Dogon group, Tengu, near 
Bankass. Personal communication.
47 Kervran (1982: 227)
48 I have not been able to trace this group, which is also not mentioned on the Dogon languag-
es website at www.dogonlanguages.org or on Blench’s website, see note 52.
49 Calame-Griaule (1968: 54)
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As the lexemes seem to depend on their location, let us follow the zones. In 
the Northern languages, du (in its varieties) clearly means East, while for 
North and South no joint markers are available. South lacks any common 
term, while the stem usu or usi may well indicate ‘wind’, also in Nanga. The 
suffixes da, dâ, daga or daya were translated by Calame-Griaule for Toro So 
as ‘closed’.50 However, only Toro So differentiates between du and dudaga, so 
in this semantic domain daga or daya might be interpreted either as ‘fixed’ 
or simply as ‘the side of ’.51
 Other lexemes are hard to interpret, especially in Mombo, which seems 
the odd one out in this domain.52 The terms nɔŋɔ might refer to a ward of the 
village, nɔŋ in Jamsay, nɔŋɔ in Toro So, such as a faraway ward lying in that 
particular direction. Some lexemes are intriguing in themselves: tumbalu in 
the lexicon variant of Tommo So (note 50) and tombal in Bondum both mean 
South, the two languages are neighbours. The term is enigmatic but might 
be related to tum, and thus to du:. For munyurɔ dâ (South in Ben Tey) and 
munyurɔ (South in Jamsay), which do point in the same direction, the refer-
ent is probably an enemy of old, the Mossi in Burkina Faso, munyu in Jamsay 
and other Dogon languages. As the Mossi were feared slave raiders, it makes 
perfect sense to name this dangerous direction after them.
 In the Central languages, du, the one constant directional term, seems to 
shift toward the North, with the East predominantly represented by tum, in 
many varieties. This group consists of a series of very small, closely related 
languages, often comprising just one or a few villages, and I tend to view tum 
as a local variant of du. In this cluster du and teŋ seem to be clearly oppo-
sitional terms as South and North,53 while in the Southern group they are 
more South and East (like in the baja ni example we mentioned above). So 
50 For Toro So, ‘small’ would also be an option as a viable translation, thus the ‘small’ East. Af-
ter all, du na, the large East, in Toro So means the North-East, the important direction for the 
rains. But it is questionable whether such a distinction within du holds for the other languages 
as well; it does not in Donno So, at least.
51 daga is ‘side’ in Jamsay. With thanks to Oumar Ongoiba.
52 Blench & Dendo (2005) mention Ambaleeŋge as one of the languages—and have no direc-
tional terms on their wordlist—but it seems to be classified as Mombo elsewhere: see www.
roger blench.info/Language/Niger-Congo/Dogon/Ambaleenge%20wordlist%20paper.pdf. 
53 Jeffrey Heath, as mentioned above, refers in this context to the Tengu, a group living South 
of Koro (personal communication); if the term tεŋ indeed is a generic directional term, the 
name Tengu might be an exonym, like ‘People from the South’. The shifting of the direction 
of tεŋ in itself would be consistent with a referral to a people somewhere in the South, as the 
central languages tend to associate it with South, and the South-Eastern ones with West. But 
this does not hold at all for Ben Tey, up in the North, for which tεŋ means West. Occurring as 
northerly as Nanga and Ben Tey—even if it is West there—tεŋ is hard to see as a reference to a 
particular people South of Koro, and all in all there are simply too many languages using a var-
iant of tεŋ not to see it as a primary term of directionality.
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the basic directional opposition in the Dogon language family probably is du 
> < tεŋ, a duo that comes into full bloom in the Southern group of languages, 
where du is clearly East with a slight arabesque to the North in Toro So, but 
where tεŋ is divided between South and West. 
 Thus two major dynamics seem to inform Dogon directionality: one pair 
of terms in clear opposition, plus ‘swinging’. The terms tend to be defined in 
opposition to each other, du as East calls for a tεŋ as West, while du(-daga) 
in the North finds itself paired to a tεŋ version in the South, and du-daya in 
the East is opposed by tεŋ-daya in the West. The swinging element is what 
we started out with—that is, the Tireli (=Toro So) vision of the skewed axis. 
Throughout the corpus of closely related Dogon languages a remarkable in-
decision reigns over the ultimate direction of du and tεŋ, du moving between 
North and East while tεŋ cannot really decide whether it means South or 
West. The dominant original meanings might well be East and South, respec-
tively, but other forces, like that of opposition, intervene, pulling them in op-
posite directions. As shown in Figure 9.4, the cliff is an imposing background 
to the village; orientation to that feature is almost self-evident. 
 
Figure 9.4
Dwelling at the cliff-side
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Interpretation
Here we come back to our opening example, the gods of the East and the 
West in Tireli, and their peculiar skewed axis. Dictionaries and lexicons do 
not check directions; that is not possible. But the Tireli people, with their ver-
sion of Toro So, would not be the only ones with a skewed axial cross. Some 
of their North-Eastern co-inhabitants of the cliff, the Nanga, Ben Tey, Ana 
Tinga, and Tebul Ure Dogon would be expected to share a similar direction-
ality, just as would a few of the South-Western neighbours near Kani Bonzon, 
some of whom are still unclassified language-wise. For all of these, an inde-
cision as to whether du means East or North, or whether tεŋ implies South 
or West, makes perfect sense, as the natural orientation of the escarpment 
does not tally well with the cartographic one. And precisely this is what we 
see in the whole corpus of Dogon languages, an indecision over what exactly 
du and tεŋunu mean. 
 My main point here is that our criteria for the construction of the world, 
like the cardinal directions, are not nearly so self-evident as we think them to 
be. People do not live inside an environment, they live with it; they interact 
with it while it interacts with them: they dwell their environment: 
When I discussed the cardinal directions last October in Bamako with the 
baja ni singers, I showed them the map of the Dogon area, a cartographic 
highlight for us researchers.54 The reaction of the Tireli men was characteris-
tic: ‘Ah, that is the white man’s thing; they do not live there.’ 
This is what Ingold calls ‘dwelling’, a perspective in which ‘the world contin-
uously comes into being around the person’ (Ingold 2000: 153), where man 
and environment are mutually constituted. The environment is what peo-
ple see in it, which is mostly based upon what they do with it. Yet, it is not 
completely ‘in the eye of the beholder’ either: some natural phenomena are 
simply too large, too important, or too obvious to be ignored, like the Dogon 
escarpment. So here, in the cardinal axis of the escarpment, the Dogon are 
confronted with a different choice of criteria: not the rising and setting of 
the sun dictate East and West, and consequently North and South, but the 
mountain habitat, running in a perfect diagonal, skews the cardinal direc-
tions. In Dogon country, the sun and the moon have to follow the moun-
tainside. This cliff is too large to play second fiddle, and the heavenly bodies 
simply have to follow its lead and direction. 
54 Despite the drawbacks and shortcomings, as noted on the dogonlanguages.com website
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In one of the opening songs baja ni, the funeral cycle mentioned above, the 
singers from Tireli invite all the villages in their neighbourhood to their night 
of singing, and finally exclaim: ‘If we enumerate all villages, the sun will rise 
above Bamba.’ But from the vantage point of Tireli, Bamba is straight North-
West!55
 
But why do the languages of plains and plateau show the same indecision 
about direction? One obvious reason would be that in the past their ances-
tral population did in fact live at the cliff-side. If that was the case, we may be 
able to interpret our linguistic data in a historical-semantic fashion, and this 
forms the conclusion of my chapter. Of course, the lexical basis is much too 
small for any serious semantic reconstruction, so this part of my homage to 
Ton Dietz is highly speculative—but that is what a Festschrift is for. 
 The problem is that the views on the deep Dogon history from linguistics, 
archaeology, and oral history do not match. Oral history has the Dogon ar-
rive somewhere during the 13th century at the escarpment after a major mi-
gration from Mande, in the far South-West of Mali. From one central place of 
arrival at the cliff-side, Kani Na, nowadays a deserted village near Kani Kom-
bole, the Dogon reportedly started colonizing the cliff-side. As such, this 
move from Mande to the escarpment region, which is central in Dogon oral 
tradition, may well be more of a mythical charter than actual history, but the 
designation of Kani Na as the central place of arrival is surprisingly beyond 
debate. From Kani Na the group split in three—Jon, Aru, and Ono—and from 
the latter, other Dogon groups trace their descent, such as the Domno. Mov-
ing North-East alongside the escarpment, these early Dogon encountered 
the Tellem who had settled part of the area, and who later gradually moved 
out, probably after quite some time of living together. Tradition holds that 
they became the Kurumba of Burkina Faso, but that is debated. From the 
escarpment area, the Dogon then moved out onto the plateau and into the 
plains over the following centuries, a movement that is still going on.56 So 
oral history and some ritual data indicate a first presence of the Dogon at the 
escarpment not before 1250 CE. 
 Linguistic data, however, paint a completely different picture. Viewing the 
array of languages and the measure of their differentiation, some linguists 
propose a much longer Dogon presence in the area, not one of centuries but 
of millennia: 3,000-4,000 years!57 We saw the Dogon language family to be 
very homogeneous as such, but with a surprisingly large internal variation, 
even discounting isolates such as Bangime, a village which is culturally quite 
55 See van Beek, Saye & Ongoiba (2018: 104)
56 The Ono may well have moved directly into the plains from Kani Na (Gallay 2012: 217).
57 Blench & Dendo (2005: 14-15)
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Dogon but linguistically unrelated to any other language in the area. The 
main question is how fast a language can split up into first dialects and then 
related languages from one initial point of immigration. Linguists differ on 
the presumed speed of linguistic radiation, but most are of the opinion that 
seven centuries would not be sufficient. For them, the Dogon linguistic sit-
uation provides a direct challenge, if they have to accept the data from oral 
history.
 The third historical source, archaeology, for its part, does indeed show 
a gradual replacement of the Tellem by the Dogon during the 14th and 15th 
century.58 But that is only at the cliff-side; much earlier traces of occupation 
have been found on the plateau,59 even from the early Palaeolithic.60 There is, 
in short, no way the area has ever been empty, though archaeology does not 
give an indication as yet of any specific group identity. So, for how long have 
the people from whom the Dogon descended been present in the region?
 Whatever the time scale and the historical relevance of the oral traditions, 
it is difficult to imagine that also in the deep past the escarpment area was 
not the epicentre of Dogon culture. Recently, a major attempt at synthesis 
has been undertaken by a Swiss team headed by Alain Gallay, on the basis 
of extensive research into pottery traditions.61 As one of the core regions of 
their Sahel research, Gallay has focused on the Dogon area, its oral history, 
linguistics, and archaeology, in particular ethno-archaeology of pottery tra-
ditions. He shows how the various Dogon ‘tribus’ (as he calls them; they are 
in fact descent traditions) coincide with language variation and with pottery 
traditions—to some extent at least. His overview is the most complete to date 
and adheres to the one-point-dispersal, from the mountainside. For instance, 
Aru, the descent tradition in which Tireli is situated, is closely linked to Toro 
So and to one specific pottery line62—and so too, to a lesser extent, is the Jon 
tradition. So let us see what that means for my cardinal speculations. Our 
small semantic domain suggests that we indeed start from a first settlement 
of the Dogon at the escarpment area and that the cartographic diagonal of 
the cliff has continued to serve as a basic frame of reference for the groups 
migrating outwards.
 In the long linguistic scenario, the languages would have split slowly, ra-
diating out from the escarpment and developing separated vocabularies in 
58 The same holds for the much scantier evidence for an earlier population, the Toloy, present 
at the escarpment at the start of the CE.
59 A. Mayor et al. (2005); see also Aline Robert et al. (2003).
60 These earlier groups have not been identified with the elusive Toloy, who occupied the es-
carpment around the start of the CE. Gallay (2012: 224), Bedaux (1991), Bedaux & Lange (1983).
61 Gallay (2012: 223)
62 Gallay (2012: 253)
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the course of time, with the basis opposition between du and tεŋ. But then 
they would also have retained their relative lack of fixed direction, and it is 
an open question whether languages are conservative enough to do so over 
such a long time period—plus, I have to admit, a millennia-long presence of 
the Dogon at the cliff-side implies a paradigmatic shift that I am not yet ready 
for. Nor are the Dogon themselves. So I opt for the other scenario, with the 
short time span of oral history—just seven centuries. This time span requires 
a different dynamic, where the escarpment settlements, the core of which 
stem from Kani, spawn small groups moving out onto the plateau and plains 
whenever resources open up, creating daughter settlements which then in-
teract with groups at the rim of the Dogon area, leading to a rapid dialecti-
zation. The age of insecurity, between the 16th and 19th centuries,63 may well 
have boosted language differentiation. A high degree of village endogamy, 
relative social isolation of the villages through slave raiding, and a sub-cur-
rent of inter-village hostilities led to isolation of the social units and thus 
to—admittedly very rapid—linguistic radiation. Gallay posits the option of 
an ancient population, like the Tellem, remaining in place and providing deep 
historical roots for the separation of the Dogon language groups, but this 
runs against all oral history and has little to no basis in archaeology.
 All in all, to conclude this speculative part of my contribution to Ton Di-
etz’s volume, the direction of the escarpment may well have influenced the 
peculiar situation of this semantic domain, and we see the echo of the domi-
nance of the cliff ‘diagonal’ in the indecision that reigns in the major terms in 
question. These wishy-washy cardinal directions of the Dogon, in my opin-
ion, point to a relatively recent dispersal of the Dogon from the escarpment 
area, offering us a view on a geographical situation where the struggle be-
tween the mountainside and the sun is not yet over: just two main directional 
lexemes which swing like a pendulum between two points of the compass. 
Read this way, the direction of the escarpment provides a handsome, elegant 
clue to this exotic conundrum, thus providing an argument for the first set-
tlement of the Dogon at the escarpment in a not too remote time period—
but, anyway, a reminder that geography is in the eye of the beholder.
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Stamps surrender to mobile phones 
Reading the communication ecology of 
erstwhile West Cameroon64
Mirjam de Bruijn & Walter Gam Nkwi
The film Elephant’s Dream,65 a sketch of the decline of the State of the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, shows the expectations of post office personnel in 
the era of advancing mobile communication technologies. The film reminds 
us of our own observations in Cameroon, where the postal offices are in-
creasingly empty, some even closing their doors, or transformed into West-
ern Union offices. The days of letters and stamps are increasingly coming to 
an end. Meanwhile, the national post office and the stamps are concrete sym-
bols of the nation-state. They are the emblem of the state itself. Since 2000 
these functions are increasingly being replaced by mobile phones and ICT 
companies, which make international calls accessible and apparently make 
national borders disappear. Their symbolisms are of an international world. 
In the synopsis of the film, it is formulated as follows: ‘Although these three 
government-owned institutions are running on their last legs, the film allows 
for a surprisingly poetic and empathetic look at a state in decline. Yet, it also 
64 West Cameroon existed in the political chessboard of Cameroon from 1961 to 1972 as a fed-
erated state. This was following the constitutional conference which took place in Foumban on 
14-17 July 1961 to harmonize the bi-cultural structures of the British and French colonization 
that had existed since 1916. One effect of the constitutional conference was that it gave birth to 
the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Following the constitution, Cameroon became a federal Re-
public of Cameroon made up of two states: The Federal State of West Cameroon and the Federal 
State of East Cameroon. This was a permanent clause, but within ten years and eleven months 
a referendum was organized by the president of the First Republic, El Hadjj Ahmadou Ahidjo, 
and the federal system was supplanted by the United Republic of Cameroon. West Cameroon 
was further divided into two provinces—the Northwest and Southwest provinces—as a con-
sequence of the referendum. Recently, the provinces became regions. At the tail-end of 2016, 
there were strikes called by teachers and lawyers as well as the common people, and one of their 
demands was to restore the state of West Cameroon or return to the Federation. For more on 
West Cameroon, see Ngoh 2001.
65 Elephant’s Dream – a film by Kristof Bilsen, 2013.
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makes us witness the small but apparent moments of change and revolution.’ 
How is the mobile telephone a symbol of the state in decline and at the same 
time a pivotal moment of change and revolution?
Introduction: Communication research at the ASC
The African Studies Centre (ASC) research on mobile telephony that began 
in 2006 has written history. We mean this literally. From 2006 to 2012, we 
observed radical changes in the communication ecology/landscape in Cam-
eroon, Chad, and Mali—that is, the introduction of the mobile phone, now 
referred to as ‘the past’, being overtaken again by the smartphone making ac-
cess to the Internet increasingly easy, leading to a rise in the use of social me-
dia and Internet services. In this article, we examine a question that popped 
up during our research but one we never explored in depth. What happened 
to the national symbolism that was part of the older forms of communication 
technologies, such as the postal stamps, and also to the organizations of the 
postal services in general (Kevane 2008; Wallach 2011)? Were these symbols 
replaced by other symbols in the mobile phones? What do the mobile phones 
and the ICT companies symbolize? How does it relate to the recent period 
of increasing access to the Internet through smartphones? And how do these 
developments coincide with the decline or revival of the nation-state? 
This article is based on the results of the research programmes ‘Mobile Afri-
ca Revisited’ and ‘Connecting in Times of Duress’ and on a study on Mobile 
Money dynamics in different African regions.66 These research programmes 
allowed us to follow with qualitative methods the social, economic, and polit-
ical changes in relation to changes in communication technologies. 
 Fatima Diallo, who was part of the first programme, related her explo-
ration of ICTs to the changing governance practices in Senegal/Casamance 
(Diallo 2009). Her conclusion was that the state could increasingly control 
its bureaucratic services by controlling the digital space. Her work relates to 
the discussions on e-governance. Her hypothesis that new ICTs in fact will 
reinforce the state goes against the argument often heard in the literature on 
ICT4D—that is, the argument that ICTs democratize communication and 
hence also remove control of governance from the state to the people. This 
democratizing feature of ICTs was especially ascribed to the mobile phone 
and its communication features, features that cross borders, make commu-
nication uncontrollable, and have become transformed into the so-called 
66 Mobileafricarevisited.wordpress.com; www.connecting-in-times-of-duress.nl; mobilemon-
ey.wordpress.com
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power of social media (Wasserman 2011).67 In our Mobile Money study,68 it 
appeared that the introduction of mobile payments leads on the one hand to 
an increase in control by the state through the payment, for instance, of elec-
tricity bills via mobile money systems, and on the other hand it gives people 
more of a free hand in the way they can send their money and helps them 
achieve a certain economic liberty. In these studies, the core of the analy-
sis is on governance patterns and control of services and people, and hence 
they provide insight into the strengthening or decline of the state. However, 
the question remains what these developments change in the symbols of the 
state/nation—and hence, how they hint at national identity.
 As we also discovered during our research, ICTs are not only tools to do 
things; they are as well symbols and expressions of identity. This brought us 
to reflect on how the different periods of ICTs and the communication land-
scapes that go with them have influenced not only the practice of governance 
but also the symbols of government and governance. While going through the 
publications of Ton Dietz to discover linkages with our work, we came across 
his working papers on stamps in German colonial Africa. Hence, Ton made us 
aware of the symbolism of ICTs (Dietz 2015). One of his papers discusses the 
case of stamps in German colonial Cameroon. In this paper, we will further 
focus on the link between state decline and national symbolism and the role of 
changing ICTs in Anglophone Cameroon (a former German territory). 
Symbolism and stamps (and post office)
After money, postage stamps are the most common public medium for dis-
playing the identifying symbols of a State and its people (Roberts 2006: 32)
According to (Adedze 2006):
Postage stamps are public art and public art in general embodies the beliefs 
and aspirations of its patrons, which in this case are governments. Stamps 
are handy because as cultural productions, they are politically expedient 
and very cheap—they satisfy current political needs.
In the colonial and post-colonial period, the issuing of postage stamps has 
remained the monopoly of central government—the metropolitan capitals 
during the colonial period, and now the post-colonial state. As a result, it will 
67 There are many articles on ICT4D and development that include the idea that these tech-
nologies ‘democratize’. However, see articles based on our observations in Cameroon (de Bruijn, 
Angwafo & Nyamnjoh 2010; Brinkman, de Bruijn & Nyamnjoh 2013).
68 www.ascleiden.nl/research/projects/ethnographic-study-mobile-money-africa
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not be an overstatement to say that the issuing of stamps is politically moti-
vated. Despite the fact that stamps have been widely used, especially in the 
post-colonial period, little or no research have been carried out detailing the 
symbols and history found on stamps (Reid 1984; Posnansky 2001). How-
ever, stamps were introduced as a currency for mail only in the later years 
of colonial Africa. In this section, we provide a quick overview of the post 
office and its working, and the stamps and their symbols, in relation to the 
different states that dominated the territory we call now West Cameroon.69 It 
is assumed that the postal system was a means of communication introduced 
in Cameroon by the Germans during German colonial rule (1884-1916).70 In 
the Bamenda Grassfields, postal services were carried out during the Ger-
man rule, but a post office was not built. Mail was transported by foot in a re-
lay system. Messengers and relay runners dealt most of the time with admin-
istrative mail and served the Fons, native authorities, and colonial masters. 
Even though at creation this post service served just the administrative body 
of the area, it gradually also became useful for the common people.71 The use 
of foot messengers with sign messages like the grass sticks that symbolized 
modern post offices today relayed messages and information in several nodal 
points of the territory. These colonial messengers who stood in for the letters 
were precursors of modern-day postal services.72 What therefore changed 
were the medium of transportation, the means of passing the message, and 
the introduction of stamps with colonial symbols (Maddock 1996; Nkwi & de 
Bruijn 2014).73 Post offices were built on the ashes of the flag post huts. 
 The post office in Bamenda started as a sub post office opened to the pub-
lic on 10 February 1919.74 It was a temporary building unsuitable for protect-
ing the modern technology instruments.75 In 1924, work began on the con-
struction of a semi-permanent post office, which was completed in 1925.76 
The post office was situated at the old German fort at Station Hill and was 
built of mud and stone.77 During that period it was roofed with thatch, with 
69 Walter had already done some archival work and conducted some interviews with people 
who were involved in the post office in 2016.
70 File No. Cb1921/1, file no 520/22, Bamenda division annual report 1921.NAB.
71 Interview with Mbiybe John, Bamenda, 7 October 2015, 70 years, retired post worker.
72 Interview with Ngiewih Asunkwan, Bamenda, 24 March 2016, 70 years, retired civil servant 
from the Ministry of Communication.
73 Also see File No. Rg (1916)1, Establishment of Postal Services in British Cameroons, 1916; 
Rg (1916)5, Postal Orders and Stamps, 1920. 
74 File No. Cb1919/1, file no 53/1920B, Annual report 1919 Bamenda Division.NAB.
75 File No. Cb1921/1, file no 520/22, Bamenda division annual report 1921.NAB.
76 File No.Cb1925/1, file no 1568, Bamenda Division annual report 1925.NAB.
77 File No.Cb1924/2, Quarterly reports on the Bamenda Division, Cameroons Province March 
1924–September 1927.NAB.
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grass which was collected at the station. In 1956, the post office was trans-
ferred to Commercial Avenue opposite the Community Hall known today as 
the Bamenda Council Library.14
 At creation, the post office served only the colonial administrators in a 
mail system referred to as Her Majesty’s Royal Mail.78 Letters and parcels 
were transported from one administrative unit to the next, be it within the 
Grassfields or out of the Grassfields. Individuals gained interest in sending 
mail through the post office because it proved faster for long-distance com-
munication.79 It was realized by the administration that letting individuals 
make use of the post office would enable the post office to generate income 
for itself. Individuals began to send mail through the post office by buying 
stamps corresponding to the weight of the letter or parcel.80 The heavier the 
letter or parcel, the more expensive was the cost of the stamp.81
 The post office offered two different communication services: the mail 
service and the telegraphic service. As far as the mail service was concerned, 
it was a system of communication in which various forms of mail were trans-
ported by any means possible under the authority of the post office.82 Mail 
could be letters or parcels. With the involvement of the general public in the 
post office service, pillar boxes were placed around the different communi-
ties, where letters were dropped for collection by the post messengers.83 In 
some areas, the mail was kept in the Fon’s palace or with the churches, from 
where the people could collect them.84
 Letters were the most common things posted through the post office. 
When a letter was brought to the post office, the sender bought a stamp ac-
cording to the weight of the letter and placed it on the letter before leaving 
it for posting.85 The stamps were a source of revenue for the postal system. 
Stamps were sold at different prices, depending on the weight of the mail; the 
cost increased as the weight increased.86
 At independence, the post service was functioning well and the post-co-
lonial state kept the buildings and system going. In a society as we know it 
from Bamenda, where the plantation economy and later economic migration 
78 Interview with Mbiybe John, Bamenda, 7 October 2015, 70 years, retired post worker.
79 Ibid.
80 Interview with Mbah David, Batibo, 5 April 2016, 75 years, retired Principal Controller of 
Post and Telecommunications,
81 Figures 10.8 and 10.9 show typical stamps widely used during the period.
82 Interview with Mbom Valentine, Bamenda,18 July 2016, 73 years, retired post office worker.
83 Interview with Mbah David, Batibo, 5 April 2016, 75 years, retired Principal Controller of 
Post and Telecommunications.
84 Interview with Ngwa Rachel, Bamenda, 4 November 2015, 60 years, trader.
85 Interview with Mbom Valentine, Bamenda, 18 July 2016, 73 years, retired post office worker.
86 Ibid.
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affect almost all families, this postal service did indeed touch the common 
man. Contrary to telephony, which was an elitist form of communication, the 
postal service was used by everybody. We have observed the archives of let-
ters of many families in the villages in the region. And as the interviews have 
shown, letter writing was a real tradition. This did not change profoundly 
under the two presidents that Cameroon has known, Ahidjo and Biya, until 
2006 when mobile telephony started to enter the more remote areas of An-
glophone Cameroon, as we witnessed during our research.
The visualization of belonging to the ‘Nation’ on stamps
And as we can read from these stamps, they symbolized the colonial and lat-
er post-colonial state. In a very broad perspective, the images on the stamps 
convey the symbolic image of the master narrative of the ruling elite, with the 
hope that the masses will rally behind these narratives and thereby suppress 
alternative interpretations (Adedze 2006). The stamps changed in content 
under the different colonial regimes, German to French/English, and from 
colonialism to independence. Furthermore, stamps often represent moments 
of unification, of war, and historic dates, as well as symbols to show that all in 
the country was good, or they show the beauty of the country. These all refer 
to histories of nationalism and are meant for people to identify with. Yet im-
ages on stamps can also carry ‘deceitful history’ if not well handled; and at the 
same time, stamps can be a very powerful route into the history of a country. 
The situation in Cameroon is no exception.
 Stamps show what types of images there were during colonial rule. Figure 
10.1 shows the German colonial rule, and in its middle is a symbol of a ship. 
In the nascent years of colonial rule, ships were the most common form of 
communication technology. The Germans annexed Cameroon in 1884 after 
outsmarting the British. The Germans defeated almost all the indigenous re-
sistance and then established a commercial economy, albeit there were some 
reforms in the domains of education, agriculture, and road infrastructure. 
The year 1906 stands out as quite important because it was in that year that 
the first German school was opened in the Muslim centre of Garoua in Ad-
amawa (Rudin 1938; Fanso 1989). Figure 10.2 symbolises the former West 
Cameroon as part of Nigeria. The Germans were in Cameroon for approx-
imately 30 years (1884-1914) when they were pushed out by combined An-
glo-French and Belgian forces. The German territory was then partitioned 
into two unequal parts. While France took four-fifths and administered it as 
part of French Equatorial Africa, Britain took one-fifth and administered as 
part of the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria. Britain called this portion British 
Southern Cameroons, which she governed from 1916 to 1961.
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Figure 10.1
German colonial stamp 
1906
Figure 10.2
British colonial stamp
One important symbol of the state is the flag. When carefully handled, flags 
symbolize historic moments as well as ecological and environmental issues. 
Figures 10.3 and 10.4 show the Cameroon flag of green, red, and yellow. Fig-
ure 10.4 has a star. The colours symbolize different vegetational zones of the 
state: green symbolizes the equatorial forest of the south, the red symbolizes 
the savannah, and yellow symbolizes the Sahel of the north. Figure 10.3 does 
not have a star because it symbolizes French Cameroon in 1960. It gained 
independence on 1 January 1960 and took its seat in the United Nations six 
months later. The star in Figure 10.4 symbolizes the Unitary State which ex-
isted between 1972 and 1984, when the Biya government changed it to just 
the ‘Republic of Cameroon’.
Figure 10.3
Stamp at independence
Figure 10.4
Stamp 1972 Cameroonian flag
Labour was crucial to the colonial and post-colonial state. Figure 10.5 
symbolizes the Cameroon coat of arms as well as the labour code, which 
is peace-work-fatherland. Figure 10.6 symbolizes Paul Biya, who has ruled 
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Cameroon since 1982. The immediate post-independent Africa postage 
stamps in Sub-Saharan Africa carried images of their presidents, and these 
images on stamps have become the medium of transmission of propagan-
dist messages about the country of issue to its citizens and perhaps to the 
rest of the world (Scott 1991; Jones 2001; Dobson 2002). This tradition had 
been emulated from the colonialists, who introduced the tradition of postage 
stamps by inscribing their heroes, heroines, and conquerors, just to name but 
a few (Adedze 2006). Unlike in Ghana—where the Stamp Advisory Commit-
tee, according to its policy guidelines, is to issue stamps that portray aspects 
of Ghanaian heritage, life, culture, achievements, and arts, as well commem-
orate important international and local events—in Cameroon the issuing of 
stamps is the monopoly of the state. Cameroon constitutionally is a bilingual 
country, but a closer look shows that it is French. Figure 10.7 shows that it is 
a Francophone country and also gives the impression that the country gained 
independence in 1960. Historically, the country gained independence in 1960 
and 1961. The presidential palace on the stamp symbolizes the opulence in 
which President Biya has been living since 1982. Many things have been de-
bated under Biya’s regime, but the issue of citizenship has been the most hot-
ly debated in Cameroon.
Figure 10.5
Stamp to celebrate
Figure 10.6
Stamp with President Biya
Independence 1961
Figure 10.7
Anniversary stamp in 1990
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Figure 10.8
Federal Republic of Cameroon, 1959-69
Figure 10.9
Federal Republic of Cameroon stamp 
showing a prawn
Citizenship in Cameroon under President Biya: 1980–present
Who are the citizens who consume the national symbols? And what is their 
relation to the nation-state and the nation? Broadly speaking, a citizen is a 
person who is entitled to enjoy all the legal rights and privileges granted by 
a state to the people comprising its constituency and is obligated to obey its 
laws and fulfil his or her duties as called upon. Related denominations are na-
tional, domicile, and resident.87 Consequently, a citizen can be a citizen only 
if he or she has rights to services of the state and is protected by that same 
state. In Cameroon this is certainly not the reality for all layers of the popu-
lation. In Cameroon the whole idea of citizenship has been an ‘invention’ in 
the divide between the Anglophones and Francophones. In general, the An-
glophones feel more subjects than citizens (Mamdani 1996). They feel badly 
treated by the government. Apart from the near absence of basic necessities 
such as water, the Anglophone region has one of the worst road infrastruc-
tures compared with other parts of Cameroon. Also, in the appointments of 
governmental staff, Anglophones are most of the time given second-tier po-
sitions in the state bureaucracy, while some of the key ministries have been 
denied to them. They have grievances with the civil and common law (Jua & 
Konings 2004). The civil law, which actually operates within the Gallic tra-
dition, has found its way into Anglophone Cameroon where common law 
has been swept away. The Francophonization of Anglophone Cameroon has 
therefore denied the Anglophones their traditional rights. Yet the logos of the 
ruling party inscribed on stamps and fabrics show that all is bright and cheer-
ful in Cameroon, especially under the presidency of Paul Biya since 1982.
87 Read more: www.businessdictionary.com/definition/citizen.html [Accessed on 29 Decem-
ber 2016].
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In Cameroon, President Biya has become the symbol of the nation, as he has 
been in power for 35 years. He is the incarnation of the Cameroon state; he 
is the head of state and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, although 
Cameroon is a civilian state. He has become the unseen guest at every meal 
and the ‘Silent Listener to every conversation’. His strings have penetrated all 
the cronies of the state. In every public office his photograph hangs behind 
the chair of the person sitting in the office. His power is best illustrated dur-
ing his outings to fly out of the country to Europe or attend a national cere-
mony. The motorcade is all-powerful. Approximately 9-12 people run along-
side his limousine while a military helicopter guards him from the air. He has 
constructed his power around a network of political acolytes whose duty is 
to sing his praises. From the ministers to secretaries of state to members of 
his political party, Biya has been deified, to say the least. Certainly his figure 
has been inscribed on some of the country’s stamps. He and his CDPM party 
have in fact become representative of the state. The symbols of the CDPM 
(Figure 10.10), the ruling party in Cameroon, are all over the cities, as is the 
figure of the President Biya himself (Figure 10.6), for instance on the cloth 
women wear for special occasions (Figure 10.11). Interestingly, Biya also fig-
ures on the stamps of the nation. The nation is the party as personified in the 
president and his family. He is thus personified and internalized. Among the 
Anglophones, he is more the president of the Francophones, because in his 
35 years in power he has never addressed the nation in English, and in 1984 
he re-baptized the United Republic of Cameroon to just Republic of Came-
roon, which is symptomatic of what existed before reunification. So the An-
glophones feel they do not belong.
Figure 10.10
CDPM logo
Figure 10.11
Women wearing Biya/CDPM cloth; the cloth is often given for free
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Nevertheless, the dominance of the party and president is and has been con-
tested in Cameroon—for instance, by the strong opposition party of John 
Fru Ndi, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), which was formed in Bamenda 
on Saturday, 6 May 1990 and soon became a broad-based party in almost all 
regions of Cameroon. Since 1961, Bamenda and its surroundings have never 
benefited greatly from the development projects run by the Cameroonian 
government. There was not much development during the colonial period 
either, but the people of this area expected more development from their 
own government than from the colonial administration. Bamenda has always 
remained on the fringes of state development. It had no state-run industry, 
electricity was most of the time quite inadequate, road infrastructure was 
poor, and even water was scarce. Representation in the government as far 
as influential positions were concerned was absent. Thus, this area is often 
depicted as marginal by the people who view themselves as being marginal 
and regard state representatives as the dominant others. Such marginality 
came in various forms and was related to the economy, politics, and social 
sphere. The economic and political situation of the people in Bamenda at the 
end of the 1980s was not the best. To add insult to the injuries, the economic 
crisis set in in the late 1980s. The economic blizzard that generally affected 
the world struck Bamenda particularly hard because of the absence of any 
previous economic lifeline in the region. Consequently, life became unbear-
able, exacerbated by mass unemployment of the youth who at the time were 
just leaving university and institutions of higher learning. The year 1990 ap-
proached with much disillusionment and hopelessness among the people, 
and Ni John Fru Ndi, formerly a bookseller, emerged as a messiah, the hope 
of a disillusioned Bamenda, by forming the SDF. However, the attempts to 
join elections and to challenge power have been repressed in violent ways, as 
was also recently again the case. 
The Cameroonian government uses the armed forces to gain legitimacy at 
any time there is a sign of resistance from the population. In the Anglophone 
Cameroon, the gendarmerie—the ‘territorial masquerades’, to use the words 
of Mbembe (2001)—was introduced from the French Cameroon as early as 
1962 to quell any resistance (Nkwi 2014). Shortly after the reunification of 
Cameroon, a pseudo-military force, the gendarmerie, which had been in op-
eration in East Cameroon prior to reunification, was quartered in all admin-
istrative divisions of West Cameroon. The object was, like that of the police, 
to maintain safety and security of the state and her citizens. The gendarmerie 
was a federal security force, and in the 1960s this force caused panic and fear 
among West Cameroonians, who had until then been used to the British and 
Nigerian police force. To that effect, there was a litany of complaints from 
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all administrative divisions of West Cameroon against this force.88 The gen-
darme officers in West Cameroon were regularly accused of arrogance and 
of acting brutally against people. According to colonial reports found in the 
Buea National Archives, in some quarters it was argued: 
The gendarmes in West Cameroon behaved with brutality and reckless arro-
gance as if they were an occupation force in a vanquished territory. The bran-
dishing of weapons, the show of power and the throwing of weight around 
areas inhabited by the population gave rise to great concern and disquiet.89
Since 1990 this force has continued with atrocities, maiming, killing, and 
raping innocent civilians. The government relies heavily on this force to 
maintain its legitimacy. In February 2008, the youths in almost all ten regions 
of the country rebelled against the increase of fuel prices, a rebellion fed by 
related grievances with very deep historical roots against the ruling regime 
(Amin 2013). The gendarmes were not enough to handle the situation, al-
though at the end the protest was silenced. The government in turn created 
another force, Battaillon d’Intervention Rapide (BIR.). It has two main head-
quarters, both in Anglophone Cameroon: Limbe and Bamenda. The BIR are 
charged with maintaining order at all costs. Such measures deny any form of 
citizenship and create a distance between the state and the population. 
 Just recently in August 2016, when lawyers attempted a peaceful march 
in Bamenda and Buea, the two administrative capitals of Anglophone Cam-
eroon, the military was dispatched to harass and intimidate the lawyers into 
submission. Soon after these confrontations more protests took place in the 
cities of West Cameroon. These protests were again violently repressed, with 
even killings as a consequence.90
88 Letter No 1566/52 A, 5 March 1962. From the Federal Minister of Armed Forces to the Fed-
eral Inspector of Administration, National Archives Buea, henceforth cited as NAB.
89 Confidential Letter from J. N. Foncha to the Minister of Armed Forces, PMO 330/s.1/24 
January 1968; Letter from the Minister of Armed Forces to the Vice President of the Republic, 
Prime Minister of West Cameroon, no. 38/MINFA/cf/9, NAB.
90 See: https://mirjamdebruijn.wordpress.com/2016/12/12/cameroon-alert/
Dietz Essays.indd   176 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 177
177
Figure 10.12
Bad roads in the Northwest Region 2016 © Walter Gam Nkwi
These examples raise the question: Does the form of citizenship as it is offi-
cially defined exist in Anglophone Cameroon, and for whom? Being a citizen 
is almost impossible: rights are not defended; in fact, fundamental rights are 
trampled upon. The nation is mixed up with the dominant political party and 
with the figure of the president. One could therefore just as well question the 
strength of national symbols and how these interact with feelings of citizen-
ship. Or is it the case that in these governance constellations citizens seek 
for alternatives and therefore embrace, for instance, symbols of internation-
alization or of the alternatives to their own lives in the very limited space of 
citizenship in their own countries. 
 In such circumstances of violence, one can imagine that the symbol of 
nationhood is not difficult to abandon. In the next section, we will delve into 
the recent phase of communication as it has appeared with the advancement 
of mobile telephony. 
Symbolisms of belonging and the mobile phone companies/ 
advertisements 
The advancement of mobile telephony has been hailed for its revolutionary 
impact, particularly in regions where communication technologies were not 
that well developed. Indeed, also in West Cameroon, after the first connec-
tions in the urban areas, from 2006 onwards the interior has also been con-
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nected. Especially in this area, where roads are a luxury, where fixed telepho-
ny was mainly for the elites, we can indeed say that the mobile phone has had 
a huge impact on the frequency of communication and the disappearance of 
distance. In our research project, this has been amply proven. And certain-
ly the introduction of mobile phones has also been one of the factors in the 
decline of the post office’s function—and hence the disappearance of letter 
writing and the use of stamps. But that is not the only transformation we ob-
served. Another very important development, but not as widely discussed, 
is the appearance of the telecommunication companies in the economy and 
their visibility in the landscape. As Prideaux remarks: ‘an often overlooked 
element in “mundane” nationalism [is] company advertising’ (Prideaux 2009: 
613).
 At present, the post office in Bamenda is almost non-functional. One can 
send a letter, but entering the office gives an impression similar to the one in 
the film Elephant’s Dream. The office is non-functional; most of the postal 
boxes are empty. On the other hand, in the streets of Bamenda one encoun-
ters huge billboards of the telephone companies. They shout a message to the 
public in colours and large images. 
Figure 10.13
MTN advertisement in the main commercial street of Bamenda © Mirjam de Bruijn 
2008
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Figure 10.14
Billboards along the road Bamenda–Douala at election time 2011 © Sjoerd Sijsma
What do we see on the advertisements in Cameroon? They are not adver-
tising Cameroonianism, but instead we read them as the creation of a mid-
dle-class consumers’ group. It is nice to call to your family abroad, and the 
music comes to you. Welcome to the ‘New World’ that is clearly brought by 
the company with the new technology and the possibilities this has (Obadare 
2005).
Figure 10.15
Remarkable advertisement © from MTN site
Are these advertisements a symbol of ‘new’ nationalism? Or do they offer peo-
ple a new identification? In our view, these advertisements refer indeed to a 
‘new’ world, more or less outside present-day authoritarian Cameroon, where 
the national becomes less important; on the contrary, family ties and friends 
are increasingly digitized—that is, ‘mobile phoned’—and become international 
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and cross borders. Any national reference here is lacking (de Bruijn 2010; Nkwi 
2014). People ‘engineer’ in new ways their relations and in doing so they define 
what is important. Symbols of nationalism seem to disappear and make place 
for symbols of wealth and internationalism (van Dijck 2012).
Identity in a mobile phone
Figure 10.16
A tailor’s identity © Mirjam de Bruijn 2009
The mobile phone also introduced a new, more private identity marking. As 
we stated in another article, the mobile phone is increasingly the archive that 
is comparable to the letter archive of a person (De Bruijn & Nkwi 2013). This 
picture refers to the beginning of the period of mobile telephony in Bamen-
da, when people indeed took their phone number as their identity card. The 
mobile phone itself became increasingly a gadget, especially in the urban en-
vironment, where the colour, mark, and possible accessories are a personal 
choice and reflect a person’s identity.
 For our argument it is important to note that the phone as a communica-
tion tool probably does have the same function as letters had, but its form is 
completely different. And it is clear that the state again has nothing at stake 
here. It is simple: the control of the symbols in the phone is completely in the 
hands of the people themselves—the pictures they communicate, the mes-
sages they send, and so on. However, this proved not completely true when, 
during the election campaign, the president sent SMS messages to people to 
favour his party, or when on New Year’s Day he sends messages of luck to the 
people. These become as well symbols of nationalism in the Cameroonian 
form: veneration of the president and his party.
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Mobile money and the like
The last phase in mobile phone development is the payment function. Is the 
payment of bills through mobile phones a way to control people? It certain-
ly is, and it can be a way to organize the state better, to understand who the 
citizens are. However, in a state where control is related to violence, one can 
expect that such digitalization of the bureaucracy will not be a simple thing 
and certainly not automatic. For instance, when the mobile phone companies 
tried to register people for their SIM cards, the Cameroonians were eager to 
circumvent these rules, and indeed today many people do not register but 
still use their phones. From our study on mobile money, we found a similar 
response of rejection to such measures. People mistrust these attempts to 
control them, although it is sold to them as being for the betterment of so-
ciety.
Some concluding remarks 
This article is a first attempt to understand symbols of communication as 
symbols of a national identity, in the context of the history of the state and 
citizenship in Cameroon. We argued that the replacement of post offices and 
their important technological tool, the stamp, by the mobile phone and In-
ternet tell a story about the decline of the state—at least in the ‘heads’ of 
the people who are assumed to be the citizens of these states. In Cameroon 
the arrival of the mobile phone goes hand in hand with increasing protests 
against the Biya regime. Probably here the mobile phone goes beyond its 
function of identification and even enters into the realm of being a tool of 
rebellion (Castells 2009; Branch & Mampilly 2015). Mobile phones and their 
communication flows can never be real symbols of the nation because of the 
way these phones are appropriated by people as their private field of commu-
nication, a way of making their own choices. In the case of Anglophone Cam-
eroon, we argued that given their feelings of being subjected to and marginal-
ized by the Cameroonian (in their eyes Francophone Cameroonian) state, the 
mobile phone gave people a way out of nationalism toward a more individual 
and at the same time international identity. In addition, the companies that 
come with this technology impose a certain image of citizenship: users are 
supposedly world citizens with middle-class lifestyles. Finally, however, the 
authoritarian state will enter into both domains with its intrusive character 
and will try to regain control of identification processes. The more protests 
occur, the more the Cameroonian state will develop its antenna for the possi-
bilities of the mobile phone also as a tool to control its citizens. And then we 
are back to the fact that in Cameroon, and especially the West Cameroons, 
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the citizen is a subject of the state and not a participant. Even the most demo-
cratic and pro-poor tool of communication, which the mobile phone can be, 
will not be able to resist the power of the authoritarian state.
 With this article we have opened the agenda for new research, a follow-up 
on the ASC research on communication that began in 2006. Include the first 
attempts of Ton Dietz to further understand the meaning of symbols of the 
state as evidenced in its services, such as the post office, and then we are back 
to the film Elephant’s Dream. We hope to build on these ideas in the coming 
years.
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Stemming the tide? 
The promise of environmental rehabilitation 
scenarios in Ethiopia
Jan Abbink
Introduction
This chapter highlights some positive developments in environmental reha-
bilitation that are in progress in various parts of Ethiopia—as yet, small-scale 
but promising and showing the way forward. 
 Environmental challenges mar the developmental trajectory of many 
countries in Africa (and elsewhere). While economic growth pathways are 
visible and often hopeful, the combined pressure of population growth,91 
‘modernist’ consumer ideals, global inequalities, and elite strategies of ac-
cumulation and power abuse make heavy demands on ecological systems. 
In much of his work, Ton Dietz has called attention to the multifarious tra-
jectories and development potentials in Africa in an engaging and stimulat-
ing manner—for instance, in his Leiden inaugural lecture (2011) and in the 
policy brief on ‘agricultural pockets of effectiveness’ (Dietz & Leliveld 2014). 
He has also repeatedly pointed to challenging environmental problems oc-
curring in Africa, both urban and rural. In his interesting ‘Still silverlining’ 
presentation of March 2016 at the ASC, he mentioned increasing popula-
tion explosion-induced pressures on ‘natural resources’. This is indeed a cru-
cial issue impacting on Africa and the world’s development trajectory. Next 
to population growth, there is of course climate change. This threat, due in 
part to massive fossil fuel burning (with China now as the largest producer 
of emissions) and ill-regulated capitalist practices (see Klein 2014), is often 
compounded by misguided top-down developmental plans in Africa, led by 
false ideas and schemes of central planning and fantasies of mega-growth. 
91 For an impression, see: www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/
gallery/2015/apr/01/over-population-over-consumption-in-pictures?CMP=share_btn_fb.  See 
also the rather depressing World Population Clock: www.worldometers.info/world-population.
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These factors contribute to an ecological crunch scenario that seems to be 
unfolding slowly but inexorably (see WWF 2008: 1; Rockström 2010; OECD 
2012). 
 In the developed, industrialized countries the antidote is a radical green-
ing of the economy and the energy infrastructure, only hesitantly taking 
shape. The developing world, notably Africa, will still be largely based on ag-
riculture and externalized resource extraction, despite the fact that the urban 
economy and urban zones of industrialization will make an upsurge in the 
coming decades.92 An agrarian-based food production economy is long going 
to remain basic, and the way forward to avoid the eco-crunch is to decentre 
this agrarian economy toward the producers, and to enhance a symbiosis be-
tween the emerging large-scale agrarian investments and environmental and 
eco-systems control by local communities, aided by new scientific insights. It 
is unlikely that the massive ‘replacement’ of local smallholders and agro-pas-
toral systems by large-scale commercial agrarian enterprises—propagated by 
certain states and often also by donor countries and the World Bank—will do 
the job. The evidence available from studies on massive mono-crop planta-
tions (biofuels, cotton, maize, or sugar cane) shows that profitability is very 
disappointing, stakeholder involvement minimal, and long-term environ-
mental damage significant (e.g. WWF, ZSL & GFN 2008; Behnke & Kerven 
2013 evaluating the disaster in Afar, Ethiopia; Muluken 2014; Maru 2016).
 However, a closer look at positive local-level developments in Ethiopia re-
veals the potential regarding environmental initiatives by local communities, 
set against the background of their intricate local economies and agro-eco-
logical systems. By agro-ecology I here mean agrarian cultivation that is em-
bedded in and somehow takes into account its natural preconditions and 
environmental sustainability, and in its modern form an approach applying 
‘the principles of ecology to the design and management of sustainable food 
systems’ (Montenegro 2015). It also is geared to furthering agricultural bi-
odiversity. Various efforts underway show the potential of rural communi-
ties in realizing long-term viability and in (re)taking charge of their envi-
ronments, often beyond governmental projects that favour the large-scale 
land enterprises that have not yet proven their worth. Partly, this chapter was 
inspired by experiences of agro-pastoralists in southwest Ethiopia, where I 
have done fieldwork over the years among the Me’en and Suri peoples, who 
are no strangers to environmental challenges.
92 Also, cities can make a significant contribution to taking climate action, as many of them are 
more directly confronted with the negative effects. As Naomi Klein noted (2014: 364), instead 
of national governments, ‘…cities are leading the way on climate action around the world, from 
Bogotá to Vancouver’.
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The thesis here is that, far from being a romantic, small-scale domain, indig-
enous ecological knowledge in relation with local production practices can 
play an essential role in addressing extant environmental problems in Ethi-
opia. These bodies of knowledge are of course not the only ‘wisdom’ availa-
ble and have aspects not backed by scientific evidence. But they are evolved 
products of adaptive processes (see Amborn 2012) and can form the basis of 
any scaling up or market-based commercialization of agrarian production in 
the country. In addition, the government structures of Ethiopia always being 
volatile and unstable necessitates the cultivation of locally embedded resil-
ience in the food economy rather than going for dependency. This also im-
plies recognition of the quality of the agricultural areas available: low-poten-
tial areas do not benefit much from large-scale fertilizer input, and so on, but 
from the use of alternative crops, water retentions techniques, and pastoral 
herding. First, a little more on the background of Ethiopian environmental 
and agrarian challenges.
The Ethiopian economy and environment: Tensions
Ethiopia, a self-declared developmental state, has realized significant quanti-
tative economic growth—that is, higher GDP rates, agricultural production 
increase, infrastructure outlays, budding industries, and especially service 
sector growth. But it continues to struggle with long-term environmental 
problems: top-soil loss, depletion of soil organic matter, erosion, species loss, 
declining biodiversity, pollution of the land due to untreated chemicals, and 
more droughts due to vegetation loss—all compounded by rapid population 
growth. The policy toward the rural sector has a curious mix of furthering 
large-scale commercialization via plantations given in concession to foreign-
ers and wealthy domestic investors, and a half-hearted and unpredictable 
policy toward smallholder farmers. While there is also a policy toward (agro-)
pastoralists with a rhetoric of support, investments and use rights protection 
for this sector are neglected (see Mohammud 2007; Berihun 2016).
 Ethiopia’s agrarian sector is very diverse according to landscape features, 
crop systems, and ethnic agro-ecology traditions. There are intricate systems 
of intercropping and cultivation, with often finely tuned interdependencies 
of species and crops, as well as livestock (with dung used as fertilizer and in 
house building). The cultural ecology of Ethiopian rural societies cannot be 
broken without serious consequences for production systems and produc-
tivity, and it must ideally be expanded gradually via context-sensitive tech-
nological, agronomic (especially ‘climate-smart’), and politico-economic in-
novations. The lure of large-scale agriculture and mono-crop production is 
strong, despite this not being a one-size-fits-all solution.
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With land, food production, and agrarian exports (and employment) still 
forming the basis of the national economy, the objective need for land con-
servation, biodiversity maintenance, and improvement of current small-
scale production systems is paramount. Production output might have been 
higher if certain property rights and thereby the stakes of producers in the 
land had been recognized (e.g. as community property). But all land is state-
owned in Ethiopia, even the urban plots on which houses and enterprises are 
built. Land can thus be redistributed by the state authorities at will, although 
under certain conditions. This in origin socialist-Marxist idea has always 
been defended by the current EPRDF government (1991-) with reference to 
‘social justice’ motives: to prevent a rich class of landed power-holders or 
elites emerging and to discourage rural-urban migration of impoverished 
farmers. Few citizens, however, buy this argument nowadays, although they 
have adapted to the lack of rights to property via ingenious schemes of land 
leasing, sub-letting, share-cropping, temporary use rights, etc. The Ethiopian 
government is, however, aware of the need for soil conservation and rehabil-
itation of agrarian lands and has policies for it. Until now, much of the exe-
cution of this policy was not solidly based within communities and this has 
limited its success.
Figure 11.1
Eroded Ethiopian highlands (Wollo), due to overgrazing and wood cutting 
(Photo J. Abbink 2006)
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Figure 11.2
Soil erosion due to over-cultivation and vegetation loss, Wolaitta, southern Ethiopia 
(Photo J. Abbink 2006)
But some recent efforts made and ongoing in parts of Ethiopia for soil con-
servation, reforestation, and rehabilitation of eroded lands are remarkable. 
While these initiatives are still small-scale, a few have shown results and hold 
much promise. They represent an emerging movement of locally based ef-
forts by people confronted daily with the effects of erosion and degradation 
of their environment and show a notable fusion of ‘traditional’ agrarian pro-
duction methods and modernizing tendencies—for example, diversification 
and market-oriented production. For the initiatives to spread and be inte-
grated in mainstream economic practice, a couple of conditions are required, 
as well as policy changes. In view of a clear scepticism of the government to 
autonomous local-level initiatives and context-based scientific advice, it is 
to be seen whether these ‘grass-roots’ projects can expand. The national de-
velopment policy of Ethiopia, as laid out in the ‘Growth and Transformation 
Plans’ (now GTP 2 is in progress, for 2015-20), does not foresee, for instance, 
massive investment in the smallholder sector or the (agro-)pastoral areas, 
which are both seen as ‘stagnant’ and ‘backward’, nor connect to local bod-
ies of agricultural knowledge. But ca. 90% of Ethiopia’s food production still 
comes from small-scale farmers and agro-pastoralists. Also a problem is that 
the 1997 Ethiopian Environmental Policy does not recognize the importance 
of indigenous ecological knowledge. National policy at present privileges the 
above-mentioned large-scale plantation investments and massive fertilizer 
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use, driven by exogenous interests. But community-based restoration has 
a key role in durable agrarian production and resilience in the developing 
world (see Leigh 2005) and has to be invested in more.
Embedding economic practices in local ecological systems: Ethiopian 
initiatives
Ethiopian initiatives at rehabilitation are of two kinds: the local, cultural-ecol-
ogy-based ones, as an extension of time-proven ‘good practices’ in a particu-
lar cultural-geographical setting; and the externally (donor-) supported ones. 
 In the following, we discuss some examples of both categories, starting 
with the second. Notably, when donor countries and global organizations 
like the UN and its various sections (UNEP, UNSDC) make funds available 
for environmental rehabilitation and biodiversity conservation, the Ethiopi-
an government will take up the proposals. It has also shown awareness of 
the need for green energy and the sustainability of agrarian production, as 
evident from policy documents (like FDRE 2011; see also FDRE 2005; Davi-
son 2015). But relying chiefly on large donor plans and funding is risky and 
inappropriate.93 The Ethiopian government is (too) slowly developing its own 
action plans in environmental matters, and indeed future donor funding is 
going to be less reliable. 
 The first kind, the local, cultural-ecology-based practices of reproduction 
and ‘sustainability’ (although local people do not use that word), is the more 
hopeful and interesting one. These may not have direct solutions to natural 
risks—pests, drought—and not reach top productivity levels in ‘economies of 
scale’. But agro-ecological practices account more for the depreciation of natu-
ral capital (see Barbier 2014) by orienting toward circularity and rehabilitation, 
so as to reproduce the natural conditions of production and avoid predation. 
They are more embedded in local knowledge and experience (see Pardo de 
Santayana & Macía 2015). The point here is not that these systems are ‘the 
solution’ to global environmental decline, but that they are needed as a base 
from which to further develop sustainable or ‘circular’ agrarian economies. 
a Ethiopian farmer communities taking action to restore their eroded 
 environment
Recent estimates are that the extent of degraded land in Ethiopia is ca. 25% 
of the total, affecting nearly a third of the population—some 28-30 mil-
lion people in the northern and central highlands, intensively cultivated for 
93 Some World Bank-funded schemes have gone awfully wrong; see Hallman & Olivera (2015) 
for one example.
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1,500-1,900 years and largely deforested. The Ethiopian government has tak-
en action by addressing the problems in the PSNPs (Productive Safety Net 
Programme, World Bank-funded) since 2005, and it recently joined the ‘Af-
rican Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative’ (AFR100, launched at COP21 
in Paris in 2015). Another example of donor-stimulated land rehabilitation is 
the Sustainable Land Management Programme (SLMP), an initiative in place 
since 2008 and financed by the German GIZ. It is active in various regions 
and has shown hopeful results: some 250,000 ha. was rehabilitated by terrac-
ing hillsides, and new systems of intercropping were introduced.94 There is 
also the MERET programme (Managing Environmental Resources to Enable 
Transitions; see WFP 2012). These are good but still limited initiatives not 
solidly integrated into mainstream national policy, and while the government 
approaches local people, it often gives them little ‘ownership’ or autonomy. 
Local initiatives from the bottom up work better, and these were started in 
several regions of Ethiopia, likely inspired by the example of indigenous ter-
racing by the southern Konso people, who developed this over the past ages. 
Smallholder farmers in the 1990s in several places started to terrace their 
lands, restore the soil, reduce overgrazing by fencing communal plots, and 
plant trees. Examples are found in Oromiya, Amhara, and Tigray regional 
states. Here there are some remarkable cases of rehabilitation and of environ-
mental consciousness that were instrumental in reversing a downward trend 
and showed notable community resilience95—so much so that people after 
successful land rehabilitation say they are no longer leaving the community. 
A famous initiative is that of the community of AbrehaWeAtsbeha (Watson 
2015). In Tigray alone, a total of 1 million ha was ‘rehabilitated’ (see also Vidal 
2014 and Gromko 2016). 
This people in southern Ethiopia have an intensive agrarian complex, based on 
local food crops like taro, enset (Ensete ventricosum), and a whole range of gar-
den and forest crops. They also keep livestock for a variety of purposes, includ-
ing fertilizing the fields with manure. Holdings are small and family-owned but 
very productive (Getachew 2014). The Gedeo have a finely balanced system 
that respects an inner systemic quality or equilibrium and one that is actively 
maintained. An argument could be made for an integrated ‘ritual ecology’ ap-
proach to explain their production system, along the lines of Rappaport’s fa-
94 On an SLM programme supported by the World Bank and implemented by GIZ, see: ‘Re-
greening Ethiopia’s highlands’, www.youtube.com/watch?v=nak-UUZnvPI. Also on an Irish 
project in Tigray: www.youtube.com/watch?v=BEfYy5zFXI4.
95 One is in Tigray; see Mark Dodd, Ethiopia Rising (2015), trailer at: www.youtube.com/
watch?annotation_id=2c3fd41a-9487-49a0-8695-92d701c2b683&feature=cards&src_vid=Jb-
w85rcKr_c&v=Kp4BbO6_4DU.Zi. See also Keeley (2013).
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mous study (1984) of the Tsembaga in Papua New Guinea, showing the prime 
importance of ‘culture’ in ritually organizing and reproducing local livelihoods. 
Although many Gedeo left their traditional religion for Evangelical Christiani-
ty, they mostly keep their agro-ecological practices in place.
Figure 11.3
Newly terraced slopes in northern Ethiopia (2015)
Figure 11.4
Soil rehabilitation in Bale, southern Ethiopia: renewed growth of trees and shrubs in 
once denuded hill areas (courtesy of The Guardian, 30 October 2014)
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b Ethno-cultural systems: Embedded sustainability
In the south the environment was perhaps not as degraded as in the north 
(except where plough agriculture was practised), and more agricultural vari-
ety and resilience was maintained. One well-known example are the Gedeo.  
Interesting about the Gedeo is that they achieved a fruitful combination of 
market-integrated cash economy, producing a highly prized coffee variety 
for the (inter)national market, with a traditional ecology-based subsistence 
economy. Their area is also a prime example of a ‘biocultural heritage terri-
tory’ (see IIED 2014, 2016), which due to well-adapted methods shows so-
phisticated land, energy, and crop use for a densely populated region (ca. 
1,400 people/sq km). A couple of years ago the government considered land 
redistribution to make farming more ‘rational’, ‘equal’, and ‘market oriented’. 
This would have meant the destruction of the agro-ecology-based produc-
tion system. But they ultimately refrained from implementing it (Getachew 
2014: 226)—a wise decision respecting the intricate local agro-ecology.96
 Also the Gamo people in south-central Ethiopia (see Lesur & Planel 2016) 
have a system of cultivation (e.g. maize, sorghum, t’eff, cotton, and bananas in 
the lowlands, and wheat, barley, potatoes, enset, beans, and peas in the high-
lands) that ‘integrates’ environmental management in ritual ways (via the woga 
rule system) and maintains biodiversity and crop varieties (e.g. 100 enset vari-
eties, 12 wheat varieties, and 60 barley varieties). The system is embedded in 
a philosophy of humans as an integral part of nature—not an ‘opposite’ to ex-
ploit it only. Their cosmology codifies ‘resources’, or rather the natural order, as 
encompassing humans as one ‘species’ among others and imbues nature with 
‘spiritual forces’. This is a familiar cultural feature, which has worked well. Nev-
ertheless, its ‘cognitive assumption’ of the presence and causality of spiritual 
forces is being eroded by emerging forms of Evangelical Christianity and scien-
tific narratives. Also, this is not new. Remarkably, many non-Christian Gamo 
now consciously (re)formulate their cosmological views in a more down-to-
earth ‘ecological’ narrative, whereby respect for nature and its forces is defined 
as positive and environmentally friendly without necessarily accepting the 
traditional notions of ‘actually existing spirits’, etc. There is unfortunately an 
unresolved tension between so-called traditional Gamo and those Gamo who 
adopted Christianity, the latter tending to bypass the tradition of the—ecologi-
cally favourable—taboo system and the respect for natural forces as well as for 
population regulation. While Christianity as an overarching discourse has also 
‘empowered’ Gamo in certain contexts (see Freeman 2012), Christian Gamo 
evaluate the ontological status of the behavioural rules and taboos on crops 
96 One of the Gedeo staple crops, enset, is also not suitable for large plantation-like exploita-
tion and must be embedded in community and family system cultivation. It is also a prime 
famine-buffer crop.
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and land or about limiting the number of children very differently, as these are 
not ‘God-given’ rules. This is one example of a new theological perception that 
blurs the realistic appraisal of social and environmental challenges that was 
contained in ‘traditional’ culture.97 
 While the Gedeo were able to ward off threats to their production system, 
in Gamo the battle is still ongoing and the outcome uncertain. If lost, the 
consequences can be predicted: less productivity, species and biodiversity 
loss, higher population growth, more unemployment, and more outmigra-
tion. It seems clear that the cultural context has to be taken into account 
when interpreting economic life and trying to enhance development.
c Two more cases
From fieldwork in south-west Ethiopia I briefly mention two other cases of 
community-based agro-ecology: the Me’en cultivators and the Suri agro-pas-
toralists. The Me’en are shifting cultivators and have a productive though 
technologically simple agrarian system. They maintain a rich subsistence 
economy, and famines in the area were unknown. For approximately the last 
eight years they have successfully developed sesame as a cash crop (next to 
coffee). It is privately farmed and privately sold, but to a monopolistic trader 
cartel controlled by non-Me’en middlemen, who give them a relatively low 
price. The Me’en farmers retain their shifting cultivation system for subsist-
ence purposes (with shifting field rotation) and livestock keeping, but tend 
to cultivate the sesame on permanent plots. Land-use planning is important. 
While the Me’en country is not yet affected by land scarcity, this will occur 
within a decade, due to (a) large-scale influx of government-related domes-
tic and foreign investors (e.g. a large sugarcane plantation in the lowland) 
and resettlers from the north introducing plough agriculture; and (b) rapid 
population growth, an unforeseen result of religious (Protestant Evangelical) 
faith expansion and a certain loss of knowledge on indigenous birth control 
practices and female health. As in the Gamo case, the commercial success of 
a number of farmers and the successful continuity of local farming will be 
undermined by these external factors.
 The Suri agro-pastoralists combine agriculture (sorghum, peas, beans, 
maize) in higher altitude areas with extensive livestock herding in the semi-arid 
plains, hunting and gathering, and alluvial gold panning. They have a well-de-
veloped system of mobile land use and classification (see Olibui & LaTosky 
2015 on the related Mursi people) and preserved the savannah landscape and 
pastures with periodic burning of bush and selective cutting of trees. Suri 
97 See A Thousand Suns (2009) – a Global Oneness film on bio-diversity and the Gamo high-
lands (www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pU0fkwL8yA).
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never cut down and uproot trees but leave them in and along the fields for 
re-growth. Bush and forest patches, especially those along rivers or streams, 
were left standing because of the many medicinal, ritual, and food plants found 
there. A serious problem since 2008 is that huge sugarcane plantations are be-
ing constructed by the state Sugar Corporation98 which threaten all this: pas-
tures, bush areas, and cultivation sites. Suri had no say in the sugar venture and 
deplore the loss of livelihood space and biodiversity. They signalled to the gov-
ernment on the long-term damage likely to be done to the land—erosion, spe-
cies loss, water scarcity, and impoverishment of soil quality—but to no avail; 
their environmental knowledge was deemed irrelevant and bypassed. Ques-
tions arise here as to why in northern regions of Ethiopia (see above) anti-ero-
sion and land rehabilitation are stimulated, while in the south the scenario of 
large-scale mono-crop cultivation and subversion of local agro-ecology-based 
livelihoods is pursued. Both these rural economies of Me’en and Suri are in 
principle resilient and deserve investment, not neglect. They showed potential 
for innovative behaviour without state support (Me’en: cash crop development; 
Suri: gold exploitation and quality cattle herding), and this could be utilized for 
further, locally embedded development.
Government reform of the agrarian sector: Paradox and promise
Ethiopian government policy for the rural sector is paradoxical: on the one hand, 
support for the large-scale commercial exploitation of the land via mono-crop 
plantations (often in areas not fit for long-term cultivation of the species cho-
sen, like jatropha, sugarcane, or cotton); and on the other hand, support for lo-
cal community-based regeneration of eroded lands and respect of agro-ecolo-
gy-based systems, as we saw above in the examples from northern Ethiopia. The 
latter case is one of revaluing community-based smallholder farming, which in 
some policy plans (like the GTPs) was designated as ‘backward’.
 The promise of Sustainable Land Management (SLM), land rehabilitation, 
and respecting ‘traditional’ agro-ecological complexes is great. At the same 
time, the social and human costs of large-scale land enterprises in Ethiopia 
so far have been high, with many people displaced and made poor (and hun-
dreds of casualties and much property destruction, e.g. in waves of protest 
during 2015-16). Conflicts between government and local populations also 
emerged, as well as between ethnic groups. The effect of large-scale land en-
terprises on local food security, employment, and the environment has not 
been favourable either (Maru 2016). 
98 Some 175,000 ha was originally planned for the plantations, with expansion to up to 300,000 
ha for other private or semi-state enterprises.
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A more hybrid strategy, combining investment in local agrarian systems and 
ecologies while giving space to individual entrepreneurs, as well as develop-
ing selected commercial agricultural enterprises in appropriate human and 
ecological settings, would do more to achieve durable growth and make peo-
ple ‘stakeholders’. The various successful land rehabilitation initiatives men-
tioned above contribute to this; the indiscriminate, top-down construction 
of mega-mono-crop plantations does not. 
 Being caught in the imported, modernist discourse and policies toward 
massive factory-like commercial farming, the structure and ecological ba-
sis of the rural producers’ sector in Ethiopia is precarious. Environmental 
limits are not being respected by the large-scale enterprises, and the eco-
logical conditions for social and economic reproduction outside those large 
enterprises seem threatened. But the ‘traditional’ smallholder sector has a 
backbone function in national food production. It is a moot point whether 
the intricate and fine-tuned agro-ecology of the Gedeo or the Gamo will be 
allowed to exist in future, despite their highly developed cultivation systems 
and near-optimal environmental adaptation. If these ‘sustainable’ systems of 
dense population and intensive cultivation—with food-secure production—
are changed by new policy initiatives, then the end of Ethiopian rural society 
and productivity is near. The country’s food insecurity will increase dramat-
ically and the well-being of its citizens seriously decline. All the more reason 
to adhere to earlier decisions of the Ethiopian government taken here and 
there (e.g. in Gedeo) to continue and respect locally evolved agrarian sys-
tems. This enhances sustainability of the rural economy in novel forms. The 
government and its various institutions and donor partnerships supporting 
agrarian development have accumulated remarkable bodies of knowledge, 
and there is a strong commitment toward positive change. The approach of 
respecting locally embedded development trajectories of communities that 
intimately know their agro-ecology is productive and would win even more 
were it extended to investment in agro-pastoral societies—for example, in 
the south and south-west. Integrating new ‘outgrower’ schemes in local 
agrarian production would be another option.
 In short, to avoid the looming environmental crunch, we should, as Rock-
ström (2010) said, ‘let the environment guide our development’. Ethiopian 
initiatives as briefly described here carry potential and need to become main-
stream.
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12
Connecting rare birds and people in 
Burkina Faso
Observations from the field
Michiel van den Bergh99
Introduction
In the years 2011-13, I carried out fieldwork for my PhD research on the so-
cio-cultural, socio-economic, and institutional aspects of conservation pro-
jects in Burkina Faso. This research was possible thanks to a collaboration 
between Vogelbescherming Nederland (i.e. BirdLife International100 in the 
Netherlands) and the African Studies Centre Leiden101 (including, most no-
tably, the institute’s director, Ton Dietz). The study was conducted as part of 
the integrated development and conservation project ‘Living on the Edge’, 
which was developed and implemented by Vogelbescherming Nederland and 
BirdLife International in Sahelian West Africa during the period 2011-15. 
This ambitious initiative aimed at improving the living conditions in the Sa-
hel for both birds and people, by working with the local population to con-
serve and restore the natural environment and enhance livelihoods through a 
more sustainable use of natural resources. Local conservation groups (LCGs) 
were responsible for the project’s local execution and management strategy.
 My fieldwork included two such LCGs in Burkina Faso, namely Sourou 
LCG and Higa LCG (see Figure 12.1). For comparison purposes, and to place 
the Living on the Edge project in a broader context, similar interventions 
99 World Wide Fund for Nature, The Netherlands. Email: michielvdbergh@gmail.com. Copy-
right photos in this chapter: Michiel van den Bergh.
100 BirdLife is a global partnership of 120 national, non-governmental conservation organiza-
tions with a focus on birds. It is the world’s largest partnership of conservation organizations 
and strives to conserve birds, their habitats, and global biodiversity, working with people to-
ward sustainability in the use of natural resources (BirdLife 2000, 2015).
101 The African Studies Centre Leiden is the only multidisciplinary academic knowledge insti-
tute in the Netherlands devoted entirely to the study of Africa. It has an extensive library that is 
open to the general public. The ASCL is an inter-faculty institute of Leiden University.
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were also studied. In addition, the local population and the development ac-
tors active in the two LCG areas were also included in my study, as well as 
development actors with similar activities in other areas in the country. Fur-
thermore, ecological aspects, including changes in land use and land cover, 
and their (potential) impact on African-Palearctic (A-P) migrant birds are 
also discussed in the thesis (thankfully, Ton Dietz insisted on including these 
ecological aspects in the research). This connects this research with integrat-
ed conservation and development concepts.  
Figure 12.1
Sourou and Higa research areas and Burkina Faso’s climatic zones
Source: Adapted from Atlas de l’Afrique 2005
Although a broad range of research methods and sources were used for 
the study, field research in the two LCGs was the study’s fundamental data 
source, in particular interviews with the local population, which focused 
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especially on the people’s perceptions regarding the research topics. In ad-
dition, development actors were also an important study group because of 
their integrated (bird) conservation and sustainable development efforts. 
Lastly, the Participatory Assessment of Development (PADev, a participatory 
and holistic methodology for evaluating development interventions that has 
been developed by Ton Dietz; see Figure 12.2) was used, and PADev-inspired 
focus workshops were held. The focus in these workshops was on the PADev 
‘assessment of actors’ exercise, which was used to discover participants’ per-
ceptions of interventions and the actors working in the area (Dietz & the 
PADev Team 2013).
Figure 12.2
Field research in Burkina Faso. Besides being valuable to discuss my interviews in 
the field with my supervisor (Ton Dietz: right), it was a great pleasure to share our 
passion for Africa, and Burkina Faso in particular
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In my dissertation, I describe the local inhabitants’ perception of (migrant) 
birds and the environment in detail. The following quote may best summa-
rize my findings regarding these perceptions:
Although environmental issues are not always among people’s main worries 
in this region, the environment is seen as being highly important to their 
livelihoods, and also for their coping strategies and their socio-cultural val-
ues. Birds are often considered an integral part of the environment and play 
numerous roles in people’s lives, sometimes directly related to their liveli-
hoods. Birds are seen by some inhabitants as an indicator of environmental 
health and are therefore useful in addressing conservation issues. Many be-
lieve that bird populations are being threatened and declining, and various 
(human-induced) causes have been suggested, some of which overlap with 
those found in the literature on A-P migrant birds threats, such as deforesta-
tion and the exploitation of birds. (van den Bergh 2016: 115).
Bird observations
During my stays in Burkina Faso, I had the opportunity to make frequent 
bird observations (i.e. between July and September 2011; between December 
2011 and March 2012; in February/March 2013; between February and April 
2014; and again in April 2015). Areas included the extensive wetlands of the 
Sourou River Basin (primarily in Di and Lanfiera departments) and the pre-
dominantly dry Sahelian landscape of Lac Higa (mainly in Tankougounadié 
Department), as well as urban Ouagadougou. On many days in the research 
areas, the first and/or last hour(s) of the day where used for bird-watching. In 
addition, a 4-day trip was made to the south-west of the country, including 
Lac Tengrela, La Guinguette, and Cascades de Karfiguela, around the end 
of 2011, as well as a 3-day trip to the W National Park in south-east Burkina 
Faso, around the beginning of 2014. During all bird-watching trips I made 
use of a spotting scope (Swarovski ATS 65 HD: 25-50 zoom) and a binoc-
ular (Swarovski EL: 8x42). Daily notes were made of observed bird species 
and interesting observations, on paper or in an Excel file. Photos and sound 
recordings were made of some of the more interesting or exciting sightings.
During these bird-watching trips I obtained several remarkable bird records 
for Burkina Faso. For instance, I discovered and described two new bird spe-
cies for the country and obtained the first fully documented records of three 
other species (van den Bergh 2013, 2012). Also, observations related to the 
status in Burkina Faso of four A-P migrant species were published (van den 
Bergh 2013). In the present article, I describe several other interesting and 
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unpublished observations and connect them with the local inhabitants’ per-
ceptions of birds as described in my thesis (van den Bergh 2016).
Birds and bird observations in Burkina Faso and the research areas 
Well over 500 birds species have been recorded in Burkina Faso (Lungren 
et al. 2001; Portier et al. 2002). Although this is perhaps somewhat limited 
compared with some of the other (highly diverse) African countries, it is still 
a considerable number considering the fact that the country has no rainfor-
est or coast and is poorly explored by ornithologists. The country has a broad 
range of habitats, ranging from desert-like habitats in the far north to small 
pockets of semi-rainforest habitats in the south-west, which all host their 
own specific set of matching bird species (Figures 12.3a-t). Moreover, the 
country is visited by many A-P migrant species. 
 The African continent is a winter ground for no less than a quarter of the 
more than 500 bird species breeding in Europe. Especially the continent’s 
northern savannahs serve as a wintering ground for migrant birds, including 
the Sahel region. The Sahel region is indeed an important area for migrant 
Palearctic birds, either for those species that spend their winter there, or for 
those species wintering further south on the continent that use this region 
as a staging area (Jones 1995; Zwarts et al. 2009). Many A-P migrant spe-
cies were seen during my fieldwork in Burkina Faso’s Sahel region, such as 
Western Bonelli’s Warblers, Woodchat Shrikes, Common Sandpipers, and 
Western Yellow Wagtails (Figures 12.3a-d). In wetland areas, including along 
the shores of the Sourou River and Lake Higa, A-P migrant species were at 
least as common during some visits in the dry season as African migrant 
and non-migrant species. Burkina Faso has a number of wetlands that are 
of significant importance for water birds, both resident and migrant species. 
A few of these wetlands receive congregations of at least 20,000 water birds 
annually. All of these sites are found in the country’s Sahel region, and one 
among them is Sourou. In fact, the site is known to hold what may be the 
largest concentration of wildfowl (Anatidae) in Burkina Faso (Lungren et al. 
2001; Portier et al. 2002).
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From the top down and from left to right: Western Bonelli’s Warbler (Phylloscopus bonelli), 
Woodchat Shrike (Lanius senator), Common Sandpiper (Actitis hypoleucos), Western Yellow 
Wagtail (Motacilla flava), Sahel Paradise-whydah (Vidua orientalis), Chestnut-bellied 
Sandgrouse (Pterocles exustus), Yellow-crowned Gonolek (Laniarius barbarus), Abyssinian 
Roller (Coracias abyssinicus), Lavender Waxbill (Estrilda coerulescens), Red-billed Hornbill 
(Tockus erythrorhynchus), Red-throated Bee-eater (Merops bulocki), Yellow-billed Shrike 
(Corvinella corvina), Pied Kingfisher (Ceryle rudis), Spur-winged Lapwing (Vanellus spinosus), 
Long-tailed Cormorant (Microcarbo africanus), Lesser Jacana (Microparra capensis), Cattle 
Egret (Bubulcus ibis), African Pygmy-goose (Nettapus auritus), Little Bee-eater (Merops 
pusillus), and Black-winged Kite (Elanus caeruleus).
Figure 12.3a-t
Burkina Faso is home to a wide array of birds species
Observations of rare birds
During my fieldwork I made several interesting observations, of which some 
were published in the journals Malimbus and African Bird Club Bulletin, 
including the first records of Pectoral Sandpiper (Calidris melanotos) and 
Blackstart (Cercomela melanura) for the country and the first fully docu-
mented records of Great Bittern (Botaurus stellaris), Quail-plover (Ortyxelos 
meiffreni), and Little Crake (Porzana parva). Observations related to the sta-
tus in Burkina Faso of Great Snipe (Gallinago media), Blackstart (Cercome-
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la melanura), Green-headed Sunbird (Cyanomitra verticalis), and Iberian 
Chiffchaff (Phylloscopus ibericus) are also described. Other interesting ob-
servations that have not been published before include the lack of sightings 
of some species (bustards, vultures, and eagles) and the sightings of some 
rare birds (i.e. Eleanora’s Falcon and two Wagtail (sub)species). These obser-
vations are described below.
Bustards, vultures and eagles 
During almost three months of fieldwork in Burkina Faso, which included 
frequent short birding trips in several remote areas, I recorded a worryingly 
low number of bustards, vultures, and eagles. For instance, only one bustard 
(Savile’s Bustard), one species of vulture (Hooded Vulture, present in moder-
ate numbers; see Figure 12.4), and four species of eagles (a handful of Boot-
ed, Wahlberg’s, Short-toed Snake, and Beaudouin’s Snake Eagles; see Figure 
12.5) were seen during this period. Unfortunately, this recent observation, or 
rather the lack of observations, marks a continuation of the previously estab-
lished negative population trends (Thiollay 2006a, 2006b). In particular, large 
vultures suffered a dramatic decline (98%) outside protected areas from 1970 
to 2000, including in Burkina Faso. Similar declines were noted for eagles and 
bustards. Overhunting and overgrazing and degradation of acacia woodlands 
are thought to be the main causes for the declines in bustard populations. 
The vultures and eagles are facing a range of specific threats, the most signif-
icant for vultures in particular being poisoning and the trade in traditional 
medicines (Thiollay 2006a, 2006b; Ogada et al. 2016). 
Figure 12.4
Hooded Vulture (Necrosyrtes monachus) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
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This vulture is listed as ‘Critically Endangered’ by BirdLife International, as 
the population is experiencing an extremely rapid decline with an estimated 
83% decline (range 64-93%) over three generations (53 years) (www.iucnred-
list.org/details/22695185/0).
Figure 12.5
Beaudouin’s Snake Eagle (Circaetus beaudouini) in Sourou, Burkina Faso
The Beaudouin’s Snake Eagle has a small population, which has suffered rapid 
declines, and the species is therefore classified as ‘Vulnerable’ by BirdLife Inter-
national (www.iucnredlist.org/details/22732272/0). 
Eleanora’s Falcon (Falco eleonorae)
In the late afternoon of 25 January 2012, an adult pale morph was seen cir-
cling near Tankougounadié, located near the Burkina Faso–Niger border. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to photograph the bird. For this reason, and be-
cause I had no previous experience with this species and because of the very 
‘peculiar’ date of this observation (in January all Eleanora’s Falcons should 
be in their winter area in or near Madagascar), I do not consider this record 
as definite (although the dark underwing coverts were seen!). According to 
Borrow and Demey (2004), there is only one record of this falcon in West 
Africa (Mauritania), but satellite tracking shows that juveniles range widely 
throughout Africa and probably have been overlooked in the past (Sinclair & 
Ryan 2010). Indeed, the recent satellite tracking (2003-05) of 13 birds showed 
that at least two Eleanora’s Falcons visited Burkina Faso, one during spring 
migration and one during autumn migration (Gschweng et al. 2008). 
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White-throated Wagtail (Motacilla (flava) cinereocapilla) and Yellow- 
crowned Wagtail (Motacilla (flava) flavissima) 
Both Sinclair and Ryan (2010) and Borrow and Demey (2004) mention and/
or depict these two (sub)species, but they do not provide any additional in-
formation. A presumed White-throated Wagtail in breeding plumage was 
seen on the shores of Lac Higa on 22 February 2012, but unfortunately not 
heard. In the same area, at least one Yellow-crowned Wagtail was seen and 
photographed during the end of February 2012.
Conclusions
As I describe in my thesis (van den Bergh 2016: 178):
birds, including those that migrate, are typically valued by the studied local 
population in many (socio-cultural and socio-economic) ways, and play nu-
merous positive roles in people’s lives, sometimes directly related to their 
livelihoods.
For instance, inhabitants value the critically endangered Hooded Vultures, as 
these birds indicate where dying or dead livestock is located and people ap-
preciate the ecological role they fulfil by cleaning carcasses. Vultures are pro-
tected by national law, and many inhabitants are aware of this. However, the 
illegal hunting of (at least several other protected) bird species was regularly 
observed during my fieldwork. Hunting is among the many threats bird spe-
cies face, and many are threatened with regional extinction in Burkina Faso, 
including those large species that are well known to the local inhabitants. The 
inhabitants are often well aware of the decline in these bird populations (van 
den Bergh 2016).
 However, the current status of most West African birds is little known 
(see e.g. Thiollay 2006b), as is illustrated by the observations described here. 
Few birdwatchers visit the Sahel (see e.g. Lungren et al. 2001; Portier et al. 
2002), and the local inhabitants’ knowledge is often restricted to common, 
conspicuous (noisy, colourful, and/or large), socio-culturally valuable, and/or 
pest bird species (see e.g. van den Bergh 2016). I therefore encourage foreign 
birdwatchers to visit the Sahel, including Burkina Faso. Knowledge about the 
distribution and the status of bird species is much needed for the conserva-
tion of threatened species (Thiolly 2006a). By entering their observations in 
a public database (such as observado.org) and/or publishing on their notable 
sightings, visiting birdwatchers can contribute to the knowledge of the re-
gion’s avifauna. Birdwatchers could also stimulate the inhabitants’ interest 
in birds, including by generating income. At the same time, education and 
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awareness-raising about the importance and aesthetic value of birds, the en-
vironment, and conservation (including hunting and environmental legisla-
tion) could contribute to local bird-friendly behaviour. 
 Nonetheless, urgent strict conservation action should be taken to pre-
vent the imminent extinction of—in particular large—bird species such as 
vultures, bustards, and eagles. Hunting law enforcement and protected areas 
play a prominent role in the conservation of these species (Thiolly 2006a). 
This should go alongside efforts to promote sustainable land-use practic-
es that contribute to habitat restoration and conservation as well as better 
livelihoods for local people (van den Bergh 2016). Increasing knowledge of 
the country’s avifauna could help direct the implementation of appropriate 
protected areas, law enforcement, and sustainable land-use practices. In that 
way, the Sahel can once again become a safe haven for a wide variety of rare 
birds and people.
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13
Beyond ‘two Africas’ in African and 
Berber literary studies
Daniela Merolla
Studies on North Africa and African studies developed internationally on 
relatively parallel tracks: the first were usually included within the scope of 
research on the Arab world and the Middle East, while the ‘rest’ of Africa was 
approached and studied as a world comparatively homogeneous and differ-
ent from North Africa. Such a north/south division still shapes current stud-
ies, as shown, for example, in the substantial number of papers that focus on 
Sub-Saharan Africa at the European Conferences on African Studies of the 
AEGIS (Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies) and at the annual 
meetings of the African Studies Association based in the USA. An anecdote 
that contributed to my reflection on the ‘two Africas’ is linked to the scientif-
ic policy of the African Studies Centre (Leiden) (ASC) in the 2000s. I intend-
ed to organize a conference on North Africa, but it was suggested that I not 
submit it to the ASC because its regional focus was ‘beyond the scope’ of the 
centre. This policy similarly emerges from the publication lists of the ASC. 
North Africa appears only once, and countries such as Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia do not appear at all. However, the awareness of the problematic 
divide of Africa has now begun to sustain the dialogue among fields that have 
remained institutionally distant until recently. When I organized the work-
shop ‘African Studies and the Epistemological Reflections on “Two Africas”’ 
together with Mirjam de Bruijn at Leiden University in 2013,102 the ASC was 
represented by Ton Dietz. As organizers of the workshop, Mirjam and I were 
happy to hear that Ton warmly agreed upon a scientific policy going beyond 
the north/south divide of Africa. 
 This article103 aims at presenting the criticism of divisive conceptions in 
African studies and the reflections from a field that has a marginal position in 
both African research and Middle Eastern research: Berber/Amazigh literary 
102 Leiden University, 20 September 2013.
103 I would like to thank Valeria Poli for the translation of the article (Merolla 2013) which 
constituted the basis for the present text.
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studies.104 Amazigh is a language spoken in North Africa in numerous local 
variants.105
Figure 13.1
1439 portolan chart of Gabriel de Vallseca 
Critical reflections on ‘Two Africas’
Transcontinental movements of people are ancient phenomena in Africa be-
tween north and south, east and west, and vice versa. Traders and soldiers, 
104 In the past, ‘Amazigh’ was a term used by activists, while ‘Berber’ was the academic de-
nomination. Amazigh is currently used officially in the Maghreb and has also been appropri-
ated in studies. The term ‘Berber’ will be used throughout this article to indicate the historical 
continuity of the field of study. 
105 The number of speakers is between 30% to 40% of the Moroccan population (Rif, Middle 
and High Atlas, Sous). In Algeria, between 14% to 25% of the population speak local forms of 
Amazigh (Kabylia, Aurès, Mzab). There are an estimated two million speakers within the Tuar-
egs who live in a wide Saharan and Sub-Saharan area across Algeria, Libya, Mali, Niger, Burkina 
Faso, and Nigeria. In Tunisia, there are small pockets of Berber speakers on the Isle of Djerbaa and 
in the south (Chenini, Douz, Tozeur), while larger communities live in Libya (an estimated 3% of 
the Libyan population). The range of estimates indicates that censuses, when taken at all, have 
not inquired about language use, and any existing sources are old or unreliable. See also Green-
berg (1950); Bougchiche (1997); Chaker (2003); Lewis (2009).
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slaves and pilgrims, travellers and migrants marched while bringing along 
goods and knowledge. They established routes that were partly disrupted by 
colonial borders and have now been reopened in the current acceleration of 
global migration. As indicated by Winegar and Pieprzak (2009: 8) with ref-
erence to the work of artist Ursula Biemann,106 ancient trans-Saharan routes 
are now followed by migrants who traverse the desert and arrive in Morocco 
and Libya searching for work and a new life and often for further passage to 
the north—that is, to Europe. The contacts between the inhabited zones of 
the Sahara (oases, steppes, and woodlands) and the Sahel-Saharan regions 
have been intense as well, as shown by studies on networks and connectivity 
in southern Morocco, southern Algeria, and in the Tuareg area.107 The links 
between Nubia, Egypt, and the Sudan have been similarly re-appreciated in 
recent studies.108 
 The awareness of cultural continuities of North, West, and East Africa 
and the function of the desert as a contact zone is not new. The idea that 
the Sahara could function as a division wall has been criticized by African 
writers such as the Algerian Kateb Yacine, the Sudanese Tayeb Salih, and the 
Cameroonian Werewere Liking, who were keen to reflect on intra-African 
links.109 Similarly, as indicated by Winegar and Pieprzak (2009), the criticism 
of conceptual divides has been raised from the world of visual arts, films, and 
music. Important exhibitions of African arts were held in Bamako, Dakar, 
Douala, Johannesburg, Fès, and Venice, among other locations. These exhibi-
tions and festivals invited artists, musicians, and film makers from the whole 
of Africa to participate and enter into dialogue with each other about their 
work. 
 In reference to the studies, William Zartman discussed the function of 
the Sahara as a connecting area instead of as a divisive one in the 1960s.110 
In the same period, Cheikh Anta Diop published Antériorité des civilisations 
nègres: mythe ou vérité historique? Although Diop’s work has been criticized 
from a methodological perspective because of his use of the concepts of ‘race’ 
and ‘black phenotype’, it maintains the undeniable merit of having raised the 
issue of the racialized division of Africa. Such a division was determined by 
the ideology of European superiority and by certain self-representations of 
the North African post-colonial states. Cheik Anta Diop’s work reconnects 
106 Winegar & Pieprzak (2009: 4, 8).
107 Scheele (2016); Jeppie & Diagne (2008).
108 De Simone (2014).
109 See Kateb Yacine’s Le polygone étoilé, Tayeb Salih’s Season of migration to the North, Abdul-
razak Gurnah’s Paradise, and Werewere Liking’s Un Tuareg s’est marié à une Pygmée in Tissières 
(2002). 
110 Théodore Monod in the 1930s and Fernand Braudel in the 1940s already wrote of the con-
necting functions of caravans in the Sahara. See Lydon (2015: 3-4).
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North Africa to the ‘rest’ of Africa by criticizing the obliteration of Black 
Nubian pharaohs from ancient Egyptian civilization. Moreover, relocating 
the birth of Mediterranean civilizations in Egyptian and Sudanese Africa, 
he debunks the acquisition of ancient Egypt into the genealogy of European 
history. His ‘Afrocentric’ perspective partially converged into the cultural and 
political movements connected to Pan-Africanism. The latter proposed soli-
darity between all Africans (and their diasporas) as an instrument to counter 
the political and ideological hegemony of colonial and post-colonial Europe 
and the United States. However, the concept of a cultural and historical di-
vide between North Africa and the ‘rest’ of the continent persisted. For ex-
ample, the poet and first president of Senegal as well as founder of the Ne-
gritude literary movement, Léopold Sédar Senghor, called for African unity 
across the Sahara but identified Africa and Africanity with being black.111 The 
metaphor of ‘Black Africa’ led to internal differentiation and, in some cases, 
to a Pan-Africanism limited to Sub-Saharan Africa.
 As discussed in the beginning, the notion of Africa as ‘Black Africa’ has 
also persisted in academic studies. Such an idea is engrained in the epistemo-
logical approach that moulds the separation of the ‘two Africas’, contributing 
to the divides among African studies, Middle Eastern studies, and Mediterra-
nean studies in academic institutes and museums. The winds of change have 
begun to blow in the new century. Socio-historical processes and related dis-
ciplinary motivations of the African north/south divide have been criticized 
in the activities of the Saharan Studies Association since 2007 and in the pub-
lications of researchers such as Hélène Tissier (2002), Ghislaine Lydon (2005, 
2009, 2015), Jessica Winegar and Katarzyna Pieprzak (2009), Mohamed Has-
san Mohamed (2010), Ziad Bentahar (2011), James McDougall and Judith 
Scheele (2012), Stéphanie Pouessel (2012), and Judith Scheele (2016). 
 One of the most pungent and methodologically grounded critiques of 
the ‘two Africas’ and of the rhetorical figure of ‘Black Africa’ as ‘real Africa’ 
(Scheele 2016) has been offered by the historian Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2006). 
As summarized below, Zeleza analysed the separation of Africa into North 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa as an idea created on the classification of the 
peoples and their geographical locations through a stereotyping biological 
and essentialist approach associated with race theories: 
The conflation of Africa with ‘sub-Saharan Africa,’ ‘Africa South of the Sahara’ 
or ‘Black Africa’ […] ultimately offers us a racialized view of Africa, Africa as 
biology, as the ‘black’ continent. (Zeleza 2006: 15)
111 Senghor saw Africanity and Arabicity as separate identities that should enter into dialogue 
without merging. See Katchka (2009: 44).
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As Zeleza writes (ibid.), the making of the ‘two Africas’ has occurred through 
long historical processes; however, it is with slavery in the colonial period 
that this epistemological construct takes on the form and content still in-
ferred today.  
 The great partition, the so-called Scramble for Africa, carried out after 
the Berlin Conference in 1884-85, paved the way for the enormous colonial 
domains created under the rule of France, stretching from the Mediterrane-
an Sea to the Gulf of Guinea,112 and of Britain, stretching almost uninterrupt-
ed from Egypt to South Africa. The colonial territorial extension, however, 
did not signify a unifying approach to Africa. The British colonization ‘orien-
talized’ Egypt, separating it from Africa and integrating it into a ‘Near Orient’ 
(currently referred to as the Middle East) consisting of British dominions 
that, in different forms, extended from Egypt to former Persia (present-day 
Iran). Similarly, the French colonization ‘orientalized’ Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia in competition with the British Near East and separated them from 
‘Black Africa’.113 Conversely, the connections between the north and south 
regions of the Sahara were established exclusively through the mediation of 
French colonialism and its ‘Francophone’ world, which will also affect con-
temporary research as will be discussed below. 
 The concomitant construction of Africa and the ‘Orient’ as objects of 
knowledge and dominion has involved an entire host of epistemological ef-
fects. According to Zeleza (2006: 15), a first effect in African studies is the ‘bi-
ologization’ (and racialization) of Africa due to ‘blackness’, which involves the 
assumption that cultural continuity and homogeneity characterize Sub-Sa-
112 French colonial policy tended to expand from Western Africa to the east of the continent, 
which, nevertheless, failed to materialize mainly due to the concomitant English expansion. From 
a linguistic perspective, the Congo under Belgian rule is included in the French-speaking area.
113 According to Edward Said (1979), the ‘Orientalist’ construction was accomplished through 
a series of clichés and oppositions which can be traced in travel narratives, novels, and paint-
ings, as well as in scientific discourse. It is defined by Said (ibid. 233) as a variety of social 
Darwinism, according to which ‘the modern Orientals were degraded remnants of a former 
greatness; the ancient, or ‘classical’, civilizations of the Orient were perceivable through the 
disorders of present decadence but only (a) because a white specialist [...] could do the sift-
ing and reconstructing and (b) because a vocabulary of sweeping generalities (the Semites, the 
Aryans, the Orientals) referred not to a set of fictions but rather to a whole array of seemingly 
objective and agreed-upon distinctions’. Later criticism of Said’s work has emphasized that Ori-
entalism, nonetheless, holds the merit of having gathered and issued an enormous collection 
of archaeological, linguistic, literary, and ethnographic data and analyses that not only pro-
vide wide-ranging subject matter but also high-profile studies, despite the fact that the reading 
of such material is complex and arduous due to the interpretation process that constructs its 
‘object’, as Said indicated. For examples in Berber studies, see Merolla (2006: 42-51); Boukous 
(2001); Bounfour (1994).
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haran Africa.114 It can also be stated that a further effect of this assumption is 
that Africa is imagined as a ‘black world’ that is neatly separated from the ‘an-
cient greatness’ of the ‘Orient’. Accordingly, historical connections between 
the regions north and south of the Sahara are disregarded.
 Denied connections include historical and cultural continuities as well as 
the massive trade that had connected northern Africa with western Africa 
(Mali and Niger, in particular) and with eastern Africa (Sudan and Tanzania). 
This ‘erasure’ is largely due to the omission of what Zeleza (ibid. 17) calls 
the ‘Islamic Library’, that is, the knowledge accrued through both intellec-
tual and economic exchanges that thrived around the immense centres of 
Islamic culture in the Sub-Saharan area of current Mali and Niger. There is a 
further point to be considered according to Zeleza: the African belonging in 
both Christianity and Islam, which are customarily presented as foreign and 
antagonistic to local religions, whereas history shows that ‘Christianity and 
Islam were implanted in certain parts of Africa almost at their inceptions and 
Africans made significant doctrinal contributions to both religions’ (ibid. 20).
Another important effect of the biologization of Africa is the erasure of its 
past history, which particularly concerns the Berber-/Amazigh-speaking 
populations: 
the characterization of North Africa as exclusively Arab erases the history of 
the peoples and cultures that existed in the region long before the coming 
of the Arabs and Islam and the subsequent creation of complex creolized 
cultures. (ibid. 16).
For instance, the scholar Martin Bernal conceived a ‘Black Athena’—follow-
ing somehow in the footsteps of Cheikh Anta Diop—to advance the critique 
of the oblivion of the African role in the rise of the ancient civilizations that 
thrived around the Mediterranean Sea.115 Such a definition, however, once 
again identifies the role played by the African component in Greek culture by 
reducing it to the ‘black’ adjective. This has subsequently provided a reason 
to the Berber studies scholar Vermondo Brugnatelli to record an ‘epistemo-
logical void’ in North Africa116 because colour appears crucial to the defini-
tion of Africa and leaves no opportunity to other components, particularly 
the Berber one, which is local, Mediterranean, and African all at the same 
time.
114 ‘Unless culture is coded in skin colour, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of cultural practices 
in Africa […] should not be assumed a priori […]; the Hausa of West Africa had more in common 
with their neighbours to the North than with the Zulu of South Africa’ (Zeleza 2006: 16).
115 See also van Binsbergen (1996-97).
116 Brugnatelli (2009-2010: 1-6).
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The critique of the separation between a north and a south in Africa offers 
a perspective through which also the relationships between African studies 
and Berber studies can be reviewed. The following sections of this article at-
tempt to track down some elements of the connections and disjunctions of 
these fields of study today as far as literary studies are concerned.
Figure 13.2
Part of the 1375 Catalan Atlas by Abraham Cresques
African and Berber literary studies 
From the perspective of African literary studies, we should consider the pivot-
al work of Denise Paulme in the 1970s, which included African examples and 
North African tales (Kabyle Berber), and of a few scholars who specialized in 
Saharan studies (Calame-Griaule 1977, 1982, 2002; Bernus & Calame-Griaule 
1981).117 By and large, however, research primarily developed on separate or 
parallel tracks (see the bibliography published by Görög-Karady 1992). Ziad 
Bentahar (2011) shows that the interpretative model based on the ‘two Afri-
cas’ has been strengthened by a set of international political factors and edi-
117 In the field of African history, see the works of Paulo Fernando de Moraes Farias on Saha-
ran connections (de Moraes Farias 1967, 1974, 1999, 2006, 2008).
Dietz Essays.indd   221 11/09/2017   09:17
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 222
222
torial policies linked to the legacy of the division between ‘Francophone’ and 
‘Anglophone’ studies. For the English-speaking world, the separation of the 
studies between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa roughly correspond-
ed to the attention given to the new African literature published in English, 
while North African literature remains the domain of what is written in Ar-
abic or French. In the case of French studies, the situation is more complex. 
A tendency to overcome the north/south divide is found in literary studies 
that include Francophone authors from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca (Bentahar 2011: 8). This can be linked to the fact that, as previously men-
tioned, the north/south division of Africa as well as its reunification under 
the label of French rule and ‘Francophone world’ was an essential component 
of the colonial policy. Bentahar writes that the north/south divide continues 
to permeate French African studies because the latter do not recognize Ara-
bic as an ‘African’ language. If the non-African origin of Arabic motivates this 
exclusion, it denies the appropriation and ‘Africanization’ of Arabic over the 
centuries and in the immense geographic area stretching from the Mediter-
ranean to the Indian Ocean beyond the Middle East (ibid. 9). This approach 
can be traced back to the desire to create an autonomous disciplinary field 
for African studies and to the long process of construction of European iden-
tity in opposition to the Arab-Islamic world that, during the colonial period, 
was combined with the downplaying of the Arab cultural impact in Africa. It 
should be added that the tendencies retraced by Bentahar, combined with the 
negation or marginalization of the connectivity between Sub-Saharan Africa 
and northern Africa, have involved the continuous emphasis of the cultural 
and religious links of North Africa and the Middle East and the exacerbation 
of the opposition as well as of the union of Arab and Berber speakers and of 
their languages and literatures.118 
 In the century-long French colonization of Africa, Berbers have come to 
occupy a particularly ambiguous position.119 Following the indications pro-
vided by Hélène Claudot-Hawad and Paul Pandolfi,120 it can be ascertained 
that an ensemble of studies and literary texts have contributed to creating 
the ‘myth’ of the Tuaregs of the Sahara as a population different and opposed 
to the black inhabitants of the Sub-Saharan oases.121 The Tuaregs were con-
sidered as the noble ‘whites’ ruling over the ‘black’ vassals of the oases. The 
118 Lydon (2015: 13). 
119 See the studies by Ageron (1972); Lacoste-Dujardin (1984); Lucas & Vatin (1975).
120 Claudot-Hawad (1990, 1993); Pandolfi (2001). See also: Camel (1996); Henry (1996); Vallet 
(1990).
121 Pandolfi (2001) mentions researchers such as Duveyrier (1864), Stefanini (1926), Gautier 
(1935), and writers such as Georges de Labruyère, Pierre Benoit, and Jules Verne (see L’invasion 
de la mer 1903). See also Foucauld (1888: 88, 140, 264) and Lhote (1955).
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French representation of a ‘White Africa’ that was separated and opposed 
to the ‘Black Africa’ south of the Sahara supported the establishment of set-
tlement colonies in North Africa both politically and ideologically.122 These 
representations have recently re-emerged in newspapers and magazines be-
cause of the uprising of the Tuaregs in northern Mali in January 2012 and the 
ephemeral creation of Azawad, an independent state not recognized by the 
international community.123
 It is important to clarify that the French ‘myth’ of the Tuaregs recon-
structed the sociological division between pastoralists and sedentary farm-
ers, according to a division of ‘colour’ that denied forms of alliance and col-
laboration that existed among different language groups. Again, an effect is 
that, in such a representation, the Sahara became an area of separation, and 
not the area of trade and communication interchange that it had always been, 
between a barbarian but heroic (or ‘anarchic and unreliable’ in negative por-
trayals) north and a ‘black’ and more ‘primitive’ south, along the lines of the 
social Darwinism prevalent until the first decades of the 20th century. In the 
literary field, an example of these colonial models and their latent persistence 
can be found in the interpretations of the literary forms that epitomize love, 
whereby romantic love is a prerogative of European narratives, sensual love 
is associated with Arabic-Berber tales, and functional (social-reproduction) 
love is associated with tales from ‘Black Africa’.124 
 It should be remembered that the Tuaregs were also opposed to the Ar-
abs, following the dictates of a divide and rule policy in which the Berbers 
were represented as either more or less ‘developed’ than the Arabs or, in any 
case, as being less Islamized than Arab populations, which made establishing 
a division line possible. The colonial discourse toward Berbers was indeed 
ambivalent. On the one hand, Berbers were imagined as the Roman civili-
zation’s heirs, who only aspired to be reintegrated into Western civilization 
122 Lydon (2015: 9-11). 
123 On Azawad, see Zounmenou (2013); Lecoq (2010, 2015).
124 Finck (1899: 116): ‘[Romantic love] is a modern sentiment less than a thousand years old 
and not to be found among savages, barbarians, or Orientals. To them, [...] it is inconceivable 
that a woman should serve any other than sensual and utilitarian purposes.’ Alta (1961: 131-132): 
‘The closest approach to this [European tales of romance] are the historic tales of the Hausa and 
Fulbe, which do depict the bravery of the dashing hero [...] but scarcely [his mistress’s] purity or 
loyalty […] There is sufficient evidence even in the stories to show that tenderness and affection 
do exist between a man and a woman. However, the deeper and more enduring relationships are 
shown to be those between a parent and child or between siblings.’ The influence of such a di-
vision was perceptible in later texts of well-known scholars; see for example in Calame-Griaule 
(2002: 34-35): ‘Dans la littérature traditionnelle d’Afrique noire, il est rarement fait allusion aux 
sentiments individuels […] Par contre, [quand] l’influence méditerranéenne et même orientale 
est évidente, les sentiments sont exprimés clairement’. Romantic/passionate love is expressed in 
poetic genres in several African languages (Okpewho 1992: 143-146).
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by French colonization (see Masqueray 1885: 261-265; Frémeaux 1984: 29-
46).125 On the other hand, Berber societies were stigmatized as being more 
retrograde than the Arab ones.126 The stigmatization of Berbers gained po-
litical credibility after the insurrection of Kabylia (North Algeria) in 1870 
but could not erase the first attitude toward Berbers as ‘bons sauvages’. The 
differences of approach, however, were not substantial; both attitudes were 
instrumental to the construction of French Algeria. One attitude planned on 
dividing Arabs and Berbers by prospecting the possibility of assimilating the 
latter within ‘White Africa’,127 while the other attitude intended to oppose 
Berbers and Arabs without fancying the assimilation of the Berbers (Hano-
teau 1867; Basset 1920; see Lucas & Vatin 1975).
 Whereas the negation of connectivity prompted the French divisive co-
lonial politics of ‘Arabs’, ‘Berbers’ and ‘Blacks’, post-colonial nationalist poli-
cies emphasized the associations between North Africa and the Middle East 
and negated the requests for cultural recognition of Berber activists. In the 
20th century post-colonial approach, the unifying hyphen in the definition 
‘arabo-berbère’ became an unavoidable requirement in African, (Maghre-
bian) Arab, and Berber studies, signalling both their anticolonial discourse 
and their disregard for the affilations with the ‘south’ and the local (‘African’) 
component of the creolization of the Maghreb.128 
 Moving to Berber studies, it can be noted that most of the research has 
looked to the ‘east’ and ‘north’, somehow disregarding the possible connec-
tions to the ‘south’. When the bibliography of Berber research published by 
Bougchiche (1997) is studied, it can be determined that in-depth compari-
sons with African literatures is only sporadically undertaken in the field of 
Tuareg research and is based on literary genres from Mali and Niger.129 This 
125 Anthropological differentiation between Arabs and Berbers was initially constructed 
around elements such as the blonde hair and blue eyes of the Kabyles (for example, see Mas-
queray 1882: 333). Sociological elements of differentiation were seen in their democratic village 
organization and in their women’s condition. Kabyle Berber women were appreciated since they 
worked in the gardens outside the houses and did not wear a veil. These practices would demon-
strate that Berber women enjoyed a higher status than Arab women (Sabatier 1883; Masqueray 
1886, 1914). See the discussion on the representation of Berber women in Lacoste-Dujardin 
(1984).
126 Also in this case, a major example was found in the Kabyle Berber woman’s condition, one 
that was presented as particularly backwards since women were disinherited and they could be 
married off before puberty and ‘sold’ to their husbands, according to Hanoteau (1867); Coulon 
(1930).
127 On the ‘Kabyle myth’, see Ageron (1972: 267-292) and Lydon (2015: 9-11). Criticism of the 
presumed philo- Berber cultural policy of France is discussed in Chaker (1989: 83-91).
128 Merolla (2006: 54).
129 See the already mentioned studies by Calame-Griaule. In Berber linguistics, see for exam-
ple Tilmatine (1996).
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is linked to the current consequences of the historical context of the studies 
and of the north/south ‘great division’ discussed above. It should be consid-
ered that Berber studies remained a domain largely investigated by French 
researchers until the 1950s.130 Even after independence, research published 
in French played a central role in the field of Berber studies. A process of in-
ternationalization and ‘maghrebization’ of the studies (Chaker 1998) is per-
ceptible after the year 2000, when the effects of the new national policies in 
Algeria and Morocco (and currently in Tunisia and Libya as well) began to 
appear after the establishment of institutes committed to the study of the 
Amazigh and the opening of Amazigh courses of studies.131 This process of 
internationalization and maghrebization, however, has not yet led to a new 
interest in the comparison of African studies. 
 A specific case that I have investigated (Merolla 2013, 2014) is that of 
the Berber studies in Italy which have developed somewhat differently from 
international research. African, Arab, and Berber studies in Italy have been 
conducted under the aegis of ‘Afro-Asian’ studies and unifying academic in-
stitutions. Such institutional and ideological connections were established 
in the early colonial period and later under fascism when a school of ‘Orien-
talists’ (see Baldinetti 1997; Soravia 2004) included research on North and 
Sub-Saharan languages alike, which reflected the Italian colonial interests 
and the invasion of Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Libya.132 It is thus not sur-
prising that, in such a framework, African and Berber studies appeared in the 
same journals and conferences. The long-term influence of such construc-
tions is perceptible in the post-colonial time as well. Although there is no ‘on-
tological’ separation between north and south of the Sahara in Italian studies, 
130 As indicated by Chaker (1982: 83): ‘The research remains, until independence, almost a 
French monopoly [...] Apart from the work of Italian and Spanish researchers on the Berber 
varieties spoken in the areas under Spanish or Italian domination (Libya, Rif, Ifni), almost the 
entire production of this period is written in French and a good part of it is edited in Algiers.’ 
[my translation].
131 In Algeria, the HCA (Haut Commissariat à l’Amazighité) was instituted in 1995. In 2002, 
the Amazigh language was recognized as a ‘national language’ and, in 2016, as a ‘national and of-
ficial language’. In Morocco, the pilot project of alphabetization in Amazigh has been launched 
by the Moroccan Royal Institute for Amazighity, and the Amazigh language gained official sta-
tus in the new Moroccan constitution of 2011. Nevertheless, Amazigh is not yet fully integrated 
into mass education, and contradictory policies affect government recognition of multilingual-
ism. Recent demonstrations in the Moroccan Rif in favour of economic, democratic, and lan-
guage rights have been met by military force.
132 However, the differentiation between North Africa and the ‘rest’ of Africa along the lines 
of the Cultural Evolution theory is also found in Italian studies. In the context of the Italian 
pro-Arab policy (in opposition to the British influence in the area), the African world—once 
again, ‘Black Africa’—was considered inferior to Islam, which, in contrast, had to be politically 
and culturally supported. See, for instance, Beguinot (1936).
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the strength of colonial constructs can be still evidenced; the concomitant 
presence of articles on North and Sub-Saharan Africa has neither required 
nor involved any need to establish a connection between the two areas that 
are drawn together without a real dialogue as historical and cultural exchang-
es are not usually envisaged (Merolla 2013: 77, 81). 
 The tendency to work together but on parallel tracks can also be found 
in the publications that have begun to overcome the north/south ‘great di-
vision’ within academic institutions and research (Baumgardt & Bounfour 
2000, 2004; Lafkioui & Brugnatelli 2008; Lafkioui & Merolla 2008; De Féral 
et al. 2014). However, an approach that analyses the relationships between 
the north and the south of the Sahara in their local contexts and details not 
only has its own epistemological validity; it also discloses new research paths 
on the multiple realities of contemporary Africa (which, in my view, includes 
North Africa), such as in the case of the pioneering work of Paulme (1976). 
Such an evolving situation is shown, for example, by the comparison between 
Berber studies and (other) African studies in Merolla (2005, 2013), Kossmann 
(2010), Lafkioui (2013), and Souag (2013, 2015). 
Figure 13.3
Sahara, route from Ouargla to Ghardaia, Algeria (Photo Daniela Merolla)
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Perceptions and constructions of ‘Africans’ and ‘Berbers’
A final point is that the colonial divide of ‘two Africas’ does not imply that 
such a construct is a conjecture with no factual basis or utterly imposed from 
the outside. There is also correspondence—and a reuse for local purposes—
with internal perceptions and constructs, which has subsequently re-pro-
cessed colonial imagination. The French ‘orientalization’ of the Maghreb has 
built up from and integrated the historical domination by Turkish regencies 
along the coast of present-day Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia since the 16th centu-
ry. As to the ideas about ‘white’ and ‘black’ Africa in Muslim writings, Lydon 
(2015: 5-8) provides an impressive overview including the works of famous 
authors such as Ibn Khaldun and Leo Africanus (al-Hasan ibn Muhammad 
al-Wazzan al-Fasi). She convincingly writes that ‘the self-identification of 
North Africans and Middle Easterners as “white” clearly has a long history’ 
(Lydon 2015: 8). This history intertwines with the continuous demand for 
slaves from eastern Muslim regions, which created slaving practices in North 
Africa involving the Arab conquerors as well as the local Berber populations, 
the latter being massively enslaved until the 8th century when several Berber 
confederations became enslavers (Savage 1992). Pouessel (2012: 77) remarks 
that, in the Maghreb, subordination is marked as ‘black’ and (citing Valensi 
1986) that a person is perceived as black when he/she is subordinate; thus 
blackness is socially ascribed. 
 The correspondence of internal and external constructs similarly applies 
to the constitution of post-colonial North African states as Arab (and Mus-
lim), which has not only entailed the erasure of the Berber component but 
also, until recently, the oblivion of historical connections between Morocco, 
the Timbuktu area, and present-day Mali, as well as the enduring marginali-
zation of the Nubian influence from Egyptian civilization and culture. Con-
versely, contemporary Berber artists’ decisions to connect to Africa as an 
identity referent is associated with their quest for autonomy and their will 
to overcome the marginalization they have experienced in North African 
states.133 
In the Maghreb, the term ‘Africanity’ is akin to the valorization of an identity 
that is alternative to proposed or imposed cultural identities, [it is] a move-
ment of disconnection from Arabism and sometimes from Islam, by stress-
ing the belonging to ‘Africa’. (Pouessel 2012: 14) [my translation]
133 Cynthia Beker (2009: 72): ‘Amazigh painters […] use colonial memory but use it as the ba-
sis of a transnational movement that allows activists to confront the pan-Arab Islamic nation-
alism propagated by their governments and to create a counter-narrative that promotes their 
Amazigh identity and their connection to the African continent.’
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The discourse on ‘Black Africa’ must similarly take into account the various 
contestations and movements arising in Africa, in the diasporas, and in the 
United States, in particular, which have reused the metaphor of ‘Black Africa’ 
for their own strategies and purposes—as in the case of the Negritude artis-
tic movement (France/Senegal), the political movement named ‘Black Con-
sciousness’ (South Africa), and the ‘Black is beautiful’ cultural and artistic 
movement (United States). Such movements have played an enormous role 
in redeeming and celebrating ‘blackness’ in opposition to the connotations 
labelled upon it by racist and colonial approaches. It is, however, equally nec-
essary to acknowledge that these movements have likewise emphasized the 
unity of Africans by defining and ‘essentializing’ their identity in terms of 
colour.134 
 Differences in historical processes are reflected in the self-perception and 
identity of various African people; consequently, North Africa can be differ-
entiated and identified as a specific socio-cultural area in academic studies. 
However, a fundamental concern is inevitably raised when the differentia-
tion becomes radical and metaphysical and based on distinctions in colour 
and cultural terms that are carried to extremes, absolutized, and reputed to 
be innate—thus ahistorical—and when, at the same time, continuities and 
exchanges among the various African linguistic, artistic, and social compo-
nents are marginalized.135 
Conclusions
In the way that research on the ‘two Africas’ developed, we recognize so-
cio-historical processes that emphasized the unity of Africans by defining 
and ‘essentializing’ their identity in terms of colour. Building from recent 
critical works, we have seen that it is fruitful to investigate specific cases 
of the north/south division of African studies and to reflect on the specific 
conditions of such links and on the eventual new dialogues that have been 
recently established. Berber/Amazigh studies offer a valuable case for re-
flecting on the ‘divided’ construction of the field of research regarding the 
separation between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Berber 
134 Without going into the debate on Pan-Africanism, Afrocentrism, Black Nationalism, and 
the ‘Black Atlantic’ in texts of authors such as Keti Molefi Asante, Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
Manthia Diawara, and Paul Gilroy, the search for political unity and a common heritage result-
ed in building ‘an idea of Africa’ that critics define as fictitious, while its supporters define it as 
a form of ‘strategic essentialism’. See Ronald (1993).
135 See the critical concerns expressed at the conference ‘North Africa and the Pan-African 
Movement: Retrospect and Prospect’ (North Africa Region), 27-28 September 2003, Cairo, 
Egypt, organized by CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in 
Africa).
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studies have tended to look to the east and to deny the south, recent publi-
cations have started to include forms of comparison with African languages, 
literary themes, media, and social processes.
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Imagining Africa
An uphill struggle
Harrie Leyten
For almost two centuries, museums of ethnography have enjoyed a promi-
nent place in Europe’s cultural landscape. Throughout this period, they have 
had a reputation for presenting peoples living in remote parts of the world to 
the home crowds. The museums pride themselves on their displays of curi-
ous objects and religious practices, so different from what their visitors were 
used to. But how truthful were these displays? How objective, or—may we 
say—how biased were their images of Africa? Creating images of Africa was 
indeed their main goal, but a critical evaluation of their methods of display 
is warranted.
The nineteenth century 
In the 19th century, when the differentiation in academic disciplines took 
place, many universities in Europe established museums of ethnography for 
research purposes, but the anthropologists attached to these museums did 
not go to Africa for fieldwork (they have been nicknamed ‘armchair anthro-
pologists’). On the contrary, they collected the required materials (reports, 
stories, objects) from missionaries, merchants, and others who returned 
from Africa. The Ethnological Society of London (predecessor of the Anthro-
pological Society), established in the 1840s, issued a list of questions on tribal 
customs to travellers and officials so they could contribute to the systematic 
study of mankind (Lienhardt 1969: 5). The main objective of museums was 
not to present a factual image of Africa, but to find data, observations, and 
arguments which showed that the story of mankind was one of a linear evo-
lution, from primitive to advanced, from uncivilized to civilized. Societies in 
Africa (and elsewhere) were studied not to understand them better in their 
own right, but to find arguments to support the theories of evolution. Afri-
cans were seen as ‘contemporary ancestors’, low on the ladder of evolution, 
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while the anthropologists themselves had reached its top. This was called a 
theory of social progress. The philosopher G.W.T. Hegel discussed Africans 
in his lectures in 1830 in this manner:
The Negro represents natural man in all his wild and untamed nature. If you 
want to treat and understand him rightly, you must abstract all elements of 
respect and morality and sensitivity […] there is nothing remotely human-
ized in the Negro’s character […] Nothing confirms his judgement more than 
the report of the missionaries (Debrunner 1959: 301).
Curators of university museums of ethnography, almost always attached to 
these universities, collected objects which supported their scholarly inter-
est in evolution. The British Army General Pitt Rivers was intrigued by the 
study of linear evolution of forms in weapons with the same function, such 
as spears and bows and arrows. During his military sojourns overseas, he 
collected thousands of weapons to prove his point of view. At the opening 
of his exhibition in London in 1874, he spoke of the principle of ‘sequence’: 
‘the succession of ideas by which the minds of men in a primitive condition 
of culture have progressed from the simple to the complex’ (Chapman 1991: 
2) In 1883 he donated his collection to the university of Oxford, which made 
it into a museum, bearing his name.
 University museums in the 19th century with a focus on Africa appear 
to have been satisfied with the information about African cultures, religious 
rites, and objects that reached them through the accounts of travellers, mer-
chants, soldiers, and others with experience in Africa. They contributed little 
to a better understanding of African cultures and indigenous African reli-
gions, which were consistently viewed negatively. The images of Africa pre-
sented to Europeans in the 19th century spoke of fetishism, animism, idolatry, 
and lack of civilization (Leyten 2015: 82).
The colonial period
Between 1885 (the Conference of Berlin, where Africa was partitioned be-
tween European nations) and the 1920s, the ‘scramble for Africa’ was materi-
alized. Colonialism was imposed on Africa. 
 But colonial powers believed (or claimed) that they had a ‘mission civili-
satrice’. Even when they used force, they spoke of a process of pacification. In 
order to show to people at home the virtues of colonialism, they established 
museums, showing material culture of the ‘native population’ as well as the 
good work the government was doing in fields of schooling, health care, and 
the general well-being of the indigenous people, in the assumption that the 
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latter would continue to live in desperate circumstances without the Europe-
an interference. David Livingstone, missionary and discoverer, instructed his 
assistant on the Zambezi expedition in 1867 as follows:
We come among them as members of a superior race and servants of a Gov-
ernment that desires to elevate the more degraded portions of the human 
family. We are adherents of a benign holy religion and may by consistent 
conduct and wise patient efforts become the harbingers of peace to a hith-
erto distracted and trodden-down race (Jordan 1968: 25).
When the submission of African ‘tribes’ was not immediately successful, and 
the ‘tribes’ continued to resist the ‘rule of law’, the authorities appointed an-
thropologists to study the natives and report back to the authorities so that 
appropriate action could be undertaken. This move was welcomed by an-
thropologists, who—unlike their predecessors—were taking a genuine inter-
est in the ‘other’. Following initiatives by Malinowski, who had done fieldwork 
among the Tobriand Islanders, they were happy to accept requests from colo-
nial authorities, as the latter provided funds to support fieldwork.
 Evans-Pritchard—the British anthropologist who later established the In-
stitute of Social Anthropology at Oxford—became a government anthropol-
ogist among the Nuer of South Sudan in the 1930s. He worked among them 
for a year under difficult circumstances, as the Nuer, who were feared for 
their belligerent nature, distrusted him and opposed every form of interfer-
ence by foreigners. Yet, he came to the conclusion:
The Nuer are undoubtedly a primitive people by the usual standards of reck-
oning, but their religious thought is remarkably sensitive, refined and intelli-
gent. It is also highly complex (Evans-Pritchard 1956: 311).
Evans-Pritchard was among the first generation of anthropologists who de-
veloped an image of an African society which differed altogether from that 
of the 19th century and set a standard for future work. Many anthropolo-
gists were interested in the way African societies and communities organ-
ized themselves and how the different responsibilities within the community, 
such as the relationship between the sexes, the relationship between man and 
the spiritual world and the ancestors, the use of power and authority, were 
taken care of. This approach was called functionalism.
 Museums of ethnography acquired most of their collections by purchase 
or gifts from merchants, soldiers, missionaries, ethnographers, and others 
who returned home from a stay in Africa. This manner of obtaining collec-
tions was haphazard and depended on the personal taste of the collectors. It 
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resulted in incomplete museum collections without their original religious 
or social context or significance. For instance, when Europeans who had wit-
nessed a masquerade tried to purchase the masks, they were rarely interested 
in the costumes, made of leaves or raffia; they were considered unattractive, 
most likely infested with bugs, and expected to fall apart or rot away. It is 
only now that researchers come to the conclusion that the entire entity (facial 
cover as well as costume) constitutes the ‘mask’ and that in many cases the 
costume is considered by the community to be more important (van Beek & 
Leyten, in press).
 A major handicap for museums are objects which have been decontex-
tualized, which means they had been removed from their original shrines, 
palaces, family homes, and the events in which they featured. They have been 
taken out of their context and consequently have lost their meaning, which 
they derived precisely from this context. For instance, the context of an nkisi 
figure in a Yombe ritual context in Congo involves the setting, the nganga 
(priest of the shrine), songs, dances, behavioural restrictions, special enclo-
sures and prepared spaces, and the prescribed rituals. The efficacy of the nk-
isi (healing a sick person, solving a feud between factions or villages) works 
during ritual, and ritual, in turn, works only if all the conditions are fulfilled 
(MacGaffey 1993: 50). It is hard to believe that museums of ethnography are 
able to persuade their visitors that a solitary nkisi figure represents the origi-
nal context.
 Certain collections in European museums of ethnography have been ac-
quired through auctions after they had been looted during military opera-
tions. An example are the world-famous bronzes from the Kingdom of Benin 
in Nigeria, now in museums in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Leiden, and 
others. They were looted during a British Punitive Expedition in 1899. The 
royal palace had been burned, the Oba (king) of Benin sent into exile. No 
one took the trouble of enquiring about the hundreds of bronze plaques that 
adorned the palace walls: their meaning, their age, their context. In 1906, 
when the German discoverer Leo Frobenius visited the Nigerian city of Ile Ife 
(where, according to the Yoruba, God created the world), he saw the bronze 
heads and figures in the palace. He was most impressed by their beauty and 
the skills with which they had been made. However, he could not accept that 
these objects had been cast by Africans, but instead assumed that they had 
been produced by the descendants of ancient Greek artists:
I was moved to silent melancholy at the thought that this assembly of de-
generate and feebleminded posterity should be the legitimate guardians of 
so much loveliness.136
136 Wole Soyinka, quoting Frobenius in his Nobel Lecture, 8 December 1986.
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With the large numbers of objects arriving in museums of ethnography dur-
ing the first half of the 20th century, curators were unable to display all of 
them. The selection of objects to be displayed in the galleries was arbitrary. 
Moreover, the information which was available for many of the objects was 
scant. This resulted in equally scant, incomplete captions, such as ‘Ancestor 
figure, Baule, Ivory Coast’ ( Susan Vogel found evidence that the Baule never 
make effigies of ancestors), ‘Mother and child figure, Luba, Congo’ (describ-
ing what every visitor could see, but not indicating what the Luba said it 
meant).
 Many a museum of ethnography during this period contributed little to 
a better understanding of African cultures and failed to correct the negative 
images which still stuck to everything African.
The 19th century also saw the arrival in Africa of European missionaries of 
many different churches, eager to convert the ‘poor pagans’ to Christianity. 
Convinced of their superiority, not only as members of the white race (the 
influence of evolutionary thinking) but also as messengers of the good tidings 
of the Bible and of the mandate ‘to go and teach and baptize all nations’, they 
were determined to draw Africans away from their superstitious beliefs and 
practices into the Christian churches.
… any religion (a fortiori Christianity) that lays claim to the Truth and Univer-
sality is necessarily committed to expansion and propaganda. It is impossi-
ble for this religion to view other religions as anything else than a sad aberra-
tion. It must feel the urge and the duty to replace these religions. Christianity 
cannot view itself as one religion on a par with so many other religions, but 
as the only one intended by God (Groot Seminarie Hoeven 1924: 8).
A number of missionaries are known to have taken an interest in African 
culture and religions. Father Bittremieux among the Yombe (Congo), Fa-
ther Knops among the Senufo (Ivory Coast), and Father Brouwer among 
the Ewe (Ghana) are some of them (Leyten 2015). Yet, these missionaries 
remained loyal to their professional mandate. They appropriated rituals, reli-
gious practices, and objects which they encountered among Africans instead 
of accepting the fact that (for Africans) they had a deep spiritual meaning. 
Missionaries attributed an opposite meaning to them by portraying them as 
instruments of the devil.
 An example. The Ibo live in south-eastern Nigeria and were an acephalous 
society in pre-colonial times. When British armies conquered the area and 
learned that the Ibo had no kings, warrant kings were installed. This caused 
confusion among the Ibo. Missionaries discovered that the Ibo (in line with 
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them being acephalous) had no supreme God. When missionaries learned 
that the Ibo had a notion which they called chi and which (they believed) per-
meated the entire world (every human being has his/her chi; chi constitutes 
interdependence between human beings, ancestors, age-mates, and married 
people), the missionaries appropriated the Ibo concept of chi and equated it 
with the Christian concept God. The next step was to assume that the Ibo 
acknowledged the existence of a pantheon in which the many ‘small gods’ 
could find a niche. Another central notion in Ibo religion and culture is the 
concept of ike, which can be translated by ‘power’, or ‘something that gives a 
person the power to achieve something in life, such as success, money, or a 
career’. When an Ibo achieves something in life, he attributes it to his chi. He 
will objectify his achievement in a statue, named ikenga, in which the figure 
of a male adult can be seen, seated as a token of his authority and carrying the 
emblems of his power (in former days, a cutlass or machete in the right hand 
and the severed head of an opponent in the left). After this ikenga had been 
ritually placed in the owner’s shrine, it was believed that the figure would 
empower the man again and again. Missionaries were quick to call this figure 
a ‘god of war and fortune’, the name which has been commonly used in much 
of the Ibo literature since the beginning of the 20th century (Leyten 2015: 
172-176). Rev. G.T. Basden was a British missionary of the Church of England 
who worked among the Ibo for some 35 years. In the preface of his first book 
(Basden 1921: 14), he wrote:
The black man himself does not know his own mind. He does the most ex-
traordinary things and cannot explain why he does them. He is not con-
trolled by logic; he is the victim of circumstance, and his policy is largely one 
of drift.
An Anglican missionary, Basden grew up in Victorian England and could not 
envisage a people without central authority, not only in politics but also in 
religious matters. He could not envisage a people without a Creator-God. He 
could therefore write uncritically:
There is a distinct recognition [among the Ibo] of a Supreme Being—benefi-
cent in character—who is above every other spirit, good or evil.
Basden—and with him most other anthropologists who studied Ibo culture—
misunderstood the notion of chi and the concept of Chuku (i.e. Chi uku, lit. 
the great Chi), which the Ibo themselves used to describe that all-pervading 
power in the universe, and translated it as ‘Supreme God’ and ‘Creator-God’.
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It is implicit in the logical structure of these terms that chi-ukwu, or chuku, 
is a sub-category of chi rather than the more general class within which chi 
may be categorized (Henderson 1972: 107-108).
In order to gather financial and non-material support for their mission work 
(building churches and schools, training and upkeep of hundreds and hun-
dreds of missionaries) missionary congregations in some European countries 
organized missionary weeks in Catholic towns and villages, with sermons by 
missionaries in church services, visits to schools to recruit boys to become 
missionaries, and missionary exhibitions in church halls, where experienced 
missionaries told about their work, surrounded by objects from daily life, and 
statues and masks from ‘pagan’ religions (see Figure 14.1).
Figure 14.1
Father Leo Brouwer SMA addressing visitors to a missionary exhibition around 1950. 
He holds an Ibo ikenga figure. The photograph on the left is by Father Knops and 
shows a Senufo ‘feticheur’.
Missionary exhibitions were in many respects like exhibitions in other muse-
ums of ethnography. Generally speaking, the same categories of objects were 
on display. They differed, however, in their motives for collecting objects and 
particularly in their presentation. They had, generally speaking, no universi-
ty-trained curators but appointed one or more missionaries who had shown 
a special interest in African religious practices and had a lively manner of 
story-telling. Their motives for collecting and displaying were twofold: first, 
the objects served to show the (mostly Catholic) visitors how ‘pagan’, ‘su-
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perstitious’, and ‘idolatrous’ the people were among whom the missionaries 
were working. Secondly, the exhibitions served to illuminate the good work 
of these missionaries, collect money to support them, and call on young boys 
to join the missionary congregations. In modern terminology, these activities 
would be called crowd-funding. 
 These missionary exhibitions (which were organized well into the 1960s) 
confirmed rather than criticized the negative images with which Africa had 
been associated for so long. The efforts to Christianize Africa have been suc-
cessful in the sense that a majority of Africans call themselves Christian, and 
that ritual practices and religious beliefs of the past have all but disappeared.
The post-colonial period 
The post-colonial period started around 1950 when the first African nations 
gained political independence.
 Anthropologists searched for a new view of their study of African cul-
tures. Instead of focusing on the functioning of societies, they shifted their 
attention to ‘meaning’. Studying culture as an open, active, and dynamic enti-
ty meant that symbols and symbolism within a given society were viewed in 
a dialectic perspective. The new anthropology carried several names: inter-
pretative, semantic, semiotic, hermeneutic, and other names.
 Mary Douglas searched for the sense in the apparently irrational beliefs of 
people. She considered dirt as a symbol, as it involves reflection on the rela-
tion between order and disorder, form and formlessness, life and death. Dirt, 
then, becomes a master symbol or root metaphor (Douglas 1966).
 Evans-Pritchard heard the Nuer of Sudan, among whom he conducted his 
fieldwork, speak repeatedly about Kwoth. He sensed that this word would be 
the key to understanding their religion and their philosophy. He translated the 
word by Spirit (with a capital letter), distinguishing it from the Christian no-
tion of God. The Nuer could not describe the meaning of Kwoth, other than 
by contrasting it with, among other things, the creation, the world. The con-
cept Kwoth is interpreted by the Nuer in many ways and makes Nuer religion 
both monotheistic and polytheistic. To the Nuer, these interpretations are not 
incompatible. ‘They are rather different ways of thinking of the numinous at 
different levels of experience’ (Evans-Pritchard 1956: 316). When a group of 
persons are able to make and use symbols—in this sense of the word—it im-
plies that they are able to attach a meaning to something where that meaning 
did not exist before. Victor Turner showed that symbols mean something, but 
they also are something: they are real. The Ndembu of Congo, where Turner 
conducted fieldwork, speak of their symbols as ku-solala, a word that does not 
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mean ‘representing’, but ‘revealing’ something or ‘making visible’ a truth or a 
power (Turner 1967: 18).
 Unlike anthropologists in the 19th and early years of the 20th century, these 
researchers have contributed greatly to a better understanding of African 
cultures and religions, not least by distinguishing the ‘emic’ account (the in-
siders’ view, the native point of view) and the ‘etic’ account (the outsider’s 
view; in this case, the anthropologist’s view). According to this approach, cul-
tural expressions of a people can be understood but never fully; when they 
are communicated transculturally, this can be done but always with a loss of 
meaning (van Beek & Blakely 1994: 3).
 However, these innovative views on African cultures and religions have 
scarcely reached the European masses. They have appeared in scholarly 
books and articles but have been unable to undo existing prejudices among 
Europeans.
 How have museums of ethnography reacted to the fundamental changes 
which took place in Africa in the post-colonial period? Have they joined the 
anthropological attempts to develop new methods of presenting Africa? Have 
their collections played an innovative role in countering existing biases? Let 
us take a look at the recent developments in the Dutch museums of ethnog-
raphy. In the 1950s there were 11 of them: some with colonial connections 
(Delft, Rotterdam, Tropenmuseum), others with missionary roots (Berg en 
Dal, Cadier en Keer, Tilburg, Steyl-Tegelen), again others linked to universi-
ties (Leiden, Breda, Nijmegen, Groningen). Missionary congregations went 
into severe decline in the 1960s: seminaries closed; missionary exhibitions 
were discontinued; the number of missionaries dwindled dramatically. The 
museums at Tilburg and Cadier en Keer shut down. Universities were unable 
to maintain their museums and closed them down. Museums with colonial 
roots did not fare better: they had lost their relevance and became redundant; 
they had become remnants of the past. There was resentment about the use 
of words such as ‘primitive’ and ‘tribal’. In the 1970s the Rotterdam museum 
hoped to reverse the tide by liaising with political action groups in the city. 
The project was not successful. Later, under new management, it decided to 
go commercial and was about to sell its world-famous Africa collection. The 
Tropenmuseum tried to re-invent itself and closed itself to the public for five 
years, after which period it presented itself with an entirely new approach. 
Its focus was no longer on collections but on the human being in the process 
of change and development in Africa (and other southern continents). The 
refurbished Africa gallery paid attention to education, health care, economic 
development (a replica of a Nigerian market), history, agriculture, and fish-
ing. It was modelled on the ideals of development cooperation (Faber 2011). 
As the Africa curator, I was determined to fight stereotypes and present a 
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more positive image of Africa. In 1989 I curated the exhibition ‘White on 
Black’, a critical analysis of existing stereotypes of whites on blacks. The post-
er showed two men (one white, the other black) gazing at each other, while 
being faced with their caricatures (Figure 14.2).
Figure 14.2
Tropenmuseum ‘White on Black’ exhibition poster
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The Tropenmuseum changed its course again in the 1990s, as the economic 
model was no longer desirable. In the new millennium, three leading muse-
ums have fused (the Rotterdam museum will probably join).
 Dutch museums of ethnography have not been able to re-invent them-
selves effectively. They have been unable to find an answer to the changes 
which took place in Africa at all levels. During this period, the museums have 
realized that a large number of the African objects in their collections be-
longed to a culture which does not exist any longer; or, if it does, it exists in 
a different form. By presenting these objects as representing Africa as it is, 
the museum gives again an incorrect and, to a certain extent, a biased (call it 
‘sentimental’) image of Africa.
 Is there a future for the museums of Africa? One answer has been given by 
the director of the Pitt Rivers Museum in Oxford: ‘Let us begin with a prov-
ocation: the ethnographic museum is dead’ (Harris & O’Hanlon 2013).
 With the impact of ethnographic museums on Dutch public opinion 
dwindling, the challenge for the African Studies Centre Leiden to promote 
the cause of Africa is becoming stronger and stronger. Professor Ton Dietz, 
departing director of the ASC, a renowned scholar of African affairs, has—
through his inspiring personality and leadership—also done much to create a 
more positive image of Africa in this country, which has been an uphill strug-
gle so far. 
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From roads for form to roads for war 
Toward a history of roads in colonial Zambia, 
1890-1920
Jan-Bart Gewald
It was more by chance than through design that the territories that would 
make up the colony of Northern Rhodesia, present-day Zambia, came to be 
established by an Order-in-Council in 1891.137 However, in keeping with in-
ternational law that determined that colonial powers had to ‘develop’ the ter-
ritories under their formal control, once established, the colony had to be 
filled with a modicum of institutional infrastructure.138 To this end a concert-
ed programme of road-building was initiated in a territory in which wheeled 
vehicles, let alone motor vehicles, did not exist. Indeed, it would take another 
ten years before the first motor vehicle passed through the territory, and an-
other 20 years before motor vehicles became fairly common.
 In Northern Rhodesia roads came to be built not so much as things that 
facilitated communication, but as instruments of subjection and control. 
Thus in Northern Rhodesia the first roads suitable for wheeled traffic were 
built as a function of enforced taxation. Furthermore, the subsequent roads 
that led (a) from the railhead at Broken Hill to the German East African bor-
der, and (b) from the railhead at Fungurume to the headwaters of the Congo 
River were built as instruments of war in what was known as the Great War 
between 1914 and 1918 and were abandoned immediately upon the cessation 
of hostilities.
137 Andrew Roberts put it very eloquently when he wrote that Northern Rhodesia was: … 
simply an awkwardly shaped piece of debris resulting from Rhodes’s failure to obtain Katanga. 
The [British South Africa] Company now found itself committed to ruling what amounted to 
not one but two huge and sprawling territories: one in the west, with communications running 
south, and the other in the east, with communications running further east, to Nyasaland. An-
drew Roberts, A History of Zambia, New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976, p. 175.
138 The so-called principle of ‘Effective Occupancy’, as determined at the Berlin Conference 
in 1884.
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Figure 15.1
Map of Zambia
Fifty years after the outbreak of World War I, Northern Rhodesia ceased to 
be a British colony and became the independent Republic of Zambia. From 
its very inception, Zambia featured prominently in the foreign affairs of the 
Netherlands, and thousands of Dutch farmers, horticulturalists, extension 
workers, medical doctors, development workers, experts, and academics 
visited and worked in the country.139 Just over ten years after Zambia’s in-
dependence, three young students from what was at that stage a university 
139 A.L. Hoek, From idealism to realism: A social history of the Dutch in Zambia 1965-2013, 
Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014.
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in the midst of a ‘Cultural Revolution’ were among the many who visited 
Zambia from the Netherlands.140 Two of these students, Ton Dietz and An-
nemieke van Haastrecht, were a couple, who married in the year after their 
return from Zambia and went on to publish on their experiences in Zam-
bia.141 Informed by dependencia theory and anxious to conduct their work 
‘in a (somewhat) radical setting’, Ton and his colleagues hoped to investigate 
the impact of large capitalist investments in a rural environment.142 To this 
end the intrepid academics travelled to two large-scale industrial projects 
in the Kafue-Mazabuka area in Zambia, the Kafue Estate and Nakambala 
Sugar Estate. Between March and August 1975, while the Zambian economy 
continued its decline, the three conducted their research, and after a jointly 
written thesis the young academics graduated in February 1976. Although 
Ton would not return to Zambia as an academic, it was the site of his first real 
fieldwork, and his interest in the country persisted throughout his academic 
career, as can be seen in the MA and PhD theses dealing with Zambia which 
he supervised.143
Taxation and the building of roads
The introduction of taxation in some parts of the colony in 1901, and the 
labour collected in lieu of cash tax payments, enabled administrators of the 
British South Africa Company (BSAC) to build the first roads in the territory. 
In the years prior to World War I, BSAC administrators consistently sought 
to transform Zambia into something that was in keeping with an imagined 
ideal type. Native and District Commissioners, rather ineffectively, sought to 
enforce their worldview on all aspects of everyday life in Northern Rhode-
sia.144 Under their command they attempted to centralize and amalgamate 
villages, appoint and dismiss chiefs and headmen, enact and enforce the col-
140 ‘Ton-Dietz ... who studied at Nijmegen during the years of its cultural revolution (1969-
1976)’, www.connecting-africa.net/query_1.php?rid=PR1238887 [Accessed 17 February 2017].
141 Scheffer, H.R. (Rudolf ), A.J. (Ton) Dietz & J.M.(Annemieke) van Haastrecht (1977). Local 
effects of two large-scale industrial projects in the Kafue-Mazabuka area in Zambia: The Kafue 
Estate and Nakambala Sugar Estate. Nijmeegse Geografische Cahiers 8. Nijmegen: GPI, KUN, 
164 pp. & Dietz, Ton, Annemieke van Haastrecht & Rudolf Scheffer (2008). ‘Revisiting periph-
eral capitalism in Zambia’. In: P. Hebinck, S. Slootweg & L. Smith (eds), Tales of development. 
People, power and space, pp. 61-78. Assen: Van Gorcum.
142 Dietz, van Haastrecht & Scheffer, Revisiting peripheral capitalism in Zambia, p. 61.
143 S. Hardus China in Africa: Consequences for traditional donor aid. A case study of the 
possible influence of Chinese economic aid on traditional donor conditionality in Zambia, MA 
Thesis, University of Amsterdam 2009 & M. Leenstra, Beyond the façade: Instrumentalisation 
of the Zambian health sector, PhD Thesis, Leiden University 2012.
144 The failure to effect an effective ban of slash-and-burn agriculture (chitemene) prior to 
WWI is a clear case in point.
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lection of taxes, prohibit forms of agriculture and hunting, order and regu-
late the building of roads and paths, and generally convert the economies, 
societies, landscapes, and ecological environment of Northern Rhodesia into 
something that was in keeping with their modernizing view of the world. 
Central to this modernizing endeavour was a system of taxation, which came 
to be applied throughout the territory.145
 Although taxation was introduced in some districts of Northern Rhode-
sia in 1901, the bulk of the population had no cash with which to pay the tax-
es levied by the BSAC administration.146 In lieu of cash, people were permit-
ted to pay with their labour power, which the administration put to use in an 
extensive programme of road-building. The young administrator, Frank Mel-
land, who arrived in the country from Nyasaland via Mozambique in 1901, 
described the roads being built by ‘tax defaulters’, as well as the heavy-handed 
manner in which those unable to pay their taxes were dealt with:
Prisoners having finished cattle Kraal and other works, started on roads 
round the Boma [administrative centre]. In the evening we developed a 
most successful role [sic] of Cookson’s photos …, also a snap of 200 taxmen; 
prisoners being chikoti’d [whipped].147
Describing the roads being built by ‘taxmen’ under the supervision of his fel-
low administrator, De Jong, Melland noted that ‘his 300 men’s work is excel-
lent. I really think the best road I’ve seen since Lorenzo Marques.’148 Melland 
was initially stationed in Mpika, and the Boma’s District Notebook contains 
detailed descriptions and photographs of the roads built in lieu of tax.149 The 
District Notebook (see Figures 15.2 and 15.3) describes the road being built 
toward the far-off town of Kasama:
Towards Kasama 23 miles a 6 ft road raised, passes through a good deal of 
Dambo. 1903 Carried on to the Chambezi but was not raised beyond the sec-
tion completed in 1902. Except actually in the dambos. A great many bridges 
145 For a discussion of similar processes elsewhere, see J. Scott, Seeing like a state, New Haven, 
1998.
146 Many observers and historians have argued that the BSAC administration introduced taxa-
tion precisely because it wanted to ensure the availability of wage labour. F. Macpherson, Anatomy 
of a conquest: The British occupation of Zambia, 1884-1924, Harlow, 1981, pp. 105-147.
147 Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS. Afr. R. 192 (1) Frank H. Melland 1901, Diary from the day of 
sailing for northern Rhodesia May 15th 1901.
148 Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS. Afr. R. 192 (1) Frank H. Melland 1901, Diary from the day of 
sailing for northern Rhodesia May 15th 1901.
149 National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, 1901. 
Folio 35.
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necessary all along the route to the Chambezi. A single span wooden bridge 
was put over the Manshia. 1904 Road all re-hoed and bridges repaired: Man-
shia Bridge swept away start rebuilt [sic] Road continued to Lukalashi. 1905 
Roads re-hoed and repaired. 1906 Roads re-hoed and repaired.150
Figure 15.2
Road to Kasama from Mpika 1902151 
150 KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, 1901. Folio 35.
151  NAZ, KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, 1901. Folio 35.
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Figure 15.3
District Notebook Mpika detailing road-building152
Events in Mpika, where tax labour was used for the building of roads, were 
mirrored in other districts where taxation had been imposed.153
The actual quality of the roads established and drawn onto the map of North-
ern Rhodesia were put to the test in 1908, when the German explorer, Paul 
Graetz, ventured on an expedition that took him right across Northern Rho-
152 NAZ, KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, 1901. Folio 35.
153 NAZ, District Notebook Isoka, Vol. 2, p. 263.
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desia. In April of 1908, Frank Melland noted in the Mpika Station’s District 
Notebook that the ‘automobile expedition Graetz’ had passed by the settle-
ment.154 Paul Graetz, otherwise known as ‘Bwana Tucka Tucka’, introduced 
the motor-car to colonial Zambia in 1908, when he became the first person 
to drive across the African continent in 1907-1909.155 Graetz’s continuing 
popularity is such that re-runs of his trip with replicas of his vehicle are or-
ganized by tour operators, and whole websites are devoted to Graetz and his 
exploits.156 Although a reading of his travelogue indicates that Graetz had 
his fair share of ‘traveller experiences’, what is omitted from these texts is the 
simple fact that the expedition would not have been possible without African 
labour. Graetz’s trip from Dar es Salaam in German East Africa through to 
Swakopmund in German South West Africa was possible only through the 
extensive use of African labour for road- and bridge-building, as well as the 
portage of petrol by labourers recruited to prepare the way and establish fuel 
dumps along Graetz’s intended line of travel.157 
 Roads, insofar as they existed in Northern Rhodesia prior to World War 
I, were at best a haphazard affair. Perfectly graded and stamped down in the 
immediate vicinity of the administrative Bomas, practically none existed be-
yond the immediate reach of the incipient administration. At 12 days’ walk 
away from the nearest line of rail, the young official Theodore Williams de-
scribed the road that led from Kansanshi to the line of rail as
... just a broad path through the trees, with the enormous ruts a traction en-
gine makes—no macadamized roads in this country. We had a bike with us, 
& I’d have used it a good deal in places—but generally let Matthew push it.158
Prior to World War I, the BSAC administration simply did not have the 
means, let alone the capacity, to develop roads in the territory under its con-
trol. The events of World War I as it unfolded in Central Africa put an end 
to that.
154 NAZ, KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, 1901. Mpika Station, South Awemba Di-
vision, N.E. Rhodesia, District Note Book, Folio 4.
155 Paul Graetz, Im Auto Quer Durch Afrika, Berlin, 1910.
156 www.bwana.de/spezialreisen/expeditionen/paul-graetz-tour.html [Accessed 17 February 
2017]. Following his trip across the African continent, Graetz went on to make a name for him-
self in airships operating in the Dutch East Indies.
157 NAZ, KSD 4/1 Vol. 1, Mpika District Note Book, 1901. Entry for April 1908.
158 Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781. Williams (Theodore R.) Administrative Of-
ficer, Northern Rhodesia: Diaries, 1912-21. 3 vols.; letters home, 1912-24. 3 Volumes. Letters 
Volume 1: 1912-1914 Letter addressed to Mrs. F.R. Williams, Charlton, Constant Spring P.O. 
Jamaica, via England, Kansanshi, Friday Jan 17 1913, My dear Father.
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World War I: The necessity of roads
The difficulties were that between the nearest point on the Railway and the 
northern border, where the Rhodesian Column was concentrated for its ad-
vance into German East Africa there were 600 miles of country covered with 
tsetse fly, in which no domestic animals could live and therefore no sus-
tained ox, horse, mule or donkey transport was possible. Because of this no 
roads had been made suitable for wheeled traffic and motor traffic was not 
possible until such roads had been made. We were therefore at first limited 
to native carrier transport.159 
The issues of transport and communication in war, and thus the building of 
roads, became particularly relevant in the context of World War I in North-
ern Rhodesia. The frontline on the border between the belligerents, North-
ern Rhodesia and German East Africa, provided enormous logistical diffi-
culties for British forces. No less than 1,000 km from the nearest railhead 
at Broken Hill, the frontline could only be reached on foot through tsetse 
fly-infested country, as draft animals could not be used without killing them 
through infection with trypanosiamiasis. In addition, no roads suitable for 
wheeled transport had been built. This meant that in the first instance British 
forces were totally reliant on carriers for their transport needs. 
 From late 1915 onwards, British forces were commanded by Major-Gen-
eral Sir Edward Northey, whose first and most pressing problems of com-
mand related to transport.160 Northey was informed that ‘in this country, ex-
cept on a few bits of road south of the Frontier, all transport had to be done by 
Carriers, who consume as much as they carry in one month’.161 Administrator 
Wallace, who had sought to ensure the effective supply of goods and materi-
als to the front by carriers, worked out the capacity per distance of carriers:
The average rate of travel for carriers … is about 15 miles per day. The net 
load carried is 60  lbs to which has to be added cooking pots blanket etc. 
Their rations are 2½ lbs of meal per day. A carrier would therefore eat the full 
159 National Archives, Kew, NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of 
activities on and around the Northern Rhodesia Border. A certain Edwards writing to Major 
Stack 15/11/34, ‘This is a manuscript copy of the substance of a lecture given by the writer Sir 
Laurence Wallace KCMG who was administrator during the Great War of Northern Rhodesia.’
160 For further information on Northey, see G.W. Hatchell, O.B.E., ‘The British occupation of 
the south-western area of Tanganyika territory, 1914-1918’, in Tanganyika Notes and Records, 
1958, Number 51, pp. 131-155.
161 NA, WO 95/5329, East Africa Brig Gen E. Northey’s War Diary 4 Dec 1915 – 8 Apr 1916, 
7 January 1916.
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weight of his load in 24 days, that is on a 12 days journey outward (180 miles) 
and 12 days return.162
Clearly the transporting of goods to the front 600 miles away could not be 
effectively done by carriers. Indeed, Wallace calculated that should he wish 
to ensure the supply of 1 ton per day at the front 600 miles from the railhead, 
he would need no less than 71,000 carriers.163 At the time, there was a tax-
able population of approximately 120,000 in Northern Rhodesia, of whom 
approximately 80,000 could be recruited. However, ‘it was found that if more 
than one third of these away at a time cultivation suffered, with a consequent 
loss of the food we so much wanted’.164 
 Anxious to find a solution to these pressing problems, the colonial ad-
ministrators sought to put their faith in technological innovations. However, 
in the short term, the technology that appeared to hold so much promise 
could function only with the application of substantial amounts of African 
labour and was, economically speaking, far more expensive and inefficient 
than the labour power that it had sought to replace. In the end, petrol-driven 
motor-cars and steam-driven traction engines, although they may have stood 
at the forefront of technology, failed in the context of Northern Rhodesia in 
1914-1918.
 Anxious to be able to continue to wage the war, British authorities sought 
out other forms of transport that in the first instance did not appear to de-
pend on extensive amounts of human labour. Thus, when General North-
ey assumed command of British forces operating out of Northern Rhodesia 
in late 1915, he sought to engineer a shift in supply from carriers to motor 
transport where possible: 
I am now arranging for carriers to enable mobile forces to get forward and 
for the making of roads for motor traffic for forward and lateral communi-
cation.165
Motor vehicles appeared to offer the solution to Northey’s wishes. Instead of 
a string of porters each carrying a maximum of 60 lbs on their shoulders for 
an absolute maximum of 15 miles a day, the Model T easily transported ten-
162 NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around 
the Northern Rhodesia Border. Folio 2.
163 NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around 
the Northern Rhodesia Border. Folio 3.
164 NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around 
the Northern Rhodesia Border. Folio 4.
165 NA, WO 95/5329, East Africa Brig Gen E. Northey’s War Diary 4 Dec 1915 – 8 Apr 1916.
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fold the amount of a porter and for far more than 15 miles a day.166 Yet for this 
to succeed, roads would be necessary and would have to be built.
In the course of 1916 a road was cut and bridges built from the railhead at 
Broken Hill to two points on the border. Up to 17 motor-cars were obtained 
via South Africa and converted into lorries able to carry 700 lbs plus a driver 
and his kit.167 
The road was an earth track, generally fairly good except for 80 miles of sand. 
Corrugation of this part was found to be useless as it shook the motors to 
pieces and in the end wheel tracks in the sand were filled with soft stone and 
the cars ran on two slightly sunken ribbons of Macadam thus formed and it 
is extraordinary how well they kept them.168
Once British forces had begun their full-scale invasion of German East Africa 
and had begun utilizing food supplies available in GEA, the motor transport 
route in Northern Rhodesia was suspended. Administrator Wallace reported:
The motor traffic on the road has been suspended, the most useful cars hav-
ing been sent to General Northey in GEA; the rest (principally wrecks) are 
stored and being repaired at Kashitu.
…
As there is not much probability of the motor road being used again I have 
not felt justified in keeping a great number of men on its maintenance …169
Essentially, in terms of cost efficiency, the introduction of the motor vehicle 
in Northern Rhodesia was far from a success, and there was initially nothing 
to indicate the later dominance of the motor-car and motor-lorry in the ter-
ritory’s transport sector. As long as thousands of carriers could be dragooned 
into carrying goods at economic costs that lay substantially below those of 
166 Stephen Rockel wrote to me in 1988 with the following: ‘I like the story told with astonish-
ment by a colonial official in Tanganyika about porters and a lorry in the Kilimanjaro region. 
Some time in the late 1920s he recruited unwilling Chagga porters to go on tour with him, only 
to find that they all chipped in to hire a lorry to transport his loads. This made more econom-
ic sense to them—they could make more money if they stayed behind rather than wandering 
around the countryside for a pittance.’
167 NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around 
the Northern Rhodesia Border. Folio 1.
168 NA, CAB 45/14, East Africa Campaign Great War: Accounts of activities on and around 
the Northern Rhodesia Border. A certain Edwards writing to Major Stack 15/11/34, ‘This is a 
manuscript copy of the substance of a lecture given by the writer Sir Laurence Wallace KCMG 
who was administrator during the Great War of Northern Rhodesia.’
169 NAZ, BS3, A2/3/4, L.A. Wallace, Administrator, 12/2/17, to Secretary BSAC, London.
Dietz Essays.indd   256 11/09/2017   09:18
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 257
257
motorized transport, the administration would continue to rely on human 
transport. The motor-car may have been at the very forefront of cutting-edge 
technology; but in terms of financial considerations, cars were simply too ex-
pensive to justify their continued use.
Steaming through the jungle 
At the beginning of World War I, Imperial Germany dominated Lake Tanga-
nyika with a series of steam launches and a large warship, the Graf Götzen. 
Anxious to terminate German control of the lake, innovative plans were 
drawn up by the British to transport two petrol-driven gunboats overland 
from Cape Town to the headwaters of the Congo River and on to Lake Tan-
ganyika 4,000 km to the north. These boats, part of the ‘Tanganyika Naval Ex-
pedition’ led by Commander Spicer-Simson, destroyed German naval pres-
ence on Lake Tanganyika and provided the British with a welcome victory in 
the face of stalemated carnage on the Western Front and humiliating defeat 
at Gallipoli. The Tanganyika Naval Expedition had all the makings of a Boy’s 
Own Adventure,170 and the expedition formed the basis for countless roman-
ticized novels and films, the most famous being C.S. Forester’s The African 
Queen, which was later transformed into an award-winning film starring 
Humphrey Bogart and Katherine Hepburn.171 
 By and large, contemporary portrayals of the Tanganyika Naval Expedi-
tion are based on The Phantom Flotilla by Peter Shankland, which served 
as the prime source for the subsequent portrayal of Spicer-Simson and the 
expedition, of which Giles Foden’s rendition in Mimi and Totou Go Forth is 
the most extreme and exotic. These stand in surprising contrast to more con-
temporary documents such as the National Geographic and Northern Rho-
desia Journal, which contain reminiscences of contemporary participants 
in the expedition, and all the more so in contrast to the extremely efficient 
lieutenant-commander presented in the pages of C.S. Forester’s The African 
Queen.172 Although these portrayals make ample mention of the heroic ex-
ploits of men and machines, very little attention has been paid to the actual 
170 Jeffrey Richards, ‘Boy’s Own Empire: Feature Films and Imperialism in the 1930s’. In: John 
M. Mackenzie (ed.), Imperialism and popular culture (Manchester, 1986).
171 The making of the film The African Queen (1951) starring Katharine Hepburn and Hum-
phrey Bogart in late colonial Belgian Congo in turn formed the basis for another film, White 
Hunter Black Heart (1990), starring Clint Eastwood.
172 C.S. Forester, The African Queen, London 1935. H.M.S Matilda and H.M.S Amelia, ‘…
those motor-boats had cost in blood and sweat and treasure more than destroyers might have 
done, for they had been sent out from England, and had been brought with incredible effort 
overland through jungle, by rail and by river, to the harbour in which they lay [Port Albert, Bel-
gian Congo]’. p. 177, 1986 Penguin edition.
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road that needed to be built through the jungle, swamps, mountains, and 
hills of the Manyika Plateau in southern Congo.
 To ensure the safe transport of the motor-launches to the Lualaba River 
and within striking distance of Lake Tanganyika, a road had to be built from 
the railhead in Fungurume to the Lualaba River at Sankisia. In early July 1915 
the expedition, under the command of Commander Spicer-Simson, arrived 
in Cape Town. Less than two weeks later the expedition arrived in Elizabeth-
ville in the Belgian Congo and detrained at Fungurume, the end of the line of 
rail from Cape Town to the Katangese Copperbelt. Prior to the arrival of the 
expedition in Congo, men had been sent on ahead to reconnoitre a route for 
the expedition from Fungurume to Bukama. Apart from falling out with one 
another, these men brought back conflicting reports as to the feasibility of the 
undertaking. Lieutenant Hope, one of the men sent on ahead to reconnoitre 
and develop the road, had contracted Italian labour contractors to build a 
road capable of carrying the expedition’s steam-traction engines, trailers, and 
boats. He returned reports to Spicer-Simson, the commander of the expedi-
tion, that did not bode well:
Monsieur Frashoti [Italian road-contractor] … affirms that he would never 
try to bring a Traction engine over this route. He has been thirty years in 
this Katanga and cut the original carriers road we are following. His advice is 
to depend on boys [sic] and oxen over the worst part, using tractions when 
possible.173 
Spicer-Simson dismissed the claims of the Italians, writing in his report to 
the Admiralty that Mr. Barducci ‘is believed to be a German agent’.174 Shortly 
after, Spicer-Simson also dismissed Hope, arguing that Hope was particularly 
fond of whisky and that he had not done what he should have done to ensure 
that the road was passable. Thus Spicer-Simson wrote:
I have the honour to report that Lieutenant Douglas Hope is to all intents 
and purposes defying my authority. On 9 August I sent this officer with Lieu-
tenant Tyrer to take charge of the road-building on the North side of the 
Manika Plateau. He passed along the road and reported many difficulties 
but did not remain on the road nor did he take charge of the road-building 
173 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Hope, Sankisia 
19th August 1915, to Commander Simson.
174 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, M’wenda Makoshi, 30th August 1915, report of proceedings No. 3.
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beyond writing a letter to one or two of the Contractors giving them certain 
obvious instructions.175
All in all, the road that was to have been built to transport the expedition to 
the headwaters of the Congo had not been built.
 In addition to the fact that the envisaged road had to all intents and pur-
poses not been built, once the two steam-traction engines detrained at Fun-
gurume, they proved to be incapable of drawing both stores and boats at the 
same time. In addition, the cradles originally designed for the boats began to 
break up. Thus the decision was taken to transfer the boats onto the goods 
trailers and to allow for the goods to be transported by porters.176 As Frank 
Magee, who accompanied Lee and Spicer-Simson, noted in his later report 
on the expedition: 
In the meantime stores were being sent ahead by native carriers, each boy 
[sic] carrying on his head a load weighing about 60 pounds. Provisions, am-
munition, and petrol for the motor-boats were all transported in this fash-
ion, our string of native carriers extending in a single file for miles.177
In the absence of a properly constructed road, the expedition had to be lit-
erally manhandled overland from Fungurume to Sankisia. Through relying 
on thousands of African porters and labourers, the expedition eventually 
reached the headwaters of the Congo. As Commander Spicer-Simson noted 
bitterly in one of his monthly reports to the Admiralty in London:
As to the road itself, Mr. Lee, who suggested this road to their lordships in 
May last, informed them that the road was already in existence, and that it 
would only require to be widened, have some of the sharp curves eased, and 
that some of the bridges would have to be strengthened.
 The statement is misleading for the road, as it existed before my arriv-
al, was nothing more than a cleared track not more than 6 feet wide. This 
track had been built some few years before, and as in all tropical countries 
is bound to occur it was rapidly becoming thick bush except for the narrow 
footpath used by the natives. I am informed that it is at least two years since 
any wheeled traffic passed over it.
175 NA, DO 119/919, War Tangnyika Motor Boat Expedition, Conduct of Lt. Hope RNVR.
176 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, M’wenda Makoshi, 30th August 1915, report of proceedings No. 3.
177 Frank J. Magee, ‘Transporting a Navy through the Jungles of Africa in War Time’, in The 
National Geographic Magazine, October 1922, 335.
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Further, the road was built with a view to economy, and therefore when a 
large tree was met with, or an ant heap, it was left standing and the road tak-
en around it. The bridges which existed were only foot bridges, the ox-wag-
ons being able to go up or down a gradient of 1 in 1 and being able to ford a 
stream. Not one of the bridges could be utilised and nearly two hundred had 
to be built, some of course being only a few feet long, but others reaching as 
much as 100 feet. There were also many short sharp dips in the road of such 
formation that the boats, with their great length, would have rested across 
the two rises, thus bridging the dip. These dips had therefore to be filled up 
or a way found round them. In spite of the greatest care the sterns of the 
cradles have on one or two occasions touched the ground, and it has been 
necessary to dig a hollow to allow them to pass.178
In the event, thousands of labourers were recruited to build the road and to 
manhandle the expedition along the overland route from the railway head at 
Fungurume to Sankisia, which serviced the river-boat harbour on the Lualu-
ba at Bukama.179
 To build the road and manhandle the expedition, enormous amounts of 
labour had to be recruited. To this end, numerous often conflicting contracts 
were drawn up with a wide variety of road contractors and labour contrac-
tors. Commander Lee, the erstwhile hunter who had initially dreamt up the 
scheme, made an initial contract with Mr. Lock, ‘a Transport Contractor, to 
improve the road, supply labour and transport between Nguba and Sanki-
sha’.180 At the same time, Sub. Lieutenant Dudley had meanwhile arranged 
with Mr. Davison, another Transport Contractor, to supply labour and to im-
prove the road from the southern end. In the event, Lock eventually took 
over Davison’s contract, with Lock undertaking the road-building and Da-
vison ‘the bridging of streams and hollows’.181 As it progressed, the road was 
built and improved upon at a phenomenal rate of about 4 miles (10 km) per 
day.182 Spicer-Simson, as overall commander of the expedition, comment-
ed on the difficulties involved in ensuring the successful construction of the 
road:
178 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, Sankisia, 30th September 1915, report of proceedings No. 4, August 31st to September 28th.
179  Given that the route covered between Fungurume and Sankisia was about 200 km, this 
works out to at least one labourer every 250 m along the whole route.
180 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, Elizabethville, 29 July 1915, to Commandant General Rhodesia.
181 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, Fungurume, 14th August 1915, report of proceedings No. 2, July 20th to August 14th.
182 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, Elizabethville, 29 July 1915, to Commandant General Rhodesia.
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Mr Lock, has apparently, had difficulty in obtaining labour. I gave him orders 
to put 300 men on to the southern end of the road on or about 1st August. Up 
till now not a single man has appeared and Mr Davison has supplied me with 
115 men with which labour the bad road has been built.
Mr Lock’s contract, which was made by Lieutenant Commander Lee before 
my arrival, appears to me, now that I have got a little local knowledge, to be 
costing some £50 per diem more than is necessary, I shall therefore cancel 
his contract as soon as I can get into touch with him and will endeavour to 
come to a better arrangement with Mr. Davison, who is prepared to put 600 
men on to the road at a week’s notice.183
The contracts that had originally been made with Lock and Davison were re-
scinded, but given the fact that new contracts became necessary for the por-
tage of goods, neither Lock nor Davison lost out, as new contracts for por-
tage were drawn up with the two labour recruiters.184 It has been noted above 
that the earlier advice, based on the reports of two Italian labour contractors, 
submitted by Hope in August 1915 regarding the inappropriate nature of the 
traction engines in favour of porters and oxen, had been dismissed.185 Their 
comments turned out to be correct, and the struggle for the lucrative labour 
contracts began in earnest. Barducci and Lock both claimed to have been 
approached and bound by contract to supply labour to the expedition. The 
Italian labour contractors Barducci and Frashoti had dealt with Lee prior to 
his departure from the Congo, and for his part Hope had continued these 
dealings. As Hope noted in his report, the dealings between Lee and Bar-
ducci ‘were somewhat complicated, but took place prior to the signing of 
Lock’s contract in Bukama’.186 Lee received quotes of 1.80-2.00 francs per la-
bourer per day from Barducci, and from Barducci’s sub-contractor Frashoti 
2.50 francs per labourer per day. Lee came to an agreement with Frashoti, 
with labourers starting to work on 21 July. In the ensuing conflict, Barducci 
demanded that payment be made for no less than 460 labourers. In addition, 
Frashoti had recruited 340 labourers.187 
183 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, Fungurume, 14th August 1915, report of proceedings No. 2, July 20th to August 14th.
184 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, M’wenda Makoshi, 30th August 1915, report of proceedings No. 3.
185 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Hope, Sankisia 
19th August 1915, to Commander Simson.
186 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Hope, Sankisia 
19th August 1915, to Commander Simson.
187 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Hope, Sankisia 
19th August 1915, to Commander Simson.
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The detailed mile by mile, day by day reports of Spicer-Simson illustrate very 
clearly how difficult the passage from Fungurume to Sankisia actually was. 
More than once men and machines were put to the test, and although Sim-
son littered his reports with reports on roads that had been re-cut or re-sur-
faced, in the end it was always African labourers who saved the day. Simson’s 
entry for 23 September 1915, for example, is nothing out of the ordinary:
Road still soft, but improving, and better progress made. Descended the last 
of the foot hills of the Plateau 150 natives carrying water between Kikoma 
and engines. Heavy thunderstorm on Plateau and foot hills in afternoon, but 
only light rain experienced by the Expedition. Camped at Kikoma at about 
5.30 p.m. at 4.9 miles. Captain Mouritzen of the Congo Hydrographic Service 
arrived from Bukama to consult with me as to the voyage down the Luala-
ba.188
Thus, eventually, the expedition reached the headwaters of the Congo on a 
road that was literally built as the expedition moved forward.
The road as a route with limited resources
The roads built for the purposes of war fell into almost immediate disuse 
upon the cessation of hostilities, but the long-term impact of the movement 
of thousands upon thousands of hungry people along the road in the thinly 
populated lands of Central Africa had a disastrous impact upon local com-
munities. Colonial administrators in Northern Rhodesia were well aware of 
the disruptive impact of the enormous movement and recruitment of labour 
along the roads to the front for war purposes. Assistant Native Commission-
er Theodore Williams described how, already within the first year of the war 
in 1915, food resources were becoming scarce, as well as the disruptive influ-
ence of columns of war porters on food security:
As regards Commissariat I had been able to get a few eggs and 3 fowls so far 
but have had to live largely out of tins. This road has been so worn since the 
war that things are hard to get now—though the carriers seem to be able to 
get a meal all right.189 
On paper, with honest intentions, administrators sought to alleviate the dis-
ruption in ways that they believed were correct and acceptable. But, as so 
188 NA, ADM 123/142, African Lakes Operations, Africa Station War Records, Spicer-Sim-
son, Sankisia, 30th September 1915, report of proceedings No. 4, August 31st to September 28th.
189 Rhodes House Oxford, MSS. Afr. S. 776-781 May 12, 1915, My dear Father.
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often, the road to disruption, ruin, and revolt was paved with the good inten-
tions of administrators. The mass recruitment of thousands upon thousands 
of carriers for the war effort depleted the countryside of able-bodied people 
and led to a collapse in food production. The incessant demands for food 
along the road depleted the already over-stretched food reserves, and the 
movement of thousands of ever-hungry carriers like locusts across the coun-
tryside finally completely destroyed alongside the road all food reserves and 
devastated the landscape. 
 To survive, Africans became dependent upon foodstuffs transported from 
the line of rail in exchange for their labour power as carriers. In effect, this set 
in motion a vicious circle in which people, in exchange for food, had to work 
and were of necessity away from their homes and thus unable to prepare gar-
dens and so forth which could have ensured their continued self-sufficiency 
in food production. 
 Weakened by four years of war, incessant work, and insufficient food, the 
people of Northern Rhodesia were an easy prey for the influenza pandem-
ic when it struck the territory in late 1918 and early 1919.190 Deserting and 
discharged, carriers and porters carried the disease far and wide across the 
territory, bringing life to a standstill and appearing to herald the end of time. 
The role of the newly established military road, which led from Broken Hill to 
the frontline, in spreading the disease is not to be under-estimated. Reports 
from the Mkushi sub-district explicitly mention the significance of Broken 
Hill as a centre from which influenza spread:
Influenza appeared at Mkushi early in November. … Natives fleeing from 
the scourge when it first came to Broken Hill died by the roadside … eight 
strangers who died on the road were buried. The disease was brought 
straight from the railway by the mailman….191
In all, by the end of World War I, the military road that had been built across 
1,000 km of bush was abandoned. Far from opening up the country to de-
velopment and communication, as one might have expected, the military 
road had brought famine and ruin to those unfortunate enough to live within 
25 km of the road.
190 For a standard work on the influenza epidemic in Zambia, see Mwelwa Musambachime, 
‘The influenza epidemic of 1918-1919 in Northern Rhodesia’, in Zambia Journal of History, 
1993/94, Nos. 6/7, 59. 
191 NAZ, LMA, F6/1, Annual Report, Mkushi Sub-District, 1918-1919.
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Conclusion
Observers dealing with Northern Rhodesia may comment on the concerted 
road-building programme that occurred in parts of the territory after 1901 
as examples of the development brought by Pax Britannica to the peoples of 
Central Africa. However, in doing so, they conveniently gloss over the unfree 
nature of the labour employed to build the roads under duress in lieu of taxa-
tion. It must not be forgotten that in Northern Rhodesia the first roads suita-
ble for wheeled traffic were built as a function of enforced taxation. Similarly, 
the two further road-building programmes that led to the construction of 
roads used in World War I were built as instruments of war and were aban-
doned immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. In Northern Rhodesia, 
roads came to be built, between 1900 and 1920, not so much as things that 
facilitated communication and economic development, but as instruments 
of war, subjection, and control.
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Colonial memoirs
Jan Hoorweg
In the late 1990s, I was stationed in Malindi, Kenya, in charge of CERS, the 
Coast Environment Research Station. I had Ton Dietz to thank for this ap-
pointment and I am still grateful to him for the opportunity. At the time, Ton 
directed the joint programme of the University of Amsterdam and Moi Uni-
versity in Eldoret. The Coast Station was part of the programme even though 
it was located at a distance of 900 km from the main campus. I had long 
wanted to live in a provincial town in East Africa and Malindi was indeed an 
enjoyable place—a tourist town on the coast of the Indian Ocean, modest in 
size but with plenty of amenities and a pleasant climate.
 As CERS coordinator, I was responsible for the office we had rented, for 
assisting students doing their fieldwork, for organizing workshops on coastal 
issues, and for contacts with other research centres in the Coast Province. I 
also had the responsibility for a piece of land, 40 ha large, at the mouth of the 
Sabaki River, a few miles north of Malindi. The landscape consisted of a river 
bank with mangroves, sand dunes, and inland scrub vegetation with, here 
and there, straggling trees including coconut palms. The idea was to conserve 
this land as a kind of nature reserve with a great diversity of plants but, if pos-
sible, to try and develop it commercially as well. One suggestion was to start 
a herd of goats because they are hardy animals, multiply rapidly, and eat any-
thing. I rejected this idea because of the indiscriminate grazing behaviour of 
goats to the detriment of the desired biodiversity. Instead, I decided to plant 
casuarina trees for their timber, and we duly purchased and planted a batch 
of seedlings. Sadly, the awesome El-Niño of 1997 washed part of our land 
away including half of the trees we had planted. 
 The land also harboured different kinds of wildlife. Samuel, the farmhand, 
had once been taken by a crocodile but had somehow managed to free him-
self. He did not like to talk about this experience, but it left him with an un-
derstandable respect for large animals. On one occasion, a hippo with a baby 
had taken up residence in one of the inlets of the river, and Samuel explicitly 
instructed me not to go near the animal—who was in a bad mood, as hippos 
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often are. On another occasion, he proudly showed me an adult python he 
had killed that very morning. Asked why, he ventured the snake was poison-
ous, which is a widely held belief about pythons. I did not have the courage to 
remark that killing animals was not quite in line with the conservation objec-
tives of the School of Environmental Studies. Instead, I quietly arranged with 
my colleague from the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) in Mombasa for him 
to be enrolled in a course given to KWS wardens, from which he claimed to 
have learned a lot.
 The land was favoured not only by animals, but also by the local people. 
Perhaps the first to mention is the herdsman with his cows, who regularly 
trespassed to water his animals at the Sabaki River. To the great irritation of 
Samuel. More seriously, our land at one time was invaded by a large group 
of squatters, who gave several reasons for their occupation. Firstly, their an-
cestors were buried there, but that was not considered a serious argument 
even by the squatters themselves. Secondly, they feared, although the land 
was now owned by the university, if not developed it would be passed on to 
private individuals who might sell it for a high price to developers. Admitted-
ly, not such a far-fetched scenario. All I could do was ask the District Officer 
(DO) for assistance, and he posted a few policemen on the plot and miracu-
lously the squatters disbanded. Miraculously, because there were other cases 
not far away where squatters had occupied land for decades. Nevertheless, 
the School of Environmental Studies hastened their plans to put up a lab-
oratory building on the site, which afforded me the opportunity to learn all 
about public tenders and building contractors.  
 Another invasion was by illegal wine tappers. Coconut palms (like other 
types of palm trees) can be tapped for palm wine by making an incision in 
the bark of the tree, but in such a way that the tree bleeds gently and can go 
on producing for years. However, there are also illegal wine tappers who spot 
palms on uninhabited land, and they bleed the trees aggressively for larger 
production but with the result that the trees die in a few weeks’ time. One 
such group had spotted trees on our site, had set up camp, and had already 
attacked several trees before I was informed. These tappers had a reputa-
tion as rogue characters and people were usually afraid to address them. Not 
me. Perhaps naively, I considered it my duty to get rid of them, certainly in 
the light of the earlier invasion of squatters. Rebson, my office assistant, had 
warned me I had to be very careful because, in all likelihood, they would be 
drunk and might even threaten me or worse. Still, I managed to convey the 
message that I did not want them on the site, but they could finish the trees 
they had attacked already and which could not be saved anyway, but not to 
start on any new trees and then please leave. And leave they did, after a week, 
much to my relief.
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One of the attractive sides of Malindi was the colourful mix of people living 
in the town. Firstly, the majority of residents were local Mijikenda, but there 
were also many Africans from up-country who had found employment there. 
The Swahili and Arab communities also need mention; their roots trace back 
to the time of the Zanzibar Sultanate, together with many Asians who first 
started arriving when the Uganda Railway was being constructed. Another 
group was the English pensioners, many of whom had worked most of their 
life in Kenya. Among them, there were a number of ex-civil servants who had 
served in colonial times; some had even attempted to write down their recol-
lections, and at least one of them had his memoirs issued by an international 
publisher. To understand the gist and context of colonial memoirs, we need 
first a short description of the Colonial Service and what it stood for.   
Colonial Service
The British Colonial Service was established in the course of the 19th century. 
A standard text on the history of the service has been written by Kirk-Greene 
(2000), himself a former DO in Nigeria, who later joined the academic staff 
of Oxford University. The Colonial Service consisted, firstly, of the Coloni-
al Administrative Service (Governors, Provincial Commissioners, District 
Commissioners, and DOs, in that order). However, it also comprised profes-
sionals, such as medical staff, educational personnel, forestry officers, veter-
inarians, police officers, and so on. Gann and Duignan (1978), in their mon-
ograph on British Africa during the period 1870-1914, devote chapters to 
respectively Colonial Governors, DOs, and African Assistants (who played a 
role particularly in West Africa in the early years), but also a separate chapter 
to the various technical personnel. By 1914, the combined total of technical 
staff in the British African Colonies already surpassed the number of district 
administrators (ibid. 292). Still, DOs formed the backbone of the colonial ad-
ministration, certainly in the early years. They combined the roles of admin-
istrator, magistrate, and government representative, and occasionally they 
were technical officer as well. They built roads, collected taxes, maintained 
law and order, visited outlying locations on safari (field trips), and were the 
ones in direct contact with the local people.
 Recruitment procedures of the Colonial Service varied. Headquarters in 
London recruited DOs from among university graduates. But few matched 
the candidate who asked Winston Churchill, then Under-Secretary for the 
Colonies, for a personal interview and was subsequently hired in 1908 (Dun-
das 1955). Recruitment could also happen locally among army officers or oth-
ers with tropical experience. For example, before World War I, staff who had 
been in the employ of the Imperial British East Africa Company were taken 
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over when the company went under. Similarly, after World War I, veteran 
army officers who had seen service in Africa were also locally approached 
and recruited. (The same happened after World War II.) Remuneration was 
apparently attractive: one candidate in 1913 compared his starting salary to 
that of a scholar with a ‘Double First’, and conditions of service were still con-
sidered agreeable in the 1950s. However, salary levels differed by colony re-
gardless of rank. Pitiful were Governors-in-name appointed to a small island, 
who sometimes received such a low salary they had great difficulty in making 
ends meet.
 Already before the onset of World War I, it was realized there was a need 
for training to prepare the candidates for their upcoming duties. The first 
formal training of future DOs was organized at the Imperial Institute; in to-
tal, the course took three months. In the early 1930s, the training was ex-
panded to a full year and given at Oxford University, Cambridge, and the 
London School of Economics as a sort of postgraduate training. After the 
war, the training was reorganized again, now under the name of the Devon-
shire Course. Apart from academic subjects such as anthropology, economy, 
and history, the course also included the necessary familiarization with office 
routines and instruction in local language and law. The exams in the two lat-
ter subjects had to be taken later, after the candidate had served in the field; 
these exams were much feared and they could indeed be career-breakers.  
 Daily routines depended on the size of the station and whether one or 
more officers were present. If alone on a remote station, which was often the 
case, half the time might be spent on station duty, meaning administrative 
chores, correspondence, and court sessions. The other half of the time they 
were visiting remote parts of their district on safari—in the early years, on 
foot or on horseback with the porters setting the daily pace. The advent of 
motorized transport greatly increased mobility, and a Land Rover became a 
much-treasured asset.  
 In the early years, living conditions were generally modest, often wattle-
and-daub houses without electricity, running water, or sewage drains, and no 
nearby towns with shops. Every two to three years, the DO was entitled to 
home leave of a few months, but, once back in the UK, many of them found 
themselves rather alienated from British society and soon wanted to return 
to their stations—unless they had embarked on a romantic relationship and 
had decided to get married, which then had to be arranged hastily. In fact, 
senior officers actively discouraged junior officers from marrying, which 
changed only after World War II when more DOs took their wives with them 
to outstations.
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Colonial memoirs
English literature knows a rich tradition of personal memoirs with records 
of events or history from personal knowledge or from special sources. ‘Co-
lonial memoirs’ are a sub-category relating experiences during the times of 
colonial administration, which often give lively and interesting accounts of 
the tropics and confrontations between traditional societies and Western ex-
pectations.192 Colonial memoirs have now become an academic specialism. 
In this respect, a pivotal role was played by the early decision in 1929 of the 
Rhodes House Library to start collecting published and unpublished colonial 
materials (Pinfold 2005). BBC Radio played an important role as well with the 
programme Tales from the Dark Continent, with candid interviews about ex-
periences in the African colonies. An anthology in book form followed (Allen 
1979). The Radcliffe Press also deserves mention, with its impressive series of 
more than 50 memoirs and biographies published since 1993.
 More colonial memoirs seem to have appeared in the English language 
than in French or German. The reasons are manifold: firstly, there was the 
size of the British Empire and the large number of colonial officers on the 
ground, but equally important must have been the generally positive reputa-
tion of the Colonial Service.193 And, of course, the simple fact that the poten-
tial English readership was much larger.
 Colonial memoirs are best arranged according to time period and the 
profession or position of the author. The following time periods can roughly 
be distinguished: (a) the period before World War I as a time of exploration 
and pacification; (b) the middle period between World War I and World War 
II as a time of development and consolidation; and (c) the period after 1945 
as a time of consolidation but with the increasing awareness of the oncom-
ing de-colonization (Allen 1979). As for the profession of the author or his/
her position in colonial society, there were many occupations possible out-
side the colonial administration, as already mentioned. Early accounts often 
consist of ethnographic descriptions of the local populations but with few or 
no personal impressions, such as, for example, Eliot (1905), H.M. Commis-
sioner in Kenya from 1901 until 1904.194 During the early period, the DOs 
were thin on the ground, but many of them achieved senior positions later 
and left us their accounts (Jackson 1930). Many others are listed in the ex-
192 A colonial memoir is not to be confused with accounts of expeditions by explorers, such as 
Burton and Stanley, because they did not take up residence for any length of time. Travelogues 
of renowned writers, such as Waugh and Gide, also do not qualify as colonial memoirs for the 
same reason.
193 A popularity that was enhanced by the series of ‘Sanders’ novels by Edgar Wallace on the 
life of DOs in West Africa—twelve novels that were published between 1911 and 1928.
194 His brother also served in the Colonial Service, but he wrote memoirs on a more personal 
note (Eliot 1938).
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haustive review of the life and living circumstances of DOs by Kirk-Greene 
(2006), based on the memoirs and written contributions of more than 500 
DOs who had served in Africa. But the professional and technical staff also 
wrote about their experiences in different sectors, such as agriculture, health, 
education, police, livestock, forestry, even locust control. Mention must also 
be made of the wives of the colonial officers—for example, Alys Reece, who 
decided to accompany her DO husband in 1936 to live in Marsabit in the 
Northern Frontier District of Kenya, then considered totally unsuitable for 
women (Reece 1963). Some renowned white settlers also contributed occa-
sional manuscripts (Cranworth 1939).
Rift Valley, Kenya
At some point in their career, DOs often developed strong ties with one or 
more of the districts where they were stationed. Actually, this was no dif-
ferent in the case of the generations of academic researchers who followed 
later (but not very much later). Personally, I have strong ties with the Indian 
Ocean Coast of Kenya. In the case of Ton, his favourite area is West Pokot, 
ever since he did the fieldwork for his PhD thesis Pastoralists in Dire Straits 
(1987). West Pokot is situated in the middle of the Rift Valley Province, with 
neighbouring districts of Elgeyo-Marakwat and Baringo, which also form 
part of this story. The area offers spectacular nature, including the Elgeyo 
Escarpment, the Kerio Valley, and the Tugen Hills. The earliest mention of 
the area is by Thomson (1885), during his expedition through Masai Land. 
Early descriptions of the Kalenjin living in these districts were given by Beech 
(1911) on the Suk (the Maasai name for the Pokot) and Massam (1927) on the 
cliff dwellers of the Elgeyo Escarpment. Both writers had served as DOs in, 
respectively, Baringo and Marakwet. Their monographs have a strong focus 
on ethnography, customs, and language, following the trend already noted. 
Personal memoirs followed much later by other DOs, and I have selected 
three memoirs at roughly 20-year intervals, the latest ending in 1959. The 
DOs were stationed respectively in Kabarnet in the Tugen Hills, Tambach on 
top of the Elgeyo Escarpment, and Sigor in the Pokot plains, roughly at dis-
tances of 100 km from each other. 
Before 1920
The first memoir is by Henry Seaton, who arrived in Kenya in 1914. Lion in 
the Morning was published in 1963. Seaton was hired as Assistant District 
Commissioner, fresh from university, but before being sent overseas had to 
attend the lectures at the Imperial Institute in London. The course being a 
recent innovation, it was also attended by staff already serving in the field, 
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usually during times of home leave. The course was divided into two periods 
of six weeks each, the first period covering the colonial system of accounts, 
tropical hygiene, and the law of criminal procedure. The second period of-
fered Mohammedan law, tropical agriculture, and survey methods.
 In April 1914, Seaton was on his way to East Africa. On arrival in Mom-
basa, he was sent by the Chief Justice on to the Town Magistrate in Naku-
ru. This up-country town was regarded as the very centre of the European 
settler community, which the author describes cynically as follows: ‘Every 
settler was the lord of a manor, no matter whether his holding were great 
or small—his homesteads built of stone or mud’ (p. 14). Newly appointed 
administrators, of course, still had poor command of the local language and 
had little administrative experience. The problem of language, in the case 
of Seaton, was solved with the help of a Swahili interpreter, who had been 
trained in Zanzibar by the Bishop himself and who spoke fluent, melodious 
English. (The interpreter also ran a licenced beer shop as well as a brothel in 
the town.) For office duties, he could, thankfully, rely on one of the Goanese 
administrators, who rightly had the reputation of being not only efficient, but 
highly motivated as well.
 Life abruptly changed with the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, 
which soon resulted in hostilities between Kenya and Tanganyika, the latter 
then still a German colony. An emergency meeting of local settlers was or-
ganized in Nakuru, with tempers running high and where our novice DO was 
shouted down for being a bloody liar. Thankfully, Lord Delamare, in person, 
came to his help. Administrative officers were not allowed to join the armed 
forces. Instead, Seaton was soon transferred to a remote outpost. From No-
vember 1914 until late 1919, he was stationed in Jubaland (which then was 
still part of Kenya) and Ukambani. He returned to the Rift Valley in 1919 to 
be stationed in Kabarnet, a one-man station, 50 miles from the District Office 
in Eldama Ravine. The station had been built five years earlier and comprised 
barracks and a prison. The local population, the Kamasia (now Tugen) living 
in the Kerio Valley, cultivated maize, but they loved their livestock more, 
even though there was little pasture around and infestation by tsetse fly was 
rife. Otherwise, the author describes some of the exotic aspects of native 
life, such as witchcraft cases, a rhino slaughter, the fishing methods in Lake 
Baringo, and the case of one askari who ran amok and made a deliberate at-
tempt to kill our DO. 
 DOs in Kenya often found themselves caught between the native popula-
tion, on the one hand, and the white settlers on the other hand; they were not 
much appreciated by either. The loyalty of the white settlers ‘to the Crown 
was absolute, but [their] attitude towards Government was a mixture of re-
sentment and contempt’ (p. 14). Newly arrived government officials were, 
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after all, ‘a dangerous, unknown quantity […] [and] but a bird of passage […] 
[with] no stake in the country’ (p. 15). On the other hand, the Kamasia re-
garded the presence of the white man, generally, as an evil, if only because the 
annual tax rates had increased from 3 sh. to 8 sh. during the past five years, 
much to the discontent of the local chiefs. Surprisingly, when the Indian ru-
pee was introduced as standard currency they accepted the change from sil-
ver coins to paper notes without demurring, even though coins were solid 
and could be buried in the ground and paper money was easily burned if huts 
caught fire. Seaton was surprised about the lack of protest until he learned 
the elders had interpreted the currency measures as a sign of the coming de-
parture of the British, who—understandably—must be making every effort 
to carry all their valuables with them.
Between the Wars, 1920-1940
Richard Hennings started out as DO in Kabarnet in 1935; later, he was sta-
tioned in neighbouring West Pokot and Elgeyo-Marakwet. His memoir Af-
rican Morning, about his time in this part of Rift Valley, was published in 
1951—illustrated with black-and-white photographs. In his own words, 
Hennings was mainly concerned with taxes, law and order, and the ongoing 
construction of the road connecting Tambach and Kabarnet, At the time, 
the District Commissioner in Tambach could only reach Kabarnet, some 20 
miles across, by means of a detour of 150 miles through Eldama Ravine. So 
far, the roads department had not been able to construct an all-weather road 
along the steep Elgeyo Escarpment, but now was the time. It was left to Hen-
nings to prepare an access road from Kabarnet to the bridge across the Kerio 
River.
 The daily routine consisted of station duties, administrative work, cor-
respondence, and court sessions. Remote as Kabarnet may have been, there 
was quite a mix of people. The subordinate staff came from all corners of 
East Africa. At one point, the station administrator was a Goan, the prison 
overseer was a Muslim from the Comoros, and the sergeant in charge of the 
police constables was a Somali from Wajir—not to mention a nearby settle-
ment of Sudanese ex-soldiers and two Indian grocers. 
 As much as half the time could be spent on safari, even though motor-
ized transport was now available. Main activities during these fieldtrips were 
tax collection, native courts, and barazas (public meetings). The collection 
of taxes had a reverse side—namely, the many requests for tax exemption 
by elderly men, who had to be heard individually and who invariably took 
every effort to show how poor they were, starting with the clothes they were 
wearing. Law and order took the form of court sessions and active pursuit of 
felons. Court sessions mostly had to deal with cases of runaway wives and 
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bride price, stock theft, and the occasional murder. Murder cases varied from 
drinking brawls to outright robberies. In the case of the first, and when there 
were enough witnesses to support the testimony of the defendant, he was 
usually sentenced lightly. But the author also describes a case where four 
local youths had murdered a Somali storekeeper for his money; they dis-
persed across the region but were arrested one-by-one, taken to court, and 
sentenced to hang.
 Hennings gives an ironic account of his speeches to elders during barazas 
about rural development:
pay your taxes in good time, store most of your grain crop, don’t use it all for 
making beer, don’t destroy your woods and trees, for they help to conserve 
the rain and keep the springs running; look after your fields, put stones and 
trash along the contours to prevent the soil being washed away, and give up 
cultivating steep slopes […].’ (p. 46)
However, he sells himself short, because he did show a genuine interest in 
the livelihoods of the different ethnic groups and the general economic via-
bility of the region. He points, for example, at the difference between the El-
geyo herdsmen living on top of the escarpments with wide pastures and large 
numbers of livestock and the small farmers living at the bottom of the Kerio 
Valley, who manage only a meagre existence and are being looked down on 
by their fellow pastoralists in the process. Actually, the author touches on de-
velopment alternatives and ventures that the lifestyle of the pastoralists could 
only be maintained because of low population density, and he already shows 
concern about a greatly increased concentration of huts and livestock in the 
Elgeyo High Country and wonders what to do about it. This was already writ-
ten in 1951, but even in the late 1960s I still remember the country along the 
main road to Uganda being very thinly populated. After all, the total popula-
tion of Kenya was only 10 million then; now it is more than 40 million. 
After World War II
John Russell was the son of white settlers, and he was locally recruited after 
having served in the Kenya Regiment during the Mau Mau insurgency. His 
memoir Kenya Beyond the Marich Pass, with black-and-white photographs, 
was published in 1994. He was appointed as DO (cadet) and sent for the 
Devonshire Course in the UK. In 1957, he arrived in Kapenguria, the Dis-
trict Headquarters of West Pokot, where he served until given his own divi-
sion at Sigor, a distance of 50 km. The division population was an estimated 
20,000 people—predominantly pastoralists. By now, the division stations had 
expanded in size, and the Sigor boma (station) comprised a division office, 
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radio room, police station, a prison with a barrack, the DO’s house, and po-
lice rondavels. Water still had to be collected daily from the nearby Wei-Wei 
River in drums, but soon piped water was installed. The police force consist-
ed of 18 constables, including two non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Each 
evening, the two NCOs and the prison warden would formally report for pa-
rade. The only work force available were the prisoners, who collected water 
and firewood by lorry. 
 The duties of the DO were, firstly, the daily running of the station, admin-
istrative reporting, and acting as magistrate for those cases which carried a 
sentence of less than three months’ detention; otherwise they had to be re-
ferred to a higher court. Some years earlier, in 1949, there had been an upris-
ing in Sigor which had been forcefully suppressed by the police. Twenty-nine 
of the rebel tribesmen and one police constable had been killed. Russell took 
pains to document the confrontation with the colonial administration, after 
which military presence was maintained for some years. By now, the divi-
sion station had a modest health clinic, but the Pokot generally preferred the 
mission hospital at Ortum, some 20 km away. Actually, Russell is one of the 
few authors who mentions the mission activities and praises the role of the 
individual priests and nuns. More than his predecessors, Russell was engaged 
in development activities and reflects on different development projects. 
Among his routine activities, he mentions improving rural water supplies 
and enforcing soil and conservation measures. He personally undertakes at-
tempts to improve the health condition of livestock, the mainstay of the local 
community and the source of their prosperity. Like me, later in Malindi, he 
had no love for goats, but together with the livestock officer made efforts to 
protect pasture from overgrazing by instituting a system of block grazing, 
which was not popular among the Pokot.  
I have to admit that I read many of the colonial memoirs with great pleasure. 
Why? I can think of at least three reasons: the style of writing, the frequent 
anecdotes, and the obvious affection for the local people. Firstly, the style of 
writing is generally carefree, since the authors can use any format they want, 
which leaves plenty of room for spontaneity. Secondly, most memoirs make 
an effort to recount humorous episodes the writers have come across. At 
least they make us laugh. But thirdly, most of the memoir writers show great 
affinity with the people they write about, and they manage to express their 
appreciation and concern for the people they have lived among for a longer 
or shorter time. The three protagonists presented in this chapter are all cases 
in point, and they share a mutual loyalty with people and country. 
 After having been stationed in the Rift Valley, and perhaps to prove the 
suspicious elders wrong, Henry Seaton served a further 15 years in Kenya and 
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did another three years in the West Indies, before retiring to the UK. Richard 
Hennings probably served for some time in Laikipia District, but in 1951 he 
was certainly at the Ministry of Agriculture where, in 1961, we find him in 
the position of Permanent Secretary. He was still concerned about grazing 
management in the pastoral areas. After Sigor, John Russell was transferred 
to Kilifi District; and after this tour, he left the country to take up an appoint-
ment in the South Pacific, where he served for 27 years. He retired to Malin-
di, where I met him. He was a short, stocky man who kept much to himself 
but who was secretly admired by the members of the British community.
 A large number of colonial memoirs relate to East Africa. This is under-
standable given that, in comparison with elsewhere, it hosted a sizeable set-
tler population. The memoirs presented here are all about Kenya, but they 
cover quite different time periods, ranging from early colonial times before 
World War I to shortly before Kenya achieved independence—a time span of 
roughly 50-60 years but incorporating World War I and World War II, an age 
that saw profound political and social changes. On the one hand, the mem-
oirs demonstrate the consistency in the duties of the DOs with regard to road 
building, monthly safaris, community barazas, and native courts, duties that 
remained important until the end. On the other hand, there were improve-
ments in accommodations and office routines as well as noticeable changes 
in transport and communication facilities, but perhaps more important was 
the growing attention paid to health services and rural development initia-
tives. Once the different colonies had gained independence, the colonial DOs 
were soon replaced by Kenyan-born officers; but one might argue that they 
were also succeeded by an influx of development workers and academic re-
searchers from abroad, who shared many of their concerns for the well-being 
of the population. I count myself as belonging to this group of early research-
ers, and occasionally I have tried to write down some of my recollections; but 
I must admit that my output has been very modest so far. Perhaps as a group 
we were much more diverse in nationality, training, and expertise than the 
former officers of the colonial administration, and this might partly explain 
why we have failed to deliver a consistent body of personal memoirs, notable 
exceptions aside (e.g. Sapolsky 2001). Now that this early generation of re-
searchers has retired or is on the point of retiring, should we not call on them 
to draft their memoirs as well and add their observations and experiences to 
the developments across the African continent?  How about it, Ton?
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‘His name will inseparably be connect-
ed to the African Studies Centre’ 
The legacy and archives of Hans Holleman, 
second director of the ASC Leiden
Jos Damen
The Javanese region of Tulungagung, the democratization movement in the 
Netherlands in the 1960s, prolific Africanist Isaac Schapera, and the African 
Studies Centre (ASC) in Leiden do not seem to have much in common. Yet 
here they are together in one setting, with Johan Frederik (‘Hans’) Holleman 
as the linchpin. The Library of the ASC in Leiden holds ten boxes and seven 
folders containing personal correspondence (from 1945 onwards), a complete 
set of field notes from Southern Africa, and manuscripts.195 Other parts of his 
archives are in different places in Leiden. The Leiden Museum of Anthropol-
ogy stores 123 photographs from Kwazulu-Natal, made by Hans Holleman 
in the period 1938-40. Leiden University Library (UBL) holds five boxes with 
folders,196 containing manuscripts, letters and photographs, typescripts, and a 
children’s book.197 An inventory of this UBL archive was made by Han F. Ver-
meulen, who also wrote several articles about the legacy of Hans Holleman.198
195 François Janse van Rensburg: Archival Inventory. Papers of Johan ‘Hans’ Holleman, Director 
of the African Studies Centre. Leiden, 2016. www.ascleiden.nl/sites/default/files/johanfrederik-
hollemandirectoroftheafricanstudiescentre.pdf
196 University Library Leiden: BPL 3438
197 The children’s book Klos Hulle is of course not the most interesting gem in the Holleman 
archives of UBL, but it is connected to a nice story. All Dutch queens seem to have an odd con-
nection to the ASC, and Beatrix is no exception. Hans Holleman wrote this children’s book in 
1939, and it was published in Cape Town. The mother of J.F. Holleman, Dutch Adriana (‘Adje’) 
Geytenbeek, liked this book so much that she sent a copy to the Dutch Royal family, then living 
in Canada because the Netherlands was occupied by the Germans. A typewritten thank-you-
note was sent to South Africa in return (signed ‘Trix’) by then Princess Beatrix. (H.F. Vermeu-
len: Adatrecht en Volkenkunde. Leiden, 2001-02, p. 10)
198 A.o. Franz Von Benda-Beckmann & Han Vermeulen: ‘Adat Law and Legal Anthropology. 
In Memoriam: Johan Frederik (Hans) Holleman (18 December 1915-28 August 2001); with a 
bibliography’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 2001, vol. 46, pp. 103-114.
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The Holleman family
Hans Holleman and his father Frederik David (‘Frits’) Holleman need to be 
seen in connection—the more so because their archives are divided in six 
parts, both in Leiden and The Hague.199 Father Frits was born in Potchef-
stroom (Transvaal) in 1887. He was a jurist and ethnologist and studied in 
Leiden with Prof. C. van Vollenhoven (thesis 1911). He worked in the Dutch 
Indies as an administrator, was a law professor (adatrecht) in Leiden from 
1934 to 1939, and worked in Stellenbosch from 1939, where he died in 1958. 
The life of his son Hans Holleman is in a way more diverse and interesting, 
also because Hans’s personality is a more complex one. His life is worth a full 
biography, and all material is available in the archives—his complete field-
work notes, letters from his interesting contacts, material about his role in 
South African society in the 1940s and 1950s, his reports to the South Afri-
can government, and documents about his time in Leiden. 
 Hans Holleman was born in Java, Tulungagung region, on 18 December 
1915. He went to high school in Amsterdam and Batavia (Jakarta) and stud-
ied law (1935-37) and ethnography (1938-40) at Stellenbosch University. He 
spent a number of months on fieldwork in Zululand and had two photo ex-
hibitions on Zulu life in Stellenbosch (1938 and 1940). He also published a 
novel in Afrikaans (Gety) in 1938, under the pseudonym Holmer Johanssen 
(Figure 17.1). (The novel is a roman à clef on the cultural life in Stellenbosch.) 
This literary debut is remembered as ‘exemplary of the influence of the Neue 
Sachlichkeit in Afrikaans. From a musicological perspective the novel is im-
portant because of the way it connects the cultural life of Cape Town in the 
1930s with music’200 (see Figure 17.2).
 He became a South African citizen in 1940 and worked for the Union Civ-
il Service in Riversdal. In 1941 he married Marie Sem, with whom he had six 
children. In 1945 he began working under Isaac Schapera at the Rhodes-Liv-
ingstone Institute in Lusaka, as a Beit Research Fellow. His fieldwork with 
the Mashona in Southern Rhodesia culminated in a PhD at the University 
of Cape Town in 1950. After working in Salisbury and Bulawayo, he became 
director of the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Natal in 
199 Frits Holleman’s archives are partly held at Leiden University Library. The file UBL BPL 
3437, only a few centimeters away from the archives of his son, holds papers, correspondence, 
a diary, and some photographs. Other papers of F.D. Holleman are held in the Dutch National 
Archives in The Hague and at the ASC in Leiden; see François Janse van Rensburg: Archival in-
ventory. Papers of Frederik ‘Frits’ David Holleman, Professor at Stellenbosch University. Leiden, 
2016 www.ascleiden.nl/sites/default/files/frederikdavidhollemanprofessoratstellenboschuni-
versity.pdf 
200  Stephanus Muller: ‘Musiekgeskiedenis en fiksie: Hans Holleman en Arnold van Wyk in 
Holmer Johanssen se roman Gety’. In: LitNet Akademies, jaargang 5, no. 1 (2008).
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Durban from 1957 to 1962, where he published the interesting book African 
Interlude (1958).
Figure 17.1
Holleman’s novel Gety (1938), under the pseudonym Holmer Johanssen, with a personal dedi-
cation to his wife and daughter (Collection ASC Leiden)
    
Figure 17.2
Guido Perold, Arnold van Wyk, and Hans Holleman (Stellenbosch, 1936) 
(Collection J.S. Gericke Library, Stellenbosch)
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Hans Holleman in Leiden
Holleman then received an offer for a dual position in Leiden: director of the 
ACS and professor at Leiden University. The directorship seemed attractive: 
the board of the ASC wanted to expand and professionalize the centre, and 
as a professor (of Sociology and Culture of Africa) he would succeed the not 
very successful (later Ghanaian prime minister) Kofi Busia, who had left his 
position in Leiden after barely two years. Holleman was to become the sec-
ond director of the ASC—perhaps even the first one, as the official first di-
rector (Prof. P.J. Idenburg) was in fact the caretaker of a very small institute, 
mainly consisting of a library and documentation centre with a few research-
ers at Rapenburg 8 in Leiden (Figure 17.3).
Figure 17.3
P.J. Idenburg and Hans Holleman (ASC Leiden, 1963)
Holleman starting working in January 1963 and presented his views in a formal 
document (Nota betreffende de ontwikkeling van het Afrika-Studiecentrum) in 
August of the same year. In this programmatic report he in fact advocated an 
interdisciplinary approach to African studies. He first pointed to the two main 
objectives of the ASC: (a) promote and undertake scientific research on Africa, 
and (b) promote the dissemination of knowledge and understanding of Afri-
ca. Next, he selected five fields of study: (a) social factors and acculturation; 
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(b) economy and demography; (c) politics and law; (d) spiritual development; 
and (e) indigenous people and modernity. In practice, Holleman stimulated 
research on education in Rungwe, Tanzania (with ASC researchers Jan Konter, 
Nel van Hekken, Jan Sterkenburg, Jan Kaayk, and Bonno Thoden van Velzen) 
and research on customary law in West Africa (with ASC researchers Rionne 
Ketting, Emile Rouveroy, Els Baerends, and Jenny Goldschmidt). Holleman 
started enthusiastically. He became a Dutch citizen in 1964, and everything 
indicated a new and fresh beginning. However, the directorship did not work 
out well. Times were turbulent, with Dutch universities under pressure from 
students and faculty asking for more influence.
 Holleman was unwilling and unable to cope with the demands for demo-
cratic centralism, and his long summer leaves to South Africa (three months 
in 1965, four months in 1966) and his long sick-leave in 1968 indicate his 
growing need for a break away from the ASC. His authoritarian style as di-
rector was met with growing resistance from large parts of the staff. Hol-
leman resigned as director of the ASC in August 1969, while retaining his 
professorship in Leiden. In this capacity he wrote several books on Africa: 
Chief, Council and Commissioner. Some Problems of Government in Rhode-
sia (1969), White Mine Workers in Northern Rhodesia 1959-60 (1973, with 
Simon Biesheuvel), Issues in African Law (1974), and Leiden in Africa (1977, 
with Adam Kuper, Hans van den Breemer and Isa Baud). His early retirement 
as a professor, partly due to health reasons, came in 1979. The Leiden chair 
of adat law, once held by Cornelis van Vollenhoven and by Holleman’s father 
Frits, came to an end with Holleman’s valedictory lecture in May 1980. A year 
later, he published the book Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law, a 300-
page text which he translated and edited. Johan Frederik Holleman died in 
Alphen a/d Rijn on 28 August 2001.
Holleman’s directorship: Failure or success?
Most people writing about the history of the ASC tend to point at the nega-
tive aspects of Holleman’s directorship: his authoritarian style, his ‘difficult’ 
personality, and his old-fashioned way of governing a scientific institute. 
However, to do him justice, the positive aspects of his directorship should 
also be mentioned: 
1 The main reason for thinking more positively about Holleman’s time in 
Leiden is the way he professionalized the ASC. He did this in two ways. 
First, fieldwork became an integral and prominent part of research, and 
researchers were thus made aware of the reality of life in Africa. Second, 
he also brought interdisciplinarity to African studies, long before the term 
was to become fashionable. As Africanist Albert Trouwborst remarked: 
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‘The big man in the history of the ASC is Holleman, nonetheless. An un-
comfortable gentleman, interesting man, high scientific level. He is the 
one who has really put the centre on the path of scientific research.’201 
2 Holleman led the promised expansion of the ASC onto the right track, by 
hiring new and young staff members. Within a few years, the ASC grew 
to an institute of 13 researchers (without teaching obligations), a well-
equipped library, new publishing facilities, and a more professional jour-
nal (Kroniek van Afrika).
3 Holleman brought his network to Leiden, and Leiden to his network. If 
one looks at the Annual Reports in the 1960s, at lectures and seminars 
given in Leiden at the time, and at the correspondence in the Holleman 
archives in Leiden, it is easy to see the effect of the contacts with Holle-
man’s teachers and friends such as Isaac Schapera, Max Gluckman, Mon-
ica Wilson, and Elizabeth Colson. 
Scientific director or manager?
In a way, the Holleman case makes one thing clear: a good researcher is not 
automatically a good manager of a scientific institute. Holleman’s successor, 
Gerrit Grootenhuis, did not publish any significant book in his long career, 
but he listened carefully to the signs of the times, let the researchers at the 
ASC do what they thought was necessary, and facilitated their needs. He was 
to become the director of the ASC for a period of over 20 years, from 1969 
to 1990.
 The ASC Annual Report 1969 is hypocritical about Holleman’s resigna-
tion: ‘the institute owes him [Holleman] a lot: his name will inseparably be 
connected to the ASC.’ Even more revealing is the policy plan of the ASC, 
dated June 1969 (Nota betreffende het beleid van het Afrika-Studiecentrum), 
which bears both Holleman’s and Grootenhuis’s names but is clearly written 
by the latter. The report looks inwards and talks more about internal organ-
ization and salaries than about goals and set-up of research. The telling An-
nex 2, signed by most researchers, states that ‘all policy decisions need to be 
agreed on by the staff meeting’. 
 Within a year, the road ahead was clearly pointed out. The Annual Report 
1969 stated: ‘The Governing Body and the Council of Assistance […] decid-
ed not to appoint a new scientific director. Instead they handed over control 
to G.W. Grootenhuis (MA) who thereby became general secretary cum di-
rector’ (p. 2). The ASC thus entered a new period, in which the researchers 
201 Max de Bok: Leer mij Afrika kennen: Vijftig jaar Afrika-Studiecentrum. Leiden, 2000, p. 15 
[my translation]
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in fact gained control. This was in complete accordance with what the new 
director wanted: ‘In line with my views [on scientific leadership], I decided 
to arrange the organization in such a way that in fact the scientific leadership 
would be in the hands of others at the ASC.’202
 Back to the general question: does a research institute need a scientific 
director or a manager as director? Though managing a research institute is 
both a contradictio in terminis and a mission impossible, the answer is of 
course clear. The director of a research institute needs to have a solid scien-
tific background; otherwise he or she will not be able to show the scientific 
road ahead, which also means setting priorities. At the same time, manageri-
al skills such as the ability to make quick decisions and facilitate profession-
als, as well as political and financial insights, are necessary. 
202 G.W. Grootenhuis, quoted in Max de Bok: Leer mij Afrika kennen. Vijftig jaar Afrika- 
Studiecentrum. Leiden, 2000, p. 22 [my translation].
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History, politics and the public 
perception of Africa
Chibuike Uche
Introduction
During a recent visit to one of the countries in East Africa, a colleague and I 
had a meeting with the founder of a major European company that has exist-
ed in the said country for over 40 years and whose businesses currently em-
ploy over 2,000 Africans. This apparently very successful entrepreneur made 
it clear to us that his long stay in this African country was simply because 
he found paradise there. He complained, however, that the country had per-
formed far below its potentials. He specifically suggested that if the country 
was run by Europeans, it would have been a paradise for all, including Afri-
cans. According to him, ‘the only thing the country has achieved since it at-
tained political independence was to quadruple its population’.
 A ‘politically correct’ way to react to the above assertion will be to prompt-
ly label this very successful entrepreneur, a major employer of labour in Af-
rica, a racist. In fact, under the current United Nations rules and regulations 
governing interracial and intercultural relations, he could be pronounced 
guilty of serious discrimination against Africans, which many would then 
label racism. This entrepreneur could therefore run into serious trouble for 
making the above assertion. Irrespective of whatever evidence he may have 
to support his opinion, international politics has simply made it illegal for 
people to make public their real views on such a highly politicized subject 
matter. 
 This paper argues that political developments have influenced what can 
be publicly said about Africa and its leaders without necessarily changing 
the real perception of the continent by the rest of the world. The result is 
that there is little correlation between what is publicly said and the actions of 
third parties with respect to several issues that concern the continent. While 
the governments of many developed countries publicly claim they are opti-
mistic that the economies of African countries will surge and grow rapidly in 
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the coming years, their actions contradict such positive public opinions.203 
The reality is that despite the fact that Africa is the largest growing market 
(population) in the world, its share of world trade, both as an exporter and 
an importer, remains insignificant (World Trade Organization, 2015). It is 
perhaps as a consequence of this that most developed countries, and even 
emerging countries such as India, are increasingly dedicating less time and 
political resources to their dealings with Africa. International political con-
ventions and rules that discourage the criticism of Africa and Africans, even 
when based on empirical observation, in actual fact do not in any way help 
the continent and its people.
 Instead, a shift from politics to reality in describing and criticizing Africa 
and Africans will do much more to help the continent address the diverse 
causes of its backwardness. Taking into cognizance the level of economic 
and social development of various African countries will help to encourage 
African leaders to adopt and operationalize policies that can aid the sustain-
able economic development of their respective countries. Then and only then 
they may enjoy the rights and privileges that come with being honourable 
members of the international community of leaders—and not before. Corre-
lating the international recognition of African leaders with the level of eco-
nomic development in their respective countries will also help to encourage 
Africans to demand more from their leaders.
 In order to achieve its aim, this contribution is divided into three parts. 
Space does not allow us to deal with the long history of European views on 
Africa, even if it is germane to the argument. That 19th century tale of coloni-
zation, exploitation, and blatant—even pseudo-scientific—racism is known 
all too well and has been analysed in depth elsewhere (see Crocker 1936). 
Since my argument addresses the present, we enter the timeline at World 
War II to review the dynamics of the public perception of Africa and Afri-
cans. The second part analyses the impact of the politicization of the abilities 
of Africans on the development of Africa, and the third part concludes the 
chapter. 
World War II and the public perception of Africa
Human rights are a newcomer on the world stage, and certainly in the case 
of Africa; racism does not die easily. The pressure to advance human rights 
across the world had commenced by the early part of the 20th century. Dur-
ing the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which led to the establishment of the 
League of Nations, for instance, the privilege of national self-determination 
203 For evidence of such positive views, see for instance Obama (2015) and Jinping (2015). 
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was extended to several states in Eastern and Central Europe. Africa, how-
ever, did not benefit from the change. The whole idea of universal equality 
essentially started in the United States when President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
outlined his ‘New Deal’ vision in his 6 January 1941 speech to Congress (see 
Soohoo & Stolz 2008). His goal was to promote important humanitarian prin-
ciples in the United States. Specifically, he argued that all Americans should 
have the right to the following four freedoms: freedom of religion, freedom 
of expression, freedom from fear, and freedom from want (Roosevelt 1941). 
 The commencement of World War II provided the window for President 
Roosevelt to extend his New Deal principles to the rest of the world. In Au-
gust 1941, for instance, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt 
met in Placentia Bay in Newfoundland to make common declarations of 
purpose with respect to the war. This meeting resulted in the promulgation 
of the Atlantic Charter. This ‘was an American effort to ensure that Britain 
signed on to its liberal democratic war aims’ (Ikenberry 1996: 83). It specifi-
cally made it clear that the signatories to the Charter must
respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they will live; and [that] they wish to see sovereign rights and self-gov-
ernment restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. (Roo-
sevelt & Churchill, 1941)
This declaration helped to raise the fighting morale of the resistance ele-
ments in the Nazi-occupied countries of Europe. In addition to the above, it 
also acted as a catalyst to pro-independence nationalists in most colonized 
countries, many of which were in Africa (Ezera 1964). It was after the signing 
of the Atlantic Charter that the ‘normative principle of self-determination 
passed into customary international law’ (Laing 1992: 209). Colonialism be-
gan to lose its legitimacy as an international institution (Jackson & Rosberg 
1986).
 Although Churchill later insisted that they had had only European states 
in mind when drafting the Charter, this view was rejected. President Roo-
sevelt, for instance, declared that the Atlantic Charter applied to all humanity 
(quoted in Ezera 1964). The influence of Roosevelt’s 1941 ‘Four Freedoms’ 
speech in subsequent developments in human rights across the world has 
been articulated thus: 
The Four Freedoms were the first articulated norms to guide or govern na-
tions in the realm of human rights. These ideals were the catalyst for sub-
sequent developments in international law. In August 1941, President Roo-
sevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill issued a declaration known as the 
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Atlantic Charter. In January 1942, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet 
Union and their allies signed an agreement called the Declaration by United 
Nations. The Atlantic Charter, along with the Declaration by United Nations, 
embodied, articulated and universalized the values stated in the Four Free-
doms. (Laing 1989: 114) 
Subsequently, the 1945 United Nations Charter made it explicit that all na-
tions have the right to self-governance. This set the stage for most African 
countries to gain political independence. Subsequent UN resolutions ham-
mered the final nail into the coffin of the idea, which was widespread at the 
time, that a people could be inferior because of their culture or race. The 1965 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (the Racial Convention), for instance, explicitly stated:
any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically 
false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and [...] there is 
no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere.
The Convention then went on to define racial discrimination thus:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nulli-
fying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal foot-
ing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life. (United Nations 1965)
Plainly interpreted, the above convention implies that specificities of coun-
tries and territories must be respected by all and that no nation has the right 
to judge others based on their own standards and norms. 
 It was perhaps as a consequence of the above international political de-
velopments, which commenced with the signing of the Atlantic Charter, that 
the world began to view Africa and Africans in a new light. The march to-
ward political independence heralded new optimism about Africa, both in 
Africa and in Western nations. In the 1950s, for instance, Kwame Nkrumah 
of Gold Coast (Ghana) enthusiastically declared that ‘this mid-twentieth cen-
tury is Africa’s’ (Enwezor 2001). In 1947, a decade before Ghana became in-
dependent, he boasted: ‘If we get self-government […] we will transform the 
Gold Coast into a paradise in ten years’ (Yergin & Stanislaw 1998). Nkrumah 
was not alone in his optimism about Africa. In 1960, Patrice Lumumba simi-
larly declared: ‘we are going to safeguard our national unity, for it is this unity 
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that will make the Congo a great nation in the heart of Africa’ (see Klein & 
Licata 2003). 
 Even in the West, the optimism about the future of Africa was also wide-
spread, and world leaders clearly showed this. On 8 March 1961, for instance, 
President John F. Kennedy personally received Nkrumah at the airport in 
Washington under the rain. This was a day after he had given a speech at 
the United Nations in New York. Later in the year, Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson extended the same courtesy to the visiting Nigerian Prime Minister 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.204 
 Yet, it did not take long for African leaders to begin to act in ways that 
helped to erode the newly found respect. Immediately after political inde-
pendence, for instance, most African countries gradually metamorphosed 
into one-party states and dictatorships. President Milton Obote, the first 
post-independence President of Uganda, converted his country into a 
one-party state shortly before his ouster (Mazrui 1969-70). President Nkru-
mah of Ghana defended his transformation of Ghana into a one-party state 
by ingeniously arguing:
I have established so many industries and institutions and I don’t have 
enough competent people to man them. Many of the people who can do 
this are in the opposition. That was why later I found the only way out was to 
have a one-party state so we all belong. (CCTN Africa n.d.).
Once the one-party state was in place, Nkrumah declared himself Life Pres-
ident of Ghana. In 1965, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny’s Party in Ivo-
ry Coast, the Parti democratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), was declared 
by its congress to be ‘a single party, for a single people, with a single lead-
er’ (Toungara 1990). Not surprisingly, President Boigny, who was at various 
times referred to as Le Sage (the Wise Man), Le Vieux (the Old Man), or 
Nana (Grandfather), died in office after 33 years as president of his country. 
Another African ‘life president’, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, tried to defend 
his self-proclaimed status on cultural grounds by arguing that democracy is 
alien to Africa. ‘There was only one African chief and he ruled for life’ (see 
Antwi-Boasiako & Okyere 2009: 144). The fact that he was not born a chief 
and that he seized power by force was of little consequence in his thinking.
 Most African dictators did not stop, however, at declaring themselves 
president for life. In order to maintain their grip on power, some of them 
204 See 8 March 1961 – President John F. Kennedy’s Remarks of Welcome to President Nkru-
mah of Ghana, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=1OzMa79TXTM [Accessed  2 January 
2017]. See also Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s official visit to USA in July 25-28 1961, 
available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=YT5m9Fn9RBg [Accessed 2 January 2017]. 
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promulgated laws that allowed them to detain perceived enemies indefinite-
ly. Nkrumah, for instance, promulgated the Preventive Detention Act, which 
allowed him to detain indefinitely any person he perceived as a threat, a law 
that contradicted the very ‘freedoms’ that lay at the foundation of African 
independence. The fact that such a law was passed by a parliament speaks 
volume about the ruling class in Africa.
 Kwame Nkrumah, Obote, and Mobutu were not, however, the only Afri-
can leaders that either acquired or tried to acquire the powers of a dictator. 
Others include Jean-Bedel Bokassa (Central Africa Republic), Sekou Toure 
(Guinea), Francisco Nguema (Equatorial Guinea), Kamuzu Banda (Malawi), 
Hamani Diori (Niger), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), and Francois Tombalbaye 
(Chad). In fact, ‘almost all of the African states, which broke away from the 
colonial yoke established one-party states’ (CCTN n.d.). Instead of develop-
ing strong institutions, African leaders were busy turning themselves into 
‘strongmen’. The near absence of strong institutions across Africa helped 
institutionalize corruption across the continent.205 This has been explained 
thus: ‘African politics are based on private power, where individual loyalties 
and fear compliment [sic] a system of material incentives in replacing insti-
tutions of effective government.’ The consequence of the above is that indi-
viduals in positions of power, rather than being guided by rules of office, ‘are 
motivated by expediency and the pursuit of personal and factional aggran-
dizement’. Such leaders are, therefore, often ‘courted, cajoled, convinced, and 
even bribed to agree to circumstances or procedures that are generally insti-
tutionalized processes in many industrialized states’ (Thachuk 1989).
 Put bluntly, it is difficult for economic interests groups and organiza-
tions in the continent to legitimately pursue their business without explicitly 
courting and bribing African leaders. According to Tiny Rowland, the man-
aging director of Lonrho, the largest multinational company that has ever 
existed in Africa: ‘These African leaders … are so corrupt that there’s not a 
single one of them I could not buy’ (The Observer [UK] 6 June 1993: 9). It was 
because of the widespread corruption in the continent that he concluded that 
‘the success of his activities in Africa depended on contacts at the highest 
possible level’ and that ‘ex gratia payments to individuals may be required to 
oil the wheels of business’ (quoted in Uche 2016a: 131). Arguably, one of the 
most corrupt countries in Africa is its most populous, Nigeria. According to 
the managing director of Brunel, a Dutch multinational company which re-
cently pulled out of Nigeria, ‘it is impossible to do business without breaking 
the rules’ in Nigeria (DutchNews.NL, 26 August 2015).
205 For detailed studies on corruption in Africa, see Nye (1967); Werlin (1973); Tanzi (1998); 
Ellis (2016). 
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The growing international regulation against corruption in business has done 
little to change the nature of doing business in Nigeria, which was recently 
described as ‘fantastically corrupt’ by former British Prime Minister, David 
Cameron. Even when home countries of multinational companies have pun-
ished such businesses and their officers for bribing Nigerian officials in order 
to facilitate business deals, their Nigerian collaborators, who have been well 
documented in court papers and pleadings abroad, have never been brought 
to book by the Nigerian state (Uche 2016b). 
 Another factor that helped institutionalize corruption across the conti-
nent was the military. The inability of African countries to establish insti-
tutions capable of ensuring peaceful transitions of power, coupled with the 
development of undisciplined and fragmented armed forces, helped open the 
floodgate to military coups across the continent. Among the African coun-
tries that since independence have witnessed coups or attempted coups are 
the following: Benin (5), Burkina Faso (10), Burundi (6), Central African Re-
public (5), Chad (5), Congo Brazzaville (4), Democratic Republic of Congo 
(3), Ghana (6), Guinea Bissau (4), Lesotho (4), Mauritania (6), Niger (4), Ni-
geria (8), Sierra Leone (5), and Uganda (6). 
 Coups are now less frequent in Africa, but that is mainly due to interna-
tional pressures for democratization (Makinda 1996). Even the structure of 
the emergent democracies in several African countries is brittle and lacunar. 
In recent times national constitutions have been amended in order to extend 
the reign of presidents in Uganda, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Ango-
la, and Burundi. We have also witnessed father-to-son transitions to pow-
er with presidents in Togo and Gabon. Although incoming African govern-
ments consistently accuse their predecessors of being corrupt, most end up 
being either as corrupt or even more so. Change of governments, violent or 
otherwise, has therefore done little to curb the corruption in the continent. 
Irrespective of the type of government in place, corruption remains rampant 
in most countries in Africa, not in the least because of the abundance of 
natural resources, and most civil wars and conflict in Africa have essentially 
been fuelled by the struggle for these resources. This was clearly the case in 
Nigeria, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Angola. 
Senseless mass killings have also taken place in Burundi and Rwanda. 
 Concerns about the abilities of Africans have also been influenced by 
the inability of African countries to systematically deal with adversity. Two 
obvious examples are the continent’s response to the AIDS epidemic in the 
1990s and to the more recent Ebola crisis. The AIDS epidemic ravaged sever-
al countries in East and Central Africa (see Iliffe 2006). More recently, Ebola 
killed thousands in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone and led to the near 
shutdown of their local economies (see WHO Ebola Research Team 2014). 
Dietz Essays.indd   291 11/09/2017   09:18
513779-L-bw-ASC
Processed on: 13-9-2017 PDF page: 292
292
In all these cases, local response proved abysmal, or inefficient at best. It is 
therefore safe to assert that most of the progress that has been made in cur-
tailing the above epidemics might not have been possible without Western 
support. 
 These kinds of multiple crises led The Economist to declare Africa ‘a hope-
less continent’ in 2000. The news magazine, which chronicled the widespread 
diseases, warfare, famine, floods, corruption, and abuse of office in Africa, 
concluded:
[no] one can blame Africans for the weather, but most of the continent’s 
shortcomings owe less to acts of God than to acts of man. These acts are not 
exclusively African—brutality, despotism and corruption exist everywhere—
but African societies, for reasons buried in their cultures, seem especially 
susceptible to them. (The Economist, 11 May 2000)
 
In the midst of the above chaos, there have sometimes been rays of hope. 
When commodity prices soared in the 2000s, for instance, the economies of 
several African countries began to improve (The Economist, 2 March 2011). 
Countries with low population and abundant natural resources such as Bot-
swana and Namibia naturally became the most outstanding beneficiaries of 
the high commodity prices. The standard of living indices of several Afri-
can countries also improved. With high commodity prices, several African 
countries recorded trade surpluses with the rest of the world (Moussa 2016). 
It was these developments that led to the improved perception of Africa in 
some quarters. One such optimist was Professor Ton Dietz, who used his 
2011 inaugural lecture at the University of Leiden to profess his faith in the 
future of the African continent. The title of his lecture ‘Silverlining Africa: 
From images of doom and gloom to glimmers of hope: From places to avoid 
to places to enjoy’ summarized his optimism about the future of the conti-
nent (Dietz 2011). 
 With the recent collapse of the international prices of commodities, most 
African economies have run into trouble. They find it difficult to curtail 
their taste for the foreign goods that they acquired when commodity pric-
es were soaring. The rapidly increasing population of the continent has not 
helped matters. The result is that the trade deficits of African countries, along 
with the rest of the world, again started rising (Moussa 2016). In light of the 
change, it is not surprising that several countries in the continent have wit-
nessed depreciation of their local currencies in recent times. Notable exam-
ples are Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, and Zambia; exceptions are the Fran-
cophone countries whose currencies are guaranteed by the French Treasury. 
There are also growing concerns about food security in the continent. Even 
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during the periods when African countries were being hailed as improving 
economically, the leaders in several of these countries were busy selling their 
lands to foreigners. The fact that the size of the African lands is finite and 
that the populations of these countries have been rising rapidly did little to 
curb the actions of Africans and their leaders. Based on the actions of African 
leaders, it is not surprising that the majority of the countries with food secu-
rity problems in the world today are in Africa (Nnabuko & Uche 2015). Even 
optimists like Professor Dietz have now revised their position on the future 
of the continent. 
Perception vs convention: Impact on Africa
One consequence of the current United Nation’s rules proclaiming the equal-
ity of human races and cultures is that it is now very difficult to criticize Af-
rican leaders without being branded a racist or a neocolonialist. The world 
has grown very weary of racial slurs, and racism has become the big taboo—
the history of South African apartheid and the emancipation of Afro-Amer-
icans in the United States have seen to that. African leaders have jumped 
on that band-wagon, using the blunt instrument of the accusation of racism 
against any criticism, even when supported by convincing evidence. Thus, 
what many leaders from the developed world publicly say about Africa can be 
quite different from what they actually mean: they have been muzzled by the 
politics of the United Nations. Defining Africa as hopeless, for whatever rea-
son, after the Atlantic Charter of 1941 is no longer possible. Those who have 
tried to do so have been ridiculed, irrespective of the evidence they provide. 
In 1969, for instance, Professor Arthur Jensen, an educational psychologist 
and a professor at the University of Berkeley, became the first high-profile 
casualty of the international politicization of human ability. This was after 
he published the findings of his research which had investigated why com-
pensatory and remedial education programmes, begun with such high hopes 
during the ‘war on poverty’ in the United States, yielded such disappointing 
results. Jensen noted that the youngsters in the targeted populations were 
disproportionately blacks and that historically blacks as a population had ex-
hibited average IQs substantially below those of whites. He then concluded 
that the programmes were bound to have little success because they were 
aimed at populations of youngsters with relatively low IQs. He argued that 
success in school depended to a considerable degree on IQ and that IQ had 
a large heritable component (Jensen 1969). The foundation for Jensen’s con-
troversial study was laid in 1967 when he delivered a lecture at the annu-
al meeting of the California Advisory Council of Educational Research (see 
Jensen 1967). 
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Jensen was roundly denounced and condemned. One of his most vocal cri-
tiques was Jerry Hirsh, who described the work as a ‘disgrace’ (Hirsch 1975: 
3). During the first few years after Jensen published his controversial article, 
he ‘could appear in no public forum in the United States without triggering 
something perilously close to a riot’ (Herrnstein & Murray 1994). In 1994, 
Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray added fodder to the Jensen contro-
versy when they published their controversial book which explored the role 
of intelligence in understanding social problems in America. Their conclu-
sions were similar to Jensen’s (Herrnstein & Murray 1994). The controversy 
surrounding the book was so intense that the American Psychological Asso-
ciation set up a Task Force to investigate the claims in the book. The report of 
the Task Force agreed that blacks have lower IQs than whites but was unable 
to explain why. According to the report: 
African American IQ scores have long averaged about 15 points below those 
of Whites, with correspondingly lower scores on academic achievement 
tests…. The cause of that differential is not known; it is apparently not due 
to any simple form of bias in the content or administration of the tests them-
selves. The Flynn effect shows that environmental factors can produce differ-
ences of at least this magnitude, but that effect is mysterious in its own right. 
Several culturally based explanations of the Black/White IQ differential have 
been proposed; some are plausible, but so far none has been conclusively 
supported. There is even less empirical support for a genetic interpretation. 
In short, no adequate explanation of the differential between the IQ means 
of Blacks and Whites is presently available. (Neisser et al. 1996: 97).
In 2007 the above controversy was again ignited when James Watson, winner 
of the 1962 Nobel Prize in Medicine, claimed that scientific evidence in sup-
port of the superiority of whites will soon emerge as the ‘genes responsible 
for creating differences in human intelligence could be found within a dec-
ade’. According to Watson, there
is no firm reason to anticipate that the intellectual capacities of peoples geo-
graphically separated in their evolution should prove to have evolved identi-
cally. Our wanting to reserve equal powers of reason as some universal her-
itage of humanity will not be enough to make it so. (see Milmo 2007)
Elsewhere, Watson has argued that it is wrong to prioritize politics over sci-
ence in such important issues (Watson 1997). 
 Again, these assertions instantly provoked widespread anger and con-
demnation. Keith Vaz, the then Labour chairman of the UK Home Affairs 
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Select Committee, asserted: ‘It is sad to see a scientist of such achievement 
making such baseless, unscientific and extremely offensive comments.’ He 
further asserted: ‘These comments serve as a reminder of the attitudes which 
can still exist at the highest professional levels.’ Anti-racism campaigners de-
manded that Watson’s remarks be examined in the context of racial hatred 
laws. Specifically, they argued:
It is astonishing that a man of such distinction should make comments that 
seem to perpetuate racism in this way. It amounts to fueling bigotry and we 
would like it to be looked at for grounds of legal complaint. (Milmo 2007)
The fact that Africa’s reputation as the poorest, most backward, most cor-
rupt, and most conflict-prone continent in the world may actually provide 
some circumstantial evidence in support of the above assertion is swept un-
der the carpet. Of course, there is no need to resort to racial arguments to ex-
plain the failing performance, since many other arguments can be adduced; 
but my point is that the knee-jerk reaction to brand any criticism as racism 
prevents any serious analysis of the problem. 
 So Western leaders are cautious about what they say publicly about Afri-
cans and their leaders—praising them in public, while judging severely in pri-
vate. Thanks to Wikileaks, national archives, the body language and actions 
of world leaders, and microphone accidents, we learned that some world 
leaders have no respect for most African countries and their leaders. Thanks 
to a microphone accident, we learned that former Prime Minister Cameron 
mockingly described Nigeria as a fantastically corrupt country. Surely, no 
British leader will ever say such a thing in public; similar evidence from ar-
chives consistently shows that most African leaders are not taken seriously 
in the West. The publicly proclaimed optimism about the future of Africa by 
such leaders has not been matched by actions toward the continent. Inter-
nationally, for instance, Africa is increasingly being treated as one country. It 
is now normal practice that African leaders are invited as a group by specific 
world powers as part of advancing their relationship with the entire African 
continent. The United States, China, and Turkey have done so, and a coun-
try like India, with its own colonial past, recently invited all African leaders 
to Delhi for such a summit: the notion of ‘Africa rising’ seem to be political 
rhetoric. 
 Unfortunately, such rhetoric benefits the rulers of Africa to the detriment 
of their citizens. We need to rethink the current international politics sur-
rounding the whole concept of equality of cultures and people. Since few 
dispute the fact that Africa is economically and developmentally backward 
and that culture may be a causative factor in its current undesirable state, it is 
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in the interest of all that such cultures should be objectively studied. This will 
definitely help Africa and Africans to forge a viable path forward. After all, 
understanding a problem is a necessary first step toward finding a remedy. 
In the meantime, the establishment of a phased and objective procedure that 
extends recognition to leaders in Africa (and elsewhere) who meet measur-
able criteria of good governance will be of immense benefit to the African 
people. At the very least, it will provide the much-needed incentive for Afri-
can leaders to put their houses in order and pull their people out of poverty. 
Leaders who plunder their countries and/or are unable to lift their countries 
out of mass poverty should not be recognized as honourable and equal mem-
bers of the international community of leaders; doing so removes any incen-
tive for such leaders to aspire to lead their countries out of their economic 
backwardness. Rather, undeserved membership of international bodies helps 
give credibility to corrupt and inept African leaders and aid their ability to 
cling to power at all costs. Appropriately granting international recognition 
to leaders based on pre-agreed rules and standards will provide an added 
incentive for such leaders to promote good governance and development in 
their home countries. 
Conclusion 
With respect to measured intelligence and aptitude, few experts dispute that 
there are differences between Blacks and Whites (Snyderman & Rothman 
1987). The least controversial explanation for such differences is that it is 
rooted in culture. A more contentious explanation is that which suggests 
that the difference is genetic and that Africans are inferior to other races. 
Since definite scientific proof of this has yet to emerge, it is plausible to con-
clude, as The Economist did in 2010, that the difference is based on culture. 
Unfortunately, United Nations resolutions have made it a taboo to suggest 
that diverse human species may differ in intelligence even when culture is 
the causative factor. This has made it difficult for the objective study of such 
causative factors to take place with the aim of enhancing efficiency and pro-
ductivity. The unintended consequence of the politicization of equality of 
cultures and people is the legitimization of inept and corrupt governments 
in several African countries by the international community. Unfortunate-
ly, the main beneficiaries of the politicization of equalization of cultures are 
the African leaders who are officially recognized as national leaders and thus 
granted similar privileges to other national leaders in international settings. 
Unconditionally granting such privileges to undeserving leaders not only le-
gitimizes their hold on power but also encourages them never to give up 
power voluntarily. Although there are usually variances between the official 
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policies and actions of several developed and emerging countries in dealing 
with impoverished and unstable African countries, it is rarely extended to the 
ruling class in such countries. Many African leaders therefore relish the priv-
ileges of such recognition and shirk the responsibilities that come with their 
privileged position. Unhindered passage around the world, for instance, is 
one of the diplomatic privileges African leaders (and their families) normally 
enjoy. Domestic regulations are usually promulgated to ensure that the state 
finance such privileges. The same, however, cannot be said of the citizens of 
such African countries that have to live with the real consequences of their 
national poverty. Practices that help perpetrate lifelong rulership and ine-
quality between African leaders and their people are sometimes shamelessly 
defended on cultural grounds (Antwi-Boasiako & Okyere 2009).
 So it is obvious that the idea of politicizing and equalizing cultures and 
races benefits African leaders to the detriment of the majority of Africans. 
There is thus a need to remove politics from the cultural and racial equality 
debate. Measurable and objective thresholds should be established for the 
recognition of leaders in the international community. This will help equalize 
the international benefits of leaders and citizens in backward countries. It is 
the wide variance in opportunities and lifestyle between the rulers and the 
ruled that is responsible for the widespread desperation to remain in the cor-
ridors of power in Africa, whatever the cost. The international community is 
therefore not doing Africa any favours by hobnobbing, under the pretence of 
being equals as heads of countries, with African leaders who have no interest 
in raising the economic and living standards of their people. 
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Some reflections on Africa’s 
changing educational landscape in the 
current age of global restructuring
Mayke Kaag
In this essay I aim to link Ton’s passion for teaching and his commitment 
to education to a research theme that is also close to his heart—namely, the 
theme of ‘Africa in the World’. 
 Africa’s relations with the so-called emerging powers, the new poles in 
the current multipolar world, such as China, India, and Brazil, have mostly 
been analysed in their economic and/or political aspects—and also Ton has 
mainly covered these elements in his lectures and presentations. However, 
the emergence of new global players is not only affecting the economic and 
political domain in Africa but is also influencing its educational landscape. 
Thus, one can observe Islamic schools funded by Islamic charities from the 
Gulf countries, Korean educational projects, and Turkish private schools, 
while there is also an increasing number of African students who get a schol-
arship to go to study in Malaysia, China, or Brazil. In the following, I will start 
by reflecting on why this development is important, illustrate my argument 
by some preliminary findings from my research on Turkish schools in Sen-
egal, and round off by presenting a framework for a research agenda—so as 
to reassure Ton that after his retirement, both education and Africa’s global 
connections will remain firmly on the agenda.
African engagements: On whose terms? Education as an important 
research field
Already in our volume African Engagements: On Whose Terms? (Dietz et al. 
2011), we underlined the importance of developing an African perspective 
on current processes of global restructuring in which the West has increas-
ingly lost its hegemony, with other emerging and emerged global powers tak-
ing the stage. The volume contained chapters on a diversity of topics that are 
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relevant to Africa’s changing position in the world. Education was not includ-
ed as a theme, but I would like to argue that education is indeed an impor-
tant research field if one aims to better understand Africa’s changing global 
connections, their impact on the ground, and what this may yield for Africa’s 
future. The first reason is rather straightforward: education is generally con-
sidered as a prerequisite for development (World Bank 2011), and I would 
like to underline that this holds true not only for economic development, but 
also for political development and democracy, as educated and lettered cit-
izens are better able to hold their rulers to account (Kaag & Zoomers 2014).
 Secondly, education is important in that it influences one’s worldview. For 
realizing this, we need only to look at African history: education has been an 
instrument in the hands of competing powers and a battlefield where repre-
sentatives of different worldviews have fought each other since colonial times 
(Duke Bryant 2015; Launay 2016). At independence, many African countries 
inherited the school system from the colonial powers, which means that, un-
til today, pupils in Francophone West Africa learn a lot about France in terms 
of history, geography, culture, and literature, and—if they are lucky—pursue 
their studies in France. The same holds true for Anglophone African coun-
tries. In general, it can be safely stated that these educational legacies have 
contributed to an orientation toward the West. This was understood quite 
early by Islamic charities from the Gulf countries working in Africa, which 
often fund educational projects such as schools. In these schools, the chil-
dren not only learn Arabic; they also learn history from the viewpoint of the 
Islamic world rather than from that of Europe. Children in such schools get 
acquainted with another worldview, with no longer the West but the Arab 
world as the centre (Kaag 2012, 2015)
 Thirdly, precisely because of the fact that education influences one’s 
worldview, education also influences linkages between individuals (and soci-
eties) and the rest of the world. Let me illustrate this by some examples. The 
first concerns a Senegalese public intellectual who is currently in his sixties. 
He had received Qur’anic schooling and pursued his schooling in a meder-
sa, studied Arabic, and started to teach Arabic in an Arabo-French school 
himself. Arabisants (people who have followed the Arabic education system) 
have difficulties in entering the public service, certainly in his time one of 
the most important providers of qualified jobs. Luckily, at that time, the first 
transnational Islamic NGOs from the Gulf countries started to work in West 
Africa; and after having done some translation work for them, in 1984 he 
became the first Senegalese director of a transnational Islamic charity (he 
led the regional office in Dakar). In 1987, he became the regional director of 
one of the largest Saudi charities and after that worked in Riyadh and Dubai 
for other Islamic charities, before returning to Senegal. My second example 
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concerns a Senegalese sociologist who followed the Francophone public ed-
ucation system. In his final university year, he met a Dutch Africanist, who 
proposed to him to do a PhD in the Netherlands. He gladly accepted this, 
and now, some twenty years later and a professor at the Cheikh Anta Diop 
University of Dakar, he is still building on his Dutch connections, as he is 
often asked for consultancies and projects funded by Dutch agencies and to 
collaborate with Dutch colleagues. My last example concerns the son of one 
of my Senegalese friends. She sent her 12-year-old son to a Turkish school in 
Dakar for his secondary education. From day 1 onwards, the boy has learned 
Turkish, he interacts with Turkish teachers, and goes to Turkey for a summer 
school. Probably, he will go to Turkey for further studies, and I can imagine 
that within 10 or 15 years’ time, he will have become a Senegalese business-
man trading with Turkey. 
 The foregoing examples can be supplemented by many others. African 
students, for instance, also increasingly go to China for their education. They 
learn the language and start getting acquainted with Chinese people and 
Chinese ways of doing. From this perspective, Africa’s changing educational 
landscape is extremely interesting, also with an eye on Africa’s future and its 
(political and economic) connections to the rest of the world. 
The preceding observations have been partly developed on the basis of my 
research on the work of Islamic charities from the Gulf region in Africa. At-
tempts to think my findings through from the broader perspective of ‘Africa 
in the World’ triggered my interest in the phenomenon of Turkish schools in 
Africa. During my fieldwork, I occasionally heard people referring to these 
schools, but once I started to pay attention to them, I realized that it is a 
rather recent but nevertheless a widespread trend, as I encountered them in 
every West African country that I visited. In March 2016, I started a research 
project into these Turkish schools in Senegal, from which I will present some 
preliminary findings in the following sections.
Turkish schools and the Gülen movement
So-called Turkish schools have popped up in most West African countries 
(and elsewhere in the world; they are present in some 140 countries, includ-
ing the Netherlands) over the last one or two decades. These schools are 
linked to the Gülen movement. Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish Muslim writ-
er who developed a philosophy of education that aims to reconcile religion 
with science (Dohrn 2013). He distinguishes between teaching and educa-
tion, education being more than just transferring knowledge. By contrast, his 
understanding of education is ‘the illumination of the mind in science and 
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knowledge, and the light of the heart in faith and virtue’ (Gülen, quoted in 
Dohrn 2013). The Gülen schools are private, secular schools. While Gülen’s 
inspiration is clearly in Islam, no Islamic education is offered, but a kind of 
universalistic moral education focused on values. The strategy is not da’wa 
(proselytizing) but setting a good example (Tittensor 2015). These good ex-
amples are provided by the teachers, who are followers of Gülen. Their com-
mitment to the educational cause is called hizmet, a religiously inspired ser-
vice to the community.
 A large number of the Gülen schools are financially supported by wealthy 
followers of Gülen, mainly Turkish entrepreneurs. One of the interesting 
aspects of the Gülen movement is that these entrepreneurs help the global 
spread of the schools, while the schools also help the soft landing of Turkish 
entrepreneurs in several African countries (Dorhn 2015).
Turkish schools in Senegal
Senegal’s educational landscape was for a long time characterized by the 
dichotomy between a public school system that was secular, and a diverse 
range of private schools that for the most part had a religious attachment. 
The latter category included Catholic and Protestant schools (originating 
from colonial missions) but importantly also Islamic schools, ranging from 
traditional daaras (Quranic schools) to medersas (French-Arab schools) for 
primary and secondary education. For tertiary education within Senegal, the 
Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar for a long time was the only option. 
Depending on their educational background, some students were able to go 
to Europe or to the Middle East for their studies. During the Cold War, a 
scholarship for studying in the Soviet Union was also an option that was tak-
en by a substantial number of Senegalese students. 
 This educational landscape has diversified over the last few decades, 
among other things through the national educational reform of the early 
2000s, which put an end to the strictly secular character of public educa-
tion by the introduction of religion into the curriculum of primary schools in 
2002 and the opening of the first public medersas in 2003 (Bodian & Villalon 
2015). At tertiary level, alongside the establishment of public universities in 
different parts of the country (such as in Saint-Louis in 1990 and in Ziguin-
chor in 2007), private universities have also been established. Examples in-
clude Dakar American University of Technology and the Cheikh Ahmadou 
Bamba University in Touba, the latter institution being founded in 2008 by 
the Senegalese Mouride Sufi order as part of its longer existent Al-Azhar 
School Network (Babou 2016). In addition, options for studying abroad have 
diversified, with an increasing number of Senegalese students being able to 
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pursue their studies in, for instance, Morocco, China, or South Africa. In 
this increasingly diverse landscape of educational options, the Turkish Gülen 
schools for primary and secondary have come to stand out as particularly 
attractive options for some categories of the Senegalese population. 
 Senegal was one of the first West African countries where the Gülen 
movement started to establish schools; the one in Dakar dates from 1994. 
More recently, Gülen schools have opened their doors in Kaolack, Thies, Zi-
chuinchor, and Saint-Louis. The schools in Dakar cover pre-school, primary, 
and secondary education for boys and girls separately; in the other towns, 
education so far covers the pre-school and primary level for boys only. The 
schools offer high-quality education; but as the fees are quite high, they are 
mainly attracting the aspiring middle class and well-off elites. Scholarships 
are available for poor children with excellent school results.
 When I visited the Collège Yavuz Selim in Dakar in March 2016, I was 
quite surprised by the outlook of the school, so different from other Senega-
lese schools and in stark contrast with the neighbourhood where it is situat-
ed. As one of the parents stated: ‘When you enter the school, it is as if you 
enter Turkey.’ The large building, painted in bright yellow, is very well kept 
and tidy, with bright posters representing scientific topics on the walls. The 
main courses are taught by Turkish teachers; other courses can also be taught 
by Senegalese teachers. Teaching is done through Turkish and English. Every 
class of pupils has a Turkish tutor who has an important task as a role model 
and offers an example of moral education. In this way, scientific and moral 
education go hand in hand. The idea is that these pupils can become the new 
generation of leaders, who will then have not only an excellent intellectual 
training but also an excellent moral education (see also Dohrn 2013).
 The first alumni of the school in Dakar have already started their profes-
sional careers. Some of them have integrated as teachers in the school. When 
asked about possible collaboration with Turkish entrepreneurs, one of the 
Turkish teachers told me that some of the alumni have indeed started to work 
with a group of female Turkish entrepreneurs.
 Despite the very good results of the schools, I encountered mixed feelings 
among the parents. First of all, language barriers and cultural differences are 
leading to communication problems and irritation, for instance, about the 
school fees. Despite the fact that these are mentioned on the school’s website, 
there is a lack of clarity about the school fees among the parents. They com-
plain about the fact that the fees have increased over the past few years but 
that they do not know the reason for this. In addition, it appears that there 
are many exceptions concerning the fees to pay—for instance, in the case of 
excellent pupils and pupils from the countryside—and the reasons and rules 
are unclear to the parents. It is not entirely plain to me whether this is mainly 
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a language problem or mainly a cultural one, Turkish and Senegalese possibly 
having a different attitude toward speaking about financial issues.
 A clear language issue is involved in the communication between the 
class tutors and the parents. One of the Turkish class tutors told me that in 
order to get connected to the home environment of his pupils, he visits them 
at home to meet the parents. This is related to the educational philosophy of 
the Gülen movement, which is that education is a broad undertaking that has 
to start at home and be taken up in school, and finally also in society. How-
ever, in view of the fact that the tutor did not speak French or Wolof, I was 
wondering how he would fulfil this task.
 Clear cultural differences do not help the smooth connection between the 
schools and the Senegalese either: the separate boys’ and girls’ schools, not 
shaking hands, and so on, as promoted by the Turkish, do not sit well with 
many of the parents, who often adhere to one of the Islamic Sufi orders domi-
nant in Senegal. In addition, these—in their view conservative—cultural hab-
its do not fit their aspirations to being modern and economically successful 
elites. 
 Interestingly, the members of the parents’ committee told me they had 
no idea about Gülen and his philosophy when they sent their children to the 
school and that they received information about this only when they went on 
a trip to Turkey organized for them by the school. They had mainly chosen to 
register their children at Yavuz Selim because of the good academic results of 
the school.
After my first steps in this new research field in March 2016, developments in 
Turkey in the summer of 2016 greatly changed the fate and prospects of my 
research object. An unsuccessful coup d’état against Turkey’s President Er-
dogan led him to accuse Fettulah Gülen of being the instigator. A real witch-
hunt against Gülen’s followers in Turkey and beyond followed, including a 
request to the United States to extradite Gülen to Turkey in order to stand 
trial. Turkey put increased206 pressure on many governments to close the 
Gülen schools in their countries. In Senegal, the Turkish teachers started the 
new school year by keeping a low profile, not speaking out, and waiting to 
see what would happen. At some point, there were rumours that the Gülen 
schools in Senegal would be closed; but it appears that in the end, the schools 
have remained open, the leadership of the schools however being replaced. 
I have not yet been back after these events, but the website of Yavuz Selim 
looks remarkably similar to how it looked before. 
206 In fact, pressure had already started in the years before, when the once close relationship 
between Gülen and Erdogan began to deteriorate.
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Conclusion: Toward a research agenda
The foregoing presentation of some preliminary research results has shown 
that Turkish schools in Africa are a promising field of investigation in view 
of Africa’s changing global connections and how these take shape in, and 
through, education. I am currently developing a research methodology to 
further flesh out the processes involved, at the individual level, the institu-
tional level, and the national/international level.
 Thus, it will be extremely insightful to follow the alumni of these schools: 
what does their education path mean to individuals? Do these alumni indeed 
become a new generation of Senegalese leaders? If so, what are the conse-
quences at the national level and for Senegalese international relations?
 Secondly, I aim to investigate the school as a focal point of connections: 
connections between pupils and teachers, connections between parents and 
members of the Gülen movement (e.g. Turkish entrepreneurs, Turkish char-
ities), and connections between the school and the neighbourhood. What do 
these connections bring in terms of opportunities/constraints for different 
parties? 
 Finally, it will be important to include the national and international lev-
el and to investigate how the Gülen schools are being used in geo-political 
strategies, those of the Erdogan government, the Gülen movement, and the 
Senegalese government. The latter has a great interest in having good rela-
tionships with the Turkish government, but also with the Turkish business 
community,207 and with its own elites. 
Returning to the larger perspective of Africa’s changing educational land-
scape, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, one of the main aims of 
this research is to contribute to answering the following question: Does the 
diversification of educational options lead to polarization in Senegalese so-
ciety (such as the already existing Arabophone/Francophone divide), or to 
more diversified connections leading to better economic and political oppor-
tunities for Senegalese society as a whole?
 In this respect, this research directly links to Ton’s interest in reflecting 
on Africa’s future, starting with his inaugural lecture ‘Silverlining Africa’ and 
followed by subsequent analyses integrating new developments. The topic 
also links to other current questions concerning both education in Africa and 
African studies, related to a ‘decolonization of the mind’ (Wa-Thiongo 1993; 
see also Amoah 2011). One only has to think of the current struggle at South 
African universities to get rid of apartheid legacies in higher education, or 
207 In April 2016, two Turkish companies won the bid for finishing Senegal’s national airport.
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the discussion in African studies concerning the role of African scholars in 
the academic debate and the curriculum of African studies. These questions 
are quite complex and not so easy to answer, but at least Ton has dared to 
address them. 
 The question of ‘African engagements: on whose terms?’ remains topical, 
also in the sphere of education. A more diversified educational landscape 
at least offers the (theoretical) opportunity to choose between systems and 
worldviews. African bottom-up approaches to knowledge formation, also 
beyond academia—such as those tried by some West African colleagues in 
the framework of the IIAS Mellon-funded project ‘Humanities without Bor-
ders’,208 and PADEV-like approaches of community learning (Dietz 2013)—
are important as a counterweight to external influences and add to this land-
scape as well. 
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This volume is an homage to Ton Dietz who served as Director of the African Studies Centre, Leiden, from May 2010 
to September 2017 and as Professor of the Study of African Development, at Leiden University. Colleagues and former 
colleagues at the African Studies Centre want to show their appreciation for him, both as a director and as a scholar – and 
even as a stamp collector – by  zooming in on the topics he has engaged in during his long career.
As Ton Dietz has a wide and encompassing interest in Africa, so the 19 essays in this volume range wide and address 
three broad themes, which the editors (Wouter van Beek, Jos Damen & Dick Foeken) have suggested to the contributors: 
coping with Africa, the relation between people and environment, and development. The latter issue forms the topic of 
his inaugural address at Leiden University on 14 January 2011, entitled ‘Silverlining Africa’. 
Ton Dietz studied human geography in Nijmegen (1969-1976), and in 1987 at the University of Amsterdam defended his 
PhD based on fieldwork among the Pokot of Kenya; in 1995 he was appointed Professor of Human Geography at the same 
University of Amsterdam. From 2002 until 2007 he was a (part-time) Professor of Social Sciences at Utrecht University and 
the Scientific Director of CERES, the Research School for Resource Studies for Development. He was the Scientific Director 
of AMIDSt, Amsterdam Research Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies in 2008 and 2009. 
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